12/6


Vancouver
Hudson's Bay Company
British Isles
Newfoundland
Bermudas
Bahamas
West Indies
Honduras
British Guiana
Gamb
Sie
Asce
St. Helena
PACIFIC OCEAN
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Equator
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
60
40
20
4
30
60
80
Sailing Ship Tracks
Outward
Homeward

THE BRITISH EMPIRE in 1815

NUNC COGNOSCO EX PARTE

TRENT UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2019 with funding from
Kahle/Austin Foundation

https://archive.org/details/britishempire0000some

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

SHORT HISTORY OF OUR RELIGION
STUDIES IN STATESMANSHIP
DISRAELI AND GLADSTONE
A HISTORY FOR BRITISH PEOPLE
ENGLISH THOUGHT IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

COOK SETTING OUT ON HIS SECOND VOYAGE

The pieture shows " Resolution " (in the centre) and " Endeavour." On the left the same two ships are seen moving off—a common feature in old prints

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

By
D. C. SOMERVELL

LONDON
CHRISTOPHERS
22, BERNERS STREET, W.1.
MELBOURNE : SYDNEY : WELLINGTON : TORONTO : CAPE TOWN

DA16.S6

First Published in 1930

Printed in Great Britain by The Crypt House Press Limited
Gloucester and London.

PREFACE

ENOUGH books have already been written under the title *The British Empire* or *The British Commonwealth* to place the author of yet another under an obligation to claim that he espies a gap in the existing ample library. It is for the reader, if he wishes, to reply that the gap espied is, in fact, the space between two stools, into which the author has catastrophically descended. However, it seemed to me that books on the Empire as a whole fell broadly into two classes. There is the extensive treatise, often a work of composite authorship, and there is the descriptive or controversial essay, which either assumes a knowledge of the facts, or introduces only such facts as are relevant to its point of view. I thought therefore that a useful purpose might be served by a book which, while a treatise rather than an essay, sought to cover all the ground in outline, within a space equal to that occupied by a middle-sized novel. My book is entirely innocent of any controversial purpose, but it may perhaps supply a background of elementary knowledge helpful to some who may be intending to embark on those more specialized studies without which controversy cannot usefully be carried on.

Anyone who essays the writing of a brief book on the Empire as a whole has to face, on the threshold of his task, formidable problems of arrangement. The subject matter is embarrassingly various and dispersed. Just as the Empire itself is one, yet of many parts, so its story is many separate stories and yet one story after all. The plan of the

book will be made apparent by a glance at the Table of Contents. I have opened with a general sketch of the imperial policy of the Mother Country from the first beginnings down to the end of the nineteenth century. This is followed by a series of chapters upon the various provinces and regions of the Empire. Finally, lest all sense of the unity of the whole should have been lost in the course of the study of the separate parts, I conclude with a brief chapter on the Empire as a whole, the part it played in the Great War, and its place in the post-war world.

The book, as is the way with books, has become rather longer than I had wished it to be; and yet it omits so much I should like to have got in. I should like to have given, in a far more personal and concrete manner, some idea of the day-to-day life of the ordinary men who have made the Empire, the early settlers in Canada and Australia, the sugar planters of old Jamaica, the servants of the East India Company; and their modern equivalents. But this, I felt, could only be done by long and leisurely citations from old letters and memoirs; and such a collection of typical records would need a book to itself.

D.C.S.

CONTENTS

		PAGE
	PREFACE	vii
CHAP.		
I.	THE HEART OF THE EMPIRE	
	(i) Introduction: Why is there a British Empire? . . .	17
	(ii) The Opening of the Seas . .	19
	(iii) The Stuart Period . . .	27
	(iv) The Eighteenth Century . .	44
	(v) The Nineteenth Century . .	58
II.	THE REGIONS OF THE EMPIRE: A PRELIMINARY SURVEY	75
III.	CANADA AND NEWFOUNDLAND	
	(i) The Country	82
	(ii) Canada under British Control (1760–1847)	91
	(iii) Self-governing Canada . .	101
	(iv) Newfoundland	109
IV.	AUSTRALIA	
	(i) The Country	113
	(ii) Australia under British control (1788–1851)	121
	(iii) Self-governing Australia . .	131

CHAP. PAGE

V. New Zealand 142

VI. South Africa

(i) The Land and its Native inhabitants 152

(ii) British and Dutch : the first advance and withdrawal (1795–1858) . 163

(iii) British and Dutch: the second advance and withdrawal (1859–1884) 171

(iv) British and Dutch: the third advance and the Union (1885–1910) 174

(v) The non-European peoples within the Union 187

(vi) Rhodesia 198

VII. The Irish Free State 202

VIII. The Indian Empire

(i) India and the Indian Peoples under British Rule 219

(ii) British Indian Policy to Lord Curzon's Viceroyalty (1905) . 235

(iii) From John Morley to John Simon (1906-1930) 245

IX. Ceylon, Burma, and the Far East . . 259

X. Egypt 269

XI. Tropical Africa

(i) The Beginnings of a New Empire . 278

(ii) West Africa 283

(iii) East Africa 289

CHAP. PAGE

XII. The West Indies 299

XIII. Fragments that Remain 306

XIV. The Empire in the Twentieth Century

(i) The War and the League of Nations 314

(ii) The Development of the Empire . 319

(iii) Conclusion 327

Appendix. The Mandates of Iraq and Palestine 331

Bibliography 337

Index 341

ILLUSTRATIONS

	FACING PAGE
Cook Setting Out on his Second Voyage	*Frontispiece*
Elmina Castle	26
Toronto: Water Front in 1848	46
Toronto: Water Front to-day	46
Sydney Cove in 1788	60
Circular Quay, Sydney, to-day	60
Montreal	84
Wellington from the Tinakori Hills	148
Table Mountain and Cape Town in 1766	164
Table Mountain and Cape Town to-day	172
The Shannon Scheme: The Great Weir	204
Khyber Pass	222
Benares; Ceremonial Bathing in the Ganges	228
New Delhi: The Council House	254
Hong Kong Harbour	266
Kenya Mountain	292
Belize: British Honduras	302
Malta: A Street in Valetta	308

LIST OF MAPS

British Empire in 1815 . . . *Front End-Paper*

British Empire in 1930 . . . *Back End-Paper*

FACING PAGE

Canada 90

Australia: Political 118

Climatic 118

South Africa: Political 154

Physical and Climatic . . 154

India: showing the Indian States and the Provinces of British India. . . . 232

East Indies 262

Africa 280

West Indies 300

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

Chapter I

THE HEART OF THE EMPIRE

(i) Introduction : Why is there a British Empire ?

IT must always seem a very singular fact that an island of moderate size, situated off the north-west coast of Europe, should have become, in the last three hundred years, the centre of an absolutely unique world-wide Empire ; that its race and language should dominate the greater part of North America and the whole of Australia : that its citizens should control the affairs of a great part of Africa and the whole of the densely populated sub-continent of India, not to mention dozens and scores of lesser provinces, outposts and islands scattered broadcast over the surface of the earth. One would think that there must have been quite exceptional wisdom in the policy of the government of that island, and quite exceptional virtues in its inhabitants ; one would think perhaps, also, that the British people, in their imperial ventures, and in their competition with the imperial ventures of other folk, must have enjoyed a quite exceptional measure of luck.

There may have been exceptional wisdom, exceptional virtues, and exceptional luck. The end of the story rather than the beginning would be the place to form an opinion on those points. In fact, however, the establishment of the British Empire, extraordinary as it must seem, and extraordinary as indeed it is, is very far from being a mystery or a miracle. Many smaller events in history are really much

stranger. One can even imagine a certain type of historian saying that, from the sixteenth century onwards, the establishment of the British Empire was *inevitable*. Such an historian would point to that great event, the Opening of the Seas, the discovery of America and of the sea route to India; he would say that the peoples of western Europe possessed certain qualities which made it inevitable that, after the Opening of the Seas, they would acquire dominion over the peoples of all the other continents. Those qualities are not easily defined in a few words, but we know more or less what they are, for they are advantages which still distinguish European men, broadly speaking, from the other races of the earth. We Europeans have inherited them from the Greeks and the Romans, and they have been enriched and sweetened by the practice of the Christian religion. We may call them the spirit of enterprise and adventure, intellectual and physical, the ambition to go forward and improve things, the habit of obeying orders when orders are given, yet of acting without them when no orders are available, a reckless devotion to great causes, an unflinching pursuit of untrodden paths.

Such an historian would say, then, that the domination of the world by the Western European peoples was inevitable, and he would also say that, when those European peoples competed with one another for the prizes of Empire, the British people enjoyed certain definite advantages over all their neighbours, for the simple reason that they alone lived upon an island. Living on an island they were much less likely than their continental neighbours to be distracted by ambitions of territorial conquest in Europe itself; much less likely also to suffer from the territorial ambitions and military invasions of their neighbours. Again, their insular position had been the chief cause of the development among them of a system of government quite unlike that of any of the Continental peoples, a system which proved peculiarly well adapted to the needs of imperial policy. This book is not the place to trace the origin and cause of the rise of the parliamentary constitution in England. Suffice it to say

that parliament gave powerful representation to commercial interests, and commercial, much more than military, interests were to provide the motive power which has built modern empires.

(ii) THE OPENING OF THE SEAS

Henry the Navigator

The British Empire is based upon the oceanic highways, but the British peoples played no part in the earlier stages of the opening of those highways. The foundations on which the British Empire was afterwards built were laid in Portugal by a member of the Portuguese royal family, Prince Henry the Navigator. This prince had won military fame by the capture of the Moorish fortress of Ceuta on the African coast opposite Gibraltar in 1415, the same year in which our Henry V (who was his first cousin) won the battle of Agincourt. But Henry the Navigator, unlike his cousin, was not satisfied with ephemeral military exploits. He observed that the Moors drew their resources of gold, ivory, and tropical products from the inner parts of Africa. It occurred to him that the sources of this wealth might be reached by sea routes, that the Moors might be taken in the rear, and their wealth diverted to Christendom: it should be added that he also hoped to secure the extension of the Christian Church to unknown tropical lands. In fact he held that the solution of the age-long conflict between Christendom and Islam, in which the Crusades had been but a single episode, would be found upon the seas. In 1418 he retired to a wind-swept promontory in the southern extremity of Portugal. Here he devoted himself to naval research for the remaining forty-two years of his life, establishing an observatory, an arsenal, and a school of navigation.

The essential achievement of Henry the Navigator and his disciples was the invention of the modern sailing ship which made the great oceanic voyages a possibility. Hitherto the sailing ship had been unable to sail into the wind. Consequently sails were always supplemented with oars.

The oared ship was not really seaworthy by modern standards; moreover an oared ship needs a large crew, and consequently a large supply of food and fresh water. It cannot stay long at sea without visiting port. Mediterranean sea-routes never went far from land; all voyages were coastal voyages. Any reader of the Latin poets will remember that they suffered from what seems to us an absurd fear of the sea. Horace prays that his friend may cross safely from Greece to Italy with as much fervour as if he were intending to round Cape Horn. The ancient Greeks had regarded it as an unsound commercial venture to sail round the southern capes of Greece from east to west during the winter months. They found it better to unship their goods and carry them laboriously across the isthmus of Corinth.

It was Henry the Navigator and his school of seamen who changed all that. Henry the Navigator and his cousin Henry V of England may be taken as contrasted types of "great men." Henry V was the kind of man who makes a great noise in the world by trying to do something which is still the popular thing, but has already been proved impossible and is in fact absurd and out of date—in his case the establishment of English dominion in France. Henry the Navigator made much less noise; he quietly prepared for developments that were to fill the following centuries. Shakespeare commemorated Agincourt as a glorious memory, but Drake and Raleigh built upon foundations laid not by Henry V but by his Portuguese cousin.

It is possible that Henry the Navigator's vision did not extend beyond the Gold Coast and the solution of the conflict between Portugal and her West African enemies. But far more was at stake.

Round about 1300 Marco Polo and other travellers had opened up the overland routes between Europe and the mighty civilization of China—*El Dorado*, the Golden Land. A curtain had been raised between the West and the East. Within a century, however, it was drawn down again. The barbarous military empire of the Ottoman Turks,

arising in Asia Minor, had blocked the land routes to the East, dominated the Eastern Mediterranean, entered Europe, overrun the Balkan Peninsula, and pushed far up the Danube. The Turkish power was to increase until the middle of the sixteenth century; in 1530, when Christendom was rent by the political feud between the Emperor Charles V and Francis I of France, and by the religious feud between Lutherans and Romanists, the Turks besieged Vienna, which is half way from Constantinople to the Straits of Dover. It might seem as if a distracted Christian Europe was about to be pushed into the Atlantic by the conquests of Islam. But thirty years before that date the Portuguese pupils of Henry the Navigator had rounded the Cape of Good Hope and had established their commerce all along the coasts of the Indian Ocean. The Dutch and the English were to follow them. Islam was taken in the rear on a wider scale than Henry could have dreamed.

The Great Voyages

At first results came slowly, and Prince Henry himself, dying in 1460, had not been privileged to see any very sensational results of his work. When results came, however, they came with a rush. In 1484 the mariners reached the Congo; in 1486 Diaz rounded the Cape; in 1498 Vasco da Gama, sailing across the Indian Ocean, had reached Calicut in southern India, and brought back a cargo on which he is said to have made a profit of six thousand per cent. Within the next generation Almeida and Albuquerque established a kind of skeleton outline of Portuguese empire over the coastlands of the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile in 1492, six years after Diaz and six years before Vasco da Gama, Columbus, a Genoese navigator in Spanish employ, after studying Henry the Navigator's nautical journals, maps, and instruments, rightly conceiving that the world was round and that the fabled "Indies" of Marco Polo could be reached by a westward voyage, stumbled upon the American Islands which he called West Indies. In 1513, Balboa, landing at Panama and climbing the hills nearby, first "stared at the

Pacific." In 1520 Magellan, the greatest of all the voyagers, passed through the straits that bear his name, crossed the Pacific to the Philippine Islands, and found himself in the East Indies which were already almost familiar ground to the Portuguese who had made their way there round the Cape of Good Hope. In the next few years Cortes conquered Mexico and Pizarro conquered Peru, and the fabulous riches of these lands in gold and silver justified the Spaniards in transferring the name of *El Dorado* from the far East to the far West.

English Commercial Enterprises under the Tudors

Others laboured, and the English entered into their labours. In the same years as Vasco da Gama's voyage (1497–8) a Genoese mariner, John Cabot, sailed from Bristol, and returned with the news that he had discovered a sea (off Newfoundland) so full of fish that you could bring them up by weighting a basket with a stone and dipping it in the water. Cabot's second voyage went further north, and was discouraged by the inhospitable coasts of Labrador. Nearly a century was to pass before the English made a serious effort to establish themselves upon the soil of America, and Cabot's voyages are sometimes regarded as isolated events without consequences. But they were not so. They led directly to the Newfoundland fishing trade, which was to be our most important commercial venture in the new worlds down to the time of Charles II a hundred and sixty years later. Its importance as a nursery of seamen was recognised in an Act of Edward VI's reign (about 1550), and we read that in 1670 the trade employed 270 ships and 20,000 seamen.

As early as 1511 there were, it seems, persons at the Court of Henry VIII who recognised the future destiny of their country. "Let us," they said,

in God's name, leave off our attempts against the *terra firma* (i.e. the continent of Europe), as the natural situation of these islands seems not to suit with conquests of that kind. Or, when we would enlarge ourselves, let it be that way we

can, and to which it seems the eternal providence hath destined us, which is by sea. The Indies are discovered, and vast treasure brought thence every day. Let us, therefore, bend our endeavours thitherwards; and if the Spaniards and Portuguese suffer us not to join with them, there will yet be region enough for all to enjoy.[1]

Prophetic words; but in each of the next two years Henry VIII undertook a futile expedition into France.

Henry VIII, however, though he had no imperial policy, was in a most important respect a fore-runner of the British Empire; for he is the real founder of the British navy. Henry VII had devoted his attention to the encouragement of commercial ship-building; Henry VIII made an almost personal hobby of ships of war. It was on his ships that the use of the new Flemish heavy cannon was first made possible. Such guns could not be fired from the usual light "castles" erected on the decks, so they were placed in the hold of the ship and fired through port-holes. "For almost thirty-eight years," says a modern naval historian, "nearly every year marked some advance in construction or administration, some plan calculated to make the navy a more effective fighting instrument." The work of Henry VIII made possible the defeat of the Armada in the reign of his daughter.

The short and disastrous reigns of Edward VI and Mary, which fill eleven years between the death of Henry VIII and the accession of Elizabeth, produced commercial experiments which showed that English merchants were already prepared to venture far afield. In 1551 the Company of the Merchant Adventurers of London sent out Thomas Wyndham to open a trade with Morocco, and afterwards to poach upon the Portuguese preserves on the Gold Coast. A few years later John Lok brought home a cargo of gold, ivory, and spices from the Gold Coast which was sold for £20,000, but the most profitable trade developed with Africa was soon found to be the slave trade, begun by John Hawkins in 1562. The slave-traders secured their human cargoes in West Africa

[1] Curtis, *Commonwealth of Nations*, p. 139.

and sold them for the products of the Spanish Indies on the other side of the Atlantic. There are no two opinions now upon the iniquity of this trade. The English were destined to excel all others in it, but they did not begin it, and they were to be the first to end it.

In 1553 the same Merchant Adventurers sent out three ships under Willoughby and Chancellor to find a "north-east passage" to the Indies. Such a project we now know to be fantastic for geographical reasons, but the extent of the Siberian coast was entirely unknown at that date, and a north-east passage would have the advantage of lying far away from the routes already claimed as monopolies by Portugal and Spain. It was in fact a pacific enterprise well adapted to the period of close alliance with Spain opened by Mary's accession. Willoughby and his crew were frozen to death in Nova Zembla, but Chancellor reached Archangel and made his way to Moscow. The result was the establishment of the Muscovy Company to trade with Russia. A few years later Anthony Jenkinson, with the Tsar's permission, descended the Volga to Astrakhan, crossed the Caspian and entered Persia. His aim seems to have been to reopen the overland route of Marco Polo and to establish, through the Muscovy Company, a trade with India and China.

Trade with India was soon to come, but not by way of Jenkinson's overland route. In 1587 Drake captured the *San Felipe*, a great Portuguese East Indiaman, with a cargo worth a quarter of a million pounds and, what was more important, documents which revealed the jealously guarded secrets of the Portuguese East Indian trade. In 1591-94 Sir James Lancaster, sailing to India by the Cape, broke into the Portuguese monopoly, and brought back such profits that the East India Company was founded in 1600. What that led to we all know—the most remarkable experiment in imperial government in all history, an experiment which is only now, perhaps, entering upon its most remarkable and interesting stage.

One of the most romantic of all the achievements of Elizabethan seamen was that of William Adams who, in the

same year 1600, reached Japan by way of Cape Horn. There he made his home and married a Japanese wife; he built the first navy of Japan, and lies buried on a hill overlooking Yokosuka. A street in Tokio bears his name, and an annual celebration is still held in honour of the Elizabethan seaman who forged the earliest link between the great naval powers of the East and West.[1]

We have followed English ventures in the East to the end of the Elizabethan age. It is time to return to English ventures in the West, which we left at the slave-trading stage opened by Hawkins in 1562. Hawkins' cargoes were very welcome to the Spanish colonists but they were contraband in the eyes of the Spanish officials. Peaceful trading with the Spanish colonists was brought to a sudden end by the massacre of some of Hawkins' crew at San Juan de Ulua. The details of the story are complicated, and there seem to have been faults on both sides. In any case war had been declared so far as the seamen of the two countries were concerned, whatever their governments at home might choose to make of it. The epic of Sir Francis Drake was about to begin, and it led straight up to the Spanish Armada.

Meanwhile there were those who still did not despair of a new and entirely English route to the "Indies." Spain had the south-west passage, Portugal the south-east; the north-east was impracticable, but what about the north-west? Frobisher made a voyage through the sound that bears his name, north of Labrador, in 1576, and on his return a company was founded with the optimistic name of the Company of Cathay (China). Much heroic energy was to be expended upon this vain quest, and the names of the heroes of the north-west passage are written large on the uninhabitable islands and frost-bound seas to the north of Canada. At least these men opened up the fur trade, and the Hudson Bay Company was founded in 1670, a hundred years after Frobisher's voyage, to trade in furs

[1] Pollard, *Political History of England*, 1547–1603, p. 478.

with the North American Indians. Two hundred years later it surrendered its territorial claims to the Dominion of Canada.

First step in Colonization

Sea power and commercial adventure led to empire, but were not in themselves empire, the very idea of which involves territorial possession. The conception of the British Empire beyond the seas in this stricter sense is to be found in the petition of certain west country gentlemen to Queen Elizabeth, in 1574, that she would allow an enterprise for the discovery of certain rich and unknown lands " fatally and it seemeth by Providence reserved for England." In 1578, after the usual Elizabethan delays, the answer came in the form of a patent granted to Sir Humphrey Gilbert, empowering him to discover and take possession of heathen lands, not enjoyed by any Christian Prince. No geographical limit was imposed upon his undertakings. One-fifth of the gold and silver discovered was reserved for the crown. In 1583 Gilbert sailed to Newfoundland and took possession of it in the queen's name, but was drowned on his return voyage. His mantle descended upon Sir Walter Raleigh, who sent out, in 1585, an expedition under Sir Richard Grenville, afterwards the hero of *The Revenge*, to the mainland " between Newfoundland and Florida." The land where these adventurers tried to make new homes has ever since borne the name of Virginia, after the Virgin Queen; but, though several expeditions of would-be colonists followed one another in the course of the next few years, no successful settlement was achieved within the limits of Elizabeth's reign. The difficulties and discomforts were intense, and the colonists, being of the gentleman-adventurer type, had no sufficient motive for putting up with them. All was lost save Raleigh's faith that " I shall yet live to see it an English nation."

We talk of " the spacious days of Queen Elizabeth " and her reign is rightly associated with the beginnings of the British Empire. Yet it is curious to reflect that she is the only English sovereign between William the Conqueror

R. Humfrey

ELMINA CASTLE, GOLD COAST

and George V who did not enjoy effective possession of an acre of territory outside the British Isles. Calais was lost a few months before her accession ; the effective occupation of Virginia began a few years after her death. Very few Englishmen were as yet thinking of colonization in new worlds. It would bc safe to say that, in Elizabeth's reign, for every man interested and every pound expended in America there were a hundred men interested and a hundred pounds expended in the conquest and colonization of Ireland.

(iii) THE STUART PERIOD

The hundred and eleven years of the Stuart period (1603-1714) have much less of the glamour of empire about them than the days of the Elizabethan sea-dogs. None the less, it was in the Stuart period that the British Empire was effectively founded. Twelve of the thirteen colonies which ultimately became the United States were established, and their relations with the Mother Country elaborately regulated. The West Indian island colonies became and long remained one of the most important sources of our commercial wealth. Our East India Company outstripped that of the Dutch as the Dutch had previously outstripped the Portuguese, who had been the first in the field. The victories of the Duke of Marlborough were won on the battle-fields of Europe, but the fruits of those victories, garnered in the Treaty of Utrecht, were colonial possessions and privileges of oceanic commerce, more particularly the ill-famed monopoly of the slave trade with Spanish America.

Influence of domestic policy on Imperial Development

When we think of the Stuart period, the features that first occur to our minds are religious controversy and persecution, the claims of parliament to control the king's revenue, and the ultimate establishment of parliamentary government. It is worth remarking, therefore, that each of these things had a direct and important influence upon colonization.

Religious persecution did more to make a success of the old English colonies in America than all the imperial statesmanship discoverable in our seventeenth century rulers. After all, what sort of colonist will be prepared to cope most resolutely with the inevitable hardships of life in a new country, to resist most resolutely the temptations of home-sickness? The answer is—the colonist who has no tolerable home to return to. It is curious, and a little humiliating, to reflect upon the part played by misgovernment at home in stimulating colonization. Had our statesmen been more liberal-minded, we should have exhibited less of our boasted genius for empire-building. Laud unintentionally did more for English colonization in America than all the good intentions of Sir Walter Raleigh. The case of the Pilgrim Fathers (1620) is well known. "It is not with us," they said, "as with other men, whom small things can discourage, or small discontentments cause to wish themselves at home again." In 1632 Lord Baltimore, a Roman Catholic, obtained a Charter from Charles I to found the colony of Maryland. He had, said his son long afterwards, "absolute liberty to carry over from his Majesty's dominions any that were willing to go. But he found very few but such as could not conform to the laws of England relating to religion." Virginia, the royal and Church of England colony, found its feet without the aid of religious persecution; yet it is certain that Anglican Virginia profited very greatly from the persecution of the episcopal church at home during the time of the Puritan Revolution. It was in Cromwell's day, for example, that the Anglican clergyman from whom George Washington was descended transferred his family to Virginia. This was an effective though hardly an admirable kind of empire-building. In 1633 there was produced an allegorical play called *Caelum Britannicum* in which one of the characters proposed to transport the vices to New England "which hath purged more virulent humours from the body politic than all the West Indian drugs have from the natural bodies of this kingdom." A strange metaphor for the establishment of an overseas empire!

A second familiar feature of the Stuart period was controversy between king and parliament about the king's revenue. Customs duties were then a much more important source of revenue than they are to-day, for there was no income tax until the nineteenth century. The produce of colonies was taxed on its arrival in the mother country, and the revenue derived from such taxes was, to a large extent, independent of parliamentary control. Charles I and Charles II took a keen interest in the promotion of colonies, not only because they were interested in the welfare of the country (as indeed they certainly were, according to their lights), but also because the prosperity of the colonies strengthened their hands against the aggression of parliaments. We think of Charles II as eluding the vigilance of parliaments by living on the subsidies of Louis XIV; it would be equally true to think of him as achieving this object by living on the revenues derived from the growing colonial trade. In his book on James II Mr. Belloc suggests the possibility that, if James had not ruined the royal cause by openly espousing Roman Catholicism, the monarchy might, owing to the rapid growth of the revenues from colonial trade, have weathered the parliamentary storm altogether, and established a despotic system of government.

Finally, if the king was interested in the revenue from colonial trade, the House of Commons was interested in the colonial trade itself. Most of the members were country gentlemen, but they took their policy to a surprisingly large extent from the compact body of London merchants. The triumph of parliament meant the triumph of a commercial policy, and a commercial policy would in the long run be an imperial policy. The first act of the Rump of the Long Parliament, after it (or its masters) had executed Charles I and extended republican institutions over Ireland and Scotland, was to go to war with the Dutch, "for the fairest of all mistresses, trade." Two more Dutch wars followed under Charles II. These wars made the fortune of the East India Company, the annual value of whose imports from

Bengal alone rose from £8,000 to £300,000 in thirty years.[1] They also transferred from Dutch to English hands the finest harbour on the North American coast, New York.

Chartered Companies

We have seen that, in Tudor times, as soon as merchants perceived what appeared to be a new opening for oceanic trade, they applied to the crown for a charter, and the trade was henceforth carried on by a "chartered company," for example the Muscovy Company, the East India Company, and at a later date the Hudson Bay Company. In the same way the projectors of a new colony formed a company and obtained a charter, for example the Virginia Company. The Muscovy Company remained a trading corporation; the East India Company assumed the government of vast alien populations and continued (until 1858) to function as a system of government after it had been deprived, first of its trading monopoly, and afterwards of the right to carry on any trade at all; the Virginia Company developed into a self-governing colony with a governor appointed by the crown. But the original status of all three was the same. It is necessary, then, to form some idea of what a chartered company was.

In the Middle Ages the development of towns, with their close-packed populations engaged in trade and industry and organised in trade guilds, created problems of local government which did not find solution within the feudal system. The problem was solved by granting, to each town of sufficient importanee, a charter, legalizing and limiting its self-government. In the same way charters were granted to bodies of people undertaking industrial, commercial, or educational work, such as guilds and schools. All the old Public Schools in Great Britain owe their foundation to charters of this kind.

The charters we have here to consider were only a development of the same system; they were a delegation from the

[1] "In the year 1676 each shareholder in the Company received a bonus equal to the value of his shares, and on the capital thus doubled he received for five years a dividend of 20 per cent." Demangeon, *The British Empire*, p. 239.

crown, to a group of its subjects, of powers of government. The East India merchants, for example, proposed to invest their capital in a new, lucrative, but extremely hazardous trade. Such trade would be undertaken in open competition with foreigners. It was certain that their ships would encounter resistance from other European merchants on the high seas, and that their trading stations would have to be defended from attacks of native peoples. No single individual shipper could undertake such a trade. The merchants must form a company, and their ships must sail in fleets. It was essential that they should obtain in advance royal patronage such as would secure that their acts of war would not be disowned as piracy. It was also essential that they should secure for themselves a legal monopoly of their trade. Otherwise "interlopers," as they were called, would have a right to use the expensive facilities of trade which the company had created, without subscribing to their cost. Interlopers, indeed, were never completely eliminated, in spite of charters which made their trade illegal. Members of the Chartered companies regarded them exactly as, to-day, trade unionists regard non-union fellow-workers, who enjoy the privileges secured by trade union action without contributing to trade union funds.

The same conditions ruled in charters granted to companies for the purpose of colonization. When the colonization of Virginia was undertaken afresh, and this time successfully, in the first years of James I's reign, three Charters were granted to the Virginia Company—in 1606, 1609, and 1612. The difficulty and novelty of the problems involved, and the close attention given to them by the home government, are indicated by the fact that the first charter was thus twice at short intervals revised. In these charters the geographical limits of the colony were laid down, and the rights of self-government to be enjoyed by the colony, or rather the company, were carefully defined. At a later date the colonists were to maintain, against the parliamentary government of the Mother Country, that their charters had been granted them by the crown and were consequently

outside the jurisdiction of parliament—an argument of small merit, since parliament itself takes no legal action except " with royal assent."

The chartered company was a device without which the British Empire would either never have existed at all or would have lacked the features which enabled it to surpass its rivals. Such companies enabled weak, cautious, pacific, and often impoverished English governments to make use, under due control, of the wealth and enterprise of their subjects. Only under English rule did such companies flourish. The despotic monarchies of Spain and France throttled their colonial ventures under a system of rigid state control. The French East India Company, for example, was nothing but a department of state, ruled by aristocrats who knew nothing of commerce; it languished in spite of liberal subsidies and took to conquest, in Dupleix's day, because it failed in trade. The English Company was an independent corporation, making large profits, from which it was always ready to bribe the English government, if that were necessary, to secure itself from interference. While the English colonies in America developed an embarrassingly sturdy independence, French Canada was simply a department of France, governed exactly as if it were Normandy or Anjou. The Dutch East India Company flourished, it is true, but hardly as an independent corporation. The Dutch Company, like the French, was a department of state, but the Dutch state, unlike the French, was controlled by mercantile interests.

In comparatively modern times the system of colonization by chartered company had a curious revival. Cecil Rhodes obtained a charter for the opening up of Rhodesia, and both Nigeria and Kenya were for brief periods the scene of the enterprise of chartered companies.

Motives of Colonization

What were the motives in the minds of the adventurers who undertook, and the statesmen who encouraged and guided, the establishment of the English colonies in America

and the West Indies? A large and various collection of motives can be discovered in the official documents and general literature of the period. Some, which were most prominent in the beginning, faded out as the realities of the situation came to be better understood. First and foremost in the beginning was the search for gold. Raleigh himself was inspired by the delusive glamour of Mexico and Peru, and the last tragic episode of his life was the quest of a gold mine on the Orinoco. John Smith, the real founder, in 1608, of the permanent establishment in Virginia, knew better. "Who," he wrote, "can desire more content, that hath small means, or but only his merits to advance his fortunes, than to tread and plant the ground he hath purchased by the hazard of his life?"

Another motive which early faded was the thought that an American colony would prove a stage upon the north-west passage to "the Indies." Virginia was conceived as a Cape Colony or an Aden on the route to India!

More solid was the hope that the colonies would prove to be sources of supply of necessary articles which could not be produced in England, and that they would provide markets for the sale of the coarse cloths which were the main article of English manufacture. Here we have the policy, notably developed once again since the Great War, of Mother Country and colonies co-operating in mutually profitable trade. The goods most desired from the colonies were of two kinds—(i) naval stores, such as timber, cordage and tar, for which we depended upon our foreign trade with the Baltic countries, a trade easily closed against us in times of war, and (ii) tropical products, such as sugar, spices, and currants. For the second purpose the West Indian colonies naturally proved far more satisfactory than those on the mainland further north, and indeed they were more highly valued by general opinion throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Cromwell, our first great imperial statesman, wanted the Puritans of New England to emigrate to his newly conquered island of Jamaica. As late as the wars of the French Revolution,

Pitt wasted an immense amount of men and money in conquering and occupying the French West Indian islands. The colonies of the mainland, on the other hand, proved disappointing as producers of both kinds of goods. Virginia early relapsed into a mere tobacco plantation, and serious statesmen viewed the growing popularity of tobacco-smoking in England with the utmost disapproval. It was diverting imperial production from necessities of naval defence to instruments of idle and indeed "beastly" self-indulgence. It was in vain that the Virginia Company tried to bind its settlers to grow corn and wine and silk; in vain that they exported forty iron-workers from Sussex, and sought to attract vine-growers from France and olive-growers from Italy. Charles I declared that he mistrusted a colony "built upon smoke," and his minister Cottington said, "We plant tobacco and puritanism only, like fools." However, even tobacco produced a revenue for the government by way of import duties, and the Exchequer became reconciled to it even if the Admiralty did not.

Another motive remains to be mentioned, a motive which sounds curiously modern. It was thought that the colonies would provide homes for the surplus population of the Mother Country. It seems strange that the England of those days, with its population of five millions, should have found itself over-populated, but the Tudor period had been, for various reasons that lie outside our scope, a time of much economic distress and unemployment, and unemployment is very easily assumed to be the result of over-population. Richard Hakluyt, the historian of the Elizabethan voyages, composing at Raleigh's request an argument in favour of colonization, makes over-population his first point. "The fry of wandering beggars of England, that grow up idly, and hurtful and burdensome to this realm, may there be unladen, and may people waste countries, to their own more happy state." Elizabethan unemployment cured itself in course of time without emigration, and the seventeenth century was on the whole a period of settled and quiet economic prosperity in England.

The difficulty in Virginia and the West Indies was to secure satisfactory colonists of the labouring class. The transportation of criminals was a fruitful resource, and Cromwell, great imperialist as he was, transported rebels against his government on an appalling scale to Barbados and other colonies. In 1656 he addressed a circular to the Major-Generals, to whom he entrusted the local government of England, ordering them to apprehend dangerous persons, rogues, vagrants, and unemployed persons, and to arrange with merchants for their transportation to the colonies. But transportation did not solve the problem. It was solved by the fatal expedient of the slave trade. This trade had languished for nearly a century after the first experiments of John Hawkins, but in Charles II's reign it was taken up in earnest. An African Company was chartered for the purpose, and colonies, which were simply slave-trading bases, established on the west coast of Africa.

Religious Refugees

As we have already seen the genuinely "surplus" population for which the colonies provided new homes at need was the great body of those whose consciences would not allow them to conform to the practices of the Church of England. The Pilgrim Fathers in 1620 led the way, a mere handful. It is estimated that 20,000 Puritans followed them in the next twenty years. These religious refugees naturally settled in the northern parts where the climate, not greatly unlike that of England, was suited to the development of democratic communities needing no labour but their own. Such were the New England colonies that grew out of the settlement of the Pilgrim Fathers and maintained for generations their strict and bigoted Puritan traditions. Such also, rather further south, was Pennsylvania, founded by the Quaker William Penn in Charles II's reign. Penn's colony greatly improved upon New Englander policy in two respects. It allowed complete religious toleration, and it established and maintained friendly relations with the Red Indian tribes. On account,

perhaps, of its tolerant policy Pennsylvania rapidly became what the whole United States is to-day, a " melting pot " of many nations. One third of its population was German at the time of the American War of Independence.

The Mercantile System

By the date of the Restoration of Charles II (1660) barely half of the thirteen colonies on the mainland of America had been established, yet, as regards policy, a new period had evidently begun, a period which covers over a hundred years and extends up to the rebellion of those same colonies against imperial control. The first half of the Stuart period had been a time of groping experiment and somewhat fanciful expectations. By the time of the Restoration the general characteristics of these colonies were becoming plain, and a policy could be elaborated on the basis of ascertained facts. That policy is known as the Mercantile or Commercial System. The system was not an English invention. It was copied in general outline from the Dutch. The statesmen of Charles II's reign, Clarendon, Shaftesbury and many lesser men, working through the Colonial Committee of the Privy Council, devoted an immense amount of care and attention to colonial questions. Nothing could be further from the truth than the widespread notion that the colonies were " neglected " by the Mother Country; it would be nearer the truth to say that they suffered from an excess of government interference. They certainly would have so suffered if they had not eluded many of the regulations of the Mother Country by wholesale smuggling.

At the same date Colbert, the great commercial minister of Louis XIV, was applying Dutch methods to the colonies of France.

Charles II's first parliament (1660) carried without any opposition a Navigation Act, renewing and extending that passed by the Rump in 1651. The object of the Act was, primarily, to exclude the ubiquitous Dutch and other foreign shippers. No goods were to be imported into or exported

from British possessions except in British or colonial ships. The Act also contained a list of colonial products, "enumerated articles" as they came to be called, which were not to be shipped from the colonies to any country except England or some other English colony. Among the original enumerated articles were sugar, tobacco, and cotton-wool (then grown in the West Indies, but not in the colonies of the mainland). This device of "enumerated articles" was to be immensely extended in the course of the next hundred years, in a series of more than a hundred Acts of Parliament. The details of the system became desperately complicated, but the principles underlying it were simple enough. The colonies were regarded as "plantations" existing for the good of the Mother Country. They were to supply what the Mother Country could not produce for herself, and to take in exchange the surplus produce of the Mother Country. Their industry was to be encouraged in this direction, discouraged in that, in accordance with the requirements of the home market. Of course, the welfare of the colonies themselves was the second consideration, and it could be generously considered where it did not conflict with the welfare of the Mother Country. Some colonial products could be freely exported to all parts of the world; others the Mother Country admitted to her ports at a "preferential rate," i.e. levying upon them a lower duty than was levied on the same goods from a foreign country.

It is one thing to make laws and another thing to get them obeyed. The colonists were distant, and they were not, in any case, disposed by temperament to obey. Consider their origins: some were religious refugees who had refused to conform to the legalised Church; others were adventurers who had found home life too dull; others were transported rebels, or convicts. It is hard to say which of these classes would have least natural inclination to obedience.

The Colonies and the Mother Country

In early times the colonies exhibited a great variety of different systems of government. The New England colonies

and in particular the chief of them, Massachusetts, were for a long time virtually independent. They elected their own governors, made their own laws, went to war with their French neighbours, without any leave given from home. Pennsylvania and Maryland were "proprietary" colonies in which the founder was, under the crown, both governor and owner of the colony, a position which proved to be no bed of roses. Virginia, the "royal" colony, had a governor appointed from England; its local elected Assembly, so often said to have "broken out" spontaneously in 1619, was summoned by the Governor under instructions received from home. The last years of Charles II's reign, when the King had secured a complete victory over the Whig, or parliamentary, party, marked the beginning of an important change in the government of most of the colonies. The charter of Massachusetts was declared forfeit on technical legal grounds, and a royal governor imposed upon the colony. James II maintained and extended the system of royal governors, and the Revolution of 1688, which undid most of the work of James II, continued his colonial policy.

From that date onwards the internal history of each colony took on a certain resemblance to the internal history of England in the preceding epoch. In England the struggles between King and parliament were ending; in the colonies the struggles between royal governors and local assemblies were just beginning. The colonial assemblies adopted typically parliamentary methods for coercing their governors, voting, for example, their salaries for one year only. In 1710 a Governor of New York proposes in desperation that the Home Government should tax the colonies itself for the payment of governors' salaries. Ultimately, as we know, the governors of our old American Colonies suffered the fate already suffered by James II. They had to go, and when they went the colonies became the United States.

The colonies extended from tropical West Indian islands to bleak New England, and as their temperature decreased so did their virtue in the eyes of the old colonial statesmen.

The West Indian planters bought slaves, grew sugar, and gave no trouble. Many of them returned in old age to England, thus maintaining personal contact with the Mother Country and, by their wealth, securing a considerable "interest," as it used to be called, in the House of Commons. How different from Boston! In 1671, just a hundred and two years before the "Boston Tea-party," Lord Sandwich, a keen colonial administrator, and President of the Colonial Committee of the Privy Council, put into writing his apprehensions on the subject of New England. In another twenty years, he said, these colonists will be "mighty rich and powerful, and not at all careful of their dependence upon old England." They will manufacture their own goods, exclude ours, and compete with us in foreign markets. They will cut us out of our export trade to the West Indies, and so "reap the whole benefit of those colonies." What was to be done? Sandwich suggests an Act of Parliament forbidding emigration without license; also "to remove as many people from New England to our southern plantations as may be, where the produce of their labours will not be commodities of the same nature with old England to out-trade us withal." The same idea, as we have seen, had already occurred to Cromwell.

The modern idea of a "Dominion" is a land with a temperate climate suited to provide new homes for British people. That is just what New England was, and just for that very reason it was, according to the philosophy of the Mercantile system, an unsuitable colony. Just because its climate was well suited to provide new English homes it was ill suited to provide those non-English products which were the *raison d'être* of "plantations." In Anne's reign, for example, the Board of Trade complains that the colonies had promoted and encouraged manufactures proper to England, instead of "applying their thoughts and endeavours to the production of such commodities as are fit to be encouraged in those parts, according to the true design and intention of those plantations." No doubt the New Englanders were the worst offenders.

The East India Company

We left the East India Company at the date of its foundation in 1600. It is curious to find that at first statesmen looked askance upon the enterprise. The science of economics was in its infancy, and orthodox opinion held that the main purpose of trade was to secure an inflow of gold and silver into the Mother Country: in fact, the ideal colonial possession was a gold mine. The East Indian trade seemed to involve an export of precious metals, which would impoverish the country. Here as so often in the history of imperial policy, private enterprise went ahead in disregard of theory, and the theorists, without explicitly abandoning their theories, were content to admit an "exception which proved the rule."

The Company was governed by merchants, not by soldiers or politicians, and we find them almost painfully anxious to restrict themselves to peaceable trade, and to avoid both war and the acquisition of territory. Sir Thomas Roe writes in 1616, "A war and traffic are incompatible. It hath been the beggaring of Portugal that he keeps soldiers. It hath been also the error of the Dutch who seeks plantations here by the sword." In 1620 the Directors repudiated the action of two of their captains, who had seized the site of Cape Town, thus leaving for the Dutch this valuable half-way house to India. But Roe's policy did not square with the hard facts. Fighting was forced upon the Company unless it preferred to abandon its enterprise altogether. There had been a furious battle with the Portuguese at Surat in 1615, and fighting with the Dutch continued off and on throughout the century. The convenient doctrine that non-European affairs were outside the sphere of diplomacy enabled the companies to fight for empire while the governments remained at peace. It was the same with the relations of England and France both in India and America at a later period. Again, the policy of trade without "plantations," or trading depots established on Asiatic territory, proved impossible,

especially when, in the last quarter of the century, the Mogul Empire of Aurangzeb began to fall to pieces. By 1684 the Directors of the Company had been convinced on this point. "Though our business is only trade and security, not conquest," they write, "yet we dare not trade boldly or leave great stocks where we have not the security of a fort." We must, they say two years later, make the natives "as sensible of our power as we have made them of our truth and justice." So they gave orders for the fortification of Madras.

The Indies as envisaged by the Company originally included the East Indian islands as well as the mainland of India. Indeed the spices of the former were accounted more valuable than anything the mainland produced. Milton describing a typical fleet of East Indiamen at the time of the Restoration, speaks of them as

> Close sailing from Bengala, *or the isles*
> *Of Ternate and Tidore*, whence merchants bring
> Their spicy drugs.

The English company had a station at Bantam in Java down to 1683. The purpose of our first establishment on the mainland of India, at Surat, had been to secure Indian cotton goods for exchange with the inhabitants of the East Indian spice islands. Generally speaking, however, it is true to say that the Dutch crowded us out of the East Indies, and the development of our trade in India led us to acquiesce in this result. Surat (north of Bombay), Madras, and Hooghly were the three "factories" on the mainland as early as Charles I's reign. The Portuguese wife of Charles II brought Bombay as her dowry, and Calcutta, with Fort William, called after William III, took the place of Hooghly. Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras were to constitute the three bases from which British India was built.

In 1664 the French East Indian Company was founded. Colbert, the great French minister of commerce, was delighted to see the English and Dutch renew their warfare in the

same year; he hoped that each would ruin the other and leave the field open to the French. But his master, Louis XIV, was much more interested in extending and strengthening the north-eastern frontier of France by military aggression, which drove the English and Dutch into an uneasy alliance. The French East Indian Company was never given a fair chance, and Dutch enterprise was crippled by Louis XIV's invasion of Holland in 1672. These incidents are a convincing illustration of the advantage our island position gave us as builders of empire. We were neither tempted to military aggression, like the French, nor open to military invasion, like the Dutch. After the fall of James II a cycle of French wars opened with the accession of William of Orange and ultimately centred round the question of the Spanish succession. They continued till the Treaty of Utrecht at the end of Anne's reign (1713), and gave us Gibraltar, Minorca, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Hudson Bay (where French and English fur-trappers had long been scrapping), and commercial privileges reckoned still more valuable—the monopoly of the slave trade with the Spanish colonies, and the right to send one ship annually laden with manufactured goods to the Spanish markets in Central America.

In William III's reign a strange though temporary misfortune befel the East India Company. James II, whatever his faults, had been a keen naval man and an ardent supporter of imperial development, and the East India Company, under the leadership of Sir Josiah Child, had been one of his most faithful supporters. It was, therefore, in bad odour with the Whigs who made the Revolution. In 1693 its charter was declared forfeit because of the non-payment of certain duties, and renewed on no more than a three years' lease. In 1698 the Chancellor of the Exchequer granted a Charter to a new and rival East India Company in return for a loan to the government, and for the next four years the two English Companies did their best to ruin one another. Happily they were amalgamated by Godolphin in 1702, on the eve of the War of the Spanish Succession.

Union with Scotland

We must not leave the reign of Queen Anne without recording an event which had immense imperial significance, the Act of Union with Scotland in 1707. Hitherto, though Scottish Covenanters had been worried, like English Puritans, into emigrating to the American colonies, those colonies had been, strictly speaking, English colonies, and the Scots, except during the brief period of the Cromwellian conquest, had been excluded from the benefits of their trade. In 1699 the Scots had tried to found a colony of their own at Darien on the isthmus of Panama. William III was King of Scotland as of England, but, as he depended mainly upon his English revenue and his English army and navy, his policy, where England and Scotland came in conflict, was necessarily an English policy, and the English merchants were jealous of the Darien scheme. It was an invasion of the territory of Spain, with whom William was anxious, on the eve of the Spanish succession question, to keep on good terms. In any case the colony was doomed by the deadly nature of the climate and the inexperience of the colonists. Its failure embittered the Scots, and they took measures which practically forced the policy of union upon reluctant English politicians. Most of the terms of the Act of Union do not concern us here. The one fact that matters is that it opened the British Empire to the Scots, and ever since they have played a part in its development all over the world quite disproportionate to their numbers. Their habit of roving far afield had long been famous. A Frenchman who visited England in 1710 records what was probably a current jest :—if Cain had been a Scotsman, the Almighty, it was said, would have reversed his punishment and compelled him to stay at home. Henceforth the wandering Scot might take the British Empire for his province, and enjoy therein full rights of citizenship ; and it has been said that on the furthest frontiers of the Empire, four things can always be found—a barbed wire fence, a bottle of whisky, a Bible, and a Scotsman.

(iv) THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The eighteenth century, as one may term the period from the accession of George I to the battle of Waterloo (1714–1815), was marked by imperial events on a far larger and more impressive scale than anything in the seventeenth century. The rivalry of England and France came to a head both in America and in India ; we secured Canada and began the territorial conquest of India. No sooner had we acquired Canada than the long smouldering quarrel with New England entered upon its violent stage ; the other colonies of the mainland supported New England and we lost the Thirteen Colonies. Then came the Napoleonic Wars, which brought us a diversity of possessions in many parts of the world, and at the same time the colonization of Australia was begun. Not less important than any of these was the abolition of the Slave Trade, important in itself and still more important as a sign that people were beginning to realise that the power which Europeans had acquired over the destinies of backward races involved a responsibility for the welfare of those races. This same stirring of the conscience was the best of the many motives, good and bad, which led to the impeachment of Warren Hastings. Another result of the same movement was the rapid development, at the end of the eighteenth century, of English and Scottish foreign missions.

Our subject in this chapter is the development, from Elizabethan to modern times, of the imperial policy, the imperial outlook, of the Mother Country. From that standpoint, the group of events which includes the abolition of the slave trade and the impeachment of Warren Hastings was far the greatest new development of policy. The other big events were in the main the natural and almost inevitable results of lines of policy that had been established in the Stuart period. The conflict of Britain and France in America and in India and the victory of the British in both continents were events that might have been predicted in the reign of Queen Anne, or even earlier. The War of

American Independence was simply the climax of that conflict of interests between the old colonies and the Mother Country, which has been alrcady described. The widespread colonial acquisitions of the Napoleonic Wars were not the result of a new departure in imperial policy. We fought the French Revolution for European reasons, and new colonies came our way as a by-product of our naval supremacy. We did not enter on those wars in order to acquire Ceylon and Cape Colony any more than we entered on the Great War in order to acquire the German colonies in Africa.

Conquest of Canada

French interest in the American continent had begun when French fishermen from Normandy and Brittany jostled with our fishermen off the Newfoundland coasts discovered by John Cabot. One of these fishermen, Jacques Cartier, was sent by Francis I in 1534 to explore the St. Lawrence. Landing on the river bank he asked a native the name of the country and was answered "Kannata," which is an Indian word for a hut-village, and Canada it has ever since been called. Little came of Cartier's voyage, but in 1608, after the French Wars of Religion were over, Champlain founded Quebec. It was captured by an English adventurer in 1629 but restored by Charles I as part-payment of the price of Queen Henrietta Maria.

French Canada developed as a base of trade with the Red Indians, as a centre of Jesuit missionary activity, and as a starting point for the exploration of the unknown country which is now the Middle West of the United States. In 1683 La Salle made his way down the Mississippi from one of its tributaries near Lake Michigan to the sea. A vast new province was added to the skeleton outline of the French Empire and named Louisiana, and the French town of New Orleans was, forty years afterwards, founded at the mouth of the Mississippi. French Canada was thus in many respects admirable and enterprising, but it was *not* what Louis XIV called it in 1674 ; it was *not* a "New France." Massachusetts,

Pennsylvania and Virginia were the subject of much grumbling in England, but they were all of them "New Englands." They were countries where in increasing numbers English people made their homes. French Canada was a skeleton which never put on flesh. It never drew to itself more than a handful of genuine French colonists. Can the reason be because, throughout the eighty years when most of the English colonies were founded, France allowed religious freedom to her Huguenots, by the Edict of Nantes? In 1685, however, the Edict was revoked, and then one might suppose that Canada got its chance. But no: Louis XIV was more thoroughgoing in his bigotry than any English statesman. He would not tolerate in a French colony the heretics he was expelling from France. Consequently the Huguenots who crossed the seas enriched the populations not of French Canada but of the English colonies and Dutch South Africa. At the time of the Seven Years' War the English-American colonies had a population of 1,500,000, while there were only 60,000 French in Canada.

None the less the French governors of Canada were active and aggressive. Their great rivers led them into the heart of the Continent, while the English colonists, cut off from the interior by the Alleghany Mountains, contented themselves with their own domestic affairs. The French had lost Nova Scotia by the Treaty of Utrecht, but they built on Cape Breton Island the fortress of Louisburg, which was held to be the strongest in the New World. They ran up a line of forts along the Ohio; they seemed to be closing the west and the future to the British just as, a hundred and fifty years later, by the establishment of Rhodesia, Cecil Rhodes sought to close the north and the future to the Dutch of the South African republics.

The story of the Franco-British American war is told in all the history books; how England and France came to blows over a question which, one might have thought, concerned neither of them, namely the "Austrian Succession"; how the rival colonists fought in America, and the English colonists captured Louisburg but were compelled

TORONTO : WATER FRONT IN 1848

From an old engraving

Agent-General for Ontario

TORONTO : WATER FRONT TO-DAY

to restore it at the peace; how the French built Fort Duquesne in the backwoods of Pennsylvania, and how Braddock's expedition disastrously failed to capture it; how Pitt took control of affairs in England, and sent out Wolfe who, with the naval co-operation of Saunders, captured Quebec; and how, in the next winter, the English conquerors were themselves besieged in Quebec by the French, and saved by British sea-power coming up the St. Lawrence as soon as the ice had thawed on the river.

Pitt's Imperialism

Pitt is a great figure in our history not only because he gripped the world-wide Seven Years' War with such strong intrepid hands that the French were ousted from Canada and India, and the British Empire placed far ahead of all its rivals. He was also the first of our parliamentary statesmen to owe his power to what he called the " Great People," as distinct from the parliamentary upper classes. He was essentially a romantic and sensational statesman, and the " Great People " responded, even though there was then no popular press and no popular electorate, to his melodramatic gestures. That lends importance to the fact that he was an ardent, a fanatical imperialist, a " Jingo "—to use the slang of a century later. He wanted to paint red as much of the map of the world as he possibly could. One detects again and again in his speeches the feeling which animates so much of the work of Rudyard Kipling, that it is the destiny and the especial duty of the British race to conquer and rule a great Empire spread all over the world. He has been compared with John Wesley, on the ground that they were the two great practical idealists in a generation of materialists. If Wesley preached the religion of Christ, Pitt preached the religion of patriotism, and just as the Wesleyan movement produced some of our most popular hymns, so the Pittite wars produced some of our most popular patriotic songs—*Hearts of Oak, The Bluebells of Scotland, The British Grenadiers,* and *Rule Britannia.*

The Treaty of Paris, 1763, gave us Canada. It was not

much appreciated, and we took it mainly because we wanted the French out of it. Some said that we should have been wiser to leave them there, since it was only fear of the French and the desire for British protection against them that kept the old English colonies within the Empire. Others said that it would have been better to leave Canada, and to take the French West Indian Islands of Martinique and Guadaloupe. There was little enthusiasm about the birth of what was to be the first of the "Dominions." Its history is the subject of a later chapter.

The Revolt of the American Colonies

When Vergennes, the French statesman, heard that Great Britain had insisted on keeping Canada he said, "They will ere long repent the removal of the only check that kept their colonies in awe." Another Frenchman had said the same thing fifty years before; if the French colony failed, he said, the English colonies would become independent. The reader has already seen in the previous section of this chapter, the ground on which such forecasts were based. To put it in a nutshell, English imperial policy assumed that the colonies would serve a certain purpose; it tried by legislation to make them serve that purpose. The northern colonies, unlike the West Indian islands, were not suited to that purpose, and the legislation proved to be a strait-waistcoat, hampering their development; or rather it would have hampered their development if the legislation had been enforced. The southern colonies of the mainland, from Virginia southwards, no doubt fitted into the scheme of imperial policy much better, but they, too, had grievances against their English governors, and they followed New England in rebellion when New England led the way.

The restrictions of the Mercantile System necessarily grew more burdensome as the colonies developed. Moreover the restrictions themselves were continually elaborated. In 1732, for example, the export of fur hats from the colonies was forbidden, in the interests of the Hudson Bay Company. In 1733, in order to stimulate the exports of our West Indian

islands prohibitively high duties were imposed on the import into our colonies of molasses (raw sugar), from the French West Indies. Coming events sometimes cast their shadows before with curious exactness. The famous Boston Tea-party of 1773 was anticipated by a Boston Wine-party of 1716, when an attempt to enforce the customs duties led the Bostonians to seize a cargo of wine and spill the contents of the barrels in the streets. Again, the establishment of the Whig parliamentary oligarchy led to a decline in the quality of colonial governors. Charles II's Privy Council had selected governors on their merits. The Whigs very largely used the governorships for purposes of political corruption, and sold them to influential noblemen who never visited the colonies they were supposed to govern.

After the Seven Years' War was over, Great Britain was faced by an unprecedented national debt. An armed force in the colonies was absolutely necessary, since, though the French had gone, the menace of the Indian tribes remained. It had always been assumed that the defence of the colonies was the business of the Mother Country, but Grenville, now Chancellor of the Exchequer, felt that, after the immense services rendered to the colonies by the Mother Country in the Seven Years' War, the colonies should pay for a part of the cost of the British garrison. So the celebrated Stamp Tax (1765) was imposed upon them. Professor Egerton, a great authority, says that the importance of the Stamp Act has been exaggerated. Certainly Macaulay is very wide of the mark when he says that its imposition "found two million Americans as loyal as Kent or Sussex and left them rebels." They had been far from loyal in Macaulay's sense before the Act, and long after it, perhaps to the end of the War of Independence, the majority of the colonists wished to remain subjects of the crown. Professor Egerton attaches more importance to Grenville's attempt to secure the enforcement of the restrictions embodied in the Mercantile system. The system had been tolerable only so long as it was but half enforced.

We will not tell again the familiar story of the ten years'

wrangle that followed the Stamp Act nor of the eight years' war which followed the wrangle. British opinion at home was bewildered by the difficulty of the problem, and it must always seem extraordinary that no British statesman of the first rank was sent out to investigate the position on the spot. We acted very differently seventy years later, when Lord Durham was sent out to report upon the grievances that had created a formidable situation in Canada.

At one end of the scale was the policy of George III who held quite simply that the colonists were rebels and must be beaten into unconditional submission. It was a "John Bull" policy, and probably most Englishmen agreed with their king until they found the process of beating the colonists so very tedious and expensive; then they fell away, and the king was left alone but undaunted, protesting to the last. At the other end of the scale were detached observers like Dean Tucker, who said in effect, "These colonies are a burden and a nuisance; let them go. British commerce does not depend upon unenforceable commercial regulations but upon the capital and enterprise of British merchants."

Some held that the problem might be solved if only representatives of the colonies were admitted into the British parliament. The colonists indeed themselves raised the old cry of "no taxation without representation," but what they desired was not "representation" but "no-taxation." It is extremely unlikely that the admission of colonial democrats to the old unreformed House of Commons with its aristocratic atmosphere and its rotten boroughs, would have done any good. Such representatives would have found themselves a lonely minority in antagonism to the whole system into which they had been introduced; they would have been, in Professor Egerton's forcible phrase, "a dozen Wilkeses."[1] At best they would have

[1] Wilkes was a radical agitator, who, after election by the County of Middlesex, was expelled from the House of Commons three years after the passage of the Stamp Act. The story of how he repeatedly contested the decision of the House, and ultimately returned there, forms a familiar episode in our domestic history.

formed a permanently anti-British party, like the Irish Nationalists a hundred years later.

The colonists in fact knew a good deal about the British political system of those days, and heartily despised it. Benjamin Franklin, statesman and scientist, was the most distinguished man that the colonies had produced up to the time of Washington, and he was friendly to the British connexion until a personal quarrel with certain English politicians threw him into violent opposition. Some years before that quarrel he was in England at the time of the general election of 1768, and he wrote, "The whole venal nation is now at market, and will be sold for about two millions, and might be bought by the very devil himself."

Pitt and Burke were the two greatest British statesmen of the day. Both sympathised with the resistance of the colonists, and both desired their conciliation, but neither of them had any real solution of the problem to propose. Pitt explicitly defended the Mercantile system, and Burke was not explicitly prepared to abandon it. The problem would certainly have been simplified, if the colonists could have been induced to form themselves into a single federation, like the modern Dominion of Canada. Then at least the British government could have negotiated with a single American government instead of with thirteen separate and mutually jealous little colonies. The British government had tried to bring about such a federation by means of a Conference at Albany in 1754, on the eve of the Seven Years' War. Franklin had urgently supported the proposal, but the separate colonies would have nothing to do with it. Federation of a very imperfect description, for war purposes, was achieved by the establishment of what Americans call the "First Congress" of Philadelphia in 1774. Real federation was not achieved until five years after the colonies had won their independence, and then it was only secured by the patient statesmanship of Washington and Hamilton, in the face of intense opposition.

Beginnings of a New Empire

In the year in which the colonists published their Declaration of Independence (1776), Adam Smith, the Scottish professor, published his *Wealth of Nations*. This book, one of the most influential ever written, laid the foundations of the policy of Free Trade. The younger Pitt proclaimed himself a disciple of Adam Smith, and in the years immediately following the American War, began the process of demolishing the old system of state-regulated trade, which was to be completed by Peel and Gladstone. Most people in Pitt's day would have found it hard to say what was the use of colonies if their trade was not to be regulated. The old imperial policy was in process of dissolution and no new imperial policy was apparent to take its place.

Yet this period, when imperial policy was in abeyance, saw the laying of the foundations of the new colonial empire which was to replace what had been lost. Canada was preserved. The old French Canadian colonists had been wisely and generously treated, and resisted all incitements to join their neighbours in rebellion. After the end of the American War, Canada provided a home for the refugees from our old colonies, the United Empire Loyalists, who had remained faithful to the British connexion. The first colonizing expedition to Australia sailed in 1787 under Captain Phillip. His passengers were convicts, and the only purpose of the new colony in its early years was to provide a dumping ground for convicts who could no longer be transported to the American colonies. Cape Colony fell to us as a prize of the Napoleonic War; it was valued only as a convenient stopping place on the way to India. The latter end of the eighteenth century provided the beginnings of nearly all of what, outside India, is greatest in the modern British Empire. But that generation was too busy fighting Napoleon to expend much thought on imperial policy.

British and French in India

When George I came to the throne the Mogul Empire, founded two hundred years before by Mohammedan invaders from Central Asia, was in a state of complete collapse. Chaos ensued, similar in many respects to the chaos which followed the downfall of the Roman Empire in Europe. Native adventurers fought one another, and fought with other Afghan adventurers who penetrated far into India from beyond the frontiers. The fittest would survive, and the fittest would be neither natives nor Afghans but one or other of the European trading companies, which found themselves, in mere self-defence, compelled to take a share in the struggle. Of these companies the Dutch need no longer be considered. They had fallen out of the race; it was between the English and the French.

The Anglo-French rivalry in India was decided by the same Seven Years' War as decided the Anglo-French rivalry in America. Wolfe and Clive were contemporaries, and both were backed by Pitt. We have already contrasted French and British methods in America, and the contrast between their methods in India runs on very similar lines. In both countries the French were at first the more enterprising. Dupleix realised before any Englishmen in India the possibilities of native troops disciplined by European officers and armed with European weapons. But in India as in America the British had two advantages which, if properly handled, were almost bound to ensure their victory. In America we had a colonial population in comparison with which the French were a mere handful; in India we had succeeded in trade, where the French company had conspicuously failed. Secondly, we were supreme at sea. The years of Quebec, Plassey and Wandewash are also the years of the great naval victories of Quiberon Bay and Lagos. The Treaty of Paris, which gave us Canada, virtually marked the end of the French rivalry in India, though French agents were to attempt the organization of native coalitions against us during the War of American Independence and also

during the early stages of the Napoleonic Wars. Two years after the Treaty of Paris, Clive secured, by treaty with the Mogul who still nominally ruled all India from Delhi, the *diwani*, or financial administration of the provinces of Bengal, Behar and Orissa.

British Policy in India

The victory of Plassey had handed over one of the richest provinces of Asia to the control of what was, after all, only a commercial concern. Then followed, as was perhaps inevitable, a period of appalling extortion, which Clive, as Governor of Bengal, proved unable to check, though he did his best. Never before had Englishmen enjoyed such opportunities of getting rich quick, and English society was disgusted by the appearance in their midst of Anglo-Indian *nouveaux riches*, whom they nicknamed nabobs. Such was the situation which Warren Hastings had to face when appointed Governor of Bengal in 1772.

If Clive was, as Pitt said, the "heaven-born general" who opened for the British in India the road to empire, Hastings first taught them how to walk along it. He was a very great man. His greatest task, in which in the main he succeeded, was to teach the servants of the Company that their work now was not merely to trade, or to fight, much less to pillage, but to *govern*, and that government means the establishment of order and justice. The years of his governorship were those in which we lost the American colonies. He was continually engaged in wars with native states, and he was hampered by the defects of the constitutional arrangements imposed upon him by the home government, which now began, very properly, to take an increased interest in Indian affairs.

North's Regulating Act (1773) is a great landmark, for it was the first Act of Parliament dealing with the administration of Indian provinces, the first encroachment of the home government upon the authority of the Company. North's Act did not, as some recommended, abolish the Company, but established a two-fold system of control

over it. It set up a Supreme Court of Justice in Calcutta, with British judges independent of the Company, to hear cases of complaint against the actions of the Company's servants. It also provided the Governor of Bengal (henceforth Governor-General with an ill-defined authority over the Governors of Bombay and Madras) with a Council of four members, to watch and control his policy. Of these measures the first, the Supreme Court, was on the whole right; the second was wrong. Lord North might well have taken the appointment of the Governor-General entirely out of the hands of the Company. But it is a sound principle of all government to trust the man on the spot, and, if you do not trust him, to appoint someone else. To hamper him with a Council which is empowered to over-ride him will make him weak without making him wise. It was unfortunate, too, that one of the councillors selected was a certain Philip Francis, an industrious intriguer, who sought to advance his own career by setting himself up as a kind of leader of opposition in India. For several years he and two of his colleagues on the Council were able to thwart the policy of Hastings at every turn. When Hastings at last secured a majority on the Council, Francis came home to prepare the ground for Hasting's impeachment.

That famous impeachment (1788–95), in so far as it was the result of the virulence of Francis, was altogether bad. The charges brought against Hastings were very largely false, and the House of Lords, which was certainly not prejudiced in his favour, ultimately acquitted him on all of them. So far was Hastings from being a tyrant and an oppressor that he had done more than any of his prosecutors to bring such malpractices to an end. That he should have been subjected to the ordeal of impeachment was a gross injustice. None the less, apart from the injustice to the accused, it is impossible to regret the event. Burke and Fox were wrong on their facts but right in their intentions. They claimed to champion the rights of the down-trodden native peoples of India, and their action was the first public assertion of the principle that native peoples under British rule

have a right to the best government that British rulers can give them.

Meanwhile the younger Pitt had carried a new India Act (1785), which settled the main lines of Indian government down to the abolition of the Company in 1858, after the Mutiny. A Board of Control, consisting of members of the government, was established with powers superior to those of the Directors of the Company. Henceforth Governors-General were appointed by the government, and they were, unlike Hastings, empowered to over-rule the Council which was appointed to advise them.

At the end of the century, during the Governor-Generalship of Lord Wellesley, formidable Indian wars broke out with the Sultan of Mysore in the south and the Mahratta Confederacy in central India. Mysore was conquered, and the future Duke of Wellington defeated the Mahrattas at Assaye (1803), which was much the greatest battle that the British had yet had to fight in India. The home government welcomed neither Indian wars nor Indian conquests. Wellesley was not allowed to complete the destruction of the Mahratta Confederacy, and his successor was ordered to refrain from interventions or alliances outside the territories for which he was already responsible. But this amicable and economical policy would not work. Once embarked upon territorial dominion in India we found that, with the best will in the world, we should never be left in peace until the whole of the vast sub-continent was either under British rule, or ruled by native princes under British control. The process of inevitable conquest was very soon resumed, and was practically completed by the Sikh wars and the annexation of the Punjab in 1848.

The East Indies

At the end of the Napoleonic Wars it looked as if the British, having defeated the French in India, were about to supplant their older rivals, the Dutch, in the richest island of the East Indies. The Napoleonic Empire had swallowed up Holland, and French forces had occupied Java. Stamford Raffles, an extremely able and enterprising servant of

the East India Company, in 1811 persuaded the Governor-general, Lord Minto, to send a force from India to turn out the French. This proved a very easy task. Raffles was appointed governor of the island and ruled it with conspicuous success, but after Waterloo the home government insisted on returning it to the Dutch. It was a bitter disappointment to him. None the less this remarkable man was to leave two memorials of his greatness, one in the very centre of the Empire and the other at the extreme end of Asia. He was the founder of Singapore; and he was also the founder of the Zoo.

The Slave Trade

While the Napoleonic Wars were at their height Wilberforce and his supporters secured (1807) the abolition of the British slave trade. The slave trade had grown with the growth of British oceanic enterprise, and like all other forms of oceanic commerce it received careful attention from the Privy Council of Charles II. African bases for the traffic were established at the mouth of the Gambia river, and at Cape Coast Castle on the Gold Coast. The trade was entrusted to the Royal Africa company with the Duke of York (afterwards James II), as principal director. Fifty years later the Treaty of Utrecht gave us the monopoly of the slave trade with Spanish America in addition to that which we already enjoyed with our own West Indian and American colonies. The old American historians who used to attribute every virtue to the colonists and every vice to the Mother Country asserted that the Virginians only reluctantly accepted the slaves which our traders forced upon them; but the only discoverable ground for this assertion is that Virginia raised a revenue by a tax on imported negroes, just as we to-day raise a revenue by taxing imported tobacco.

Seldom has the world seen a more steadily profitable trade than that of the "Great Triangle." The English merchants took fire-arms, beads and gin, and sold them to the native African slave-catchers in exchange for slaves;

then followed the appalling "middle passage" with its densely packed human cargoes, from Africa to America, and the slaves were sold for sugar and other tropical products. It is estimated that British traders carried 3,000,000 negroes to America in the hundred years between Charles II's reign and the American war. After the American war the trade increased, and during the ten years 1783–93, the merchants of Liverpool, which was the centre of half the slave trade of the world, transported about 300,000 and sold them for £15,000,000.

The Abolitionist movement sprang directly out of the religious revival of the eighteenth century, in which John Wesley had been the greatest leader. It was the first and by no means the last intrusion of Christian churches and Christian principles into imperial policy. Of course, the Abolitionists were denounced as faddists and fanatics. It was said that we could not afford to abandon so lucrative a trade unless every other country would do the same, and at the same time. What was to become of Liverpool, etc.? None the less, the faddists and fanatics, after only twenty years' agitation, got the British slave trade abolished, and in the years following Waterloo all the other European nations adopted the same policy.[1] The United States had, in their Constitution, set a time limit to the life of the trade as carried on by their own merchants, and its lease of life expired, by a strange coincidence, in the same year as our Abolition Act was carried through parliament. Liverpool survived the shock, thanks to the rapid development of the cotton industry.

(v) THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

It is a mistake to belittle the remoter past; none the less it is true to say that the British Empire (outside India) as we know it to-day is substantially the creation of the nine-

[1] Many of them did so with great reluctance, and continued to tolerate an illegal traffic. The history of how, in the fifty years after Waterloo, Great Britain secured by slow degrees the suppression of the non-British overseas slave trade, is a curious story which cannot be told here.

teenth century. One might go further and say that it is substantially the creation of the Victorian Age, which so many clever modern persons now urge us to despise. If we take a rapid survey of the Empire, outside India, as it stood in 1815, what do we find? Where now is the Dominion of Canada was the Hudson Bay Company, and a string of little colonies stretching from Newfoundland to Ontario, the chief being the French province of Lower Canada, and Upper Canada as colonized by the United Empire Loyalists. Australia had not emerged from the convict stage; Cape Colony was entirely Dutch; New Zealand had not been touched. On the West Coast of Africa the Gold Coast and Gambia were derelict after the abolition of the slave trade, and the humanitarian enterprise which had founded Sierra Leone as a home for liberated slaves was as insignificant as it was well-intentioned. The West Indies, it is true, were at the height of their prosperity, little knowing the doom that was to overtake them. And that was about all. At home interest in the Empire, other than missionary interest in the welfare of native peoples, had almost entirely evaporated.

In this last section of the present chapter we shall be covering a period that will be traversed again and again in the subsequent chapters upon the different provinces of the Empire. We can therefore restrict ourselves almost entirely to the broader tendencies of the age, tendencies which will find ample illustration in the facts to be recorded later.

Four big factors account for almost every feature in the development of the modern British Empire.[1]

(i) *The growth of population.* We know much less than we would like to know about the fluctuations of population in earlier ages, but it is a well ascertained fact that, somewhere about 1760, the population, first of Great Britain and Ireland and soon afterwards of all Europe, began to grow

[1] I think I should have hit upon this fourfold division for myself, but I must say that I found it, in exactly the form in which I required it, in the Introduction to *Select Documents of British Colonial Policy* by K. N. Bell and W. P. Morrell.

as it had never grown before. This increase accelerated throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, and has continued, though at declining rate, down to the present day. It spread from Europe to the non-European peoples under European control, and it is a familiar fact that the coloured races are now increasing faster than the white race. The cause of this increase, first European and afterwards non-European, was not a rise in the birth-rate, but a decline in the death rate; more of those born survived infancy, and those who survived infancy lived to a greater age. This growth of population gave to colonies within the temperate zones an altogether new significance. Such colonies came to be thought of, much more than ever before, as homes for surplus population. If an eighteenth century person thought about the "expansion of England," he thought first of expansion of trade; colonial population existed in his eyes only for the sake of that trade. When a nineteenth century person thought of the expansion of England he thought of the expansion of the British race under the British flag; being very likely a free-trader, he thought of trade as an international, not an imperial, activity.

(ii) *The Industrial Revolution.* The spinning-jenny and the steam engine began their transformation of industry and commerce in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. It would be a bewildering and impossible task to enumerate all the ways in which modern industrial appliances have affected the British and all other empires. The steamship and the railway have abbreviated, and the telegraph has annihilated, distance. Vast areas have been opened up as they could never otherwise have been. Great Britain, the home of the industrial revolution, developed in its industrial centres a great population which could only be fed on the produce of the wide open spaces of the new countries. In the sixteenth century the most valuable food-product imported from overseas was spice; a cargo of spices, it was said, was worth a king's ransom. Then came tobacco, then sugar, coffee, tea, rice; the nineteenth

SYDNEY COVE IN 1788

High Commissioner for Australia

CIRCULAR QUAY, SYDNEY

century added the bulkier and more nourishing items of corn and, finally, meat. Again the engines of the new industry created their own demands. They required oil, and their mechanics, living in conditions of unprecedented grime, required soap, which is an oil-product. Palm oil comes from the tropics, and in the latter part of the nineteenth century there was a marked revival of interest in tropical colonies.

(iii) *Democracy.* In the nineteenth century, as never before, the Many insisted on taking the control of their destinies into their own hands. The French Revolution was the most conspicuous and melodramatic assertion of this demand, but a life of pioneering in new countries makes for democracy in any case. You may doubt, it is said, whether all men are equal in the eyes of God, but you will soon find that all men are equal in the eyes of a grizzly bear. The United States set the democratic example in the new worlds, and the British communities which developed in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were democratic from the first. But what did that imply? If they were to rule themselves, would they not be independent? How could they remain within the Empire? The Mother Country moved towards democracy by slow and easy stages. Throughout the first half of the century an aristocratic ruling class in Great Britain was responsible for imperial relations, and those relations were by no means always easy or amiable. In the Mother Country it was generally assumed that colonial self-government was a half-way house to independence. Self-government was readily granted, yet independence did not follow. The self-governing colonies were as determined to remain within the Empire as they were to manage their own affairs.

(iv) *The growing sense of responsibility for the welfare of the non-European peoples within the Empire.* There is no doubt at all where this feeling began, and who were its first champions. It began in the churches, and its first champions were the missionaries. It early secured powerful support in home government circles, where some of the

notable Colonial Secretaries and civil servants were staunch supporters of the missionary societies. It was in the Mother Country that this sense of responsibility first developed, and the Colonial Office, in championing the missionaries and the native peoples to whom they ministered, was not always fair to the white colonist, who has to cope with the native peoples at close quarters. To-day, though differences of opinion must continue as to how the principle of our responsibility should be applied in special cases, the vast majority of people admit that the principle is a sound one; that backward peoples are entitled to the best that we can give them, and that where the interests of our wealth conflict with the interests of their welfare, it is the former that should give way. Rudyard Kipling, the most popular of all imperialist writers and certainly no pious faddist, enshrined the ideal in a phrase that has become almost too familiar—the White Man's Burden. The phrase, if it means anything, means that the Empire itself is a kind of missionary enterprise, the greatest organization there has ever been for levelling up the civilizations of the world.

In the middle period of the century the claims of democratic self-government and of native rights came into conflict where a British community lived in the midst of a native population. The home government was at one time reluctant to hand over the Kaffirs of South Africa and the Maoris of New Zealand to what seemed to them the not very tender mercies of the European communities in those colonies. In the seventeenth century all British colonial communities had been encouraged to govern both themselves and the subject peoples in their midst, because the home government felt no responsibility whatever for the welfare of coloured peoples. A home government which sanctioned the Slave Trade was not likely to feel scruple about any minor forms of oppression perpetrated by its colonists. In the nineteenth century several of the self-governing assemblies of the West Indian colonies were abolished, and the Colonial Office, acting through governors of its own

nomination, undertook to hold the balance between the interests of white colonists and coloured peoples.

In quite another sphere missionary enterprise made an immense contribution to the Empire. It was very largely missionaries, such as that marvellous man, David Livingstone, who explored central Africa in the middle years of the century. They revealed the hideous conditions of savagery and superstition in which the natives lived, and the horrors of the Arab slave trade, which could only be remedied by the establishment of European governments in tropical Africa. It was philanthropy as well as palm-kernels which inspired the revival of tropical imperialism in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

Phases of Imperial Policy

The growth of the Empire is now seen to be one of the most important, perhaps the most important, feature of modern British history. But, until the last quarter of the century it attracted comparatively little attention from the leading politicians and the general public of the Mother Country, far less than in the old days of the Mercantile system. Until Disraeli took up imperial development as a leading feature of his policy in 1872, the statesmen most keenly interested in colonial affairs had been men of very secondary importance in the eyes of the general public, and imperial policy passed through many phases before it emerged into the popular and enthusiastic imperialism of the days of Rudyard Kipling's stories and Queen Victoria's Jubilee processions.

After Waterloo two schools of thought about the colonies began to define themselves. We may call them Old Toryism and Philosophic Radicalism. Old Toryism was in power, and Philosophic Radicalism was in opposition.

The Old Tory school was not enthusiastic about the colonies, but it was determined to maintain them for what they were worth. Australia, for example, was useful as a convict station, and Cape Colony as a stopping place on the way to India. Closely allied with the Old Tories were

the Evangelical religious party, and the missionaries. These were determined to maintain the colonies as a sphere of philanthropic activity. The greatest achievement of these philanthropists in the twenty years following Waterloo was the abolition of slavery throughout the Empire. Most people think of this triumph of philanthropy as entirely a result of organized popular agitation acting upon parliament and the Cabinet Ministers. They overlook the very important part played by the officials of the Colonial Office, and in particular Sir James Stephen. The building up of our permanent civil service was a leading feature of the nineteenth century, and Stephen has been called the first of the great civil servants. He was a deeply religious man, and the Sunday which he spent in drafting the sixty-six clauses of the Bill for the Abolition of Slavery (1833) was one of the only two occasions in his life on which he " broke the Sabbath." He did invaluable work for the Empire throughout an official career extending over thirty years, but his outlook was not exhilarating. Canada and Australia, he held, should be given self-government as soon as they wanted it, and would then become independent, which was much the best result for them and for us. As for the rest of the colonies, they were " wretched burdens which in an evil hour we assumed and have no right to lay down again." He was opposed to the colonization of New Zealand as it " would infallibly issue in the conquest and extermination of its present inhabitants."

The policy of the Philosophic Radicals was condensed into three words by their leader, Jeremy Bentham, when he said, " Emancipate your colonies." It is strange to find Brougham, an ex-Cabinet Minister, describing in 1839 Wolfe's capture of Quebec as a performance " which crowned our arms with imperishable glory and loaded our policy with a burden not yet shaken off." The Philosophic Radicals were ardent supporters of free trade, and when the destruction of the Mercantile system was completed in the later 'forties by the abolition of the duties on foreign sugar, and the repeal of the old Navigation Acts, they felt that a

great step had been taken towards the dissolution of the Empire.

Such a policy seems repulsive to us to-day, yet it was accepted by intelligent and patriotic men, whose outlook it is quite possible to understand. These men were—and who will blame them for it?—devoted to the cause of universal peace. In 1842, Cobden wrote :—

Our Free Trade agitation and the Peace Movement are one and the same cause. The Colonial system, with all its dazzling appeals to the passions of the people, can never be got rid of except by the indirect process of Free Trade. The Colonial policy of Europe has been the chief cause of wars for the last hundred and fifty years.

As a statement of historical fact Cobden's last sentence was very largely true—true ever since English and Dutch had fought "for the fairest of all mistresses, trade." It was very natural to assume that tariffs, colonies, and war were inseparable components of one evil system; that, as tariffs were apparently going, colonies must go, and war would go also. When Cobden wrote, Great Britain alone of European Great Powers west of Russia had an extensive colonial empire. France had lost her colonies to England; Spain and Portugal had seen their American colonies emancipate themselves. It seemed to Cobden and his friends that the emancipation of our colonies was something like a sacred duty owed by Great Britain to the cause of international civilization; moreover, the discharge of the duty involved in their opinion no sacrifice, except a sacrifice of pride.

The Durham Report

But about 1830 a third party began to make its appearance, neither Old Tories nor Philosophic Radicals. The leaders were, indeed, most of them Radicals and democrats, but they had an intense belief in the future of the Empire, and devoted their lives to its preservation and extension. They are generally called the Colonial Reformers. The leading

spirit among them was Gibbon Wakefield, who made a special study of methods of emigration and land settlement in Australia and New Zealand. But by far the greatest single achievement of the Colonial Reformers was the Durham Report of 1839.

The Durham Report belongs to Canadian history. Suffice it to say here that in 1837 the smouldering discontent in the two Canadian colonies, one mainly French and the other wholly British in population, had led to rebellions, and Lord Melbourne, the Prime Minister, sent out Lord Durham to report on the situation. Melbourne himself attached no real importance to Canada. In his letter appointing Durham he wrote, "The final separation of these colonies might possibly not be of material detriment to the interests of the Mother Country, but it is clear that it would be a serious blow to the honour of Great Britain, and would certainly be fatal to the present administration."

Durham cared nothing for the fate of "the present administration," but he cared immensely for Canada. He believed that it could be kept within the Empire, and that the way to keep it within the Empire was to grant it complete self-government in its domestic affairs. Hitherto the two Canadian colonies had enjoyed the dual system which had produced continual friction in the old American colonies; a locally elected Assembly, and a Governor sent out from, and directed by the government of, the Mother Country. Durham said in effect:—Unite the two colonies, and give them fully responsible government. Let there be a Canadian ministry formed from and representing the strongest party in the Canadian parliament, exactly on the lines of the British Cabinet, and let the British governor assume a neutral position outside party politics, the position of a constitutional king.

Durham did not live to see his policy adopted, for he died the year after the making of his report. There was some hesitation at home before his proposals were accepted. But in 1846 Lord John Russell became Prime Minister and appointed Lord Grey (son of the Prime Minister who carried

the Reform Bill) to the Colonial Office. Lord Grey had long been an ally of the Colonial Reformers. He sent out Lord Elgin, Durham's son-in-law, as Governor General of Canada, and Lord Elgin's governorship is one of the most important events in the history of the Empire, for it marks the beginning of the colonial self-government. In the course of the next few years Grey gave self-government to the Australian colonies, inviting them to draft their own constitutions. Twenty and twenty-five years later Cape Colony and New Zealand followed in the same path.

It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of these events, but it would be a mistake to suppose that the Colonial Reformers established or desired to establish Dominion self-government in the form in which it exists to-day. They aimed at establishing self-government in domestic affairs only. They meant to exclude from the control of the colonies the enactment of tariffs and the disposal of unoccupied lands. These, they held, were general interests of the Empire as a whole. But no statute limiting the powers of the self-governing colonies was ever enacted, and the limitations which the Colonial Reformers would have liked to impose in the interests of imperial unity were never imposed. Thus the wisdom, or indifference, of those who expected the ultimate independence of the colonies co-operated with the zeal of the Colonial Reformers in opening the way to the modern system.

Transportation

Self-government and the progress of emigration led to the abolition of the transportation of convicts to Australia.

Transportation suited the home government very well, and it also suited the early free settlers in Australia, whose greatest need was cheap labour. The Home government was spared the cost of maintaining expensive convict prisons. In the old days when the convicts were sent to the American colonies, the government had sold its convicts to contractors for £5 apiece, who in turn got £10 a piece for them in the colonial markets. This agreeable system

was not at first applicable to Australia, as there were no free settlers to buy the convicts. However convict labour prepared the way for free settlement, and the ex-convicts provided a labouring class when the free settlers arrived. The old transportation system has few admirers to-day, but it had its merits. The worst aspect of it was not the system of transportation itself, but the old criminal code which condemned to transportation all kinds of persons, such as poachers, who deserved quite different treatment. The fault here lay not with transportation as a system of punishment, but with such iniquities as the old Game Laws. Perhaps the wisest judgment passed upon transportation was that of Charles Darwin, the great naturalist, who as a young man saw it at work. "On the whole," he wrote, "as a plan of punishment transportation has failed. As a real system of reform it has failed, as perhaps would every other plan. But as a means of making men outwardly honest, of converting vagabonds, most useless in one country, into active citizens of another, and thus giving birth to a new and splendid country, a grand centre of civilisation, it has succeeded to a degree perhaps unparalleled in history."

Opposition to the system began, not in Australia, but in the Evangelical party in England which condemned it as inhumane. It lost its popularity in Australia afterwards, when the growth of free settlement made it economically unnecessary, and in 1852 the colonies secured the right to stop the importation of convicts if and when they desired.

Modern Imperialism

By 1860 slavery and transportation had been abolished; Great Britain had adopted Free Trade: Canada and four of the Australian colonies had secured self-government, including the right to levy tariffs on goods from the Mother Country. The Colonial Reformers were dead, and the modern school of imperialism had not yet arisen. Canada and Australia had not yet grown to recognition as "daughter-nations" co-operating on equal terms with their Mother Country. The exploitation of tropical Africa was not

yet practical politics. There ensued an interval of almost complete vacuity in imperial policy, broken only by the Federation of Canada in 1867, an act in which the Mother Country did little more than ratify results secured by Canadian statesmen. Then, with curious suddenness, came modern imperialism.

Imperialism was first and foremost an emotion. "With a sort of shock of delight," says Mr. Ramsay Muir,

> the men of this generation [i.e. about 1880] rediscovered the British Empire. They began to take pride in the marvellous achievement which had brought one quarter of the population of the earth into a single fellowship of peace. They saw themselves as citizens of something far wider than a little nation-state, concentrated exclusively on the pursuit of its own interests. They realised that they were bound by an infinite diversity of mutual obligations to peoples of almost every race and creed and colour, . . . and, regarding no longer with complacency but with dismay the idea of a dissolution of this august fellowship, they set themselves to give greater reality to the haphazard and accidental bonds by which alone it seemed held together.[1]

Many causes contributed to produce this change of sentiment. The world had changed since Cobden's day, and visions of universal peace had vanished with the rise of Bismarck's Germany, and the approach of the Russian Empire towards the land frontiers of India. The future seemed to be with great military Powers, and one after another these Powers began to scheme to become colonizing Powers. Nothing stimulates like competition. Since the Seven Years War the British had had no serious competitors in overseas empire, and interest had languished for that very reason. Now Germany entered, and France re-entered, the field. The scramble for Africa began, and it is a credit to the European and British statesmen of the 'eighties that it was accomplished without a European war, though the rivalry of France and Germany in Morocco was to be one of the subordinate causes of the Great War in 1914. Gladstone

[1] *History of the British Commonwealth*, Vol. II, p. 674.

was a survivor from the pre-imperialistic epoch, and his policy after 1880—the withdrawal from the Transvaal after Majuba, the abandonment of the Sudan involving, as it did, the death of Gordon at Khartum, and his capitulation to the Home Rule policy of the Irish Nationalists—powerfully stimulated imperialism by wounding imperial pride.

Another cause may be found in the fact that Great Britain, by the Reform Bills of 1867 and 1885, became politically democratic, and thus entered into closer sympathy with the British democracies overseas. It was the working classes whose brothers and cousins had emigrated to the colonies ; they knew that, if bad trade returned, emigration might be their lot also. These men liked to think of their emigrant brothers and cousins as fellow-citizens with themselves within the same Greater Britain. At the other end of the scale aristocracy was being rapidly merged in the new plutocracy of " big business." It is no accident that the most conspicuous imperialist statesman in the last years of the century, Joseph Chamberlain, was the first great employer of industrial labour to rise to the highest political positions. Capital and industry increasingly demanded tropical products as raw materials and new markets for their surplus production, and imperialism offered a way to both.

No one took a deeper pride or a keener interest in the development of the Empire than Queen Victoria who, just as the tide of imperialism was beginning to rise, began to emerge from the long seclusion of her mourning for her husband, the Prince Consort, who had died in 1861. India was always near her heart, and she encouraged her Viceroys to write her long unofficial letters about their work. In later years she had an Indian personal servant and amused herself with learning the elements of Hindustani. She always appreciated and enjoyed visits from representatives of the native peoples of the Empire—Maori chieftains, for example, in 1863, and the terrible Zulu chieftain Cetewayo many years later. It was indeed natural and right that the sovereign should be a keen imperialist, for personal

loyalty to the sovereign has long been one of the most important of the links that has held the Empire together. Native chieftains, themselves sovereigns within their own small spheres, have often cherished a romantic devotion to the "great White Queen" or to a King-Emperor whom in most cases they have never seen. Citizens of the self-governing British Dominions, after escaping from the control of the British government, have found in their common allegiance to the sovereign the best expression of their membership of a world-wide empire. It is possible to imagine Great Britain under republican institutions; but it is much more difficult to conceive a republican British Empire.

Imperialist policy took two forms, the expansion of the Empire, and an attempt to give it a closer unity. Expansion found its principal field in Africa, the conquest of the Transvaal in the wake of the gold-miners, the opening up of Rhodesia, the acquisition of Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda and the Sudan, the establishment of British control over Egypt.

On the other hand, the attempt to formulate a scheme of Imperial Federation uniting Great Britain and the self-governing Dominions ended in total failure. Any such scheme would demand from the Dominions a partial surrender of their self-government and this nothing would induce them to grant. Equally barren of result was Chamberlain's policy, launched in 1903, of an Imperial *Zollverein*. The *Zollverein* was the name of the customs union by means of which Prussia, thirty years before Bismarck's wars, had bound the other German States to herself by means of a system of inter-State free trade. Could not the Dominions of the British Empire be bound together in a similar customs union? Carried to its logical conclusion, an imperial customs union would mean the establishment by Great Britain of protective tariffs against all non-empire countries; it would also mean the reduction or abolition by the Colonies of their duties on the products of the Mother Country and of other parts of the Empire. But the bulk of British importations from the Dominions

were foodstuffs. If she was to give an Imperial Preference of any dimensions to Dominion imports, she must begin by abandoning the most essential feature of her free trade system, by imposing a duty on foodstuffs from countries outside the Empire. The Liberal opposition raised the cry, "Your food will cost you more," and Chamberlain's policy was decisively defeated in the 1906 election.

Of course the future may prove that this defeat, though decisive, was not final. To-day, in the changed conditions of the post-war world, the policy of Empire Free Trade has been vigorously revived. In this chapter, however, we are concerned only with the nineteenth century.

Meanwhile accident had led to the establishment of a safer, because less ambitious, method of imperial co-operation. In 1887 Queen Victoria celebrated her first Jubilee, and the presence of the prime ministers of all the self-governing colonies (Canada alone at that date was a federated Dominion), suggested to the Colonial Secretary the idea of holding a somewhat informal Colonial Conference. In 1897, on the occasion of the Diamond Jubilee, there was a second conference, and in 1902, after Edward VII's coronation, a third. It was then arranged that conferences should take place in future every four years. As time passed the numbers of the Colonial Premiers diminished and their prestige increased, owing to the federation of the Australian colonies in a single Commonwealth, in 1901, and the Union of South Africa in 1910. The chairmanship of the conference passed from the Colonial Secretary to the British Prime Minister. The work of the Conferences was simply discussion. No decisions could bind the several Premiers, who remained, as before, solely responsible to the parliaments and electorates of their own Dominions. None the less, something was achieved. Not the least valuable result was that the leading statesmen of the five democracies within the Empire learnt by personal contact to trust and respect one another.

The South African War was the climax of the imperialist movement in Great Britain. It was a climax not altogether

to be admired. We entered on the war in a spirit of vainglory which now seems little short of idiotic, and the prolonged and humiliating duel between a mighty empire and two minute republics produced in the end a wholesome reaction. The very word "Imperialism" went out of fashion, and, in so far as the term denoted the frothy exuberance which Kipling himself had denounced in his *Recessional*, the reaction against "Imperialism" was altogether a good thing. But that was not, so far as the Empire was concerned, the whole story of the South African War. That war was denounced in every foreign country as an unjust aggression against an innocent enemy. Never before had the British people stood so utterly alone in the world. On the other hand, never before had the British peoples beyond the seas given such an exhibition of their sense of unity with the Mother Country. The contingents of volunteers from Canada and Australia did something more than help Great Britain out of military difficulties which seem to us now, perhaps, not so very alarming. They proved the moral unity of the Empire.

Long before, in the most famous speech ever delivered on the subject of the British Empire, Burke had said :—

My hold on the colonies is in the close affection that grows from common names, from kindred blood, from similar privileges and equal protection. These are ties which, though light as air, are as strong as links of iron. . . . Do not dream that your letters of office, and your instructions, and your suspending clauses are the things that hold together the great contexture of the mysterious whole. These things do not make your government. Dead instruments, passive tools as they are, it is the spirit of the English communion that gives all their life and efficacy to them. It is the spirit of the English constitution which, infused through the mighty mass, pervades, feeds, unites, invigorates, vivifies every part of the Empire.

Burke was speaking of the old American colonies, on the eve of their rebellion. His speech, indeed, threw little light on the American question to which he was addressing

himself, but it has become prophetic of greater things. All those " letters of office and instructions " which Burke called " dead instruments " had become dead in a more literal sense than he implied. They had been abolished. Canada and Australia were entirely free of Downing Street. Yet in the crisis of the South African War their peoples proved that they were bound to the Mother Country far more firmly than ever in the past by those other ties " light as air, but strong as links of iron." Fourteen years later, in an incomparably graver crisis, the same call was to reach them, and to meet with a far wider and deeper response, proportionate to the gravity of the occasion.

Chapter II

THE REGIONS OF THE EMPIRE: A PRELIMINARY SURVEY

SINCE the world is a sphere, it is impossible to make a really satisfactory map of it on a flat sheet of paper. The ordinary map of the world, on "Mercator's Projection,"[1] achieves its result by magnifying the polar regions as compared with what lies near the equator. In this map the two Poles, which are theoretically points without any magnitude at all, become lines 24,000 miles long, equal to and parallel with the equator. Thus in a map of this kind Greenland appears to be six times as large as Australia; actually Australia is three and a half times as large as Greenland. New Guinea appears to be about the same size as Great Britain; actually it is more than three times as large. Thus one must not go to a map of this kind to judge the relative sizes of the various provinces of the Empire; it makes Canada relatively much too big, and India much too small.

Still, if this warning is borne in mind, the world map serves a useful purpose. A glance at it will show that the British Empire, outside the British Isles, contains four main regions—Canada; Africa from the Sudan to Cape Colony, with Nigeria separated from the main mass, on the west coast; India; and Australia, with New Zealand. Each of these is separated from its nearest neighbour, and from Great Britain, by a stretch of ocean which is in

[1] Mercator was a Flemish mathematician and geographer of the sixteenth century, and one of the founders of modern scientific map-making. The real author of *Mercator's Projection*, however, was an Englishman of the seventeenth century, named Edward Wright.

no case less than 2,000 miles, and in some cases more than twice as much.

The area of the Empire is nearly a quarter of the land surface of the globe, and its population is probably quite a quarter of the human race. The area is almost exactly equally divided between the northern and the southern hemispheres. One might say, one half of it has summer when the other half has winter, but in tropical countries the divisions of summer and winter as we know them hardly exist. It is hard to draw a line satisfactorily between tropical and temperate lands, but it is roughly true to say that half the area of the Empire is tropical, and half of it is temperate.

If we divide the population of the Empire according to the Continents it inhabits, we reach the surprising result that almost exactly three-quarters are Asiatic. Of the remainder 10 per cent. are in Europe (nearly all of them in the British Isles), 11 per cent. in Africa, 2.5 per cent. in America, and 2 per cent. in Australasia. The immense majority of the Africans are native peoples, and in Asia well over 99 per cent. are Asiatics. The percentage of White population in the Empire can therefore be found accurately enough by adding together the figures for Europe, America, and Australasia, where the non-White elements are as small as the White elements in the other two Continents ; which gives us the figures of 14.5 per cent.[1] Actually the White population of the Empire is estimated at 66,500,000, of which almost exactly two thirds is in Great Britain and Ulster, the area represented in the " Imperial Parliament."

The British Empire may be divided into the White Empire, the Brown Empire, and the Black Empire. The division is rather crude, and the terms perhaps require an apology, but they will help us to a preliminary understanding.

[1] There are, it is true, nearly two million Whites in the Union of South Africa, but for the purpose of this calculation they can be cancelled against the non-white population in the West Indies, etc.

The White Empire

By the White Empire is meant those countries in which White men have settled and made their homes, bringing with them their own civilisation. Such countries will obviously be found only in the temperate zones. They are the four self-governing Dominions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa; to which may be added the small self-governing communities of Newfoundland and Southern Rhodesia.

Within this group, however, sub-divisions must at once be made. Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Newfoundland are countries in which the native populations are quite small, and do not seriously embarrass the life of the White community. South Africa and Rhodesia are countries which belong both to the White and to the Black Empire at the same time. Self-governing White communities are living in the midst of much larger native communities, and the problems involved in this " clash of colour " are among the most difficult in the world. However, since these White communities have secured self-government,[1] the responsibility for solving the problem in South Africa rests with the South African White community and not with Great Britain.

Australia, and in a much lesser degree Canada and New Zealand, also have their " colour problems," but in a different form. Their problem is not how to deal with non-White peoples in their midst, but to keep non-White peoples from entering their country in such numbers as to submerge their own civilisation. In Australia it is called the " White Australia policy."

Canada and South Africa also have another quite different problem which is unknown to Australia and New Zealand. Canada was first colonized by the French, and South Africa by the Dutch; in each of these Dominions there is the problem of the relationship between two very different European peoples.

[1] Not completely in Rhodesia. See page 201.

So much for differences; but the provinces of the White Empire have many points in common. In the nineteenth century each of them grew to nationhood and secured self-government. To-day the problem is how best to preserve the unity of the whole, in view of the independence of each of the parts. On this subject something will be said in the last chapter.

The Brown Empire

English people have often given great offence by their bad habit of treating non-European peoples as if they were all equally "beyond the pale," dismissing them as niggers, dagoes, or the like. The peoples of India are, for the most part, of the same race as ourselves. Sanskrit, the language of the ancient Hindu scriptures, is of the same family of languages as Greek and Latin, and their word *Raj*, for empire, is clearly from the same root as *regnum*, *rego*, and *rex*. They are dark-skinned because they moved, ages ago, into a hotter country; just as the Italians and Spaniards are darker than ourselves for the same reason. They have a civilization which can be traced back to a much remoter past than our own. We entered their country when it was in the state of confusion such as always follows the break up of a great empire, the empire of the Moguls. We became masters of the whole country because we deserved to do so, being both stronger and more honest in our methods than any of the Indian principalities that opposed us. In fact, we conquered India with the active assistance of Indian peoples who appreciated the security that our power gave them. We have conferred greater benefits on the Indian peoples than one nation has ever conferred upon another. But we have remained aliens in the land, even though beneficent aliens. The time, long foreseen by thoughtful British observers in India, has now come when the intellectual leaders of India demand that we should hand over to them the authority we have wielded. The extremely difficult problems involved are discussed in the chapter on India.

Egypt, though not technically within the Empire at any

time, and less than ever now, presents a shorter and simpler variant of the same story. We took over the government of Egypt fifty years ago, for the simple reason that Egypt was bankrupt, and we were her chief creditor. We did wonders for the country. Then the Egyptians made it plain that they wanted us to go, and we went; though remnants of us still remain there.

The Black Empire

The largest part of the Black Empire is in tropical Africa, and it has been very recently acquired. The White Empire now rules itself and, as a recent writer has said, is no longer a British Empire but a British Entente. The future of the Brown Empire of India is overclouded with uncertainty. But the Black Empire is pre-eminently the Empire of the future. Here we have genuinely primitive peoples. It would be a great mistake to suppose that they will always remain primitive. Hitherto they have not had a chance of developing into civilized communities; we are giving them that chance, and no one knows what use they will make of it. They have not, like the Indians, great monuments and great literatures which prove their capacities, but it is true to say that in many respects they stand to-day where British India stood a hundred years ago.

In Africa, as in India, three types of European co-operate in the development of the native people—the trader, the missionary, and the civil servant. The fact that they co-operate is not always obvious. The trader sometimes regards the missionary as a mischievous fanatic, and the missionary sometimes regards the trader as a cheat. Both are occasionally right and more often wrong in their mutual estimates. The civil servant has to keep the peace between them, and steer a middle course, remembering that our duty in tropical Africa, as elsewhere, is to discharge what Lord Lugard, the maker of modern Nigeria, called "the Dual Mandate"; to promote the welfare of the native peoples, and to secure that the undeveloped countries in which they live are opened up, and their resources made available for

the welfare of the whole world. The missionary's task is the first half of this "mandate," the trader's task is the second. The administrator has to hold the balance between them, and facilitate the work of both.

The "Procession" towards Self-Government

It would of course be an entire mistake to suppose that there are no middle terms or stages between complete self-government on the one hand, and the rule of a benevolent despot sent out from England, on the other. Dr. Zimmern, in a very striking passage,[1] pictures the Empire as a sort of procession in which all the members are moving forward past successive milestones on the road to self-government. From this point of view the Empire is a sort of training-school in politics, and each stage in the education is marked by the grant of a certificate, or a degree. At the summit are the completely self-governing Dominions. As we descend from these heights we find :—

(i) Colonies with elected assemblies, which manage their internal, but not their external affairs.

(ii) Colonies with assemblies in which, however, a minority of the members are nominated by the governor.

(iii) Colonies with assemblies in which the majority of the members are nominated by the governor.

(iv) Colonies with assemblies nominated by the governor.

(v) Colonies in which the governor rules unaided (or unhindered) by the official advice of his subjects.

Dr. Zimmern points out what a surprisingly large number of "promotions" have been made, since the Great War, from one or other class into the class above it.

This is a useful picture, but it would be a mischievous one if it suggested that there is, so to speak, one royal road of promotion, and one and the same goal for all. If one thing is clearer than another, as a result of the experience of the last hundred years, it is that the progress of a non-European

[1] Zimmern, *The Third British Empire*, Chapter I. In what follows I have greatly simplified Zimmern's classification.

does not turn him into a European. Parliamentary institutions are a European invention; the fact that they are the best form of self-government for us—at least, so we think—does not prove that they are or will ever be the most suitable for Asiatics and Africans. One of the difficulties of the situation in India is that people on both sides of the water have too readily assumed that India, in order to attain "Dominion status," *i.e.* equality with Canada and Australia in the councils of the Empire and the world, must necessarily have a system of government resembling that of Canada and Australia. The history of Jamaica, again, seems to show that a parliamentary system is quite unsuited to some countries in which a very small White aristocracy lives in the midst of a black population. In Nigeria, which is not a White man's country at all, we are working out a system which may develop into native self-government, not through assemblies but through chiefs.

In the chapters that follow we shall study, first, the self-governing Dominions, which constitute the "White Empire"; next India, with certain other oriental provinces, and Egypt—the "Brown Empire"; and lastly the "Black Empire," the colonies and protectorates of tropical Africa, and the West Indies, where the largest element in the population are the descendants of imported African slaves.

Chapter III

CANADA AND NEWFOUNDLAND

(i) THE COUNTRY

THE Dominion of Canada extends over 3,000 miles from east to west and 2,000 miles from north to south. It is, in fact, as large as Europe, and slightly larger than the United States. That being so, it seems natural to contrast its population of barely 10,000,000 with the 120,000,000 of the United States. But the comparison is not fair to Canada. The United States lies almost entirely between latitudes 50° and 30°[1] and is throughout, except in its mountainous area, well suited to maintain a dense population. Much of Canada, on the other hand, lies in arctic or semi-arctic regions—the great frozen triangle of Labrador, the North-west territories not yet formed into self-governing provinces (if indeed they ever will be), and an archipelago of great islands, uninhabitable or inhabited only by Eskimos, stretching to within seven degrees of the North Pole. Twenty years ago it was estimated that six and a half of the seven millions of Canada lived within 150 miles of the United States frontier. Since then population has not only increased by three millions but, in the " prairie provinces," spread markedly northwards. How far this process can go it would be rash to say, but there is enough good country in Canada to hold a population many times larger than the present 10,000,000.

Natural Divisions of Canada

A traveller crossing Canada from east to west in an aeroplane would pass over three entirely distinct and sharply

[1] Roughly, the latitudes of Land's End and of Cairo. Florida and Texas both extend well to the south of 30°.

separated geographical divisions. For the first half of his journey, from when he first made land at Nova Scotia to a point a little short of Lake Winnipeg, he would be flying over a land of primeval forest, "out of which the axe has hacked every acre that is inhabited." Then, with surprising suddenness, he would enter the prairie country, gently undulating and mainly treeless open country, not altogether unlike the downlands of Wiltshire; this would be with him for two-thirds of the second half of his journey. Then, again suddenly, he would enter the region of the Rocky Mountains, with their deep valleys and forests of enormous trees, until at last he descried the Pacific.

The St. Lawrence

Thus the journey might be made in an aeroplane. But aeroplanes are a modern invention and have played but a small part as yet in the making of Canada. Such a journey following a geometrically straight line, would overlook what has been historically the most important geographical feature of Canada, the River St. Lawrence. Canada—in this respect markedly unlike Australia and South Africa—was founded upon a river; it only began to be something more than a river colony when the Canadian Pacific railway opened up rapid communication with the westward plains in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Quebec, the old French capital, owes its importance to the fact that it stands where the barren mountains first withdraw from the northern bank of the river. It guarded, from its famous promontory, the fertile alluvial strip which extends above it along both banks of the river up to the Great Lakes. Two hundred miles further up the river, Montreal, also an old French city, but now the chief commercial centre of the Dominion, owes its importance to the fact that it stands where the river first becomes navigable by large ocean-going ships, though it is frozen every winter as far down as Quebec.

Old historic Canada is the St. Lawrence country, stretching from Quebec to the more easterly of the Great Lakes.

Far to the east of this and lying to the south of the mouth of the river, are the Maritime Provinces, connected with old Canada by a strip of territory along the southern shore of the estuary. These provinces were not "Canada" at all, until modern times; for they had an entirely separate history until they joined the Dominion of Canada in 1867.

The Maritime Provinces

The Maritime Provinces are Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island. Their combined area is about equal to that of Ireland, and their combined population, which grows but slowly, is a little over a million. Actually they are much the most densely populated provinces in the Dominion, but that is because all the other provinces have attached to them vast areas either undeveloped or incapable of development. The climate of the maritime provinces is moist and mild, more like that of England than the rest of Canada (apart from the Pacific Coast). Far their greatest contribution to the welfare of the Dominion is their ice-free harbours of Halifax and St. John, connected up by railway with Quebec and Montreal. But for these the commerce of Canada could, during the winter months, only reach the Atlantic through the United States.

Nova Scotia has a long and intricate history. It would be idle to pretend that it has much importance for the world in general to-day, but as it lies quite apart from the main stream of Canadian history, something may be said about it here.

The Frenchman, Champlain, who afterwards founded Quebec, established in 1604 a settlement on a little plain on the western coast of the Nova Scotian peninsula. It was a salt-marsh and consequently clear of trees. He called it Port Royal, and it is apparently the oldest permanent settlement, either British or French, in America, being senior by a few years both to Quebec and Virginia. A hundred years later English conquerors absurdly renamed the place Annapolis, in honour of Queen Anne. The land itself was called Acadia.

High Commissioner or Canada

MONTREAL

On the right is the Victoria Bridge

About the same time King James I, colonizing from a distance, granted the whole country to a Scottish nobleman. James named the country New Scotland or rather, since he was " the wisest fool in Christendom," Nova Scotia. Nothing came of it, and in 1632 Charles I formally ceded it to France, along with Quebec, which an adventurous Englishman had conquered three years before.[1]

In 1689 the Anglo-French wars began which ultimately led Wolfe to Quebec. In 1711 the English conquered the French colony of Acadia and it was ceded to us by the Treaty of Utrecht, except the adjoining Island of Cape Breton, on which the French now built the fortress of Louisburg. In the next war (1742-48) the British New England colonists captured Louisburg but, to their disgust, it was returned to France when peace was made. Now however, for the first time the British government began to take an interest in Nova Scotia and founded Halifax. Immigrants arrived, and the old French Acadians, who had never reconciled themselves to British rule, gave them a very surly welcome. The upshot was the forcible ejection, or transportation, of 6,000 French Acadians from Nova Scotia at the opening of the Seven Years War. The American poet Longfellow has idealised them and their sufferings in his *Evangeline*, once a very popular poem, but there is no doubt that they had behaved in a very provoking manner. The story is interesting as the first example of the failure of British government to conciliate European colonists of another nation. It may be compared with the story of the Dutch in South Africa and contrasted with the story of the French in Canada.

The real history of Nova Scotia as a British colony begins with the arrival of 30,000 loyalist refugees from the old British colonies further south, after the War of American Independence. The descendants of these still form the backbone of Nova Scotian population, for there has not

1 This adventurous Englishman, Kirke, had a rather easy task. The French colonists at Quebec were starving, and gladly surrendered in exchange for something to eat.

been much immigration from Great Britain. To-day they are an old-fashioned folk, content with themselves and ignorant of the great world which has passed them by. The fisheries are the most important in Canada, and there is a flourishing export trade of apples and peaches. Cape Breton Island, once famous for its French fortress which is now a deserted ruin, has valuable coal seams, and produces the best quality of coal in the Dominion.

New Brunswick passed from France to Great Britain together with Canada after the Seven Years War. At first it was treated as part of Nova Scotia, but it was made a separate colony in 1784 on account of the influx of United Empire Loyalists from the old English colonies. The most conspicuous incident in its history was the prolonged boundary dispute with Maine, in the United States. This boundary had been left vague in 1783 and after prolonged local bickering was settled by the British and American governments in 1848.

The minute province of Prince Edward Island has good fisheries and excellent cattle farming, but both the Island and New Brunswick are losing population. They are little back-waters on the edge of the great New World, and the young and ambitious seek wider fields of enterprise in the United States or in Western Canada. Mr. Bennett, who, as I write, has become Prime Minister of Canada, is a New Brunswicker who migrated in his youth to the Prairies.

The St. Lawrence Valley Provinces

The Province of Quebec contains the heart of old French Canada conquered by Wolfe and his fellow soldiers and sailors. This "heart" is a level plain of very fertile land stretching along either side of the St. Lawrence from a few miles below Quebec to the frontier of the province, fifty miles above Montreal and a hundred miles short of Lake Ontario. Below Quebec the hills close in on either side upon the river estuary. The bulk of the population of the province, both urban and rural, still lives within this plain. It includes Montreal, the biggest commercial and

shipping centre in the Dominion, and the historic city of Quebec which is about the same size as Oxford. This is, however, but a small part of the area of the modern province. All along the north of the great estuary and the little plain lies the plateau of the Laurentian Highlands. It is thinly populated but rich in its forests and the water-power of its innumerable cascades. On the south of the estuary and on the New Brunswick border are the Notre Dame Mountains—they are mere hills—and the Eastern townships, colonized after 1783 by United Empire Loyalists.

More than four-fifths of the population of Quebec province is French, and it is almost entirely Canadian born; that is to say, there is practically no immigration into the province. None the less, the French are so prolific that the population was, until recently, increasing nearly as fast as that of the rest of the Dominion. Indeed the French percentage of the population in the St. Lawrence Valley is still increasing, and the French are overflowing into Ontario, whereas the British are tending to emigrate from the Eastern townships. The bulk of the British population is in Montreal where it controls large commercial businesses. The typical French Canadian is a thrifty and somewhat old-fashioned farmer, deeply attached to his land like the peasantry of France.

Ontario, like Quebec, is a big province with the great bulk of its population settled in a comparatively small area, namely the triangle bounded by the Ottawa river and the Great Lakes. The founders of the colony were United Empire Loyalists from the old English colonies. It contains Toronto, the biggest British city in the Dominion, and Ottawa, a comparatively small city on the river separating Ontario from Quebec, which became the capital of the Dominion when the provinces were federated in 1867. The leading industry is agriculture, but manufactures are increasing, and there has been a steady emigration of farmers to the newer Western provinces. The southern "triangle" of Ontario lies further south than any other part of Canada, and the hot summers ripen grapes, peaches, apricots and many other fruits. There is a certain amount of mining,

and ninety per cent. of the world's supply of nickel comes from this province.

The Prairie Provinces

Central Quebec and Ontario make up a single geographical unit, the frontier between them being historical and racial in origin. A long journey by sea or land separates them from the little Atlantic provinces and the Eastern townships of the Quebec province. Another long stretch, 600 miles of almost uninhabited rocky land, separates central Ontario from the prairie provinces, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta. More perhaps than any other country in the world the Dominion of Canada is held together by its railways. Before the Canadian Pacific Railway was completed, in 1885, the Prairie provinces were almost empty lands, thinly populated by Indians and half-breeds and scoured by the fur-trappers of the Hudson Bay Company. Now they are the most rapidly developing provinces of the Dominion. A glance at the map shows that these provinces have no natural frontiers, except where Manitoba touches Hudson Bay, and Alberta meets British Columbia along the crest of the Rocky Mountains. They are great wedges of territory parcelled out along the lines of latitude and longitude. The original Manitoba (1871) was a comparatively small square, including only three-quarters of Lake Winnipeg. Now it has pushed out to Hudson Bay, and hopes to make something of Fort Churchill as a place of export in the summer months. Its capital, Winnipeg, is rapidly developing as the commercial capital of prairie Canada, the Chicago of the Dominion. North to south—or rather south to north—these provinces extend as great wedges of territory over 750 miles, as far as from Land's End to the Shetlands, with an average breadth about equal to the distance from Land's End to the North Foreland. They have a great future before them, and are the provinces to which the British emigrant of to-day naturally turns, as well as many from eastern Canada and from the United States. Growth of population is the most important feature

of the history of such a country, and the following table of populations speaks for itself.

	1901	1926
Manitoba	255,000	639,000
Saskatchewan ...	91,000	821,000
Alberta	73,000	608,000
Totals	419,000	2,068,000

It will be noticed that the more western provinces are going ahead of the province of Manitoba which began to develop twenty years earlier, and that the three together already hold a fifth of the population of the Dominion. Some day they will no doubt contain more than half the population, and the centre of gravity will shift in Canada, as it has already shifted in the United States, to the " Middle West." For much that is unoccupied here is simply waiting for development, whereas the unoccupied areas of Ontario and Quebec are for the most part condemned by nature to remain a wilderness of silence.

The Canadian Pacific Railway is not yet fifty years old. Now it has been doubled by another trans-continental line which, branching northwards, west of Winnipeg, crosses the continent between 200 and 300 miles north of the frontier, and between the two main lines is a network of branches. Northwards from Edmonton on the northern line runs a branch railway to Peace River where farming settlement has recently developed with sensational rapidity. The climate of the prairie provinces is of an extreme " continental " type. The winters are long and extremely severe, but the weather is dry and sunshine abundant. It is healthy enough for healthy people, if the proper precautions are taken, much healthier than any tropical climate; and it is about the best wheat country in the world.

British Columbia

British Columbia, across the Rockies, is geographically in another world from the treeless plains of the prairies.

It is a land of great mountains, rapid rivers, and dense forests. The principal industry is mining—gold, copper, lead and silver; and there are enormous supplies of coal. Another big industry is salmon fishing, tinned salmon being an important export. British Columbia was entered almost simultaneously from the land side by the fur-trappers of the North West Company and from the ocean by the explorers of the Pacific. The Spaniard Perez first visited the coast in 1774 and Captain Cook in 1778; it was explored in detail by Captain Vancouver fifteen years later, after Pitt, by an ultimatum to Spain, had secured Nootka Sound, off Vancouver Island, for the British Empire. The island was handed over to the Hudson Bay Company which then possessed all British North America outside the colonies on the St. Lawrence and the east coast, but the mainland right up to Alaska was claimed by the United States until 1846, when the present frontier was drawn through the Rockies to the Pacific coast. Not much happened until 1858, when the discovery of gold, both in the island and on the mainland, led to the inrush of population. The island and mainland were combined in one colony in 1867, and consented to enter the Canadian Federation in 1871 on the condition that a trans-continental railway was built. The capital is Victoria on the island, but the principal city is now Vancouver, which is *not* in Vancouver island but is the terminus of the railway on the mainland. Non-existent in 1880, it has grown more rapidly than any other Canadian city.

British Columbia is in many ways curiously English. Its mild coastal climate resembles that of Devonshire. The people speak with an English accent, whereas in most of the rest of Canada an American accent prevails. On the roads, traffic keeps to the left instead of, as elsewhere in Canada and America, to the right. None the less the fortunes of B.C. (to use the common abbreviation) and the prairie provinces are closely interwoven, for each is of use to the other. The prairies have neither fruit nor wood (except inadequate amounts) and B.C. can supply them



CANADA

Showing (1) The Provinces, (2) The Main Lines of Railway

with an abundance of both. The prairies supply grain for the miners and fishermen of British Columbia. It seems too, that Vancouver is becoming one of the principal ports of export for Canadian wheat. As the area under wheat increases the problem of its transport becomes acute. Railways do not entirely meet the case, since, in the world market, cheapness is all important. Much goes to the ports at the western end of Lake Superior, and canals are being made which will enable ocean liners to travel all the way from the Atlantic to these ports. But this route will not be available in winter, and the route from Vancouver by way of the Panama canal then becomes of importance.

To the north of all the provinces lie the North-West territories, arctic and semi-arctic lands with a population of a few thousand Red Indians and Eskimos. Their extent has diminished as new provinces have been created or have extended their frontiers. Vast areas here will never, one would suppose, have much importance for civilised humanity, but one never knows. Much which was once assumed to be irretrievable wilderness now supports a steadily growing white population. The most sensational event in the history of the North-West was the discovery of gold at Klondyke on the borders of Alaska in the last years of the nineteenth century. The desolate valley of the Yukon with its eight-months winter suddenly became the El Dorado of thousands of adventurers from all over the world.

(ii) CANADA UNDER BRITISH CONTROL. 1760-1847

The French Colony

The French colony of Canada had been founded ten years before the Pilgrim Fathers landed on the shores of what was to be New England. It was thus a hundred and fifty years old when it passed into British hands. Its population was very small, only about 60,000, for the French are in comparison with ourselves, a home keeping race, and the most likely type of emigrant, the persecuted French Huguenots, had been rigidly excluded. None the less the governing

of even 60,000 persons of a foreign and European nationality, traditionally hostile to Great Britain, and Roman Catholic in days when Popery was our national bugbear, presented problems of great importance and great difficulty.

One difficulty which one might have expected did not arise. The French Canadians had no desire whatever to be re-united to France. French government had been exacting and tyrannical; it meant forced labour and conscription. Even before the treaty ending the Seven Years War was signed, Amherst, who completed Wolfe's conquest, wrote that the French colonists "behaved to us as to a father rather than a conqueror."

The French colonists were for the most part simple-minded and illiterate farmers. There was no printing press in the whole colony. They were devoutly religious, and they have remained so. There is probably no region of the world to-day where the Roman Church enjoys such undisputed authority, nor, it may be added, one where its authority has been so well and wisely exercised. The bulk of the colonists were settled along the St. Lawrence. "From Montreal to Quebec the St. Lawrence was like a street, with houses and farms on both sides. The land was granted in long strips, each with a frontage on the river, and stretching back several miles. When a farm was divided the new owner was always given an outlook on the river, and to-day, as one sails up the St. Lawrence, the first thing that strikes the eye is the long ribbon-like farms, often no more than a few yards wide, which stretch back so far inland. . . . fifteen or twenty miles to the Laurentian mountains."[1]

There were other French colonists who had gone further afield, in the wake of the Jesuit missionaries, the explorers, and the soldiers. These French fur-trappers, known as *coureurs de bois*, often became as wild as the Red Indians, intermarried with them, and formed a widely dispersed half-caste population. They hardly concern us in 1760; we shall meet them again more than a hundred years later.

Canada was extremely fortunate in its early British

[1] *The British Empire*, ed. by A. F. Pollard, p. 253.

Governors, of whom far the most important was Sir Guy Carleton, afterwards Lord Dorchester, who was Governor from 1768 to 1778 and again from 1786 to 1796. It is notable that his first resignation was a protest against the jobbery of the home government in giving Canadian appointments to worthless Englishmen who knew no French. If more men of Carleton's type had been sent to the old American colonies in the first half of that century, there might have been no American War of Independence. One of the first things Carleton had to do was to repress the ridiculous pretensions of the handful (about 300) of English colonists from New England who demanded Canadian self-government—for themselves, Roman Catholics being of course disfranchised as in England!

The Quebec Act

Carleton's policy received its official endorsement in the great Quebec Act of 1774, which gave complete freedom to the Roman Catholic religion, allowed tithes to be collected by the priests, and ordained that French law and custom should remain in force in all civil matters, though introducing English law and the jury system for dealing with crime. This Act is a landmark in the history of the Empire, for it recognized the principle that the unity of the whole must be based upon the freedom, and consequently the diversity, of the parts. It was the work of the despised Government of Lord North, and its chief authors in England were Thurlow and Wedderburn, politicians to whom historians have shown scant respect;[1] on the other hand the Act was furiously opposed by Lord Chatham. In fact the great men of history have seldom been so great nor the bad men so bad as is commonly supposed.

The Quebec Act was passed on the eve of the outbreak of the rebellion of the old English colonies, and it is obvious that its purpose was to secure the loyalty of Canada in the forthcoming struggle. If it was successful in this purpose, as it was, it also added fuel to the flames in the old colonies.

[1] Lecky compares them with Moloch and Belial!

The First Congress, sitting at Philadelphia, framed an address to the British people in which they expressed "astonishment that a British parliament should ever consent to establish in that country a religion that had deluged your island in blood, and dispersed impiety, bigotry, persecution, murder and rebellion throughout every part of the world." The British people at home did not perhaps think very differently, if one may judge by the Gordon Riots of six years later. The Quebec Act could never have been carried if at that date the British House of Commons had been elected by democratic constituencies.

When the war began the Americans invaded Canada and captured Montreal, but Carleton skilfully defended Quebec with the passive support of the French colonists. Thereafter Canada was left alone.

The Loyalists

The independence of the old English colonies produced an entirely new situation in Canada. The "Tories" or Loyalists who had opposed the rebellion and, in many cases fought on the British side, found their situation in the new republic intolerable. About 30,000 of them went to Nova Scotia, and 10,000 crossed the St. Lawrence, making their principal settlement at Kingston, where the river flows out of Lake Ontario. Although they received some help from the home government they suffered great hardships for their loyalty, hacking out new homes for their families from the virgin forest. They were extremely proud of themselves as United Empire Loyalists, and looked somewhat askance on later colonists from America who soon followed in their wake, less from loyalty to England than from disgust with the confusion and anarchy amid which the American Union began its history.

The benevolent despotism which suited French Canada, and the French civil law established by the Quebec Act, would obviously not do for the colonists of Ontario who had been accustomed in their old homes to elective Assemblies. The problem found a solution which endured for fifty years

in Pitt's Canada Act of 1791. Canada was divided into an Upper and a Lower Colony, the Upper being English and the Lower French. Each was given a constitution like those which the old American colonies had enjoyed, an elected Assembly with control over legislation and taxation and a Council nominated by the Governor. The French did not want an elected Assembly, which they regarded as " a machine for taxing us." Indeed for a long time they made very poor use of it. Only the worse type of French colonist took to politics, and the first French newspaper, founded in 1806, was a seditious rag, quite unrepresentative of the sentiments of the solid French *habitant*, or farmer. But we were not worried by their seditiousness, and thought in our superior way, that an Assembly would be good for them in the long run. Perhaps we were right.

There were now six British colonies in North America :— the two Canadas, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland. Each had their own Assemblies, and Lord Dorchester was Governor-General of all of them.

The Anglo-American War

Nothing of note interrupted the steady, if modest, growth of the little colonies till the Anglo-American War of 1812–14.

Neither at the time nor since have we in England taken much interest in that war. For us it was a miserable " side-show," barely distracting our attention at all from the catastrophic events in Russia, Germany and Spain which heralded the downfall of Napoleon. But for Canada it was a great event indeed. The nominal causes of the war were a quarrel about the rights of neutral American trade with Europe, but these grievances had existed for years, and the Americans had as good a grievance against Napoleon as against ourselves. It is notable that the chief commercial States of America opposed the war ; its authors were the politicians of the rising States of the Middle West and their real object was the conquest of Canada. The total white population of all the British colonies in North America at

this date was only 300,000, and the British regular troops were only 5,000, whereas the United States had half a million men under arms. Thus "to Canada the war was her baptism of fire; by it she won that self-respect, those traditions of brave deeds done in defence of hearth and home which are a nation's greatest treasure."

Many Americans were confident that the Canadians would leap at the opportunity of escaping from British "tyranny" to American "freedom." Their proclamations prove as much; but they were deceived. The French Canadian dreaded union with a country in which state-establishment of religion was illegal, and the British Loyalist detested the communities which had expelled him barely a generation before. Moreover, the Red Indians were still a powerful factor in the affairs of the American continent, and they were whole-heartedly on the Canadian side, for as soon as Canada had become a British possession the British home government had ordained that Indian lands were not to be seized or bought by Canadian settlers, but could only be sold to the Crown, which would ensure fair treatment. This is a very early example of the newly awakening conscience of British policy in the matter of the treatment of native peoples; perhaps conscience is not the right word, for honesty was realised to be the best policy. The same year, 1763, had witnessed the devastation of several of the old colonies by the justly outraged Indian hordes of Pontiac. It is, in any case, an illustration of the fact that native races usually receive fairer treatment from a home government than from colonists on the spot. The ordinance of 1763 had been strictly observed, and one of the heroes of the defence of Canada was the Indian chief Tecumseh.

Canada was invaded at various times at various points. The hardest fighting was on the Niagara frontier, between Lakes Ontario and Erie, where General Brock, in Sir Charles Oman's opinion, "saved Canada" and gave his life in the cause. In 1813 the Americans sailed across Ontario, and looted and burned the parliament buildings of York (afterwards Toronto), the capital of Upper Canada. Next year British troops landed

in Virginia and did exactly the same in Washington. The policy of reprisals is generally as unwise as it is unchristian; it certainly proved so in this case, for the burning of Washington was long an anti-British memory in the United States, but it was generally forgotten—outside Canada—that the burning of Washington was merely an answer to the burning of York.

However, this bad and foolish war was ended in 1814, and in 1818 Castlereagh, on behalf of the British Empire negotiated the treaty which fixed the long disputed boundary between Canada and the Union as far as the Rocky Mountains, and, what was more important, secured that that frontier should be undefended by any military or naval armaments or fortresses on either side. The achievement of such undefended frontiers between the Great Powers of Europe is still a distant ideal.

Emigration from Great Britain

Another twenty years passed, years of post-war depression and unrest in the British Isles. For the first time in European history overseas emigration on a large scale and due to economic causes began. It was almost entirely English, Irish, and Scottish, for the German emigration hardly began till the 'forties, and that of southern and eastern Europe much later. It enabled the United States to people the Mississippi valley—but that is not our concern. To Canada came on an average 20,000 every year. The new colonists did not see eye to eye either with the French or with the older "Loyalists." Social and economic discontents revealed the short-comings of the old-fashioned constitutions which Pitt had given to the Canadian colonies.

The Durham Report

An Assembly which does not enjoy responsibility for controlling the government is, said Charles Buller, one of the English Colonial Reformers, "like a fire without a chimney." It produces nothing but oratorical smoke. It thrives upon the grievances which it cannot remedy. In Lower, or French,

Canada, the English minority had grown, and the Governor, impatient of the fractiousness of French politicians, chose his Council almost entirely from the English, whose behaviour to the French was often offensive. So the Assembly passed laws and the Governor in Council vetoed them; and the Assembly made the time-honoured rejoinder by starving the Governor of necessary revenue. In Upper Canada, much the same thing without the racial element. Certain old established Loyalist families, nicknamed the Family Compact, monopolised the Council and controlled the policy of the Governor. The Assembly on the other hand was dominated by the newer and poorer immigrants, and found the measures it advocated rejected by the Governor under the influence of his "Family Compact" Council. The principal question in dispute was the so-called Clergy Reserves. Pitt's Act of 1791 ordained that an amount of land equal to one-seventh of that granted to settlers should be reserved for the endowment of Churches. No one would buy these Church Lands, when free land was available, so they remained uncultivated and an obvious nuisance. It is curious, though characteristic of Canadian history, that the leaders on both sides in Upper Canada were Scotsmen.[1]

In 1837 there were rebellions in both the Canadian Colonies. Both rebellions were, it is true, very weakly supported; the bulk of the French *habitants* followed the lead of their *curés* and gave no support to the rebellion of Papineau, and the discontented majority in Upper Canada disowned the rebel Mackenzie, partly perhaps from fear of the United States, where Mackenzie eventually took refuge. But Lord Melbourne's Government was alarmed, and sent out Lord Durham, a Radical peer well known to be interested in colonial questions, as High Commissioner to investigate and report upon the situation.

[1] In the latter part of the eighteenth century the old Scottish clan system decayed; Chiefs ceased to support retainers and took to sheep farming. Consequently Scottish emigration became a steady outflow and much of it went to the North American colonies. Scottish influence is still strong in Winnipeg, which a modern French writer described as "American six days of the week, but Scottish on Sunday."

Durham's *Report on Canada* (1839) must always be acknowledged to be the foundation of Dominion self-government. Briefly, it recommended the union of the two Canadas in a single colony, and the granting of fully responsible government. That is to say, there was to be a Canadian Cabinet, selected from and responsible to the strongest party in the Canadian parliament, and the Governor was to observe a strict political neutrality, accepting the policy of his ministers. This policy of responsible government had been pressed upon Lord Durham by Robert Baldwin, the leader of the moderates in Upper Canada. The purpose of the union of the two colonies was to secure a British majority. "If the population of Upper Canada," says the *Report*, "is rightly estimated at 400,000, the English inhabitants of Lower Canada at 150,000, and the French at 450,000, the union of the two provinces would not only give a clear English majority but one which would be increased every year by the influence of English emigration."

The Durham *Report* was not, of course, a monument of infallibility. As the sentence just quoted suggests, Durham looked forward to the absorption, possibly to the Anglicization, of the French as an insignificant minority in British Canada. He could hardly have realised that the French would increase nearly as fast by means of their high birth rate as the British population has increased with the assistance of immigration. In the matter of responsible government his policy, though an immense advance on anything yet attempted within any colonial empire, was not the Dominion self-government of to-day. He would have excluded from Canadian control the disposal of unoccupied lands and the imposition of tariffs upon imports.

On the land question he was a disciple of Wakefield (see page 66), and their policy cannot be better expressed than in words afterwards used by Lord Grey, "The waste lands of the vast colonial possessions of the British Empire are held by the Crown as trustee for the inhabitants of the Empire at large (including of course the home population), and not for the inhabitants of the particular province within

which the waste land happens to be situate. Otherwise the consequence would follow that the first inhabitants of these vast provinces, if possessing responsible government, are indefeasibly entitled to administer all the land and land revenue of the great unexplored tract of which they occupy the extremity, without regard to the nation which has founded the settlement, perhaps at great expense, in order to serve as a home for her own emigrants." This seems a very good argument. However the waste lands had to be administered by somebody, and it did not seem to Canadians at all reasonable that waste lands at their own doors should be controlled by a government responsible not to themselves but to an electorate on the other side of the Atlantic. In fact the Canadians were much more anxious to secure the control of their waste lands than the British government was to retain it; and the natural result followed. It was the same with tariffs, when Canada began to protect her infant industries in 1859. The British government emitted a mild protest, and left it at that.

The union of the two Canadas was accomplished by Act of Parliament in 1841. Canadian self-government, on the other hand, like British self-government, is to be found in no statute. It was a change not of law but of policy. For seven years (1839-1846) after the publication of the Durham *Report* each Governor sent out from Britain continued to act as his own Prime Minister. They were, as it happened, admirable men who rendered great services to Canada and won the respect of Canadian politicians, but their Governorships mark the end of the old epoch, not the beginning of the new one. The most notable and fortunate feature of these years was the partnership in opposition of the best statesmen of the two nationalities, Baldwin and Lafontaine. The success of the new experiment, when it came to be tried, would depend upon the capacity of the two races to rise above their racial prejudices.

The early Victorian Whigs seem to be out of favour with the more fashionable historians of to-day, but it was a Whig Prime Minister who sent out Lord Durham, and,

later, a Whig Colonial Secretary, Lord Grey, who sent out Lord Elgin, with whom Canadian responsible government really begins.

(iii) SELF-GOVERNING CANADA

Lord Elgin's Governorship

Lord Elgin has been described by a good judge as the only Englishman[1] of absolutely first-rate quality who devoted himself in the first half of the nineteenth century to colonial questions. The Empire, apart from India, was a matter of little interest in the England of those days; home affairs and foreign policy naturally monopolised the attention of most of the best men.

"You must," said Elgin, "renounce the habit of telling the Colonies that the colonial is a provisional existence. You must allow them to believe that, without severing the bonds which unite them to Great Britain, they may attain a degree of perfection and of social and political development to which organized communities of free men have a right to aspire. . . . Faith when it is sincere is always catching, and I have imparted this faith, more or less thoroughly, to all Canadian statesmen with whom I have been in official relationship since 1848, and to all intelligent Englishmen with whom I have come in contact since 1850."

Not the least of Elgin's merits was that he was an extremely agreeable man to meet. Colonial politicians are often proud and sensitive; they suspect Englishmen of regarding them as "country cousins," and of wanting to improve them. No one could help liking Lord Elgin, and the keenest eye could not discover in him the vices either of an aristocrat or of an official person. Professor Egerton in a striking metaphor compares the Mother Country, granting self-government to a colony, with a firm of engineers setting on foot in a strange country a complicated and elaborate system of machinery. The firms sends one of its staff to

[1] Incidentally he was a Scotsman; but I cannot bring myself to call him "the only Briton," much less "the only Britisher." The English (I mean, British) language is curiously defective.

superintend the working of the machine. Lord Elgin was an ideal superintendent for such a purpose.

The classic, and also comic, illustration of the working of the new system occurred in 1849. The mainly French ministry introduced a bill to legalise the paying of compensation to those who had suffered in the rebellion of 1837. There was a furious outcry from the Loyalists who demanded that Elgin should veto the bill. He refused; and was pelted with Canadian stones and rotten eggs because he insisted on allowing the Canadians to govern themselves. If one tries to imagine the King being pelted by a Tory crowd in London because he refused to veto a Labour bill granting compensation to victims of a General Strike, one realises how little the Canadian enthusiasts of 1849 had grasped the meaning of the new freedom they had secured.

Commercial policy

It was well that Canada received sympathetic treatment in the political sphere at this time, for in the sphere of industry the policy of the Mother Country had inflicted great losses upon her.

Under the old mercantile system Canada had been forced to send her chief exports, particularly timber and wheat, to Britain, where her goods received a "preference," paying smaller import duties than those of foreign countries. In England the old Corn Laws, protecting the home corn-grower at the expense of the home consumer, were becoming untenable, and in 1843 this preference was increased, large reductions being made in the duties on Canadian wheat and flour. This encouraged Canadians to invest in flour mills, but in 1846 all duties on corn, foreign and colonial, were swept away, and Canadian millers and wheat growers, losing their preference in the British market, found ruin staring them in the face. Their position was the more hard as the Navigation laws, confining the Canadian export trade to British markets, were not repealed until three years later. There was a distinct movement in

commercial Montreal towards union with the United States as the only way to economic prosperity. However Elgin secured a Reciprocity Treaty, as it was called, with the United States, establishing free trade between the two countries, thus securing all the economic advantages of union.

Towards Federation

The Union of the two Canadas proved, as indeed Durham had expected, no more than a useful temporary makeshift. It compelled French and British to co-operate, but it would be idle to pretend that they co-operated very easily, for there was (and, indeed, still is) very little social intercourse, mutual understanding, or community of tastes between the two peoples. Moreover the population of Ontario at this time grew faster than that of Quebec. Ontario demanded increased representation in the common parliament, and Quebec held that to grant it would upset an implied bargain. In 1861 the American Civil War broke out, and many Northerners, despairing of conquering the Southern States, talked somewhat wildly about using the vast armies they had raised for conquests at the expense of undeveloped Canada. As a mark of their unfriendliness they abandoned, in 1865, the Reciprocity Treaty with Canada which Elgin had negotiated eleven years before.

There was no denying that Canada, in comparison with her grea tsouthern neighbour, was sadly undeveloped. The States of the Union would soon stretch in an unbroken chain from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and the two oceans would soon be linked by railway. The federal constitution of the United States was admirably adapted to extension, and new stars were added to the star-spangled banner with almost automatic regularity, as each new area filled up and its inhabitants claimed admission to Statehood as the constitutional equals of Massachusetts and Virginia. What had Canada done to develop its Middle West? It had not even established constitutional contact with Nova Scotia.

Everything pointed to Canadian Federation. It would

solve the deadlock within the united Canadas, connect them with the Atlantic colonies, and facilitate Western development. Only by federation could be solved the constitutional problems that would arise in a Dominion extending, like the United States, from one ocean to the other. All the spade-work of preparing the terms of federation was done by Canadian politicians, the chief of whom was John Macdonald, though the British government gave valuable help in the negotiations with the Atlantic colonies. In 1867 the new federal constitution was ready for enactment, as the Dominion of Canada Act, by the British parliament. The fourth stage in Canada's constitutional development had been reached.[1]

The Federal Constitution

The essence of a federal constitution is the distribution of powers between the central, or Dominion, government and the governments of the provinces. It is not necessary here to go into the details of that distribution. The most important and controversial sphere left to the provinces was education; this was inevitable, in order to safeguard the freedom of Quebec province to maintain and develop her Roman Catholic system. In general the powers of the Dominion government are more extensive than those enjoyed by the Federal government in the United States, for the makers of the Canadian constitution took warning from the fact that the weakness or ambiguity of the position of the Federal government of the United States had enabled the Southern States to claim that their secession from the Union was a perfectly legal proceeding. In fact, almost immediately after the federation had been completed, Nova Scotia seems to have regretted that she had consented to

[1] The previous stages being, of course, the Quebec Act, 1774, Pitt's Canada Act, 1791, and the two-fold result of the Durham Report in 1841 and 1846. Canadian statesmen had agreed to call their Federation, the " Kingdom " of Canada. The term Dominion was substituted at the request of the British Foreign Office, which believed that the United States would be offended at the introduction of the term Kingdom into the American Continent !

join it. Howe, the leader of the Secessionists, tried in vain to persuade the British government to amend the Dominion of Canada Act so as to enable Nova Scotia to withdraw, and it appears that the British government were wise in their refusal, for the Nova Scotians, after securing more generous financial arrangements from the Dominion government of Macdonald, became entirely reconciled to their membership of the federation. Newfoundland, though her politicians had taken part in the preliminary discussions. ultimately refused to enter the Dominion, and is still a separate self-governing colony.

Western Development

The time had now come to tackle the problem of developing the West. It was high time, for old Canada had come to a standstill. The making of agricultural land out of primeval forest is a slow and expensive business. It can only be made to pay its initial cost if the land is really good, and the good alluvial lands were by now practically all occupied. At that time the great central plain between Lake Winnipeg and the Rocky Mountains was practically closed to colonization by the Hudson Bay Company, the only agricultural settlement west of the Great Lakes of the St. Lawrence Valley being a little Scottish settlement on the Red River (in what is now Manitoba) founded by Lord Selkirk in 1811. The Hudson Bay Company, knowing that the advent of settlers would drive the fur-bearing animals further north and west, had long pursued a policy of representing the prairie lands as a virtual desert.

Moreover, between the prairie and old Canada lay six hundred miles of real desert land, which still is, and will always remain, an unprofitable wilderness. Westward growth in Canada could not be, as it had been in the United States, an easy development which would, so to speak, look after itself. It needed for its inception a bold act of faith, an act of faith which found its expression in the Canadian Pacific Railway. To-day the C.P.R. is financially one of the soundest concerns in the world. When

first undertaken it was one of the most speculative, setting out, across six hundred miles of desert, to tap the wealth of lands which some said were little better than desert also.

As late as 1881, under the heading of "The Canadian Pacific Bubble," a well-known London weekly warned its readers against being "such mad fools as to put their money into this mad project." "The Canadian Pacific Railway," said the writer, "will run, if it is ever finished, through a country frost-bound through seven or eight months of the year, and will connect with the western part of the Dominion a province [i.e. British Columbia] which embraces about as forbidding a country as any on the face of the earth. . . . Fifty railroads would not galvanise it into prosperity. . . . This 'Dominion' is, in short, a fraud."[1]

However in 1869 the Dominion purchased the whole vast area, several times as large as the territory of the original Dominion, from the Company; and a new province, Manitoba, was established in the following year. The Company retained its trading rights, and is still to-day pursuing its adventurous industry over a more restricted field. Many of the fur-trappers of that date, however, were unwilling to accept the new conditions without a struggle. They were mostly Scots and Frenchmen, the latter being descended from the old *coureurs de bois* of the seventeenth century. Many of them had intermarried with Indians. They led a wild primitive life, and objected strongly to the incoming of agricultural colonists and settled government. A French half-breed, Louis Riel, organized a rebellion, and was backed by adventurers in the United States, who still hoped to secure the Canadian West for their own Union and to confine Canada to the region of the Great Lakes. British troops were in those days stationed in Canada, and Riel's rebellion was suppressed by Colonel Wolseley, afterwards the commander of the expedition sent to the relief of General Gordon in Khartum. Fifteen years later, when Riel organized another rebellion, the Canadian government

[1] Quoted in the *New Statesman*, May 24, 1930.

had no difficulty in suppressing it without British troops.

It is not necessary to tell here the story of the making of the Canadian Pacific Railway. It got unhappily entangled in party politics, and was thus delayed far longer than it should have been. The chief credit for pushing it through should go to two Scotsmen, Sir John Macdonald, the Prime Minister, and Donald Smith, afterwards Lord Strathcona, a business man of great wealth, who backed the scheme with all the finances at his disposal. Smith had the honour of driving home, at Craigellachie in the Selkirk mountains, the last " spike " of the railway in November, 1885.

The West did not immediately justify the hopes entertained of it. Not till about the end of the century did immigrants come and settle in gratifying numbers. The explanation probably is that not till the end of the century were the last of free agricultural lands of the United States filled up. It had long been the custom in the United States for pioneer farmers to take up free land on the frontier of progress ; develop it and hold it until it was worth good money ; then sell out and repeat the process further west. Now at last " further west " meant further north, and over the frontier into Canada. These men were the best sort of pioneers, for they had both experience and money, and many of them were Canadians or sons of Canadians who, a generation earlier, when Canada was at a standstill, had crossed the frontier in the opposite direction. The inflow of these experienced pioneers proved the value of the Canadian prairies and stimulated immigration direct from Great Britain.

Party Politics

Macdonald had come into power in 1878, after a spell of Liberal government, with a policy of " build the railway and protect home industries." He remained in office until his death in 1891. In 1887 the Liberals revived the old policy of reciprocity, or free trade, with the United States, but were decisively beaten. The position of junior partner to the

States, so welcome when secured by Lord Elgin in 1854, was incompatible with modern Canadian ideals of nationhood and self-sufficiency. In 1896 the Liberals, under Sir Wilfrid Laurier, a gifted and fascinating French Canadian, at last returned to power, but only by abandoning "reciprocity." Instead, these impulses towards free trade took an imperial direction, and the Liberals began the policy, since continued and extended, of reducing by a certain percentage their tariffs on imports from Great Britain. In the election of 1911 Laurier returned to "reciprocity," and was decisively defeated, and it was a Conservative government, under Sir Robert Borden, that carried Canada through the Great War.

Modern Canada

During the thirty years between the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway and the outbreak of the Great War, the wealth and population of Canada steadily increased. The increase was no doubt slow compared with the sensational advance in both respects of the United States; but quantity is not everything, and in respect of quality Canada had no cause to envy her neighbour. Emigration into the United States attained unparalleled dimensions, but the emigrants were more and more drawn from the backward peoples of eastern Europe—Polish and Russian Jews furnishing the largest quota. British emigration, on the other hand, was more and more switched over from the United States to Canada. In 1900 only 30 per cent. of British emigrants settled within the Empire; in 1911 80 per cent., of whom the bulk went to Canada. Between 1906 and 1915 there were two and a half million immigrants of whom the vast majority were British, or "Anglo-Saxon" Americans.

Of Canada's part in the Great War we will say nothing until the last chapter of this book. One of the features of the history of post-war Canada has been the great improvement in her relations with the United States. It is necessary to emphasise this fact, for the history we have hitherto recounted inevitably suggests that the United States has

been for Canada the "natural enemy." Natural enemies in a sense they once were, and everything is to be gained by frankly recognising the fact. There was the old enmity of British and French colonies, which did not cease when the French colony acquiesced in British government and the British colonies rejected it. There was the old enmity of American republicans and British Empire Loyalists. There was the later enmity when two growing communities jostled on half a dozen different boundaries—the frontier between Maine and New Brunswick, settled in 1848, the Oregon boundary opposite Vancouver settled in 1846, the Alaska boundary settled in 1903. None of these settlements gave complete satisfaction to both sides, nor did the settlement of a variety of disputes relating to fishing rights on either ocean. Again there was the natural ambition of the larger community to conquer or absorb part or all of the smaller. These things belong to the past. They are already half forgotten, and will in time be wholly forgotten. Co-operation is more and more taking the place of rivalry in the relations between the two great North American communities.

(iv) NEWFOUNDLAND

Newfoundland has steadily refused to become a province of the Dominion of Canada, and its people proudly claim that their island, though its population is barely a quarter of a million, constitutes "the oldest British Dominion." Certainly it has been British territory longer than any of the other lands whose Premiers attend the Imperial Conference.

It is probable, though not certain, that Newfoundland was the land discovered by Cabot (1497) in the first trans-Atlantic voyage ever made from a British port. Early in the sixteenth century the fishermen of all the western European nations began to frequent, and to fight over, the cod fisheries off the Newfoundland coast. The French seem in those days to have outnumbered all the rest, but we

read in a letter of 1578 that "nevertheless the English are commonly lords of the harbours where they fish, according to an old custom of the country."

In 1583 Sir Humphrey Gilbert made his ill-fated attempt to establish a colony in the island, and fifty years later Lord Baltimore tried Newfoundland before transferring his colony to Maryland. It was natural that Newfoundland should be the first thought of English colonizers, since it is nearer to Europe than any part of the American continent: natural also that second thoughts should take them further on and further south, for the winters of Newfoundland are extremely long, bleak, and forbidding. The fishing interest discouraged colonization, much as the Hudson Bay Company discouraged it within their own sphere of industry, and it was not till 1813 that the granting of land to colonists was formally legalised. The fisherman preferred to think of Newfoundland as (to quote a description of 1793) "a great moored ship near the Banks during the fishing season for the convenience of English fishermen only." On such a "ship" colonists were resented as land-lubbers. The governorship of the island was, by custom, given to the captain of the first ship to enter the harbour at the opening of the fishing season, and not till 1729 was a regular government established.

The island was long disputed property between the British and the French. The Treaty of Utrecht (1713) gave it to Britain but allowed the French to use its shores for certain purposes. The continued presence of the French in Newfoundland meant the continuance of friction between the rival fisher-folk. Pitt wanted to abolish the French privileges after the Seven Years War, but he was not allowed to do so, and they were extended after the war in which the French allied themselves with our American colonists. Squabbles between English colonists and French fishermen continued down to a surprisingly recent date. At last a happy solution was found. In 1904 British and French statesmen set themselves, as a foundation of the *entente cordiale*, to settle all the old disputes between the two

great nations. There were disputes in Newfoundland, Siam, Madagascar, Egypt and elsewhere. It was much easier to settle all these disputes together than to settle any one of them separately, for a French concession in one part of the world could be balanced against an English concession in another. Thus in 1904 the French gave up all their claims in Newfoundland and were compensated by receiving certain territories on the Gambia and between the Niger and Lake Chad in West Africa.

Newfoundland develops slowly and the fisheries are still much the greatest export industry of the colony. There is also a lumber-trade; the timber is excellently suited for making wood-pulp paper, and this industry has developed with the great growth of cheap newspapers. The paper of some of the most popular English dailies is made in Newfoundland paper mills.

Attached to Newfoundland is the eastern part of the great peninsula of Labrador. The coast of Labrador was one of the first regions of North America to be visited by Europeans. Norsemen knew it before the Norman conquest and Cabot reached it in 1498, but it presented no attractions. At one time responsibility for the fisheries on its coast was attached to the Governor of the colony of Massachusetts. Thence this duty was transferred to Newfoundland, which passed it on to Canada, but was persuaded later on to take back the unwelcome gift. In quite recent times Labrador has risen in esteem, for it is known to possess vast reserves of iron and other metals. The question then arose, whose was this vast peninsula? or—more accurately, where was the frontier between Canada (Quebec province) and Newfoundland? Canada had assumed that she owned all but the eastern coastal strip, but Newfoundland was not disposed to agree. The case was argued before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and, after an exhaustive examination in which leading British lawyers took part on either side, the whole of the area drained by the eastward flowing rivers was, in 1927, allotted to Newfoundland. The result has been to improve very considerably the future prospects

of the island colony. The case is also an excellent illustration of the value of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as a supreme Court in imperial cases.

The greatest figure in the modern history of Labrador is Sir Wilfred Grenfell, popularly known as Grenfell of Labrador. Abandoning the prospect of a brilliant medical career in England, he went to Labrador as a medical missionary in 1892, and has ever since devoted his life to the welfare of the population, Eskimo and White, scattered along its coasts. Not only by his medical work but by the organization of every kind of social and educational service he has fulfilled his life's ambition of making Labrador a country fit for human habitation.

Chapter IV

AUSTRALIA

(i) THE COUNTRY

AUSTRALIA is about the same size as the United States. Its population, 7,500,000, is two million less than that of Canada, and only about one-fifteenth of the population of the States. In both Canada and Australia there is scope for a very great increase, but it would be idle to suppose that in either will the population ever overtake or go near to overtaking that of the great Republic, for both Canada and Australia, unlike the United States, contain vast areas entirely unsuited to civilized life.

Australia contrasted with Canada

The contrasts between Canada and Australia are obvious and many. The history of Canada begins with a great river, and until the last sixty years all its history has centred round the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes. Australia, on the other hand, has less in the way of rivers than any other region of the world. A glance at the map will show that there is only one extensive river system, that of the Murray and the Darling, and of these two rivers the Darling is, in dry years, no more than a string of stagnant pools. Also, an immovable barrier of sand closes all this river system against navigation from the sea. Hence no great city stands either at the mouth or on the banks of these rivers. As for the " Great Lakes " of Australia, an early explorer said of one of them, Lake Eyre, that it made him thirsty to look at it and that the storms of salt dust which blew out of it had turned all his black boys white. Another of them is

Lake Torrens. In 1856 an enterprising pioneer suggested the establishment of a ferry service across the lake; the next year another explorer nearly succeeded in crossing it on foot, but broke through the brittle crust into a quagmire of hot blue salt mud. In fact all the centre of Australia has very little rain and a great deal of hot sunshine. Only a tenth of the rain that falls finds its way into the rivers; of the rest some evaporates and the rest sinks through the earth and flows underground. The big lakes are shallow "dead seas" with no outlets, great saucers of brackish water, full one year and nearly empty another. In fact, though these lakes lie within a few hundred miles of Adelaide, they are so useless that they were never completely surveyed until the days of aeroplanes.

Canada developed first up its great river and round its great Lakes and then along its trans-continental railway. It is a linear development across the south of the Dominion. All the big towns, from Vancouver to Quebec, are within a short distance of the southern frontier. Population and agriculture thin out as one goes northward towards the empty regions of the Arctic wastes. Australian colonization started from a strip of coast which is shut off from the interior of the continent by high mountains. Strange as it may seem, the main lines of development in early days were not up river valleys but down them. The Sydney colonists crossed the mountain range that lies fifty miles inland, and found the sources of the fertile valleys of the tributaries of the Darling and the Murray, flowing inland downwards and westwards. Until very recent times all the railways of Australia were simply local lines centering upon the five State capitals. Inter-State railway communication was, and still is, hampered by the fact that the various States adopted different gauges.

The first trans-continental line, connecting Adelaide with Perth, was not built until just before the war, and the north-and-south line, connecting Adelaide with Darwin, is not finished yet, though there is already a regular service of motors.

The Influence of Rainfall

Rainfall is the decisive factor in locating the population of Australia. Roughly speaking it is heaviest on the coasts and diminishes towards the centre, but the north and east of the continent have a better supply than the south and west. Melbourne has the same rainfall as London, 25 inches; Sydney rather more, Adelaide rather less. Queensland and the north in general have a heavy rainfall, but the climate in the north is tropical and unsuited to White labour. Tropical Australia could never, on account of its sterile soil, hold a dense population like that of Java, the chief island of the Dutch East Indies. More than a third of the continent, comprising the great bulk of Western Australia has less than ten inches of rainfall a year, and ten inches is not enough for pasture land, except in the most southern parts, where the climate is cooler and the evaporation therefore less. Generally speaking, a map of Australia which marks the rainfall will also indicate what, outside the northern tropical area, are the capacities of the country and the occupations of its inhabitants. When the rainfall is over twenty inches, the land is fit for intensive farming—dairying, orchards, timber, maize and sugar. The next belt, from twenty inches to ten, is the land for sheep and wheat-growing. From ten inches down to five, in the southern parts, sheep rearing over wide areas is possible. When the rainfall is under five inches towards the south, or under ten towards the north, nothing can be done. This is the " dead heart of Australia."

It remains to be said that, just as Canadian farming has pushed its way steadily towards the Arctic, so the " dead heart " of Australia has steadily contracted. " Resist the desert and it will flee from you," has been a sound maxim of Australian patriotism. " The country from sea to sea," say some, " is one vast continent of undeveloped resources. The desert is a myth. We will wipe it off the map." That is the right spirit, and it is a spirit that has worked wonders. Many areas reputed barren, which have drawn a sudden

influx of population owing to the discovery of precious metals, have continued to flourish as farming areas after the mines have been exhausted, though in other areas the exhaustion of the mines has meant the relapse of busy mining camps into silence and desert. There will perhaps always be a dead heart, but outside and all around that heart are thousands of square miles which only await development.

Development of the Interior

Development means two things: water and transport. The sources of water are, again, two-fold; artesian wells and irrigation. Many apparently unpromising areas of central Australia are rich in mysterious supplies of underground water, which is now being tapped on a vast scale. In some places the chemical properties of this water make it useless for watering gardens, but in most it is good enough for watering cattle, as has been proved on the great cattle ranches in the interior of Queensland. The storage of river water by means of dams and its distribution by irrigation channels is playing an even greater part. The Hume Dam, now being constructed on the frontiers of New South Wales and Victoria at the cost of £5,000,000 will be the biggest thing of its kind in the world.

Modern transport, by motor and aeroplane, which in small and fully developed countries like England is no more than an additional convenience of life, revolutionizes the prospects of Australia. Aeroplane routes with weekly services have already thrown a girdle practically all round the continent and across the interior of Queensland into the North of Australia. They serve not only their established stations but, in emergencies, every settler within sight of their pilots. "When someone is dangerously ill and there is no help at hand, a square of white sheets is made on the ground with a red blanket in the centre. The passing aeroplane sees this, understands, makes a landing, and carries off the patient to a hospital perhaps hundreds of miles away."[1]

[1] G. S. Browne, *Australia*.

Natural divisions of the Country

Australia extends from the tropics far into the temperate zone. Northern Queensland is no further from the equator than southern India, whereas Tasmania is on the southern latitude corresponding to Italy or New York. In Queensland can be found regular jungle country—bananas, coconuts and sugar plantations; in the far south, scenery not markedly different from that of southern England. The typical Australian scene however is a wide and often treeless plain, admirably adapted to sheep or cattle ranching. In the west the plain is all too often desert; the camel served the purposes of transport until, very recently, it gave place to the motor car, and the closest parallels would be found neither in India nor in England but in Africa.

Geographically, Australia falls into three well marked divisions. In the west, and occupying half the continent, is a table-land comparable with Central Africa, but not so high; it seldom rises above 2,000 feet. Much of it is, and perhaps always will be, unoccupied.

East of the table-land, and stretching north and south across the continent from the Gulf of Carpentaria to South Australia, are the Central Plains. These present many different features. Tropical vegetation in the extreme north gives place as one goes southwards to "hot grass lands" well suited to cattle ranching. Then comes the "Dead Sea" country of the Lakes, and finally the sheep rearing and wheat-growing areas of South Australia.

Further still to the east lie the Eastern Highlands and here the history of Australia has hitherto been mainly made. A long chain of mountains, rising in places to 7,000 feet, runs from Cape York, parallel with the eastern coast, down to the Bass Strait, and reappears in Tasmania. Here in the steep short valleys on the eastern slope the Australian sheep industry was first established; here on the far longer, gently sloping valleys of the inland or western, slope, it found its later and fuller development, leaving the eastern valleys to the wheat grower, the fruit grower,

and the dairy farmer. Here lie, on the southern and eastern coasts, the great cities of Sydney and Melbourne, which together contain a third of the whole population of Australia.

Very roughly one may say that the vast table-land is Western Australia, that the central plains are South Australia, and the Northern and Central Territories, which South Australia has recently handed over to the Federal Government, and that the eastern highlands are Victoria, New South Wales, and most of Queensland, though part of the last-named should be reckoned in the central plains.

Native Peoples

The native peoples of Australia, the Blackfellows, are very primitive savages, incapable of playing a part, however humble, in civilized life. They shun the centres of White civilization, and it is possible to live a life-time in Australia without ever seeing one of them. Thus, though their customs are of interest to the student of primitive man, they play practically no part in the history of Australia as a province of the British Empire. Those who have got to know them well find in them much of the charm of high-spirited children. It is supposed that they numbered about 150,000 when the first settlers arrived. Now they are about 60,000 in number and of these two-thirds live in the Northern and Central Territories, where the White population is no more than a few thousand. The Tasmanians were a still more primitive race, not advanced beyond the early stone or palæolithic stage of human development. It is said that they were the original Australian race, and had been driven into Tasmania in remote times by the on-coming Blackfellows, before Tasmania was separated from Victoria by sea. It is also said that, when the White man arrived, they were already perishing of starvation. However that may be, the tender mercies of civilization were too much for them, and the last of this interesting race died some seventy years ago.

AUSTRALIA : POLITICAL



AUSTRALIA : CLIMATIC

The area within the dotted line has a rainfall of less than 15″. The shaded areas are those of artesian water supply

Animal Life

The animals native to Australia are as primitive as its native human inhabitants. They belong for the most part to orders which were exterminated ages ago in Asia by more efficient rivals. Fortunately for the Australian species, Australia separated itself from Asia before the tiger and his like had been evolved. The commonest forms are the marsupials, who bear their young in a pouch—kangaroos, wallabies, possums, and a charming little creature called the native bear, which is a sort of "Teddy bear" of real life. Still more remarkable and primitive is the duck-billed platypus, which has a furry body, a duck's bill, webbed feet, and lays eggs. All these creatures are harmless, and are protected against destruction. Very different is the dingo, a very large and ferocious native dog, who is by no means the farmer's friend.

The animals that have so contributed to Australia's prosperity, the sheep, the cow, and also the horse and the camel, were all imported. There was also inadvertently imported an animal which has cost Australia dear. In about 1860 two dozen rabbits were introduced as pets to Barwon Park, near Geelong. Six years later 20,000 of their descendants were destroyed, but more survived. What the rabbit population is to-day no one knows, but the damage it has done is reckoned at hundreds of millions of pounds, even though, on the other side of the account, must be set the 700,000,000 rabbit skins exported in the last ten years. The herds of sheep and cattle could at once be increased by thirty per cent. if the rabbit, which eats the best grasses (as well as much else of value besides) could be exterminated: but his extermination is an unsolved problem. Nature evidently intended Australia for the rabbit, though she forgot herself to put him there. Man has made good the omission, and bitterly regrets it.

Australia's birds are as curious as her animals. There is the great emu, which is so primitive that it has not developed wings, and the laughing jackass, whose sardonic

cackles and loud guffaws occasionally break in upon the deadly seriousness of the Test Matches.

Industries

Sheep-farming was the first and is still the greatest of Australian industries. There were in 1927 over a hundred million sheep in the country, and the wool crop is greater not only than that of any other country but greater than that of any other continent. In Queensland, cattle are reared for meat and there is a large export trade, while the dairy cattle of the south maintain an export trade in butter. Wheat is grown for export in the south-eastern States, and is harvested by means of an Australian invention called the "combined harvester," which reaps, threshes, winnows, and stores the grain in a bin. When this remarkable machine has gone round the field, all the farmer has to do is to pull a lever and empty the grain from the bin into his sacks. The fruit crops are, in order of importance, grapes, apples, oranges, peaches, bananas and pine-apples.

Most of these industries owe a debt, some more than others, to the invention of refrigeration for transport, which began in the 'eighties of the last century. First applied to meat, it has since been extended to various kinds of fruit. The beef export trade of Queensland owes everything to it. For the sheep farmer, meat export is a secondary consideration but a very important one. But for refrigeration years of drought, which occur from time to time, would be worse calamities than they now are. If the farmer had not grass or water for his sheep, and if his local customers needed no more mutton, it was something to be able to export the carcase to be eaten elsewhere. Before refrigeration the only thing to do with an unwanted sheep was to boil it down and see what could be made of it as tallow.

Sugar might be extensively grown in Queensland but for the fact that its cultivation involves heavy labour under tropical conditions. In the nineteenth century Polynesian or Kanaka labour was imported from the South Sea Islands. The conditions of Kanaka labour were in many respects

bad and the traffic has now been stopped. So long as Australia excludes coloured immigrants the sugar industry is not likely to develop.

Gold mining has played a sensational part in Australian history. In the 'fifties it made the fortune of Victoria and in the 'nineties it brought prosperity to the hitherto feeble colony of Western Australia; but gold-fields get worked out, and the Australian gold-fields, having played their part in the making of Australia, are at present very much on the decline. Queensland has enjoyed a sensational boom in copper, and New South Wales in the silver and lead of Broken Hill. More valuable perhaps to-day are the rich iron ores of New South Wales and South Australia, which have made the coal-field of Newcastle (N.S.W.) a great industrial centre. The bridge now being built, with Australian iron, across Sydney Harbour will be the biggest bridge in the world.

Australia protects her industries against foreign competition, but gives a substantial preference to imports from Great Britain. Nearly half of the total import and export trade is with the Mother Country.

(ii) AUSTRALIA UNDER BRITISH CONTROL 1788–1851

Contrast with Canada

In the last section a contrast was drawn between the geography of Canada and Australia. The contrast is equally sharp between the histories of the two countries. Canada was a French colony a hundred and fifty years before the British conquest, and since Canada became British, a leading thread running through and unifying its history has been the relationship of the British and French colonists. In Australia the white population is and always has been almost entirely British. Another continuous feature of Canadian history has been the relationship between Canada and the United States, a relationship inevitably close, whether friendly or unfriendly, since the frontier between them is at most a lake or a river, and for the greater part no more than an invisible parallel of latitude. Australia is an island

like Great Britain, and her nearest neighbours are the savages of New Guinea; the nearest White man's land is New Zealand, and that is more than a thousand miles away. Hence her history is singularly self-contained. The British have made their own destiny there, unhelped and unhindered by the rest of the world.

Discovery and Exploration

It is one of the curious accidents of exploration that Australia remained so long practically unknown to the European world. Portuguese and Spaniards were active in the East Indies near by from early in the sixteenth century and the Dutch soon followed them there. Yet in the reign of George I, two hundred years after Magellan reached the Philippines on his voyage round the world, it was possible for Swift to choose for his imaginary island of Lilliput a latitude and longitude which would place it in the middle of Australia. Of course explanations can be found for the long neglect of Australia. The trade winds tend to carry ships well to the north of it whether they are sailing across the Indian ocean or the Pacific. Also much of the coast land of Australia is unattractive to the explorer on the look-out for El Dorados, and the part of it which experience has proved the best, namely the south-east, is the part furthest away from lands already known. There can be no doubt that, if the north coast of Australia had been attractive, it would have been occupied by the Dutch in the seventeenth century.

The first Europeans to see the coasts of Australia were Dutchmen who, in 1606, sailed southwards from New Guinea. They entered the Gulf of Carpentaria but failed to find the Torres Strait between Cape York and New Guinea; hence they imagined the land they found to be a great southern extension of New Guinea, in fact the *Terra Australis Incognita* (Unknown South-east land) with which map makers had been wont to adorn their maps as something to balance the great southern projection of Africa. From this time onwards many mariners, mostly

Dutch, touched various points on the north-western Australian coast, to which they gave the name of New Holland. The first systematic voyage of exploration was that of the Dutchman Tasman in 1642–44, when Charles I was fighting against his rebel Puritans. Tasman landed in Tasmania,[1] which he believed to be part of "New Holland," and crossed to the islands which he named New Zealand after one of the provinces of his native country. It seemed likely that the Dutch would now go ahead and make Australia their own, but orders came from Holland that the East India Company was to abandon unprofitable exploration and concentrate attention on its trade. Forty years later the Englishman Dampier made some exploration of the Australian coast, but his work was perfunctory and his account of its results discouraging. Australia was left alone for another eighty years, until the time of Captain Cook.

After the end of the Seven Years' War (which gave us Canada), the British Admiralty had the idea of employing some of its naval captains in exploration. James Cook was the son of an agricultural labourer in the Cleveland district of Yorkshire who won his way up the naval service by sheer genius and energy unaided by any advantages of birth or wealth. He had been employed in sounding and surveying the course of the St. Lawrence in the year that Wolfe captured Quebec, and in 1768 he was commissioned to take a party of astronomers to Tahiti to observe a transit of Venus across the disc of the sun, and afterwards to make search for the unknown continent on his return voyage. In the course of this and succeeding voyages Cook explored and mapped out almost the whole coast of Australia, New Zealand, a large number of the islands of the Pacific, and the Western Coast of North America, thus making far the greatest contribution to geographical knowledge since Magellan's voyage round the world, two hundred and fifty years before.

[1] Tasman called it Van Diemen's Land after the Dutch Governor of the East Indies. Its name was changed to Tasmania when the island ceased to be a convict station in 1853.

Transportation

Cook himself was not much impressed by Australia, and apologized to the Admiralty for not discovering something better, but one of his companions, a botanist named Joseph Banks, conceived a curious enthusiasm for the land round Botany Bay, of which he greatly exaggerated, as it happened, the fertility. By this time the American War of Independence had begun and it was no longer possible to send convicts to the old American colonies, and Banks, who had become an important and influential man of science since his return to England, advocated the claims of New South Wales.[1] There was at one time a scheme for carrying the American Loyalists to New South Wales, and providing them with either convict, or Chinese, or Kanaka labour. This fell through, and the history of British Australia began with the arrival in January 1788 of Captain Arthur Phillip with the warship *Sirius*, three storeships full of seeds, implements and cattle, and six transports containing 750 convicts. After a glance at Botany Bay, which proved quite unsuitable for settlement, Phillip entered the noble harbour of Port Jackson close by and laid the foundations of Sydney. The name of Botany Bay, however, took the fancy of the British public, and it was long used not only to describe the convict settlement at Sydney but also as a general name for convict settlements. It was, after all, the imaginary charms of Botany Bay which had attracted the botanist Banks, who, more than any one else, directed the attention of the British Government to the possible uses of Australia.

Sheep-farming

The first twenty-five years of British Australian history coincided in date with the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, and it may safely be said that no one in Great Britain except a few officials responsible for the

[1] The name had been given to that part of the Australian coast by some of Cook's sailors, who thought the view of it from the sea resembled the coast of Carmarthen.

transportation system took any interest in the new colony. Captain Phillip and the Governors who succeeded him—all of them naval officers—had enough to do to cope with two elementary problems, the supply of food and the maintenance of discipline. Food had to be imported from South Africa or China; the colony was not self-supporting until 1807. When convict ships succeeded in arriving and food ships failed to do so, famine stared the colony in the face. Discipline was an equally formidable problem, and the worst offenders were not the convicts but the regiment that had been enlisted with the special purpose of guarding them. It is hardly surprising that the service did not attract the best type of men. Many joined with a vague prospect of getting rich quick somehow or other, and they occupied themselves in importing or distilling spirits, and in bullying their Governors. One of the officers of this corps, however, and not the least insubordinate, was the founder of Australia's greatest industry. Captain John Macarthur perceived that the country was admirably suited for sheep-rearing. There were no sheep, nor indeed any other ruminant animal, native to Australia, and in 1797 he imported some Spanish merino sheep, the best of all wool-bearers, from South Africa.[1] In the same year coal was discovered seventy miles north of Sydney at a place appropriately called Newcastle.

Governor Macquarie

The colony made a great stride forward under Colonel Macquarie (1810–21), the first Governor who was not a naval officer. Macquarie established sound discipline within the New South Wales Corps, many of whom had now become settled on the land, and devoted himself to promoting the welfare of the convicts. Many of them were not hardened criminals at all, but unfortunate persons who, under the

[1] Macarthur's flock was the result of elaborate scientific breeding. "He crossed the breeds of some Bengal and English sheep, and crossed the result again with some Spanish merino sheep from South Africa. Not satisfied, he went home to England and obtained some pure Spanish merino rams from George III's private flock." (G. S. Browne, *Australia*).

atrocious criminal laws of the time, had been transported for petty offences or political insubordination. For example, men had been transported for expressing sentiments in favour of the French Revolution or the establishment of a republic in Ireland. Macquarie encouraged the convicts to earn their freedom by good conduct, and secured them grants of land. He encouraged these "emancipists," as they were called, in every possible way. The best of them were appointed magistrates, and invited to dinner at the Governor's table, to the great disgust of those who had never been convicts. Macquarie set himself in fact to break down the social barrier between freemen and "freedmen." It was an unpopular task, but no greater service could have been rendered to the infant colony. He also immensely extended the area of settlement. Previous governors had regarded the Blue Mountains, forty miles inland as a useful wall to their prison; Macquarie actively promoted the crossing of the range, and Blaxland and others who made the crossing found themselves in the gently sloping valleys which were to be the finest pasture lands of Australia. Two of the tributaries of the Darling, the Lachlan and the Maequarie, still bear this excellent Governor's names. Unhappily, like Warren Hastings, he got little thanks for his work. Macarthur, who had been exiled to England for insubordination, secured his censure and recall. He had been, it was said, extravagant and tyrannical, and had carried his emancipist policy too far. Certainly he had ruled with a high hand. He was a military man in charge of a convict settlement. Free men who chose to come to Australia could not, he held, bring the Habeas Corpus Act along with them, and when people gave him trouble Macquarie sometimes had them flogged without any trial.

The first Constitution

But the days of martial law were now drawing to an end. In 1823 the British government gave the colony its first civil constitution. Instead of being primarily a convict settlement, into which free settlers had to fit themselves as

best they could, New South Wales was henceforth to be what Virginia had been before the War of Independence, a settlement of free men to whom convicts were sent as bondservants. The Governor was given a nominated Council to advise him, a system of law-courts with a Chief Justice was introduced, and the Governor could make no law until the Chief Justice had certified that it was consistent with the laws prevailing in the Mother Country. In 1828 the Council was given a veto upon the Governor's legislation. Meanwhile freedom of the press had been introduced, and one of the first Australian newspapers was established by William Charles Wentworth in 1824. Wentworth was a remarkable man. He may be said to be one of the first native-born British Australians, for he was born, the son of an Irish surgeon, in Norfolk Island, which had been occupied by an expedition from Australia in the earliest years of the penal settlement. He had been to England for his education and, while still a Cambridge undergraduate, had written a book on Australasia. His newspaper devoted itself to advocating the renewal of Macquarie's emancipist policy, and the introduction of genuine self-government at the earliest possible date. He engaged in a long struggle with the somewhat tyrannical and conservative Governor Darling, and with the help of supporters in the British House of Commons, secured his recall by the Whig Government (the "Reform Bill" Government) in 1831.

The convict problem had been considerably eased by the establishment, in 1817, of a second convict colony in Tasmania, to which the worse kind of convicts were henceforth sent. Tasmania, in fact, became a kind of scape-goat for New South Wales.

Meanwhile the Napoleonic Wars were long over and emigration due to industrial depression had begun, but for a long time what came to Australia was a very thin trickle compared with what went to Canada. The reasons for this are obvious—a voyage of 12,000 miles half-way round the earth, and the bad name which naturally adhered to a convict settlement. One may almost be surprised that any

came at all. The average numbers were 300 a year from 1815 to 1825 and 1,000 a year from 1825 to 1830. Much had been accomplished in Canada by organized emigration run by the Canadian Land Company, which obtained a grant of a million acres of land in Ontario, and sold lots at low prices to intending emigrants. Companies of the same kind attempted to organize emigration to Australia, and in 1829 an attempt was made to found a wholly free settlement at the other end of the continent, on the Swan River, but it was absurdly mismanaged and ended in failure. It led, however, to the foundation of Western Australia.

The Wakefield System

These experiments attracted the attention of Edward Gibbon Wakefield, a remarkable man, about whom very different opinions have been held. He was a born agitator, and like many agitators he was aggressive, conceited, quarrelsome, and unscrupulous, but he had an unquenchable enthusiasm for colonization, and he devoted his life to the cause. He began to interest himself in the subject when he was serving a sentence of three years imprisonment for abducting a young lady from a girls' school. From prison he published in 1829, under an assumed name, his famous *Letter from Sydney*—though he had never been within ten thousand miles of it. The gist of his argument was what came to be known as the Wakefield Land System. A colony, he held, ought to develop within itself a varied community of the English type. But if land was given away free or for almost nothing, all would be masters and there would be no servants. A labouring class was necessary: it should not be supplied by convicts and could no longer be supplied by the slave trade. He proposed that land should only be sold for a "sufficient" price, and that the funds raised by the sale of land should be used to finance the free emigration of labourers. He defined "sufficient" price, as the sum which an emigrated labourer could be expected to save from his wages in the course of five years. Thus a destitute man would be able to get to the colonies for nothing;

he would work as a labourer on someone else's land for five years; then, if he had been frugal, he could buy land for himself, and the purchase price would serve to bring out more labourers. It was an ingenious scheme. Wakefield's critics point out that it never worked; his admirers point out, with equal truth, that it never had a fair trial—at any-rate in Australia. What is certain is that, though Wakefield's system may not have had a fair trial, Wakefield's prolonged agitation, and the influence he exercised over more powerful men, such as Lord Durham and the Colonial Secretary, Lord Grey, did a great deal to promote interest at home in the fortunes of Australia, and also New Zealand.

Abolition of Transportation

Lord Grey, son of the Reform Bill Prime Minister, entered the Colonial Office for his first term of service there in 1830. He at once came under Wakefield's influence, and Bourke, who became Governor of New South Wales in the next year, raised the price of land and used half the proceeds for financing emigrants from England. The British Government also began to make grants in assistance of emigration. The trickle of emigration quickened to a stream. There were 1,500 emigrants to Australia in 1830, 14,000 in 1838, 32,000 in 1841. Some of these settled, away from the convict colony, at Melbourne, which was, however, at that date within the area of New South Wales. Others settled in the colony of South Australia. The new immigrants demanded the abolition of the transportation of convicts and, though some of the older and bigger landowners clung to the system which ensured their supply of labour, Wakefield's group of Colonial Reformers in England supported the demand. Since the reform of the English criminal law the supply of the more amiable type of convict had practically ceased. Also, New South Wales was demanding self-government, and this was felt to be inconsistent with transportation. In 1840 it was abolished for New South Wales, though it continued for some years for Tasmania and Western Australia. In 1833 the population of New

South Wales was 60,000, of whom forty per cent. were convicts; in 1850 it was 265,000 of whom the convicts constituted less than one per cent.

Self-Government

In 1842 New South Wales was given a second step in promotion towards self-government. The nominated Council of 1824 became a Council in which two-thirds of the members were elected, on a fairly high franchise. The journalist Wentworth entered the Council, and at once a struggle began with Governor Gipps on the land question. It was an exceedingly complicated problem, for a fair price for one piece of land was not a fair price for another, and prices that were reasonable for agricultural land were absurd for distant and wide stretching pastures. Wentworth's party asserted that the Council, as representing the people of the colony, ought to control the price of land for themselves; self-government was a mockery without it. Gipps maintained the view of Lord Grey and the Wakefield school that unoccupied lands did not belong to the colonists who lived next door to them but to the Crown, and that such lands should be held in trust by the British Government and administered in the interests of the Empire as a whole.[1] Gipps resigned, worn out by opposition, and his successor gave the Council all they asked. In 1846 Lord Grey made an attempt to revive transportation, but it encountered such an outcry of opposition that, harassed by this and other Australian controversies, he asked a Committee of the Privy Council to hold an enquiry into Australian affairs. The Committee reported that the Australian colonies, Victoria being separated from New South Wales, should be invited to draw up proposals for their own constitutions as self-governing colonies. In 1851 the four colonies, New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, and Tasmania, set to work to draw up their own constitutions, and these were accepted and legalised by an Act of Parliament in 1855.

[1] Lord Grey's view has already been quoted, see p. 99.

Thus, starting from the most unfavourable beginnings, British Australia had, by the middle of the nineteenth century, attained self-government.

Exploration

Much had also been done in the way of exploring the vast continent which lay behind the small areas as yet occupied. In 1799 Bass and Flinders sailed round Tasmania, and proved the existence of the strait that still bears the former's name. By 1830 Sturt had traced the courses of the Darling and the Murray from their sources in the Blue Mountains down to the coast of what was afterwards South Australia. By 1840 Eyre had made his way inland to the lake which bears his name, and along the southern coast all the way to the isolated settlement of Western Australia. By 1850 Leichhardt had crossed Queensland to the Gulf of Carpentaria. By 1865 all the eastern half of the continent was roughly mapped out and Sturt had crossed the two thousand miles of the central plains from Adelaide to the northern coast and back again. The Australian explorers, of whom these are only a few, are little known outside their own country. Most of them faced and endured incredible hardships, and several of them lost their lives. They did for Australia what Livingstone, Stanley, Burton and Speke did for Central Africa.

(iii) SELF-GOVERNING AUSTRALIA

The Finding of Gold

At the very moment when the politicians of the four colonies were engaged in drafting their constitutions, in 1851, the attention of the ordinary man was drawn off to something he found vastly more exciting—the discovery of gold. There had recently been a rush from all over the world to the new gold-field in California, and an Australian named Hargraves, who went to California, was struck by the similarity between this new American gold field and the Macquarie valley in his native New South Wales. He returned

home, and found what he hoped for. Australians flocked to their own gold-field, and the new colony of Victoria began to fear that its population would vanish before its constitution was drafted. Then a far richer gold field was discovered in Victoria, and population streamed to Ballarat and Bendigo, first from other parts of Australia and then from all over the world. Crude lust for gold did more to populate Australia than all the careful schemes of the Colonial Reformers. In twenty years the population of Victoria rose from 77,000 to 720,000, and that of New South Wales doubled in ten years. Queensland was a separate colony in 1859 with a few thousand white inhabitants; gold was discovered there in 1867 and in 1871 the population was 125,000. Even Western Australia, which lived on a supply of convicts till 1868 and long continued minute and isolated, found gold at Kalgoorlie, 350 miles inland from Perth, in 1890. The Western Australian gold field quickly became the most productive in Australia and raised the colony from complete insignificance to considerable prosperity. South Australia alone lacked gold.

The early days of the gold rush were troublous times. The gold diggers were adventurers, with the good and the bad qualities one would expect, and among them were ex-convicts from Tasmania and a sprinkling of revolutionists who had played parts in the unsuccessful European revolutions of 1848. Moreover, the normal industries of the country were for a time alarmingly denuded of their workers; sheep were left unsheared and crops unreaped. There was even a kind of rebellion against the government of Victoria on the question of the taxation of the gold diggers, known as the affair of the Eureka stockade, a trivial and discreditable business which none the less won the sympathy of people who honoured "Liberty" without understanding that liberty is secured by good government and not by defiance of the law. But the troublous times were soon over. The gambling stage of gold-digging is, by its nature, brief, and the miners settled down to regular and profitable industry, and by their industry they fertilized every other industry

of the continent. The colonies developed home markets for their agriculture and livestock. The farmers of New South Wales profited almost as much by selling cattle and sheep to the diggers of Victoria, as the diggers themselves profited by the gold they found. South Australia developed a prosperous wheat industry, and many of those who came out to dig left the mines and found a living as South Australian farmers. Tasmania, well rid of some of its ex-convicts, developed a profitable line of market-gardening.

The new Constitutions

Meanwhile the new constitutions had come into force. Each colony had still, of course, a British Governor, whose duty, not always an easy one in these small and unstable communities, was to follow the tradition of impartiality and aloofness from party strife established by Lord Elgin in Canada. Each colony had an Assembly and a Council, and no two colonies adopted the same arrangements for their election. South Australia, the most democratic, had an Assembly elected by all male residents and a Council elected by all property-owners. Victoria was the first British community to establish the system of secret voting—by ballot. At the other extreme, New South Wales had an Assembly elected by property-owners and a Council nominated by the Governor.

Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century the Australian colonies grew quietly and steadily. In 1850 the white population was less than half a million; in 1870 it was still well under two million; in 1900 it was approaching four million; to-day it is over seven million.

Political Difficulties

It is not possible to make an interesting story out of Australian political history from the grant of self-government to the federation of the colonies in one Commonwealth in 1901. Each colony pursued its own way, enjoyed—if that is the right word—its own petty quarrels, and solved, wisely or less wisely, its own problems. The manners and

morals of many Australian politicians in the early days of self-government were an easy target for criticism. When British statesmen at home contemplated a decisive step towards democracy in the form of the Second Reform Bill of 1867, its most impassioned opponent was Robert Lowe, who declared that democratic politicians were "impulsive, unreflecting, violent," and marked by "venality and ignorance." And who was Robert Lowe, the stoutest opponent of democracy in the British House of Commons? He was the only member of that House who had served an apprenticeship of eight years in Australian politics.

One of the continual difficulties was the relationship between the Assembly and the Council. It seems almost impossible to create a satisfactory "Second Chamber" as partner to a democratic Lower House, and indeed in most of the Canadian provinces Second Chambers have been abolished. In old days, when the purpose of representative institutions was to give due weight to different ranks of society, a House of Lords had an acknowledged position. But when democratic theories are accepted, what right has the less democratic to oppose the more democratic House? These quarrels between Assembly and Council often dragged in the Governors, and sometimes involved them in acute unpopularity. In 1878 the Lower House in Victoria actually sent a deputation to the Colonial Secretary, Sir Michael Hicks Beach, begging him to "do something" to solve her constitutional problem. Sir Michael replied in a soothing and almost fatherly despatch; he pointed out that "the great Colony of Victoria" had been given self-government for her own good and on the assumption that she was fit for it; that what was wrong in Victoria was not the rules of the constitutional game, but the spirit in which the players interpreted them; that the British constitution itself would be rendered unworkable unless the leaders of rival parties exercised a certain moderation and generosity in their dealings with one another; and so on. The result was that the rival parties in Victoria came to terms. Such an episode could not occur to-day. It

illustrates the uses of a Mother Country in the period after the right of self-government has been granted but before the art of self-government has been fully mastered.

Immigration, Land, and Labour

Political controversy returned again and again to the question of the disposal of land, the all-important problem in growing agricultural and pastoral colonies. Immigration was left to look after itself, for the now all-powerful Assemblies quickly terminated the policy of assisting immigrants from the proceeds of the sale of lands. The maximum immigration was during the gold years of the fifties, when it totalled half a million in ten years. In the next two decades it fell to less than half that amount, rose in 1882–91 to 374,000, but thereafter fell to almost nothing. From 1891 till after the Great War increase of population was almost entirely due to the excess of births over deaths.

The cause of the sudden cessation of immigration was primarily the great economic depression through which Australia passed in the last ten years of the century. It began with a series of strikes. Trade unionism had developed powerfully in the three great cities of Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide. In 1890 there was the nearest approach to a general strike that had yet been seen in any part of the world, even the sheep-shearers of the upland pastures being called out, and there were serious strikes again in 1892 and 1894. Meanwhile the greatest industry of Australia had entered upon ten lean years of deficient rainfall, which turned pasture land into desert and reduced by one-third the hundred million sheep of the continent. This disaster, it seems, could have been avoided if large works of irrigation had been put in hand, and artesian wells bored, for a great deal of the Australian rainfall sinks through the porous surface soil and can be brought up again by the proper methods. However, governments had not taken the matter in hand, and the owners of the flocks had either lacked the necessary capital or preferred to trust to luck. The result of this combination of evils was a collapse of Australian

credit, from 1893 onwards, which made investors shy of Australian investments. Another natural result of the hard times was the development in all the colonies of Labour Parties, which, without actually obtaining power, were able to influence policy. The result was a multitude of experiments in semi-socialistic legislation, many of which have been exceedingly successful. The rise of political Labour, however, still further discouraged immigration. The Labour parties were anxious to keep up the rates of wages, and they regarded the influx of immigrants, with perhaps a lower standard of living, as likely to endanger their own standards. No law was passed restricting white immigration, but intending emigrants discovered that, in Australia, they were not wanted.

We have mentioned the great cities of Australia. It is a strange, and many people think an unfortunate, fact that, in this predominantly pastoral and agricultural country, over one-third of the inhabitants of New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia should live in their three capitals. The great cities supply the politicians and control politics, sometimes in the interests of the city rather than of the colony as a whole. Australian railways, practically all of them state-owned, are often cited as an example of city-made policy. They are so designed as to make everything pass through the capitals. Certainly it is curious that, whereas in Canada railway development has tended to spread population from the old colonies out to the west, in Australia it has helped to swell the three great cities to a size disproportionate to the population of the rest of the country.

Federation

The end of the century saw the federation of the six colonies[1] in an Australian Commonwealth. Federation had been suggested by Lord Grey at the time when self-government was granted in 1850, but the colonies would have

[1] Western Australia and Queensland had before this been given self-government on the same lines as the other four colonies.

nothing to do with it. It had often since then been discussed, but the rivalries between the colonies, especially between the politicians of Melbourne and Sydney, had presented an insuperable obstacle at the time. There was the further difficulty that New South Wales had retained free trade whereas the other colonies had adopted protective tariffs. But the rising power of Labour was more friendly to the federal idea, and the inland pastoral folk who passed easily from one colony to another cared little for the jealousies of the rival capitals.

The strongest argument for federation was the growing need for an Australian foreign policy. For nearly a hundred years Australia had enjoyed an isolation which made foreign policy a superfluity, but now neighbours obtruded themselves. Japan was becoming a great naval power. France and Germany occupied various Pacific Islands and, much more alarming, in 1884 Germany annexed the northern coast of New Guinea,[1] the great island whose southern coasts came within a hundred miles of Queensland. New South Wales had urged the British government to occupy the eastern half of New Guinea in 1876, but the British government refused, and accompanied its refusal with a suggestion that, as the matter was primarily an Australian concern, the Australian colonies had better unite themselves and thus put themselves in a position to bear part of the expense. Many Australians resented this suggestion, but others admitted its substantial justice. In 1883 Queensland, taking the bull by the horns, "took formal possession" of New Guinea on her own account, and incurred a snub from home for exceeding her powers. In the next year, however, the British government annexed southern New Guinea, thus partitioning the eastern half of the island with Germany.

Another question which called for a common Australian policy was the immigration of non-European peoples. The arrival of considerable numbers of Chinese had caused alarm in the seventies, and the colonies agreed upon a policy

[1] i.e. east of the long established Dutch territory, which included the western half of the island and caused no alarm in Australia.

which, without legally excluding non-Europeans, made their entrance extremely difficult, for they were subjected on arrival to an education test in English.

In 1889 Sir Henry Parkes, of New South Wales, the most conspicuous Australian politician of his generation, declared himself in favour of creating " a great national government," and the colonies responded by electing a Convention to draw up proposals for a federal constitution. But now another difficulty arose. The proposals of the Convention included an " Upper House " or Senate of the type already familiar in the colonies, elected on a restricted franchise. The rising forces of Labour would have nothing to do with this. They were determined to kill, as it were, two birds with one stone, and to secure a completely democratic constitution for the proposed federal government. This controversy was prolonged throughout the lean years of the nineties, and only in 1900 was a federal constitution, completely democratized, accepted by the governments of all the six colonies. It was enacted by the British parliament in 1901.

In this constitution both the Senate and the House of Representatives are elected by universal suffrage, male and female; the Representatives are elected by constituencies of the British type, and the Senators by the populations of colonies voting as single constituencies. Indeed the Senate has, under this system, become the stronghold of the advanced Labour partisans. The federation is of a much looser type than that of Canada. The old colonies are called States, not Provinces as in Canada, and retain extensive powers of self-government.[1] To the federal authority was allotted only those departments of policy in which it was necessary that Australia should speak to the outside world with a single voice—foreign policy, defence, tariffs, immigration; and also inter-State communications by commerce, posts and telegraph.

[1] The relative independence of the States is illustrated by the fact that they still retain British Governors, representing the King, in addition to the Governor General of the Australian Commonwealth.

Where should the capital be? Sydney and Melbourne were too nearly equal for either to give way to the other, so it was agreed that an entirely new capital city, Canberra, should be created on the frontiers of New South Wales and Victoria. Australia has here followed the precedent of the United States, which created a new capital for itself at Washington, close to the frontier between the northern and the southern States. The example of Canada could also be cited. After the union of the British and French Canadas in 1841, the seat of government, after shifting uneasily between Montreal, Quebec and Toronto, was fixed at Ottawa on the frontier between the two colonies.

State Socialism

The constitutions of some of the States have been made more democratic since the establishment of the democratic Commonwealth authority, but they are not all of them completely democratized so far as their Upper Houses are concerned. Labour therefore welcomes a full use of all the powers of the federal government, whereas the other political parties still regard the federal authority with a certain amount of apprehension. However, the leading States have been pioneers in what some call State-socialism, the extension of public control over industrial activity of all kinds, the restriction of individual liberty in the interests of social welfare. It has been suggested that the state-socialist tradition goes back to the very beginning of Australian history, for no community is more socialistically organized than a community of convicts. Even exploration, which in Africa had been financed by private individuals and missionary societies, was in Australia very largely a subsidized state enterprise. From early days the state had aided the sheep-farmer and the agriculturist, subsidizing him in various ways in years of drought. Later, it assisted the manufacturer by tariffs. Finally modern democracy has used the powers of the state to fix wages, by means of wage boards and arbitration courts. New South Wales in particular had made interesting experiments in what is

called the family wage system, involving the payment of extra wages to employees who are fathers or mothers of children.

Constitutional experiments

In political devices Australia has also been a pioneer. One of these is the Referendum, which is also used in Switzerland. For certain purposes of legislation a mere Act of Parliament is not sufficient. The measure, after passing parliament, has to be referred to the whole people who vote for it or against it as though they were voting for a candidate at an election. The most notable use of the referendum hitherto has been the proposal of conscription during the Great War, which was carried through parliament but defeated by a very narrow margin on the referendum.

Another device employed in all Australian elections, which many wish to see introduced in Great Britain, is preferential voting, or the alternative vote. Where there are more than two candidates the voter is asked to indicate a second as well as a first choice, and the second preferences indicated on the voting papers of, e.g., the candidate who comes out third are distributed between the first and second candidates. The system is held to be a cure for the obviously unrepresentative results of many "three-cornered" (or more-than-three-cornered) elections.

In 1924 the Federal Government passed a law making voting compulsory. It is no doubt regrettable that large numbers of electors should be so lazy or so ignorant that they will not vote of their own free will. It may be doubted however, whether any useful purpose is served by driving them to the polling stations. Are not such valueless votes best left uncounted?

Renewed Prosperity

Prosperity returned to Australia soon after the present century had begun, and after the war British immigration not only revived but surpassed all former totals. In five years after the war half a million immigrants reached

Australia, of whom nearly nine-tenths were British. To-day, though Australia is 12,000 miles away and has seven and a half million inhabitants, it is a very good customer of Great Britain. During the years 1926–28 Australia took a larger share of our exports than the United States, larger also than France, Italy, Spain and Portugal combined.

But it would be wrong to end on a note of facile optimism, with an implicit suggestion that the Commonwealth can simply go straight ahead along an arterial road towards increasing prosperity, without taking anxious thought for the future. It is notable that, within the last few years, the policy of the Commonwealth government, responding to economic conditions, has once again reduced immigration to an insignificant trickle. The high standard of living, admirable in itself, is already putting difficulties in the way of the marketing of Australia's staple exports. The development of the country has been financed by loans on a lavish scale, and the indebtedness to non-Australian creditors has reached what many financial experts regard as a danger-point. And behind these other problems lies the fundamental problem of maintaining the White Australia policy. There is no immediate danger here, but if White immigration is checked and the Australian birth-rate continues to decline, can the Japanese, or the Chinese, be indefinitely excluded?

The future of Australia is not to be viewed tragically. It is, indeed, much easier to be reasonably optimistic about it than about the future of South Africa. South Africa has, in any case, to wrestle with colour problems such as Australia has succeeded, hitherto, in keeping at a distance.

Chapter V

NEW ZEALAND.

THE Dominion of New Zealand comprises two islands of nearly equal size. Taken together they are rather larger than Great Britain, but rather smaller than Great Britain and Ireland. Many people say that they have the most delightful climate in the world ; it might also be claimed that they have the most beautiful scenery, and that their native people, the Maoris, are the most interesting and attractive of all the races which, when the white man first encountered them, were living under primitive conditions. The islands are very mountainous. A great range of mountains runs from end to end of both islands, rising in the South Island to greater heights than any mountains in Australia. The plains are mostly small and are isolated from one another, the largest being that of Canterbury in South Island, which has given its name to New Zealand's best known export. What used, thirty years ago, to be called New Zealand mutton, seems now to figure always as " Canterbury lamb." The change of name is perhaps well advised, for lamb is preferable to mutton, and I have met people who believed that these animals came from the same place as the archbishop. There is indeed a connection between the two Canterburys, which will appear when we come to the history of the country.

The rainfall is, on the average, greater than that of the British Isles and, as in the British Isles, the west coast is much wetter than the east ; but it seems that the rain arranges itself more agreeably than with us. There is much more warm sunshine, and the air is exceedingly clear. Wool and frozen meat are the principal exports, but there

is also a considerable export of gold—and of butter; and there are excellent coal mines.

The Maoris

The Maoris number about 60,000, nearly all of them in North Island. They are themselves, it appears, immigrants, and came to the country from overseas sometime within the limits of historical time; but whether their migration was in the days of Abraham or of Christopher Columbus or at some period in between remains undecided. When we first knew them they were divided into small tribes which carried on incessant warfare with one another. Fighting, in fact, was their staple sport, if not their staple industry. Their diet was simple: roots, rats, birds, shell-fish, and occasionally conquered enemies. Their character was what the Englishman calls "sporting." They were exceedingly hospitable. Their notions of property, like those of many primitive peoples, approximated to an advanced socialism, for the land was owned by the tribe even though it might be divided up for occupation and use among individual families. The coming of the British meant a transformation for the Maoris such as no white race has ever been called upon to face. It brought them much good and much evil. To-day, happily, the evils are being outlived and forgotten; the good is bearing fruit, and the Maoris are learning, as no other primitive people within the Empire has yet learnt, to take their share in the life of a free and civilized society as the friends and equals of the white man.

First contacts with White men

The history of British New Zealand is short, for the island was only annexed to the Empire in 1840. It falls very obviously into two parts, the dividing line being in about 1870. The first part is filled with controversies and tragedies, the second is a record of steady progress. We shall here devote more space to the earlier than to the later part of the history of New Zealand. No doubt that earlier part is, by now, an "old, unhappy, far-off thing," but it is interesting,

for it illustrates in a typical manner many of the forces that go to make, and can mar, an Empire.

Captain Cook visited New Zealand in 1769, and soon white men began to make use of the islands—whalers, sealers, escaped convicts, runaway sailors. There were about a thousand such persons in New Zealand by 1830, and their conduct was, on the whole, deplorable ; the civilization they brought to the Maoris was rum and gunpowder.

Next came the missionaries, the first being Samuel Marsden of Sydney, in 1814. They discovered the attractive qualities of the Maoris, and their aptitude for civilization, and they longed to create a native Christian state unspoiled by white colonists[1] who, even if they were nominally Christian, would be sure to sacrifice the interests of the Maoris to their own. The great missionary societies enjoyed considerable influence among British politicians and Colonial Secretaries looked with favour on the missionary ideal.

Meanwhile, however, by about 1830, projects of organized colonization were being seriously considered, both English and French, each stimulated by anxiety lest the other should get in first. Gibbon Wakefield fixed his eyes upon New Zealand as a country not only desirable in itself, but also as the ideal virgin soil for a trial of his system of colonization. He and his friends were busy with schemes for New Zealand when some of them were suddenly called to accompany Lord Durham to Canada (1838), but as soon as they returned they took up New Zealand again. A New Zealand Land Company was formed in 1839 and, since the Government refused to give any support, they sent out their own agent, Wakefield's brother, to buy land on behalf of the Company. Col. Wakefield bought recklessly, without understanding that the land belonged to tribes and that the individuals he dealt with could not sell it. Thirteen thousand colonists despatched by the Company found themselves confronted with confusion.

[1] Such a state as the Jesuit Utopia in Paraguay, which maintained its independence of white colonists throughout most of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The Treaty of Waitangi

It was now plain that the British government must annex the islands and, since the French would do so if the British did not, the missionaries themselves approved. In 1840 Captain Hobson, R.N., arrived and annexed New Zealand. The Maori chiefs, by the advice of the missionaries, welcomed the Governor, and accepted the terms embodied in the Treaty of Waitangi. By that treaty Great Britain guaranteed to the chiefs full and undisturbed possession of all their lands, and the chiefs undertook to sell no lands except to, or with the permission of, the British government.

All these events had taken place in North Island. Meanwhile the French expedition was at sea, and Captain Hobson despatched a vessel in haste to establish a formal annexation of South Island before the French arrived. The French were five days too late.

Thus the danger that rival national flags should be hoisted on the two islands, with a mere " straits of Dover " between them, was averted. None the less, British New Zealand was cradled in domestic controversy. The Governor, who established himself at Auckland in the north of North Island, was pledged to maintain the Treaty of Waitangi, and he had the whole-hearted support of the missionaries. The colonists, on the other hand, naturally regarded the Governor as an adversary and the Treaty of Waitangi as a hostile measure. It seemed to them absurd that the whole territory of North Island should be regarded as the property of native tribes who made effective use of no more than a fraction of the land. It was, no doubt, an unfortunate accident that Wakefield's Company had begun operations in North Island, while South Island, with equal or superior lands for pasture and agriculture, was waiting for him almost uninhabited. Settlements of colonists were quickly established at New Plymouth and Wellington in North Island, and at Nelson on the north coast of South Island. In 1843 fighting broke out between the colonists and the Maoris, and the Maoris killed their prisoners. The Governor held that the

colonists had been in the wrong, and refused to take action in the matter.

Sir George Grey

The New Zealand controversy reproduced itself in parliament when the Tories, who were in office from 1841 to 1846, supported the Governor's policy and the Whigs, led by Lord Grey, who had long been a patron of Wakefield, supported the colonists. What was needed was a Governor of real constructive statesmanship who would reconcile the rival interests and secure the loyal co-operation of colonists, native chiefs and missionaries alike. Such a Governor was found in Captain (afterwards Sir George) Grey who arrived in 1845 and governed New Zealand for the next eight years.

Sir George Grey (no relation of Lord Grey) in the course of a long career served as a Governor in three out of the four Dominions, and to each he rendered great services. His father had been killed at Badajoz in the year of his birth. He entered the army, but soon left it to undertake exploration on the north-west coast of Australia. In 1840 he took charge of South Australia, at that date a very sickly infant of a colony, and nursed it to health. Then he passed to New Zealand as Governor, and after New Zealand to South Africa, when we shall meet him in the next chapter; then back to New Zealand again for a second term as Governor, after which he settled down in the country, entered its parliament, and became Prime Minister.

Grey saw that, though the Treaty of Waitangi must be maintained, there was nothing to prevent him as Governor from buying from the native tribes huge tracts of land of which they made no use, and selling them to the colonists. He was, besides, an enthusiastic admirer of Maori character, and saw, what the missionaries had been unwilling to admit, that it was in the interest of the Maoris to break down the barriers between them and the colonists. The colonists had regarded the Maoris as savages, and the missionaries had regarded the colonists as little better than buccaneers.

Grey believed in the good qualities of both populations. He won the Maoris by learning their language and studying their customs. Within a few years Maori chiefs were making roads at their own expense and petitioning the Queen to make Sir George Grey Governor for life.

A year after Sir George Grey became Governor his namesake Lord Grey had returned to the Colonial Office in the Whig ministry of Lord John Russell. Lord Grey at once sent Elgin to launch Canada upon her career of self-government, and in a few years authorised the Australian colonists to draw up their own constitutions. As soon as he came into office he secured the enactment of a self-governing constitution for New Zealand. But the establishment of a government controlled by assemblies elected from a few thousand colonists would, in 1846, have been a disastrous error, for everything at that date depended upon the rule of a neutral authority who could hold the balance between the claims of the colonists and the rights of the natives. Sir George Grey sent his namesake's untimely constitution straight home again with appropriate comments. And now one of the greatest virtues of Lord Grey was to be illustrated. The Prince Consort once wrote of him :—

Lord Grey is very positive in his views, but he is quite open to argument, and if worsted is ready to own it at once and to adopt the argument by which he was overthrown. "Yes, yes, I was wrong," he will say, the moment he is shown to be in error.

To say "Yes, yes, I was wrong" to a royal prince might be easy ; less easy to say it to one of one's own subordinate officers. However, Lord Grey gave his "Yes, yes" to Sir George, and suspended the new constitution for six years.

Within that six years of Sir George's Governorship not only was bitterness appeased on both sides in North Island but two promising settlements were made in the larger plains of South Island. There had recently been a schism in the Scottish Established Presbyterian Church, and the leaders of the new Free Church of Scotland conceived and successfully

carried out the plan of establishing a Scottish colony at Otago on the east coast of South Island, with its capital at Dunedin. Thereupon the English Church, not to be outdone, formed a Canterbury Association, and established a colony on a larger plain further north on the samc coast. These colonies adopted, in general principle if not in all its details, the Wakefield plan of using the purchase price of land to assist further emigration, and they both flourished from the start.

The Six Provinces

And now, in 1852, the postponed constitution was, with Sir George Grey's amendments, brought into operation. New Zealand was divided into six provinces, corresponding to the six settlements at Auckland, New Plymouth, Wellington, Nelson, Otago and Canterbury, each with an elected council. The government of the whole colony was vested in a Governor, a nominated Council, and an elected House of Representatives. The vote was given to all who possessed or rented a small property, much like the English franchise of that period between the first and the second Reform Bills. Maoris were not excluded from the franchise on ground of race, but they were practically excluded as hardly any of them possessed the necessary property, so " native affairs " were left under the personal control of the Governor. In the next year Sir George Grey left New Zealand, amid universal regret, to take up the Governorship of Cape Colony.

The Maori Wars

Then came disaster. Sir George Grey's successors had neither his popularity, nor his wisdom, nor, owing to the new constitution, his powers. The Maoris, brought into contact with what was worst rather than with what was best in white civilization, rapidly degenerated. Grey's ordinance forbidding the sale of firearms to them was ignored, and actually repealed. No doubt they made a nuisance of themselves to the colonists, and the colonists no doubt became, from their point of view, a nuisance to

High Commissioner for N.Z.

WELLINGTON
From the Tinakori Hills

them. War between colonists and Maoris began in 1857 and extended, off and on, till 1870. The Maoris thoroughly enjoyed fighting, and they fought not only bravely but with a chivalry that could not but, in the long run, endear them to their enemies, risking their lives, for example, to get water for their British prisoners. None the less the wars had a deplorable effect upon them for the time. The missionaries saw, with dismay, the revival of atrocious pagan customs and their own life's work seemingly undone. From the British point of view the wars were almost equally deplorable. Civilized forces are apt to cut a somewhat humiliating figure when they undertake the conquest of warlike barbarians who can " play their own game " in their own country, and the spectacle of a few thousand Maoris holding at bay, year after year, four times as many British regulars was not inspiriting. The British generals may or may not have been incompetent, but it certainly looked as if they were. Sir George Grey returned to his old post as Governor from 1861 to 1868, but he could do little to improve the deplorable situation.

Moreover the British Government at home was far from pleased with New Zealand. The grant of self-government to a colony in mid-Victorian days was something more (or less) than an expression of faith in the virtues of liberty: it was an indication to the colony in question that the British Government, which regarded the colonies as on the whole very troublesome appendages, wanted to be bothered with its affairs no longer. Again, public economy was in those days a far more popular virtue than it is to-day; in those days the three cardinal political virtues were peace, retrenchment, and reform. The first and last explain themselves: the second meant reduction of expenditure, and when was reduction of expenditure more virtuous than in the matter of armaments? The grant of self-government to a colony was to be followed as a matter of course by the gradual, if not the immediate, withdrawal of its garrisons of British regular troops. What, then, was to be thought of a colony which, after obtaining self-government,

undertook a warlike policy requiring forces for which, in the main, the British taxpayer had to pay? British governments made severe and ironical comments on this situation; New Zealand politicians made angry replies; and Governors found themselves placed between what may, with apologies, be called the devil and the deep sea. The easiest course for them to adopt was to put the blame for all the trouble and expense on the incompetence of the military commanders.

At last, however, in 1870 the miserable warfare ended, and the British regulars left the colony. The Maoris were tired of fighting, and new arrangements for the sale of land were made which gave satisfaction to both parties. Four Maori representatives were given seats in the House of Representatives.

In 1876 the division of the colony into six provinces was abolished, and New Zealand became a united Dominion.

While North Island was passing through its troublous times South Island, practically uninhabited save by British colonists, enjoyed a steady development. Gold-mining and coal-mining enriched Otago, and Canterbury developed a flourishing agriculture to feed the mining centres. When the Maori wars began South Island had not much more than half the population of North Island; when they ended the position was exactly reversed. North Island had stood still, and South Island had leapt ahead. After 1870 North Island quickly entered upon the prosperous courses of its neighbour. The first, and disastrously eventful, part of the history of New Zealand was over. It is significant that this year, which witnessed the end of the Maori wars, also saw the foundation of a State University.

Modern New Zealand

In 1861 the White population of New Zealand was less than 100,000. In 1881 it was nearly half a million, and it is now well over a million. Immigration since the gold rush of the sixties has not been rapid and the birth-rate is low, but prosperity is high and is well distributed. New

Zealand has, like Australia, been a pioneer in social legislative experiments, but she has not developed Labour parties like those of the Australian colonies, and her modern history has been comparatively free from what is called class-warfare. In this she resembles Canada rather than Australia. Like Canada she has escaped the domination of overgrown cities.

The most notable of modern New Zealand statesmen was Richard Seddon, Prime Minister from 1893 to 1906. He started life as a Lancashire working lad and never acquired more than a smattering of education; but he was vigorous, eloquent, and attractive, "fearless" says a historian "in dealing with complex subjects that he had never studied." Guided by a very able colleague, W. Pember Reeves, he carried through a great deal of important legislation. The most interesting, because the most original, of the Seddon-Reeves experiments was the establishment of a system of compulsory arbitration for the settlement of disputes between employers and employed.

Seddon was also an enthusiastic imperialist, figuring at Imperial Conferences as a whole-hearted supporter of the close unification of the Empire. It is, it seems, the special mission of New Zealand to champion this cause, and certainly it is a mission she has made her own. Canada and South Africa contain great populations which, though white, are not British at all; Australians have a whole continent to themselves; all three great Dominions have to emphasize the fact that, though they are within the Empire, they are also "nations." New Zealand, the smallest of the Dominions, though not forgetful of her nationhood, finds greatness not so much within herself as in her membership of the larger whole.

Chapter VI

SOUTH AFRICA

(i) THE LAND AND ITS NATIVE INHABITANTS

THE term South Africa can be used with more than one meaning. Politically it belongs to the Union of South Africa, the self-governing Dominion formed in 1910 by the combination of the four colonies, Cape Colony, Natal, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. Geographically the term is used to cover all Africa south of the Zambesi river and a line drawn, it matters little exactly where, from the Zambesi westwards to the Atlantic coast. This includes, in addition to the Union, the vast and barren area which was formerly German South-west Africa, now entrusted to the Union by a mandate of the League of Nations; the Bechuanaland Protectorate; the two small Protectorates of Basutoland and Swaziland; the colony of Southern Rhodesia, and most of Portuguese East Africa. Geographically this country is all one. By far the greater part of it is within the British Empire, and Portuguese East Africa owes most of such importance as it possesses to the fact that its ports are the starting points of railways to the British interior. Also the native people of the whole of South Africa are akin; such differences as they present to-day are due to the length and the character of their contact with European colonists.

This larger, or geographical, South Africa lies, as a map of the world will show, between very much the same parallels of latitude as Australia. The Zambesi is about the same distance from the Equator as Australia's northern coast. Cape Town is about the same distance from the South Pole

as Melbourne. As the width of South Africa, east to west, is on the average about half that of Australia, it follows that its area is also about half. The self-governing Dominion of South Africa is, of course, much smaller, and is about the same size as New South Wales and Victoria combined.

Geography

The geography of the country is exceedingly simple. A great range, or series of ranges of mountains, runs roughly parallel with the southern and eastern coasts from the Cape to the Zambesi valley, rising in Basutoland to 10,000 feet but in most parts considerably lower. Along the southern and south-eastern coasts these mountains, or rather their lower ranges, come down quite close to the sea, but when one passes from British to Portuguese territory the mountains recede and leave a coastal plain which increases in width as one goes northwards. This coastal plain is intensely malarious. To-day one can cross it in a few hours on a railway, but until the end of the nineteenth century it was an absolute death-trap.

The Portuguese made a fatal mistake when, after an unsuccessful skirmish with the native Hottentots in which their leader was killed (1510), they abandoned the Cape and, lured no doubt by tales of gold mines inland, settled at Delagoa Bay, where is the first good harbour on the coast eastwards from the Cape. They made contact with Africa at a point where it imposes well-nigh insuperable obstacles to the penetration of the interior.

So much for the coastal slope of the range. On the other side there is, in many parts, scarcely any slope at all. The range is merely the south-eastern rim of the great South African table-land. It extends, with an average height of 3,000 to 5,000 feet, over practically all the rest of South Africa, sinking gradually into the broad upland valleys of the Orange, the Limpopo, and the Zambezi rivers, but maintaining and even increasing in elevation westwards until it drops suddenly to the barren western coast. This plateau-land is called the veld.

In South Africa as in Australia "rainfall is everything," for the simple reason that, over so much of both countries there is hardly any rainfall and consequently hardly anything for man or beast to live upon. The prevailing wind that brings the rain is from the south-east. Adequate rain, and with it the possibilities of civilised life, are therefore to be found only within the southern and eastern regions of South Africa. If one marks upon a map the area with over twenty-five inches of rain a year, one finds that it includes the southern coast of Cape Colony to about fifty miles inland, about half the Free State and the Transvaal, most of Rhodesia, and of course all Natal and Portuguese East Africa. The fifteen inch line includes another narrow strip of Cape Colony and all the rest of the Transvaal and the Free State. Westwards lie the lands of drought, Bechuanaland, the northern parts of Cape Colony, and all South West Africa. Every summer the parched brown veld waits for the brief rainy season to turn it green.

The veld is pastureland, and most of it sparse pastureland. There are hardly any forests. The area of South Africa under tillage of any kind is extremely small, and can never be large. It can never be a grain-exporting country; at present grain is still imported. There is a small wine industry near Cape Town; sugar is grown in Natal, and there are increasing exports of fruit and tobacco; but the wealth of South Africa has hitherto been found predominently in its sheep and oxen, and its gold and diamonds. The most conspicuous event in the history of the country, the South African War of 1899-1902, was due to the establishment of a community of gold-miners in the midst of an old-fashioned pastoral republic.

Means of Transport

The rivers of South Africa, Orange, Vaal, and Limpopo, are conspicuous upon the map, especially as they serve as frontiers between provinces which were once rival and hostile states, but they are as useless for purposes of communication as the Australian Darling. Throughout the



SOUTH AFRICA : POLITICAL

Indicating (1) The Union of South Africa (Shaded), (2) Other British Territory (3) Non-British Territory (dotted areas)



SOUTH AFRICA : PHYSICAL AND CLIMATIC

Showing (1) The Plateau of South Africa (the altitude of the shaded part is about 2,500 feet) ; (2) The distribution of rainfall, dry in West and wet in East

greater part of the year they are no more than chains of stagnant pools. The Orange, like the Darling (and the Nile) loses volume as it approaches the sea. The French explorers of North America made their way from the mouth of the St. Lawrence up to the Great Lakes and down the Mississippi by an almost continuous waterway before the end of the seventeenth century. Though Portuguese and Dutch were in South Africa as early as British and French in North America, scarcely any European had been as far as a hundred miles from the coast until the second quarter of the nineteenth century.

Before the days of railways the ordinary method of travel was by ox-waggon—" a long, low structure, drawn by seven, eight, nine or even ten yoke of oxen, and surmounted by a convex wooden frame and canvas roof." A day's journey was only about twelve miles. There were no roads, in our sense of the word, but the veld is for the most part so smooth and free from obstructions that practicable tracks were easily found. It was by ox-waggon that the Boers made their famous " trek " from Cape Colony to the lands beyond the Orange river in 1836 : by ox-waggon that Livingstone, the great missionary and explorer, crossed the Kalahari Desert and reached the Zambesi about ten years later ; by ox-waggon Cecil Rhodes, nearly half a century later, made the journey northward through Bechuanaland which led to the foundation of Rhodesia. As late as 1895, when the statesman and historian, Sir James, afterwards Lord, Bryce, made his tour of South Africa, he reached the end of the railway at Mafeking, and travelled by ox-cart to Buluwayo and Fort Salisbury and onwards to within a short distance of the Portuguese port of Beira. A very few years later he could have done the whole journey by train. Had he been five years earlier he would have used ox-waggon not only for this journey but also for most of his much shorter journey from Durban to Cape Town via Pretoria.

The ox-waggon was not only slow but subject to various vicissitudes of nature. During his journey in Rhodesia

Bryce saw countless ox-waggons standing idle on the track because a plague of locusts had destroyed the grass and the oxen had perished of starvation. In the year following his journey a cattle plague destroyed immense numbers of the oxen themselves.

Native population

In one all-important matter South Africa is utterly unlike the other countries in which British colonists have built up self-governing Dominions :—its native population. In Canada the Red Indians, though formidable in early days, were always few in numbers, and have long ceased to exercise any appreciable influence upon the history of the Dominion. The savages of Australia are of a low order and count for much less than the Red Indians of Canada. Even the Maoris of New Zealand are to-day only a twentieth part of the population. In the Union of South Africa (and still more in South Africa as a whole) the natives greatly outnumber the White peoples and will always continue to do so. Throughout the nineteenth century the conflicts between British and Dutch were the most conspicuous feature of South African history : as time passes this rivalry between kindred European stocks will more and more sink into the background, for it is already realised that the fundamental problem in South Africa is the place to be accorded in its social system to the native peoples.

The " Clash of Colour "

In the course of the last few centuries practically all regions of the world outside Europe (except China and Japan) have come under the control of Europeans. These regions of the world fall, for the most part, into two classes. On the one hand, there are comparatively empty countries, like Canada, which, being well suited by climate to be homes for people of European stock, have become self-governing White communities. On the other hand, there are densely populated tropical countries like India or Nigeria where the White man will never make a home : in such countries

he appears as a ruler, a trader, or a missionary, returning to his home in England when his work is done. South Africa lies mid-way between these two types. It contains a large native population, and it can also support a permanent population of European stock. It is in such countries as this that what has been called "the clash of colour" presents its most difficult problems. The Union of South Africa is the only country of this kind which is a self-governing Dominion of the British Empire, but there are other countries in which, in slightly different forms, the same conditions exist—Kenya Colony, for example, where the ultimate responsibility for the relations of the two races lies not with the British colonists but with the Colonial Office at home. Mexico and many parts of South America are lands in which Europeans have established themselves in the midst of large native populations, but the Europeans in Mexico and South America were Spaniards and they solved the problem—in so far as they have solved it—in a manner repugnant to both British and Dutch in South Africa, namely by intermarriage with the native peoples.

Perhaps the nearest parallel with South Africa is furnished by the Southern States of the United States of America. Here a White population almost entirely British in origin (for the non-British emigrants to the United States have not gone to the South) live in the midst of a coloured population, a population not very different in racial characteristics from the natives of South Africa, for these coloured people in the United States are the descendents of the Africans transported to America in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They do not, like the natives in South Africa, outnumber by four to five to one the Whit epopulation, though in some States they fully equal it. The history of the Southern States has been so unlike the history of South Africa that any comparison in detail would be useless, but, fundamentally, the "colour problem" in the two countries is the same:—are black and white to be treated alike, or is "colour" to be accepted, in law and custom, as a valid ground of exclusion from the political, social and

industrial privileges of the White man? At present, in both countries, the White peoples are determined to maintain their privileges.

Bushmen and Hottentots

South Africa has been the home of three distinct native races; the Bushmen, the Hottentots and the Kaffirs or Bantus. The Bushmen were probably the original inhabitants of South Africa. A hundred years ago they were still widespread: to-day they are practically extinct. They are—or were—savages of an extremely primitive kind, neither tilling the soil nor owning cattle but hunting wild animals with poisoned arrows. They were of extremely small stature, almost pygmies. Like the primitive race which wandered over Europe more than ten thousand years ago, they had a remarkable gift for drawing animals on smooth surfaces of rock.

When the Portuguese made their half-hearted attempt to establish themselves at the Cape in 1510 the Hottentots had already secured the upper hand over the Bushmen, and it was a Hottentot force that the Portuguese encountered. They were a pastoral race, and traded in cattle with the early Dutch settlers. They were a good-natured, cheerful folk and many of them adapted themselves to domestic service under Dutch masters. In the early eighteenth century their numbers were terribly reduced by plagues of small-pox which they caught from the Dutch, and they are now practically extinct except for some insignificant tribes in the desert country of South-west Africa. Their blood, however, flows in the veins of the Griquas or Cape boys, a mixed race descended from the unions of Hottentots with the Negro and Malayan slaves whom the Dutch colonists imported, and to some extent with the early Dutch colonists themselves.

Bantus or Kaffirs

For all practical purposes the natives in South Africa to-day are the numerous tribes comprehended under the

general names of Bantus or Kaffir. Bantu is a word of their own language, meaning " People " : Kaffir is an Arabic word meaning " unbeliever," and was applied both in Africa and Asia (e.g. Kafristan) to people who did not accept the Moslem faith. The race is not confined to the country south of the Zambesi but covers a great part of Africa. The South African Bantus were themselves probably immigrants, crossing the Zambesi at some date unknown. Some people say that the Bantus are not a race at all, but a mixture of Negro and Semitic races : certainly the various Bantu peoples present markedly different characteristics. They are generally tall and physically strong, and now that European control has stamped out tribal warfare and the murderous customs encouraged by their wizards or witch doctors they are increasing in numbers more rapidly than the Whites. There are about 6,000,000 of them within the Union and perhaps another 4,000,000 in the rest of South Africa. The White population within the Union is less than two million, about equally divided between British and Dutch, and, outside, scarcely 100,000.

Down to almost the end of the nineteenth century the Kaffir tribes and their activities were an important factor in the history of the European colonies. To-day tribal organization and the authority of chiefs has well-nigh disappeared within the regions where the White man has established himself. The Kaffir tribes were not in fact racial units but, like the European nations, the product of political circumstances. With the overwhelming change of circumstance introduced by White predominance the tribal unit loses its meaning.

The most famous of all Kaffir tribes were the Zulus, and they owed their celebrity entirely to the barbaric genius of a single Kaffir. Shortly after the establishment of the British colony, a certain Zulu named Tshaka visited the Cape and observed with admiration the drill of the British garrison. Returning home he applied what he had learnt of military method to his own people, arming them with a short broad-bladed spear which was an improvement

upon that in common use among the Kaffirs. The results were all he could desire. He defeated his neighbours, and enterprising Kaffirs flocked to join the Zulus, who became not so much a tribe as a military confederacy. Terrible was the execution they wrought over all the inland country north of the Orange and the Vaal between 1820 and 1830. In fact they created a kind of vacuum, into which the Dutch Trekkers entered a few years later, after Tshaka's death, establishing the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. In the west of the Transvaal, however the Dutch encountered the warlike Matabili under a chief who had formerly been one of Tshaka's captains. Dislodged by the Dutch, the Matabili moved north into what was afterwards Rhodesia and fell upon the harmless and unwarlike Mashonas.[1]

After Tshaka the Zulus were for a long time quiescent, but Tshaka's methods were revived, fifty years afterwards by Cetewayo, and this led to the British conquest of Zululand in 1879. Fourteen years later the British pioneers in Rhodesia brought to an end the barbarous and homicidal rule of Lobengula, the last chieftain of the Matabili.

But Tshaka, Cetewayo and Lobengula illustrate only one type of Kaffir tribal life. There was another and altogether admirable kind. It is illustrated, for example, by Khama, the Christian chief of the Bamangwato tribe in Bechuanaland, the barren country west of the Transvaal. As a small boy he had met Livingstone on his first long journey northwards to the Zambesi; he died in 1923, full of years and honour, the friend and associate of generations of British officials. One of the principal aims of his policy had been to preserve his people from the poisonous influences of European alcohol, and the reception he received in England when he visited the country in pursuit of this purpose made a deep impression in South Africa.

[1] These unfortunate Mashonas were, if one traces cause and effect far enough back, victims of the French Revolution. The French Revolution conquered Holland and made war on Great Britain; Great Britain seized the occasion to occupy the Dutch territory at the Cape; some of the Dutch, disliking our rule, moved off to the Transvaal and expelled the Matabili, who in turn fell upon the Mashonas.

Equally remarkable and by his geographical position much more closely involved in the affairs of British and Dutch colonies was Moshesh, the chief of the Basutos. Moshesh, like Tshaka, was a chief who made his position entirely by his abilities, but they were abilities of a much more admirable kind. In 1824, when the Zulu aggressions were at their height, Moshesh established himself in Basutoland, "the Switzerland of South Africa," and created a kingdom which served as a haven of refuge from the Zulus. Here he held his mountain fastnesses against the Matabili, the Dutch of the Free State, and the British of Cape Colony, one after the other. Though he was not and never himself became a Christian he early invited the missionaries into his kingdom, giving his favour to the French Protestant society, choosing them no doubt because they were neither Dutch nor British. In 1869, being hard pressed by the Dutch of the Free State, he begged the British government to take him and his people under British protection, and Basutoland remains to this day a native state under British control, enclosed within but separated from the Union of South Africa.[1] In 1879 trouble arose because the British government unwisely undertook to disarm the Basutos: but in the course of the next few years the Basutos offered so much resistance that the attempt was abandoned.

Both in Khama's tribe and among the Basutos the chief is no despot but co-operates with an assembly of the people. In 1879, at the time of the proposed disarmament of the Basutos the Cape Prime Minister attended a meeting of this "pitso", as it is called, and the shorthand report of the proceedings contains many illustrations of the free speech and good sense of the Basutos. One speaker said, "Mr— (a member of the Cape parliament) said the Basutos were the natural enemies of the White men, because we were black. Is that language which should he used by a high officer of the government? Let sentiments like these pass away. We are being educated to believe that all people

[1] Swaziland, near Natal, occupies a similar position.

are equal, and feel that sentiments like these are utterly wrong."

This Basuto put in a nutshell the fundamental problem of South Africa. No doubt such sentiments as those he condemned are "utterly wrong," but the problem of how White and Black are both to enjoy the free development in the same country is far more difficult than he probably supposed. We shall return to it in the last section of this chapter.

Kaffir Labour

One result of the presence of millions of Kaffirs in South Africa remains to be noted before we enter upon a narrative of the history of the European colonists. Since Kaffirs are available to do the unskilled manual labour, Europeans will not do it for themselves. There is no reason for this in the climate of the country. The sun is hot, but the air is dry and nights are cool; in many parts which would otherwise be hottest a refreshing south-east wind prevails. In fact the climate is no more "tropical" than that of Australia. If South Africa had been as devoid of serviceable natives as Australia, the colonists would do their own hard manual work, as the Australians do. They do not, and that is the chief reason why the European population is small: it is, in effect, an aristocracy dependent, by choice but not by necessity, on native labour. One of the evils of such a situation—it has always been a conspicuous evil in the Southern States of the American Union—is the development of a "poor white" class; for there are a considerable number of Europeans who are unfit for anything but unskilled manual labour, and in such communities as South Africa they are ashamed to do it. There are also a growing number of Kaffirs who are well fitted for various skilled occupations, from many of which, however, they are excluded either by custom or by law. One is reminded of Aristotle's defence of slavery. Slavery is right, he said, because many men are "slaves by nature"; but, he went on to admit, many of those who are actually slaves are not

"slaves by nature," and many of the "slaves by nature" enjoy a freedom which they do not deserve.

(ii) BRITISH AND DUTCH: THE FIRST ADVANCE AND WITHDRAWAL. 1795–1858

Happy, it is said, is the people whose history is dull. If that be so, South Africa has certainly been the least happy of the Dominions, for its history, by general consent, contains far more that is profoundly interesting, and even exciting, to the general reader unconnected with South Africa, than does the history of Canada, Australia or New Zealand. In South Africa, as in Canada, there has been what we may call a rivalry between equals in that in both these countries another European nation had been before us in the field, and had established a colony with which our own colonists had to establish satisfactory relations. But the peculiar circumstances of South Africa gave to the conflicts of British and Dutch a far more varied, eventful, and, be it added, unfortunate character than has belonged to the conflicts (if that is not too strong a word) of British and French in Canada. One is tempted at times to wish that the story could be forgotten, and to feel that to narrate it once again can do no good and possibly some harm. But that is a mistaken view. What has happened cannot be forgotten; and what does harm in the present is not the history of the past truly understood, but the distorted legends with which that history tends to get perverted. History, which reveals that the tragedies of the past have been much more due to ignorance than to malice, should heal wounds rather than reopen them.

The Dutch at Cape Town

As soon as the sea route to the East Indies had been opened up by Vasco da Gama in 1497 it should have been apparent that the magnificent harbour within Table Bay, a few miles north of the Cape of Good Hope, afforded an

which they have invested their wealth. Cattle ranchers, on the other hand, can move at will and take their wealth with them. Thus it has come about that the French Canadians are still a compact population occupying the homes of their ancestors, whereas the Boers have scattered themselves widely over South Africa.

The Dutch occupied the Cape in the middle of the seventeenth century; they brought with them the religious ideas of their contemporaries, the Pilgrim Fathers and Cromwell's Ironsides, and they maintained them intact right down to modern times. It is an Old Testament religion, whose God is a God of battles; a religion which encourages its devotees to regard alien and coloured people as Joshua and Samuel regarded the Canaanites and the Amalekites.

British annexation

When, after the victories of Clive, British India began to become a great and growing concern, British governments cast envious eyes upon the Cape. When the Dutch declared war upon us at the time of George Washington's war, we made an attempt to seize it; but during that war British sea power was at a low ebb. Another opportunity came with the wars of the French Revolution, for the unfortunate Dutch were our enemies perforce, since their country had been annexed to France. We occupied the Cape in 1795 but surrendered it in accordance with the terms of the short-lived Treaty of Amiens: occupied it again in 1806, and retained it after the fall of Napoleon, paying the restored Dutch government £6,000,000 for the colony. It is interesting to remember that in 1807 we made an unsuccessful attempt to occupy Buenos Ayres. Had that attempt succeeded the third great province of the southern hemisphere might have joined Australia and South Africa as a province of the British Empire.

The new colony was placed under the rule of a governor, unassisted (or unimpeded) by any elective assembly. The Dutch population numbered about 27,000. At first there

was practically no British population, but in 1819 the British government set aside £50,000 to assist the emigration of about three thousand British colonists, who settled around Port Elizabeth and laid the foundations of the Eastern Province of the colony.

The Missionaries

More important from a political standpoint than the British colonists in early days were the British missionaries. Never before or since have British missionaries enjoyed so much political influence as they enjoyed in the first half of the nineteenth century—the abolition of the slave trade and afterwards of slavery was fundamentally their work—and among the South African Hottentots and Bantus they found a particularly congenial sphere of activity. These peoples were not strongly entrenched within organised religions of their own, like the Moslems and Hindus of India, nor were they well-nigh irreclaimable savages like the natives of Australia. They had little religion other than witchcraft and ancestor-worship, yet they were sufficiently intelligent to respond to the social and educational, if not always to the religious, teaching of the missionaries. Thus the missionaries constituted themselves the champions of the native peoples, and consequently the critics and, one may say, the enemies of the Dutch. And, unlike the Dutch, they had the ear of the British government. The religious vote could win or lose many seats at elections, more particularly after the Reform Bill of 1832. Many prominent statesmen were actively interested in missions, and such statesmen, just because of their interest in missions, were apt to find their way to the colonial office. For the same reason the permanent officials of the Colonial Office were often keenly interested in missionary work. In fact, until the rise of the Wakefield school of colonial reformers, the mission interest was the most active form of imperialism in the Mother country, and the Wakefield school never took much interest in South Africa. Dr. Philip, of the London Missionary Society, was, for years,

accepted in England as the leading authority on South African affairs.

Thus there arose what was in fact a conflict between the ideas of two different ages, the age of Cromwell and the age of Wilberforce, between a religion of Old Testament fighters and slave-holders and a religion of philanthropists. Historians have been apt to take strong views on one side or the other. The Boers were slave-holders and their attitude towards the native peoples can hardly be defended. On the other hand the missionaries often erred from excess of zeal and from lack of sympathy with men whose difficulties they did not understand. There were Kaffirs of all sorts, and the Boer farmers had had plenty of experience of savage tribes of marauders and incorrigible cattle-thieves, quite unlike the docile clients of mission stations. Anyhow, the Boers were vexed by the application to themselves of standards of conduct they neither understood nor accepted, and as the Governor, under instructions from home, tended to support the missionaries, the Boers became restive under British government. In 1828 that government took a wholly indefensible step in prohibiting the use of Dutch in law-courts and official documents, a wrong which was only righted in 1882, when the Dutch and English languages were placed on an equality.

In 1833 the British parliament enacted the abolition of slavery throughout the British Empire, and the Boer farmers, like the West Indian sugar planters, had to pay the price of other people's philanthropy. Compensation was given, and the vote of £20,000,000 at the cost of the British tax-payer struck the home-keeping Englishman as an act of impressive generosity. So, perhaps, it was; but what impressed the slave-owner was that the compensation he received was only about half the market value of his slaves.

The Kaffir Wars and the Great Trek

The British government had inherited from the Dutch the responsibility for coping with the warlike Kosa Kaffirs to the east of Cape Colony. There are reckoned to have been

in all nine of these "Kaffir Wars," the first in 1778 and the last in 1864. The Kosas were impossible neighbours and possessed a quality we like to attribute to ourselves; they did not know when they were beaten. They were fine fighters, and the dense scrub of mimosa bush in which they fought made attack difficult. None the less it is obvious that they could have been rapidly subdued by the British, if the home authorities had allowed the matter to be taken firmly in hand. That it was not was due partly to the fact that the home government resented the necessary expenditure of money, and still more to the fact that the Colonial Office felt a good deal of sympathy with the Kosas. In 1834 a vigorous Governor, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, proposed to annex a tract of Kosa country between the Keiskamma and Kei rivers. For this he was sharply rebuked by the Colonial Secretary, and ordered to abandon his projected annexation.

This refusal to secure for the eastern Boer farmers adequate protection against the Kosas was the principal cause of the "Great Trek."[1] The Great Trek is the nearest thing in modern history to the Exodus of the Israelites from Egypt. Yet in one respect the parallel is misleading, for there was no Dutch Moses. Between five and ten thousand Boers left the territory within which British government operated, and made their way north-east across the Orange river, but they went in many small parties, isolated from one another. There was no single organised "Exodus." Many of them perished by the way; all of them braved great dangers and suffered great hardships. The ultimate result was the establishment of the two Dutch republics, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, but it was a long time before any such definite political units came into

[1] Some books represent the emancipation of the slaves as the main cause of the Great Trek, but this can hardly be, for most of the Trekkers had not been slave-owners. The bulk of them came from the eastern province which suffered most from the Kosa raids. The mistake is a natural one, since the abolition of slavery is a world-famous event, whereas a single incident of the Kaffir wars was soon buried in oblivion—except on the Kaffir frontier.

existence. The Trekkers got along very well for a long time without any visible governments; each group settled where it pleased and did as seemed right in its own eyes. It was long before some of the groups settled at all. They reverted to the nomad life of the native tribes, for which the vast bare uplands of the interior are so well suited.

Foundation of Natal

What would the British governor do? Like Pharaoh of old he was concerned at the departure of so many of his subjects, but the Orange river did not witness any tragedy like that which occurred at the Red Sea. The Trekkers were allowed to depart in peace, but when some years later, parties of them crossed the Drakensberg mountains to the east and, by agreement with the Zulu king, began to establish themselves near the coast, the British government stepped in, annexed all the coast line up to the Portuguese border, and established the colony of Natal. After much protest the Boers in Natal submitted to British rule (1843), but most of them subsequently left the colony. It is significant that the quarrel of these Boers with the British government turned principally on the rights of the native population, which the British government upheld. The two chief cities of the colony commemorate its origin by their names. Pietermaritzburg was the Boer settlement, Durban the British seat of government, called after the former Governor of Cape Colony. The name of the colony itself is as old as Vasco da Gama, who called the coast Terra Natalis because he sighted it on Christmas day. Yet another strand in South African history is commemorated in Berea, a residential suburb of Durban; it had been a missionary settlement, called after the Berea which is mentioned and specially commended by St. Luke in the Acts of the Apostles.

The Dutch Republics

But the Great Trek created difficult problems in other places besides Natal, for the Trekkers were established all

along the borders of Cape Colony and, though they had left the colony, they were still considered to be, legally, British subjects. The British government was very reluctant to increase its territories and expenses in what was regarded as the most unprofitable of colonies, but the missionaries were laudably anxious to protect the native tribes on the border, such as the Basutos, from the untender mercies of the Trekkers. An attempt to establish a sort of protectorate over the native tribes to the north of the colony proved a failure, and in 1846 a British resident with a small garrison was established in the Orange Free State. A few years later Pretorius, the principal Boer leader north of the Vaal, assumed a threatening attitude, and the British government, engaged at the time in another Kaffir war, bought him off with the Sand River Convention (1852), by which the Transvaal Boers were granted complete independence. At about the same time British forces were defeated in a small engagement with Moshesh, the Basuto chieftain, and Lord Aberdeen's government, already distracted by the negotiations which led up to the Crimean War, decided to withdraw from the Orange Free State. The withdrawal was effected (1854) in spite of the protests of a section of the Boer population, who had come to value the security the British garrison afforded.

Four years later the Boers of the Free State, harassed by their fellow-countrymen across the Vaal, petitioned for an alliance with the British. Sir George Grey, famous in the history of Australia and New Zealand, was then Governor of the Cape, and proposed a scheme for the federation of all the British and Dutch settlements. It was rejected in England first by a Tory and afterwards by a Liberal government. Even Lord Grey, who played so great a part in the development of Canada and Australia, had said that Great Britain had no interest in South Africa beyond the maintenance of a naval station at Table Bay.

These events had remote consequences which, nearly half a century later, were to attract the attention of the whole world and give rise to the greatest of all colonial

wars. At the time they interested hardly anyone outside South Africa and a few officials of the Colonial Office.

(iii) BRITISH AND DUTCH: THE SECOND ADVANCE AND WITHDRAWAL. (1859–1884)

Progress in Cape Colony

Within Cape Colony steady progress reigned. The White population multiplied by three in a quarter of a century, and reached a quarter of a million. Good breeds of sheep had been introduced, and the industry of ostrich farming prospered. Fashions change, and to-day ostrich feathers are perhaps seldom seen, but they were long a conspicuous feature of Victorian female adornment. The natives, under the devoted guidance of the missionaries, made progress in the rudiments of western civilisation, and when a Legislative Assembly was established in 1854, equal political rights were given to Black and White peoples, though in fact few Blacks possessed the property qualification required for the franchise. In 1872 Cape Colony received a self-governing constitution such as the Australian colonies had obtained twenty years before. The Governor of Cape Colony henceforth accepted the advice of colonial ministers so far as the affairs of Cape Colony were concerned, but, as High Commissioner for South Africa, he continued to be responsible only to the British Government at home for British interests outside the self-governing colony.

Anglo-Dutch difficulties

One may suspect that the Governor of Cape Colony would often have slept much better at night if he had not shared his bed with the High Commissioner for South Africa. These years, so peaceful and prosperous for Cape Colony, where British and Dutch subjects now amicably worked together for the common good, proved again and again the difficulty, nay the impossibility, of securing a satisfactory management of South African affairs as a

whole, so long as several independent White states were each free to go their several ways. In Australia such a condition of affairs might have proved perfectly feasible even though, let us say, New South Wales had been British and Victoria Dutch. What rendered it impossible in South Africa was the presence of the native races.

Two difficulties arose with the Orange Free State. The Basutos, finding that in spite of many victories they could hold out no longer against their Boer neighbours, asked for British protection, and their territory was separated from the Free State. At about the same time (1868) diamonds were discovered on the site which quickly became the busy cosmopolitan mining town of Kimberley. Frontiers were so vague that it was uncertain whether Kimberley lay within the Free State or not. The Governor of Natal, who was hardly likely to be impartial, was asked to arbitrate, and decided that it was outside the Free State, but the British government, as though confessing the futility of the arbitration, paid £90,000 of compensation to the Free State government. It was just as well, for, as later events proved, mining towns and Boer republics "go ill together."

Difficulties with the Free State were, however, fairly amicably settled owing to the wisdom of its President, Sir John Brand, a Dutch lawyer from the Cape, who for a quarter of a century gave the Free State Boers the blessings of good government.

Very different was the condition of the Transvaal. Here anarchy prevailed, and marauding expeditions against native tribes both within and without the vast territory were often accompanied by the most barbarous atrocities. Native chiefs from Bechuanaland and even the remote and savage Matabili appealed to the British government to put an end to an intolerable insecurity. In these circumstances it was natural that the Zulus should bethink them of their former triumphs and Cetewayo began to revive the traditions of Tshaka. Zululand lay between the Transvaal and Natal, and that small colony, with a British

TABLE MOUNTAIN AND CAPE TOWN TO-DAY

population of barely 10,000, began to become exceedingly and reasonably nervous.

The Zulu War and Majuba

It was almost impossible to tackle the Zulus without the co-operation of the Transvaal, and Lord Carnarvon, Disraeli's Colonial Secretary, determined upon a policy of South African federation. It was he who had rejected the policy twenty years before, when it was advocated by Sir George Grey. He had now changed his mind, perhaps partly because in the interval he had witnessed the successful federation of Canada. Sir Bartle Frere, a very distinguished Indian administrator, was sent out as High Commissioner to carry out his policy, and as a preliminary measure (though one may doubt if it ought to have been the first step taken) Shepstone, the Governor of Natal, was allowed to visit the Transvaal and to proclaim its annexation (1877) to the British crown.[1] Then followed the Zulu war. The Zulus were conquered, though not till after they had been allowed, by the incompetence of the British commander, to inflict a horrible defeat upon a detachment of our troops at Isandlwhana.

Meanwhile the great scheme of federation made no progress. It was, in fact, much less attractive to the Boer republics than it would have been twenty years earlier. The Free State was entirely satisfied with its existing conditions under the government of Sir John Brand. The Transvaal Boers were very naturally irritated because they had been promised self-government as a condition of their annexation, and the promise had not been fulfilled, mainly because the British government was busy with greater matters on the other side of the world. Moreover the Zulu peril, which might have frightened even the Transvaal Boers into acquiescence, had now been removed. In 1880 Gladstone, who had passionately opposed every item

1 With Shepstone on this occasion was a young Englishman named Rider Haggard who afterwards used his South African experiences to write *King Solomon's Mines* and other popular tales.

in the Conservative South African policy, became Prime Minister, and the Transvaal Boers expected him to give them back their independence. Once again delays followed. The Transvaal Boers mobilised their forces on the Natal frontier. The British government demanded their disarmament, while at the same time entering on negotiations for the granting of their independence. These confused counsels led to hostilities on the frontier and a British force of four hundred men was attacked and defeated on Majuba Hill. The British colonists and the British army demanded vengeance for Majuba, but Gladstone persisted in his original policy, and the Transvaal (1881) recovered its independence, subject only to British " suzerainty "—whatever that might mean. The treaty of 1881 was revised three years later and in this second treaty the claim to " suzerainty " was not renewed; whether it was actually abandoned became afterwards a matter of controversy.

(iv) BRITISH AND DUTCH: THE THIRD ADVANCE, AND THE UNION. (1885–1910)

At the time of Gladstone's treaty of 1881 granting independence once again to the Transvaal *The Times* wrote, " England can now have no desire to intrude herself upon the Transvaal. The more completely its people can get on without interference of any kind the better pleased we shall be. The fact is that between England and the Transvaal there is no natural connection whatever." Within five years of the writing of those words the richest goldfield in the world had been opened up on the Rand (or Witwatersrand), a high ridge of the veld in the very heart of the Transvaal, thirty miles south of Pretoria. Adventurous speculators and mining engineers flocked to the scene. Soon Johannesburg, the mining centre, was the biggest town in South Africa and the Uitlanders (aliens) as they were called—British, American, Australian, German and Jewish—outnumbered the total Dutch population of the Republic. Pharaoh had followed at last, and with a

vengeance. It was as though gold had been discovered in the Promised Land and a great Egyptian colony established itself at Bethel or Bethlehem.[1]

President Kruger

The Transvaal had at last found a strong man to rule it in Paul Kruger, whom Bismarck in his old age declared—perhaps jokingly, for he was talking to an Englishman—to be one of the two greatest statesmen of the nineteenth century. As a boy of ten he had followed the family ox-waggon in the Great Trek. Ever since he had led an active life, as a huntsman, a raider of native tribes and a Boer politician. He had been appointed general of the Transvaal forces as early as 1864, and later on he had played a leading part in overthrowing the authority of President Burghers who, having been educated at the Cape, held unduly liberal views, refusing to believe, it is said, that the devil had a tail. Kruger himself knew no book but the Bible, and it is doubtful if he ever got beyond the Old Testament. He belonged to the strictest of all Dutch sects, the Doppers (Dippers, i.e. Baptists), who held the singing of hymns to be an improper levity. The sincerity of his belief in divine guidance is beyond question, but he was, with all his piety, an extremely shrewd politician, with an acute appreciation of the value of money and of guns also.

For Kruger and his people the Uitlanders were an extremely unwelcome intrusion, but they could at least be taxed, and the revenue of the Transvaal government, £154,000 in 1886, attaining the pleasing total of £4,000,000 in 1898, a good deal of which went to enrich Kruger and his personal friends. If, in return for the revenue from the Uitlanders,

[1] Gold had been worked at various places in South Africa since prehistoric times. It is very likely that the " gold of Ophir " imported by King Solomon came from mines near the Portuguese coast, the gold being carried down to the port of Sofala, which was used by Arab traders when the Portuguese first arrived. Milton refers to this theory, which though old is probably correct, in *Paradise Lost*, XI, 400.

Kruger had supplied the Rand with the ordinary conveniences that civilised governments supply to their subjects, or even if he had allowed the Uitlanders to supply these for themselves, few complaints would have been heard, for the Uitlanders were not imperialists sighing for the sight of the Union Jack; they were a cosmopolitan crowd intent on making money. Instead, however, Kruger subjected them to every kind of petty persecution. They were excluded from the franchise, which would have enabled them to make themselves heard in the volksraad, or parliament, of the Transvaal. They were not even allowed to govern their own city of Johannesburg. The Rand was without water works, efficient drainage, or liquor control—the last so essential where a large native population was employed in the mines; its press was censored; its industry hampered by a government dynamite monopoly, whereby Kruger supplied an inferior article at an exorbitant price, and by the diversion of exports from the Cape route to Delagoa Bay. To all remonstrances Kruger replied in effect—"I have the guns, and you haven't." The obvious moral was to get the guns.

The claim of the Transvaal Boers to live their lives unmolested is one that excites sympathy—so long as one forgets the vile way in which they had molested the natives. One may grant that the discovery of gold in the middle of their territory was for them a piece of extraordinarily bad luck—though it had its financial compensations. But no one can defend the policy they pursued. One may or may not call it criminal; in Talleyrand's phrase, "It was worse than a crime, it was a blunder."

Cecil Rhodes

While Kruger was holding the fort for the past at Pretoria a still more remarkable man was scheming for the future at Cape Town. Cecil Rhodes was the son of an English clergyman, sent to Natal for the sake of his health in 1870, at the age of seventeen. He quickly interested himself in the diamond mines of Kimberley, and made a fortune

almost before he had ceased to be a boy. But Rhodes only cared for money as a means to an end. As early as 1872 he had travelled with a single native servant through Bechuanaland, a country then almost unknown except to a few missionaries, and across the open veld of the Transvaal, observed the quality of the soil and climate, and conceived the idea which materialised twenty years later as Rhodesia, a new British colony, outflanking and surrounding the Dutch republics. That, however, was for a distant future. Rhodes knew the value of other things besides money, and in 1876 the young millionaire transferred himself to Oxford to complete his education—surely one of the finest compliments ever paid to that "home of lost causes." In 1881 we find him a member of the Cape Parliament, ready to keep a watchful eye on the German settlement in South West Africa (1883), and on German intrigues with Kruger. It was Rhodes who, in 1885, was mainly responsible for the British annexation of Bechuanaland, which interposed a barrier between the Germans and the Transvaal, and kept open the road from the Cape to the Zambesi. In 1889 he secured the establishment of the Chartered Company for "trading and mining" south of the Zambesi. In 1893 Lo Bengula, the savage chief of the Matabili, was conquered and Rhodesia established, under the government of Rhodes' faithful follower, Dr. Jameson. Rhodes had hoped to secure railway and telegraphic communication from the Cape to Cairo over unbroken British territory, but he was two years too late, being forestalled by the German occupation of Tanganyika territory. Since the war that territory has passed to Great Britain, and his ideal could be realised. In 1890 he had become Prime Minister of Cape Colony. He was already one of the leading financial magnates of the Rand goldfield.

The Jameson Raid

As Prime Minister of a self-governing British colony, as a sort of absentee Uitlander, and as chairman of the Chartered Company, exercising practically uncontrolled authority,

military and civil, in Rhodesia through his agent, Dr. Jameson, Rhodes had become something like the three-headed dog Cerberus as described by Mrs. Malaprop—"three gentlemen at once." This fact made possible the disastrous episode known as the Jameson Raid. The Uitlanders were planning a kind of insurrection for the end of 1895, and invited the assistance of an invasion of the Transvaal by a detachment of Bechuanaland police, to which Rhodes very improperly gave his consent. At the last moment the rising on the Rand was postponed, but Jameson invaded the Transvaal with a ridiculously inadequate force of 500 mounted police. They were surrounded, and compelled to surrender in four days.

The Raid was a deplorable piece of folly. A breach of the most elementary laws governing the relations between states had been committed by a British force with the connivance of a British colonial Prime Minister. The British government at home had been entirely innocent of all complicity in the business, but it inevitably suffered grave discredit in the eyes of the world outside the Empire, and the consequences of the Raid placed it in a most embarrassing position. What was to be done with Dr. Jameson and twelve of his companions who were handed over to the British government? They were tried on a charge of unlawfully fitting out a military expedition against a friendly state, convicted, and sentenced to brief terms of imprisonment. Rhodes resigned the premiership of the Cape, but was not brought to trial. As Prime Minister of Cape Colony not the least of his services had been the skill with which he secured the friendly co-operation of the Dutch, for though an ardent imperialist he was entirely free from petty racial antipathies. At a single stroke his good work was undone. Krugerism was not only triumphant in the Transvaal: the tough old rascal, who stood for all that was most narrow and reactionary in the Dutch character, became the hero not only of his own subjects but of the much larger Dutch population outside. The wise Brand had died, and his policy no longer ruled the

Free State. In Cape Colony the Dutch political organisation, known as the Afrikander Bond, took a definitely anti-British character. The reasonable demands of the Uitlanders were buried beneath a mountain of racial prejudice.[1]

The South African War

In March 1899, a decent interval of three years having elapsed since the Raid, the Uitlanders addressed a petition to Queen Victoria, reciting their grievances and asking for the intervention of the British government on their behalf. The Imperialist movement, popularized by the works of Mr. Kipling and a host of lesser writers, and quickened by Kitchener's recent conquest of the Soudan, was at its height. Joseph Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary and the most powerful political influence of the day in England, took up the cause of the Uitlanders and directed the High Commissioner, Sir Alfred Milner, to seek an interview with Kruger. The discussion turned upon the claim of the Uitlanders to be naturalized as citizens of the Transvaal with a right to the franchise. When nothing satisfactory was obtained on this point, the barren question of "suzerainty" was raised. Did the British government possess suzerainty over the Transvaal, and if so, what was it? Kruger demanded that the questions at issue should be submitted to the arbitration of a neutral government. We refused, nominally, because we thought this inconsistent with suzerainty, but also, no doubt, because we held that, since the Jameson Raid, no neutral state was likely to take an impartial view of the situation. Kruger entered on the

1 'Dr. Jim' will always be remembered for his Raid, whereas all the rest of his career is apt to be forgotten outside South Africa. He was a most lovable and admirable man who rendered great services not only to Rhodesia, but afterwards, as Prime Minister of the Cape, to the whole of South Africa. His own subsequent judgment on the Raid may be indicated by an anecdote. Long afterwards, in the Cape Parliament, some speaker, dealing with it matters not what, said, "If the right honourable gentleman (Dr. Jameson) is of that opinion, he is making the greatest mistake of his life." "No," murmured 'Dr. Jim' from his seat, "I made that long ago."

negotiations with a full realization of the position, and prepared for war. He had been importing big guns from Europe ever since the Raid. With the alliance of the Free State and the active support of many Boers from the Cape he could put into the field about 80,000 men, far more than the British forces available in South Africa at the moment. It is perhaps unlikely that he expected to "drive the British into the sea" and establish a Dutch Republic over all South Africa; unlikely that, in spite of the German Kaiser's public declaration of "friendship" after the Raid, he expected help from Europe, for he was no fool, and was aware of the existence of the British navy; but no doubt he expected to be able to do enough to place the independence of the Transvaal on a far firmer basis than before. The British government had entered on the negotiations with no such clear vision of their outcome, and Kruger's ultimatum of October 1899, demanding the withdrawal of British troops from Natal, found us—as so often before—unprepared.

The British policy which led to the South African War was condemned by practieally the whole world outside the British Empire; it was also condemned by a substantial minority in Great Britain, including many who, choosing the lesser of two evils, supported the government in its war measures when once the war had begun. It was held that the grievances of the Uitlanders were not of the class of oppression that justifies the horrors of war. After all, the Uitlanders were not natives of the country: they had gone to the Rand with their eyes open, holding that the game of gold-mining was worth the candle of Krugerism. Kruger's tyrannies and extortions, it was said, reduced the dividends of the Rand shareholders by one, two, or *even three per cent.!* This was not very impressive. Moreover, Kruger was seventy-five years old. His tyranny was peculiarly his own, and would certainly be modified or disappear entirely at his death. There had long been, and there persisted in spite of the Raid, an opposition party among the younger generation of the Transvaal Boers, including such men as Louis Botha, who were prepared to come to terms with the Uitlanders.

Time was on the side of the British cause. Would it not have been possible to wait?

And yet, in retrospect, it is almost impossible to regret the South African War. If its cause was inadequate, the terms of its conclusion were wise, and without the war the South African Union could hardly have been achieved by 1910. Moreover, even if one holds that the war was an avoidable disaster in South African history, may one not plead that the South African sacrifice was, as things turned out, more than compensated by the gain to the world at large? The South African War revealed grave defects in the British army organisation, and indirectly led to the army reforms associated with the name of Lord Haldane. Without the South African War would those reforms have been accomplished? Without those reforms, would our army have been able to play the part it played in 1914—a part which perhaps just turned the balance against a decisive and final German victory?

The South African War was nominally a war between two small republics and a world-wide Empire. Actually it was, so far as South Africa was concerned, a civil war between two races living intermingled within a territory which, in spite of artificial frontiers, was inevitably a single unit. One of those races was prepared for war, so that it scored all the initial successes. The other race had behind it all the resources of the Empire, and was bound to win in the end.

It is painful to recall the ludicrous light-heartedness and the no less ludicrous ignorance of the British people at home in the opening weeks of the war. *Punch*, a week before the ultimatum, depicted the Boers as "shambling oafs, who grinned vacuously and fell over their own rifles. It was part of the prevailing ignorance that they were nearly always represented on foot."[1] As a matter of fact, of course, they went everywhere on horseback, dismounting only to fight; they were masters of the military arts of invisibility and disappearance; they were better marksmen than the British regulars, and their big guns out-ranged anything we

[1] Gretton. *Modern History of the English People*, Vol. II, p. 64.

could bring against them until we took the guns off our battleships.

The Boers invaded British territory east, south and west, and besieged Ladysmith (in Natal), Kimberley, and Mafeking. Still, we thought the war would be " over by Christmas." Instead there came " Black Week," December 11–16. Methuen, advancing to the relief of Kimberley, marched the Highland Brigade straight into a wire entanglement in the dark at Magersfontein, and lost 700 men. Gatacre, operating in Cape Colony, marched his men into a trap at Stormberg, and lost 600 prisoners and two guns. Buller, in Natal, was repulsed with a loss of 1,200 men and 10 guns at Colenso. In January came another and even more bitter disappointment. Buller had occupied a hill called Spion Kop which, the newspaper reader was given to understand, commanded the Boer lines screening Ladysmith. It turned out that it did not do so, and the forces on Spion Kop, after suffering a murderous bombardment, had to be withdrawn.

These battles seem small affairs, judged by standards set fifteen years later. They did not really endanger the British prospects of ultimate victory for a moment. None the less, if one wants a dividing line between " Victorian " and post-Victorian times, these little reverses indicate where it ought to be drawn. They gave a sudden check to the national self-satisfaction and the sense of security which had developed during fifty years of unprecedented material progress. No doubt the check administered to this mood by " Black Week " might have proved only temporary, but it happened that in the next few years other causes for deeper anxiety arose elsewhere—industrial discontent, militant suffragism, conflict between Lords and Commons, Ireland, and behind them all, the menace from Germany.

To return to the South African War. With the opening of the new year it was inevitable that the tide should turn in favour of the Empire. Roberts and Kitchener had been sent out; our available forces had been greatly increased, and the main advance was planned not from Natal but from

the Cape. By the end of February Kimberley and Ladysmith had been relieved, and Kitchener had compelled the Boer commander, Cronje, with 5,000 men, to surrender at Paardeberg, near Kimberley. Mafeking held out till May under Baden-Powell, when it was relieved by Colonel Plumer. It was a small outpost of no great importance, but the gallant defence took the fancy of the British public and made the name of the future founder of the Boy Scout movement. In June Roberts entered Pretoria, Kruger fled to Europe (where he died two years later) and the war seemed to be over.

But it was not. The British government demanded unconditional surrender, and the Boer leaders in the field showed no signs of accepting such terms. The vast size of the country in relation to the forces engaged enabled a skilful and mobile defence to prolong the struggle for nearly two years more.[1] It was a kind of warfare in which all the laurels, though by no means all the deserts, were won by the " hares " rather than the " hounds," and the name of the elusive De Wet became wearisomely familiar, though his exploits were well matched by those of other commanders such as Botha and Smuts. On the British side Kitchener set himself methodically to a task in which success was difficult and glory impossible. He divided the country into sections by lines of " block-houses," and rounded up the enemy bit by bit, by driving them against the block-house lines. It was found necessary to deprive the enemy forces of the help they inevitably drew from their kinsfolk in the farms; so farm buildings were systematically burnt and their inhabitants, mostly women and children, herded into " concentration camps." There is no ground for thinking that the commanders of these camps treated their prisoners inhumanely, but there were grave defects in organisation, the death-rate in the camps rose alarmingly. Vigorous protests against methods which had such results were raised in England. Such protests did not always make

[1] The prolonged Boer resistance would have been impossible if aeroplanes had been available.

a reasonable allowance for the difficulties of the British military authorities, but one may be glad such protests were made, for they marked the faint beginnings of a renewal of kindly feeling between two races which ought never to have been enemies.[1]

The Treaty of Vereeniging

At last the inevitable end came, and with it a wise and generous peace. By the Treaty of Vereeniging the Boers laid down their arms and acknowledged themselves British subjects. The two former republics, henceforth " colonies," were promised self-government as soon as possible. Dutch as well as English was to be taught in the schools and used in the law courts. The British government made a gift of three million pounds to assist in re-establishing the Boers in their farms. The war had cost the victors 20,000 lives (far more from enteric fever than from death in battle) and £200,000,000. The Dutch had lost 3,800 lives and 31,000 in prisoners—20,000 laid down their arms on the signature of peace.

Self-Government in the new Colonies

At the end of 1905 a Liberal government came into power in England. Most of its members had disapproved of the policy which led to the war, and one of their first steps was to grant complete self-government to the two conquered provinces. Conservative opinion in England gasped at the boldness, or rashness, of this step, but it proved to be the highest wisdom. More than anything else it won the loyalty of the Boer population, and converted the two ablest Dutch statesmen, Botha and Smuts, into unflinching supporters of the British connexion.

The Union of South Africa

In 1908, six years after the British conquest of the Dutch republics, a situation had arisen in South Africa which a

[1] In the same way, the end of Anglo-German hatred came in sight when British Tommies insisted, in defiance of orders, on sharing their rations with the starving children of Cologne.

foreigner might well have accounted strange. A Dutchman was Prime Minister in the Transvaal; another Dutchman was Prime Minister in what had for a short time been officially designated the Orange River Colony, but had already been permitted to resume its old name of the Orange Free State; a third Dutchman, the leader of the Afrikander Bond, had just won a general election and succeeded Dr. Jameson as Prime Minister of Cape Colony. Yet these three Dutch Prime Ministers, together with their British colleague in Natal,[1] had just accepted an invitation of the British High Commissioner, Lord Selborne, to meet in conference to draw up a constitution for the Union of South Africa. One may add that they were receiving valuable help in their constitution-making labours from a group of young British imperialists who had been trained under Lord Milner, once hated as the author of the South African War—a group sometimes irreverently described as Milner's kindergarten.

In fact the divisions of South Africa were no longer between British and Dutch, but between one colony and another. Economic rivalries were producing threats of "tariff wars" between the colonies, which would have seriously hampered trade. The colonies differed embarrassingly in their policies regarding the treatment of natives and of Indian immigration. There was indeed a real danger of what was called a "Balkanization" of South Africa, a division of the territory into states distracted by petty rivalries from co-operation in a common progress. The only solution was some form of union, such as had already been achieved by Canada and Australia. Jameson, before leaving office, had expressed the opinion that this was the only sound policy, and had appealed to Lord Selborne to take the subject up. The able despatch in which Lord Selborne replied to this invitation provided a basis for the conference that followed. "The people of South Africa," he wrote, "are not self-governing because they have no South African government with which to govern." An Act of Union was drawn up by a National Convention in 1908, made law by

[1] Natal became a self-governing colony in 1893.

the British parliament in 1909, and put into operation in 1910.

The constitution thus enacted was not a federal constitution, leaving wide powers to the several colonies, like the constitutions of Canada and Australia, but a Union, like the constitution governing England, Scotland, and Wales. That is to say, there is a single parliament which makes laws on all subjects for all the provinces of the Union. This does not mean that the law is the same in all the provinces. Each province has retained much of the law made before the Union, and, since conditions differ in the various provinces, the Union parliament sometimes enacts laws applicable to one province only. The same is true, of course, of the United Kingdom, for Scotland has preserved, ever since the Act of Union, her own legal system, and the parliament at Westminster still often enacts laws applicable only to Scotland. There is, however, this difference, that each of the South African provinces still retains a subordinate assembly for certain local purposes.

The one concession made to local jealousies was the curious arrangement by which Pretoria is the seat of the government, but Cape Town the meeting place of parliament, whither the Cabinet ministers and their staffs have to migrate every session. To an Englishman this seems like placing our "Whitehall" in Inverness and our "Westminster" in Plymouth. The arrangement does not, however, appear to involve as much inconvenience as one might suppose. Even before the war, when the Dutch republics were independent and "foreign" states, Bryce had remarked the extraordinarily close social connexion between all the leading cities of South Africa. He goes so far as to say (in 1895) that Cape Town, Kimberley, Bloemfontein, Johannesburg, and Pretoria "are for social purposes almost one city."

Parties in the Union

General Botha became the first Prime Minister of the Union with General Smuts as his principal colleague. Together they made a very strong combination. Botha was

a man of massive common sense and great personal charm ; Smuts, who had completed his education at Cambridge fifteen years before, was a man of absolutely first-class intellect ; indeed he shares with two of his British contemporaries, Balfour and Haldane, the distinction of having, in his spare time, made valuable contributions to the literature of philosophy. Together these two statesmen ruled South Africa until after the end of the Great War.

The party led by Botha and Smuts was called the South African Party, and the British party of opposition was called Unionist. During the war a new party grew up, under the leadership of General Hertzog, called Nationalist and advocating an independent South African Republic. The result was that the British, or Unionist, party supported and ultimately united itself with the South African party. After Botha's death in 1918 Smuts lost the bulk of his Dutch supporters and found himself the leader of a predominantly British party. The Nationalist party came into power in 1924, but only after it had abandoned for all practical purposes its policy of independence. There is also a small Labour party.[1]

(v) THE NON-EUROPEAN PEOPLES WITHIN THE UNION

The history of South Africa ends, as it begins, with the native. It begins with him because he was there first ; it ends with him because the position of the native peoples within the framework of a White society is, and will long continue to be, the chief problem of South African politics.

The White population of the Union is a little over one and a half million, fairly equally divided between British and Dutch. The non-European population is about six million. Of them five million are Kaffirs, or Bantus ; about eight hundred thousand are the so-called " coloured persons " or Cape Boys, a half-caste race descended from unions between the Dutch settlers, their East Indian slaves and the Hottentots.

[1] In this section I have used certain paragraphs from a previous book entitled *British History*, 1874–1914.

These people are, on the average, decidedly more advanced in civilization than the pure Bantus. There are also between 150,000 and 200,000 Indians, the great bulk of whom were born in South Africa, though their parents or grandparents were imported as labourers to Natal. These Indians constitute a problem of their own, separate from, though also mixed up with, the native problem.

Of the Bantu peoples rather more than a million live on the land of European farmers and work for them. Rather less than a million live in towns or mining camps and engage in industrial unskilled labour. There remain, then, about three million living on native territories of various kinds within the Union. But that is not the whole story, for the industrial section of the native population is not a permanent unit. Kaffirs come to work in the mines until they have " made their fortunes " and in most cases no longer; and, though the Kaffir wage is low, his idea of a fortune, *i.e.* enough to purchase two oxen or a wife, is still more modest, and his industrial career is a brief episode in his life. Thus, though at any given moment only about an eighth of the native population is industrially engaged, a far larger fraction of it passes through the mill of industry. The native who returns from the Rand has learnt much, both good and evil, that is incompatible with the old tribal organization, depending as it did on respect for the chief. Tribal organization is doomed: what is to take its place?

The native problem has many aspects. The most important controversies have turned upon three questions: the franchise, the land question, and the colour-bar in industry.

The franchise question

When the four colonies came together in the Union they agreed to differ on the subject of the native franchise, and each to retain their own electoral laws for electing their members to the common parliament. In Cape Colony the natives have the same rights of franchise, practically speaking, as the English and Dutch; there is no " colour bar."

In the other three provinces they are excluded from the franchise. These three provinces have manhood suffrage for Europeans and no suffrage for the rest. Cape Colony has, as Great Britain had between 1885 and 1918, a low financial qualification for the vote which admits practically all Europeans and excludes the bulk of the native population, who also have to pass a very elementary educational test. The result is that of the total electorate of the Union rather more than nine-tenths are Europeans and rather less than one-tenth natives, all the natives being in the Cape province, except a few hundreds who have been granted the franchise in Natal. In the Cape province nearly a quarter of the electorate, 40,000 in fact, are natives, of whom two-thirds are Cape Boys and one-third Kaffirs: there are only two thousand Indians in the Cape province, and most of these possess the vote.

The Cape franchise dates from the very beginning of elective assemblies in the colony, in 1853. The home government who granted this franchise were in those days much influenced by missionaries who naturally took an optimistic view of the native peoples. It would be fair to say that no one realised at that date the difficulties that equality of franchise would ultimately involve. Since the Cape received self-government in 1872, the franchise has more than once been raised, owing to apprehension that the native vote might swamp the White electorate, but there has been no widespread desire to abolish it. As a matter of fact the native electorate has grown more slowly than the White and there are only two constituencies in which the native voters are a majority. It is not at all surprising that the Boer Republics explicitly excluded the natives from the franchise, for those republics owed their very existence to disgust with the British pro-native policy in early days. Natal also excluded the natives because in that colony the preponderance of the native population over the White is far greater than elsewhere in the Union.

To-day the Nationalist party, which draws its strength from the Dutch vote and has governed the Union since

1924, makes no secret of its desire to secure the abolition of the Cape franchise. This, however, is by no means easy, since, being part of the constitution of the Union, it can only be abolished by a measure which secures a three-to-one majority in the Union parliament. Those who wish to abolish the Cape franchise put forward alternative proposals. One is the introduction of native constituencies, like those in New Zealand by which the Maoris elect a fixed number of members to the New Zealand parliament. This system works very well in New Zealand, but the conditions are very different. The British New Zealanders outnumber the Maoris by twenty to one, and, having no reason to fear them, are on excellent terms with them. It is possible to give the Maoris a perfectly fair representation without endangering British control of the country. None of these conditions exists in South Africa; and the Kaffirs are much more backward and incapable of an intelligent use of political privileges than the Maoris.

Another plan is the creation of a kind of native system of representation entirely apart from the White parliament. Excellent work has been done in Cape Colony in the way of reconstructing native societies in native areas, with local self-government under European control. Rhodes took a deep interest in this work, and it was greatly advanced during his prime-ministership (1890–96). Could not such a system be extended throughout the Union, and the various local self-governing areas combine in a Native Assembly for the whole Union? This is an ambitious plan, which presents many difficulties. Even if such a Native Assembly was established, what would be its constitutional position in relation to the White parliament? It is idle to say that one parliament could manage White affairs and the other Native affairs, for the vital problems are the relations between White and Native peoples.

The Land Problem

Of these problems one of the most difficult is the land problem. How shall the land be divided between White

and Native users? This is a problem which grows more and more urgent as both White and Native populations increase. The Native population is increasing rapidly and will inevitably continue to do so. The White population hopes to increase also, for if it does not the prospects of White South Africa are ultimately doomed. It is a problem of what is called "distributive justice," and the sole judge of the distribution is one of the two claimants. Under such circumstance the White South Africans would have been more than human if they had never tilted the scales of justice in their own favour.

In early days the White farmer paid his native labourers very largely by allowing them to occupy parts of his vast estates. It was a system like the feudal system of the middle ages, where the villein paid for his holding by working on his lord's demesne. Many natives also bought or leased land from Europeans, and legislation against this was practically ignored. In 1913 the Union parliament carried, against the opposition of nearly all the British members, a Natives Land Act, forbidding natives to buy or lease land except in areas afterwards to be defined by a commission. The members of the commission entered on its labours with the most liberal views, intending to create large and appropriate native areas. Unfortunately they were either unable or unwilling to expropriate White landowners, and the presence of a single isolated White establishment often prevented them from allotting a large area as a native reserve. In their final report they proposed to reserve 13 per cent. of the land for the natives, leaving 87 per cent. for the Europeans. These figures are rather surprising when one considers that the natives are four times as numerous as the Europeans. The fact is that those who advocate what is called a policy of "segregation" (*i.e.* separation of White and Native) would be horrified if the segregation were to become complete. The White man in South Africa will not do hard manual work out of doors. He needs the native as a wage-earning labourer on his farms, and if native reserves were adequate to native needs, the natives might prefer not to leave them.

The Colour-bar in Industry

In industry the story is much the same. We may confine our attention to the Rand, which is far the largest user of native labour. In the early days of the Uitlanders the industrial situation was as simple as the political situation was the opposite. White capital and White labour were bound together in a common hostility to Krugerism. Moreover the early White miners were really skilled men, drawn from the mining districts of Great Britain and Australia, and Kaffir labour was at first useless for any but entirely unskilled purposes. After the South African War the situation began to change. For one thing, the gold industry went through bad times. Hostility developed between the mine owners and their White employees. The White trade unions occupied a very weak position, for only custom and colour prejudice prevented the employment of Kaffir labour in many well paid jobs reserved for Whites. An ordinary strike could hardly succeed when, as was said, the black man provided an unlimited supply of " blacklegs."[1] So the miners secured the co-operation of the railwaymen and gave in 1913, on a small scale, a rehearsal of our own General Strike of 1926. The situation was really very different, and the government, quite rightly, met it by very different methods. Botha and Smuts proclaimed martial law, and the strike collapsed when confronted with the armed power of the State.

After the Great War a similar situation arose. Once again the gold industry was faced by bad times, and proposed to economise its labour costs by admitting Kaffir labour to certain semi-skilled occupations. The result, in January 1922, was a strike with violence, in which two hundred and thirty people were killed. The demarcation between White and native labour has, in fact, become exceedingly artificial. Most of the White foremen and bosses are now South African born, who have come to the

1 " Blackleg " is the slang term for non-union labour which consents to take over the jobs left vacant by men on strike.

mines because they have failed in farming, and have learnt most of what they know about mining from Kaffirs who work under them. The colour-bar, excluding the native from the well paid jobs, is maintained by trade union action. The White trade unions of South Africa, in fact, have little in common with modern British trade unions; they resemble, if anything, the old "aristocratic" craft unions of mid-Victorian days which aimed at preserving the privileged position of small bodies of highly skilled workers against the great host of the unskilled. The Nationalist party, which professes to be "anti-capitalist" and has worked in alliance with the small Labour party, would like to enforce an industrial colour-bar by legislation.

The Indian Problem

The Indians in South Africa are, compared with the Bantus, a mere handful, but their presence has provided almost as much food for thought as the native problem itself. They number about 180,000, one-tenth of the White population, and 140,000 of them are in Natal, where their numbers almost exactly equal those of the Whites. Their history is a curious one.

After the abolition of slavery all the colonies which had used slave labour had to cast about for a substitute, and as early as 1837 the sugar planters of Mauritius hit upon a plan which was afterwards widely imitated. They imported Indian coolies under indentures. Indenture may be regarded as a kind of industrial enlistment. The indentured labourer undertakes to work for a definite term of years at a certain wage, and there is usually some fixed arrangement for his future when the term of indenture is over. A sugar plantation industry developed in the semi-tropical coastal belt of Natal and, as native labour proved unsatisfactory, the planters got leave to import coolies from the Madras province in 1860. After five years of indentured labour and five more years of residence and free labour in the colony, the coolies were entitled to a choice of a free passage home or a grant of land from the Crown. All seemed well for a

time, and, as the principal nineteenth century historian of South Africa wrote, with evident satisfaction, "cheaper labour could hardly have been desired."

By 1891 there were 36,000 Indians to 47,000 Europeans in the colony. Most of the Indians preferred not to go home at the end of their ten years. They accepted grants of minute portions of land, or undertook labour on European estates in the upland country inland. Other Indians of a slightly higher class came over of their own accord and established themselves as petty shopkeepers. It began to look as if Natal might become an Indian rather than a European colony, and the offer of crown land was withdrawn. In 1893 Natal received self-government and at once imposed an annual poll tax of £3 on all Indians who had outstayed their ten years or immigrated without indenture. It also excluded free immigration for the future by imposing an education test at the port of entry.

Meanwhile the shop-keeping class of Indians had made their way into the Transvaal, where they undoubtedly supplied a felt want so far as the humbler class of White customers were concerned; but they made things very difficult for the small White shopkeeper, for their lower standard of living enabled them to undersell him and starve him out.

In 1885 Kruger's government enacted a law forbidding Indians to own or lease shops, but the law was evaded in a variety of ways, often with White connivance.

Then came the South African War. The Indian community expected that British annexation would bring them more generous treatment in the Transvaal, but it did not. In fact the British government forbade the entry of additional Indians into the Transvaal altogether. The establishment of the Union did not alter the position, and at about the same time (i.e. 1911) the Indian Government put a stop to the indentured labour system. There were now 133,000 Indians in Natal and 11,000 in the Transvaal. A quarter of them had been born in South Africa. Their numbers would undoubtedly increase even

though immigration had been stopped. What was to be done with them? In India the agitation for some form of self-government was already becoming formidable. Indian politicians affected a keen interest in their humble fellow-countrymen in South Africa, and every grievance against the South African government was treated as a grievance against the British Empire as a whole. The British government both at home and in India were therefore very anxious that the South African Indians should receive treatment which erred if anything on the side of generosity, but the South African government had to be very careful. They could not consider the Indian question apart from the native question in general. The Indians were, in a sense, the foremost wave of what was called "the rising tide of colour."

The South African Indians found a leader in an Indian lawyer who was afterwards to be famous all over the world, Mr. Gandhi. He had come to South Africa on professional business, and thereafter devoted many years of his life to the cause of the South African Indians. At that date he was an enthusiastic supporter of the British Empire, and he greatly strengthened his case by rendering many valuable services to the South African government. His aim was to secure the abolition of the poll tax, and the right of Indians to settle freely and trade in the Transvaal. In 1912 he organized a new "Great Trek" of a thousand Indians into the forbidden land. When stopped they offered no resistance, and Gandhi and many others were imprisoned for short periods. The Indian government now took the question up, and in 1913 an amicable agreement was reached. The Transvaal remained barred, but the Natal poll tax was abolished and several other Indian claims granted. It was a great personal triumph for Gandhi, and it is said that he had won the good will and respect of a very large part of the European community.

Since the Great War the situation has not appreciably changed. The Indian population has increased both in the Transvaal and in Natal, but not so much as White alarmists

expected. The Indian shopkeeper is spreading to Cape Town. There, as elsewhere, he proves a boon to some and a bugbear to others. His sanitary, or insanitary, habits are not all that could be desired, but he should prove educable. The bulk of the Indians live on the Natal coastal belt where, from the economic point of view, they are both useful and unobjectionable.

Imperial Conference, 1923

The political difficulty as it affects the Empire at large was vividly presented at the Imperial Conference of 1923. The representative of India, while agreeing that the Dominions had an entire right to control the composition of their population by excluding unwanted immigrants, demanded that there should be equality of franchise within each Dominion for all citizens of the Empire. The Prime Ministers of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Newfoundland expressed sympathetic agreement with this plea, as they could well afford to do, for the Indian population in all these Dominions taken together is no more than a very few thousand. General Smuts could not assent. "From the African point of view," he said,

"what is the real difficulty? You have a continent inhabited by a hundred million Blacks, where a few small White communities have settled down as pioneers of White civilization. You cannot blame these very small communities if they put up every possible fight for their own European civilization. They are not there to foster Indian civilization, they are there to foster Western civilization. . . . If an Indian franchise were given, the result would be that in Natal, certainly, you would at once have an Indian majority among the voters.

But our difficulty is even greater. You have a majority of Blacks in the Union, and if there were to be equal manhood suffrage over the Union the Whites would be swamped by the Blacks. You cannot make a distinction between Indians and Africans. You would be impelled by the inevitable force of logic to go the whole hog . . . and the whole

position for which we have striven for two hundred years or more would now be given up. For India it is a question of dignity; for White South Africa it is a question of existence."

In fact Canada and Australia are democracies. South Africa is a racial aristocracy, and of all forms of government a racial aristocracy is the most difficult to maintain without the commission of injustice. Yet there is quite obviously no alternative to a racial aristocracy. It is easy to maintain that the natives are not in all respects treated as well as they might be; but it is impossible to deny that they are incomparably better off than they were before the establishment of the White man's rule; it is impossible to deny that the surrender of the White man's privileged position would involve White and Black alike in a common disaster. Arm-chair criticism from a distance of the White man's native policy is very easy; but such criticism seldom offers any constructive suggestion which could help the South African White in coping with the most difficult problem in the world. He has made mistakes and he will very likely make more, but he is, comparatively speaking, only at the beginning of his task as yet.

The Future

The future of the country is admittedly uncertain. At present the largest aggregate of White population is on the Rand; but a time will come when the Rand goldfield will be exhausted, and its population will dwindle away. Will mineral wealth be tapped elsewhere? The question is an important one, for, so long as natives do all the hard work, the country will never support a large White population of farmers. It can, however, support many more than at present, and South Africa looks eagerly for White immigrants. She cannot, like Canada and Australia, draw upon the working classes of the Mother country. The settler must bring with him about £2,000 of capital. Good work has been done since the War by the

"1820 Memorial Settlers' Association," founded in memory of the first British settlers at Port Elizabeth. This Association accepts prospective settlers from Great Britain and provides them with two years' board and training in South Africa, free of cost. Assisted by the British government it has, since 1920, succeeded in settling about two thousand new British colonists on South African estates.

(vi) RHODESIA

If one were to compare the British Empire with the solar system, Great Britain being the sun, one might say that three of the greatest "planets" have each of them an attendant satellite. Close by India is Ceylon; close by Canada is Newfoundland; on the northern frontier of the Union of South Africa is the Colony of Southern Rhodesia, with the Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia beyond it. Newfoundland is the oldest of the British colonies that now enjoy self-government; Southern Rhodesia is the youngest. Both Newfoundland and Rhodesia have considered but rejected the idea of union with their greater neighbours.

Cecil Rhodes

Rhodesia bears the name of its founder, and rightly; for if ever a colony was the creation of a single man, Rhodesia was the creation of Cecil Rhodes. Something has been said of Rhodes already, for throughout the last twenty years of the nineteenth century he bestrode like a colossus the narrow world of South African history. In spite of his obvious faults and his one atrocious blunder, his was the most daring and original genius in the modern history of the British Empire. When scarcely more than a boy he set himself, working from a base in Cape Colony, to make South Africa, and ultimately all Africa, a predominantly British continent. When Kitchener was advancing up the Nile to Khartum, Rhodes saw in him a partner who was tackling the great work from the opposite end. Ultimately he and Kitchener, or their

successors, should meet half way, and the Cape to Cairo ideal should be realised.[1]

Rhodes had little faith in orthodox politicians, but a great deal of faith in himself, and in the power of money. His starting point was Kimberley diamonds, and the first great triumph of his career was when, in 1888, he secured the amalgamation of all the rival diamond companies under his control. The new De Beers Consolidated Mines Company controlled the diamond market of the world, and it was empowered by its trust deed to "take steps for the good government of any territory . . . annex a portion of territory in Central Africa, raise and maintain a standing army and undertake warlike operations." A strange mining company! Rhodes had served Mammon, and Mammon was now to be harnessed to the service of his own imperial ideals.

The Founding of Rhodesia

It was none too soon. Rhodes had secured, some years before, the annexation of Bechuanaland, the corridor to the north (see p. 177), but already in 1887 he had news that Transvaal Boers were negotiating with Lo Bengula, the savage old king of the Matabili, for concessions in the country now called Southern Rhodesia. The decisive moment had come, and for the next few years Rhodes's activity was prodigious. He secured the support of Sir Hercules Robinson, the British High Commissioner of South Africa, induced Lo Bengula to sign a treaty in which he undertook not to part with any territory without the High Commissioner's sanction; dashed off to England and persuaded Lord Salisbury's government to grant a Charter to the South African Company for the purpose of promoting trade and colonization in territories between the Transvaal and the Zambesi; returned to South Africa and organized a pioneer expedition to the country. Settlement began at once in the country round Salisbury, which was inhabited by the peaceful Mashonas, who had long been tributary to the

1 Gladstone foresaw the same possibility as early as 1880, and shrank from it with abhorrence.

Matabilis, but in 1893 came the inevitable collision between the settlers and the warrior tribesmen, whom Lo Bengula himself was unable to control. The war ended as it was bound to end. Lo Bengula fled, and died of disease and despair, the last of the great warrior chieftains of the Zulu tradition. He had done his best for the settlers in a situation which involved, for him, insuperable difficulties, and he had not been always fairly treated. His was a tragic end, and Rhodes, with characteristic generosity, provided for the education of his sons. In 1894 the whole of Lo Bengula's territories were, under the name of Rhodesia, assigned to the Company, to be governed as a crown colony; and, though the Company had a distinguished Board of Directors, so long as Rhodes lived the Company was but another name for Rhodes.

Rhodes had earnestly hoped to associate the Dutch of South Africa with him in his venture. Though a lifelong opponent of Kruger's anti-British policy, he was always a convinced believer in the necessity of Anglo-Dutch co-operation on equal terms in the work of building up a united South Africa. From 1890 onwards he was Premier of Cape Colony and dependent for his position on support from both races. Unhappily the disaster of the Jameson Raid, for which he was so largely responsible, shattered all hope of Anglo-Dutch co-operation for the time being and Rhodesia remains a predominantly British colony.

The Raid was followed by a formidable rebellion of the natives of Rhodesia, provoked, there is no denying, by actions of the new White community which should not have been allowed. Rhodes hastened to the scene, and was able, by risking his life on a personal embassy to the rebels, to extricate his settlers from a very awkward situation. Six years later he died at Cape Town, and was buried in the colony he had created.

Rhodesia to-day

This colony is now called Southern Rhodesia. In 1893 Rhodes had secured a vast extension of the Company's

sphere of action to the north of the Zambesi. This territory, Northern Rhodesia, is rich in undeveloped minerals and will some day, it is said, become one of the principal sources of the world's supply of copper; but it is a tropical country, unsuited to White settlement, and is to be classed not with Southern Rhodesia but with its neighbours, Nyassaland and Tanganyika.

Southern Rhodesia received a constitution in 1898, which brought it under the control of the High Commissioner for South Africa, and created a legislative council on which the settlers were represented. In 1923 the rule of the Company was brought to an end and the colony received rights of self-government; i.e. it attained the status which Canada and the Australian colonies attained in the middle of the nineteenth century, and Cape Colony in 1872. The Crown has, however, explicitly retained the right of veto over legislation affecting the native peoples. The native population is nearly a million, and will continue, within any foreseeable future, greatly to outnumber the White settlers.

In early years the progress of the colony was not rapid. The White population grew but slowly, for, as in South Africa, the settlers form an aristocracy and depend for unskilled labour on the native population. Almost all the settled country is within thirty miles of the railway which runs right through the colony up the old ox-waggon route through Kimberley and Mafeking to the port of Beira in Portuguese East Africa. A branch line from Bulawayo, Lo Bengula's old capital, connects Southern with Northern Rhodesia *via* the Victoria Falls of the Zambesi. In the last few years, however, the rate of increase has suddenly quickened, and the White population, which was under 40,000 in 1926, is now over 50,000. There is a tobacco industry, and, as Rhodes always hoped, gold mines have been discovered.

Chapter VII

THE IRISH FREE STATE

IN January 1922 a new Dominion was added to the list of the self-governing communities of the British Empire, when the treaty negotiated between the British government and the Irish leaders received its ratification. Whether, previous to the treaty, those Irish leaders should be regarded as rebels, or as ministers of an Irish Republic, is a point on which History is likely to continue to speak with two voices; after the treaty was ratified they were Ministers of the Irish Free State. In the next year the Free State became a member of the League of Nations, and in 1926 Mr. Cosgrave, President of the Council or Prime Minister, took his place side by side with the Prime Ministers of Canada and Australia in the Imperial Conference which drafted a new and epoch-making definition of the status of the self-governing Dominions within the Empire.

This, the newest Dominion, had been our oldest colony. Anglo-Irish history stretches back seven and a half centuries, into periods long before the coasts of any other of the Dominions had been sighted by European navigators. The space of time separating Strongbow from Sir Francis Drake is longer than that separating Drake from the present day.

Is any apology required for a refusal to re-tell, in this book, that long, controversial, and indeed ghastly story? Sir Horace Plunkett, a great Irishman and one of the greatest benefactors of his country, has described it as a history "for Englishmen to remember, and Irishmen to forget." It is indeed a story to be read and pondered by Englishmen who are inclined to overestimate the wisdom and the

humanity of English policy throughout the ages. For seven centuries it might be said, without much exaggeration, that, in our relations with Ireland, we made every possible mistake; and for much of what we did 'mistake' is far too mild a term. If it is true that, from the latter part of the nineteenth century onwards, statesmen of both British parties, Unionists as well as Gladstonian Liberals, did what they could to retrieve the errors of the past, is not the ever-recurring failure of their efforts but a forcible reminder of the truth of Mark Antony's gloomy generalization—

> The evil that men do lives after them,
> The good is oft interrèd with their bones.

That story is not to be told here, but Irish colonial history illustrates at so many points the pitfalls and the problems of imperial history further afield and in later ages—illustrates, in fact, the subject-matter of the rest of this book—that comment on a few salient features will not be out of place.

The Middle Ages

To begin with, the English first went to Ireland as adventurers and colonists. Richard Strongbow, Earl of Pembroke, invited into the country by an Irish chieftain in distress, proceeded to carve out for himself a feudal-colonial demesne. He, and all his successors down to Cromwell's Anglo-Irish landlords, ignored the communal ownership of Irish land as whole-heartedly as many of Wakefield's settlers would have liked to ignore the Maori land rights in New Zealand; the later chapters of this book will furnish other examples of the same temptation. The Crown, in the person of Henry II, followed in the wake of the first colonists, and sought, somewhat unsuccessfully, to establish its authority over a situation it did not create. Here, as so often elsewhere, what began as private enterprise was subsequently harnessed to public control.

When Strongbow came to Ireland, Irish civilization was inferior to Norman-English civilization in its material aspects

only. In the darkest of the Dark Ages Ireland had shone as a good deed in a naughty world. Its Church had been foremost in missionary enterprise. St. Bernard, a contemporary of Strongbow, wrote: "From Ireland, as from an overflowing stream, crowds of holy men descended upon foreign countries." The celebrated tenth-century manuscript known as the Book of Kells is evidence of Irish pre-eminence in art. It was in political cohesion, economic organization and military efficiency that the Irish were inferior to the English. Yet, to the colonists, the Irish were "natives" without human rights of any description, even though here there was no "clash of colour" to explain, if not to excuse, racial tyranny. The distinction of race was indeed entirely imaginary, and could not, in the long run, be maintained. Each generation of colonists found that it became "native" in the eyes of its successors. Quaint legislation forbidding Englishmen in Ireland to grow moustaches was of no avail. The English colonist of one century begat the Irish "native" of the next. The Irish are a nation to-day, because the sole test of nationality is psychological; a nation is a group of people who feel themselves a nation; but theories of a Celtic race in Ireland over against a Teutonic race in England have little, if any, foundation in fact.

Empire has grown by trade as well as by colonization. English traders established themselves in Dublin, Wexford, Waterford, and Cork, much as at a later date they established themselves in Bombay, Madras and Calcutta. Since the state of Ireland was quite as turbulent as that of India in the decline of the Mogul Empire, the traders found that they had to defend themselves. In the end Dublin was the only trading depot to secure a permanent establishment; this was the Irish Pale.[1] It provided a base for ultimate conquest, like the "factories" of the East India Company.

Ireland had a "parliament," summoned by Edward I, almost as early as England, but it represented only the English colonial interest. Its powers may be compared with

[1] From the Latin *palus*, a fence; an area fenced off. The term was also applied to the English territory at Calais in the Middle Ages.



Irish Electricity Supply Board

THE SHANNON ELECTRICITY SCHEME
Weir at Intake to the Power Canal

those of the Assemblies in the old American colonies. As in America, so in Ireland, the Crown's control over the activities of the local parliament was at first vague and uncertain, afterwards increasing in stringency. The decisive event in this strand of Anglo-Irish history is the celebrated group of laws pushed through the Irish parliament by Sir Edward Poyning on behalf of Henry VII: they subordinated the activities of the Irish parliament to the control of the English Privy Council. This stage in Irish history is strictly comparable with the measures taken by James II and William III to control the legislative activities of the American colonies.

Perhaps the worst evil of the English conquest of Ireland was the astonishing dilatoriness of the conquerors. For four hundred and thirty years, from Strongbow to Mountjoy (the last Viceroy of Queen Elizabeth), they dawdled over the painful operation. After the civil wars Cromwell had to make the conquest again. At last the " colony " was completely subdued, just in time for the strait-waistcoat of the English Mercantile system.

The Mercantile and Religious tyrannies

We have seen how the New England colonies in America suffered from restrictive legislation based on the preconception that the purpose of a colony was to supply only what the Mother country could not itself produce; that it must not be allowed to compete in the open market with the products of the Mother country. Legislation of the same kind was applied to Ireland with far more damaging effects, for the Irish community was, in the heyday of the Mercantile system, far more advanced than any American colony, and, since it was so much nearer to England, the commerce which the system stifled was much more extensive.

In 1665 and 1680 all importation into England from Ireland of cattle, sheep, swine, beef, pork, bacon, mutton, butter and cheese was absolutely forbidden. In 1663, 1670 and 1696 Ireland was excluded from all trade with the colonies,

In 1699 the English parliament prohibited the exportation of manufactured woollens from Ireland. In 1698 the Irish parliament had been constrained to forbid all exportation of wool from Ireland except to England and to discourage woollen manufactures.

These facts speak for themselves.

But a hundred years before these dates a criterion more reliable than moustaches had been found to distinguish the "English" and the "Irish" inhabitants of the country. The "Irish" were those who refused to accept the English Reformation, and they included most of the descendants of mediaeval English colonists. They supported Charles I against the Long Parliament, and James II against William III. After the Revolution of 1688 they were excluded from the Irish Parliament, and subjected to a system of social disabilities which constitute one of the meanest systems of persecution in history. The Scottish Presbyterians of Ulster occupied a middle position in the Irish scale of values. They also were, at a rather later date, excluded from the parliament, but otherwise they suffered no religious disabilities. However, as they were the most efficient producers in the country, it was on them that the Mercantile code inflicted the most serious hardship.

The first three-quarters of the eighteenth century was perhaps the dismallest period of Anglo-Irish history. It was marked by no atrocious massacres such as those of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; it was a time of quiet, systematic oppression, unrelieved either by tragedy or by hope. On the side of religion, the Roman Catholics—fully three-quarters of the population—were, as far as the slovenly administration of the law allowed, excluded from all the amenities of civilized life. On the side of commerce, the Irish farmer was excluded from all his natural foreign markets. Constitutionally, the Roman Catholics and the Ulster Presbyterians were both excluded from representation in the Irish Parliament. It was in fact a parliament of rotten boroughs, and these boroughs were managed by a group of wealthy families, paid and controlled from England.

As if this was not enough, the legislative activities of the parliament were doubly gagged—by Poyning's Acts and subsequent legislation on the same lines, and by the royal veto as exercised by the Viceroy. The Irish parliament, like colonial parliaments before Durham's Report, was a parliament without control over its executive. Another formidable engine of oppression must be mentioned, though the details of the system were too complicated for description here. Irish land was largely in the hands of absentee landlords, and the system worked so curiously as to drive out the best tenants.

It is not surprising that Irishmen had already begun to emigrate in large numbers; Roman Catholics to France, Spain and other Catholic kingdoms of the Continent, and Presbyterians to the American colonies. Irish names figure in the histories of most European nations; Ulster Presbyterians provided the backbone of Washington's armies. It is no exaggeration to say that it was Irish grievances quite as much as American grievances that nerved the rebel minority in America to persevere with their war of independence until victory was secured.

How, it may be asked, could such a system last? Because Ireland was divided. The Anglo-Irish Protestants could not protest against the commercial and constitutional tyrannies because they themselves depended upon England to maintain their ascendancy over the Irish Catholics. The "colonists" tolerated the tyranny of a Mother country which enabled them to tyrannize over the "natives." It would be hard to find a neater example of the success which may attend for a time the application of the pernicious principle of *Divide et impera*.

Grattan's Parliament

But the Irish who fought in America were indirectly fighting the battle of Ireland also. In the years between Burgoyne's capitulation at Saratoga and the end of the American War, the Irish situation was amazingly transformed. The Irish garrisons were sent to fight in America.

France declared war, and the colonists raised a force of volunteers to defend the island against French invasion The volunteers rose in numbers to 80,000 and were in effect masters of the country. Not for the last time the Irish were to learn that, in dealing with England, there is no argument like arms. In 1778 the franchise was extended to the Presbyterians. In 1780 all restrictions of Irish trade with English colonies were removed; in 1782 Poyning's Act was repealed.

Irish aspirations had found a spokesman in Henry Grattan, and the liberated Irish parliament of the next eighteen years has always been associated with his name. He was an orator with gifts of speech remarkable even among Irishmen. He was also a man of the best intentions, but his vague mind was incapable of facing facts; he was one of those who wish both to eat their cake and to have it. The question of the day was Catholic Emancipation; should three-quarters of the population be admitted to their share in the rights of liberated Ireland? There were those who, exultant in the repeal of Poyning's Act, declared that the Protestant ascendancy of the "colonists" must be maintained; there were others, especially in Ulster, who were prepared to sacrifice the Protestant ascendancy for the sake of a united Ireland. Grattan supported Catholic Emancipation. "I love the Roman Catholic," he told a Protestant deputation, "I am a friend to his liberty, but it is only inasmuch as that liberty is entirely consistent with your ascendancy, and an addition to the strength and freedom of the Protestant community. These being my principles and the Protestant interest my first object you may judge that I shall never assent to any measure tending to subvert the Protestant ascendancy."[1] Such phrase-making is the very opposite of statesmanship, for it is a refusal to face the fact that the choice lay between a Protestant monopoly and a Roman Catholic majority in the parliament which, if Grattan was to be believed, was now the sole and supreme legislative authority in Ireland.

[1] Quoted in Curtis, *Commonwealth of Nations*, p. 468.

As a matter of fact the supremacy of that parliament, even after the repeal of Poyning's Acts, was entirely illusory. It was still, after all, a " colonial " parliament, a fire without a chimney—to quote Charles Buller's description of the Canadian parliaments at the time of the Durham Report—producing little but oratorical smoke. Not only did the Viceroy, nominated by the British government, remain in control of the executive, but the rotten boroughs remained, and were purchasable by the longest purse, as before. It was perhaps inevitable that an Irish republican movement should arise to force the pace, and the French Revolution showed the way. The Society of United Irishmen looked for French help, as *Sinn Fein* long afterwards looked to Germany. An Irish rebellion in 1798 was easily suppressed, and Pitt carried the Act of Union, persuading the Irish parliament to commit suicide by means of the same gross inducements as had carried so many measures through it during its long ignoble history.

The Union

A great deal can be said in favour of Pitt's Unionist policy and of British Unionist policy from the days of Pitt to the days of Balfour, but it was never acceptable to Catholic Ireland. O'Connell secured Catholic Emancipation in 1829 by what was virtually a threat of rebellion, and the lowering of the franchise in 1867, and again in 1885, gave Parnell the material out of which he welded the Irish Nationalist party at Westminster. Agrarian discontents placed in his hands the instruments of disorder in Ireland. Gladstone was converted to Home Rule less on the merits of Home Rule than because he despaired of reconciling the Irish to an efficient administration of the Union. His carefully guarded schemes of Home Rule, which retained for the British parliament a very real control over several departments of Irish government, were defeated, the first (1886) in the House of Commons, the second (1893) in the House of Lords. The Parliament Act of 1911 removed the latter obstacle, and Asquith's eminently Gladstonian Home Rule Bill of 1912–14 was running on to

the rocks of Ulster when the Great War brought a respite from Irish controversy. Asquith's Bill was placed on the Statute Book, in cold storage; one hoped that, after surviving a World War, politicians of all parties would approach the parochial problems of Ireland in a calmer frame of mind.

But that was not to be. The Great War was something quite other than a moratorium for Irish affairs. The victory of the Allies would mean the emancipation of a half dozen small nationalities from the great empires into which they had been absorbed, and from the list of these small nationalities Ireland was determined not to be left out.

Sinn Fein

Ever since the days of Parnell a certain ambiguity had coloured the policy of the Irish Nationalists. Were they prepared to accept what English Liberals were prepared to give, as a satisfactory and final settlement? Or did they regard it as merely a first step towards further demands? And, if so, how far would those demands go? Would they stop short of absolute independence? It was said, and truly, that the Nationalist politicians spoke with two voices, one for England and quite another for Ireland and the Irish community in the United States, on whom they were dependent for funds. John Redmond, Parnell's successor as Irish leader in the House of Commons, was much more friendly to England than Parnell had been, and his hold upon his Irish supporters was correspondingly weaker. When, at the outbreak of the War, he pledged Nationalist Ireland to throw itself wholeheartedly into the struggle side by side with Great Britain, he gave a pledge which the majority of his followers were by no means prepared to make good.

For many years previous to the Great War a very wholesome sentiment had been spreading in Ireland to the effect that the Irish, if indeed they were a "nation," should learn to do things for themselves, instead of waiting, hat in hand, on the charity of English Liberals. The sentiment expressed itself through many channels; through the development of

Irish drama and poetry, whether written in English or in Gaelic; through the movement for the revival of the Gaelic language as a compulsory school subject; and through the admirable Agricultural Organization Society of Sir Horace Plunkett. The more directly political aspect of the movement found expression in the society called Sinn Fein ("Ourselves") founded by Arthur Griffith in 1900; its aim, as its name implies, was national self-sufficiency. Some of the methods it proposed resembled the Indian *swadeshi* programme, for its members proposed to "burn everything British, except coal." Before the Great War, however, the importance of Sinn Fein was hardly greater than that attributed to it by Redmond when he contemptuously described it as a "temporary cohesion of isolated cranks, not amounting to a row of pins so far as the future of Ireland is concerned." The extraordinary falsification of this forecast brought Redmond to the grave, a broken-hearted man, before the end of the War.

When the war began Redmond went to Ireland to recruit for the British army, and it was at once apparent that he would meet with strong opposition from many of the leaders of the Nationalist Volunteers, the force that had been raised in rivalry with the Ulster volunteers during the conflicts over Asquith's Home Rule Bill. After a few months the Volunteers split into two bodies, the larger accepting Redmond's leadership and the former, about 15,000 men, forming a separate and definitely anti-British association. Among the leaders of these latter were several singularly attractive young Sinn Feiners, scholars and poets of the type that had led the Girondins in the French Revolution or had followed Garibaldi in the cause of Italian freedom. They had a link with Germany in the person of Sir Roger Casement. Casement had served with distinction in the British consular service, and had rendered great services to tropical civilization by exposing the atrocities committed on the rubber plantations of the Belgian Congo and of Putumayo in South America. He had, however, long been a devotee of Irish independence, and in 1913 had prophesied that that

independence would be secured by German help in an Anglo-German war. When the war broke out he went to Germany to work for the fulfilment of his forecast.

On Good Friday, 1916, Casement arrived, with a large consignment of arms from Germany, off the south-west coast of Ireland, whither, on a similar errand, Spaniards had come in the reign of Elizabeth, and Frenchmen in the reign of George III. The German ship was sunk and Casement arrested, taken to England, and subsequently hanged as a traitor. On Easter Monday the Irish Volunteers in Dublin, to the number of something over a thousand, rose and seized a part of the city. The rebellion was hopeless from the first and, after furious fighting, was suppressed within a week. Fifteen of the leaders were shot. In the rest of Ireland no rising of any significance occurred, for the volunteers outside Dublin were very short of arms. There would, however, have been quite a different story to tell if Casement's ship had succeeded in distributing its cargo.

At the time of the "Easter Week" rebellion there is no doubt at all that only a handful of the Irish people were in active sympathy with the rising. Its suppression was generally welcomed with a sigh of relief. Yet two years later Sinn Fein had mastered Nationalist Ireland. How did this come about? In the first place, the shooting of the leaders, after secret courts-martial, sent a thrill of pity and horror through the country and made martyrs of the victims. The executions were entirely justified, but they may not have been expedient, and the method of them certainly was not so. Secondly, the rebellion led Asquith to visit Ireland, to interview some of the rebels in prison, and to promise that the Home Rule question should be re-opened at once instead of being postponed until after the war. In Ireland, as elsewhere, nothing succeeds like success, and Sinn Fein, in the very hour of its defeat, could claim something more than the ideal glamours of martyrdom. Thereupon Redmond, in his patriotic anxiety to secure a peaceful passage for Home Rule, consented to the temporary exclusion of Ulster from the scheme; henceforth the "loyalist" party

were damned as "partitionists," and Sinn Fein won its first by-election against a Nationalist (Redmondite) candidate. In 1917 an Irish Convention for the formulation of a Home Rule settlement, boycotted by Sinn Fein, lamentably failed to produce an agreed Report. Finally, in 1918, during the terrible German offensives of the spring of the year, the British government decided to apply conscription to Ireland. It was the last straw, and in the General Election of December 1918 Sinn Fein captured nearly every Irish seat outside Ulster.

Thus, at the close of the War, the British government, laurelled with victory over the most powerful military organization the world had ever seen, was confronted with a Catholic Ireland (whose whole population was less in numbers than the British armies then in course of demobilization), demanding absolute independence. Voices were raised in England suggesting that Ireland should be offered "Dominion status." Whether the offer, at that date, would have averted the tragedy which followed can never be known. Mr. Lloyd George's Coalition government did not make it. They proceeded to introduce yet another "Gladstonian" Home Rule Bill, with this difference, however, that it accepted partition, and created two Irish parliaments, one for the six counties of Ulster and one for the other three provinces. Ulster accepted the Bill as her best defence against Sinn Fein, and it is under the provisions of this Act of 1920 that Ulster has since been governed.

For the rest of Ireland the Bill was waste paper, and there followed an Irish War of Independence between the Royal Irish Constabulary, reinforced by British troops, and the Irish Republican Army, which had grown out of the Volunteer organizations. It has been remarked, very likely with truth, that the Irish Republican Army drew many, if not most, of its recruits from the young men who would normally have emigrated to America. During the years before the War the average annual emigration from Ireland was 30,000 —nearly one per cent. of the population—and this was almost entirely stopped from August 1914 onwards. In the eyes of the British government the Republican Army was "a

murder gang," and the Irish Secretary in that government declared that he would not desist until " the last revolver is picked out of the hand of the last assassin." A war conducted without regular disciplined armies always exposes those engaged in it to severe temptations, and deplorable atrocities were committed on both sides.

The Treaty

At last, in the summer of 1921, the British government decided that concession was a less evil than the prolongation of the fighting. A truce and a conference were proposed. Mr. De Valera, the Irish " President," after much theoretical swordplay, consented, and his chief lieutenants—among them Griffith, the founder of Sinn Fein, and Michael Collins, the hero of the guerilla warfare—came to London.

At the Conference the British statesmen made it quite plain that complete independence would not be granted, and that the Irish representatives had to choose between a treaty establishing a " Free State "[1] with powers practically equivalent to those of Canada or Australia, and a renewal of the war. Faced with this dilemma, and knowing that their powers of resistance were much nearer exhaustion than the British government supposed, Griffith, Collins and their colleagues accepted the proffered treaty, in December 1921, and returned to Ireland to commend it to Dail Eireann, as the Sinn Fein House of Commons was called. Here the treaty encountered a formidable opposition, led by De Valera himself. It was, however, carried by a majority of two. De Valera resigned the Presidency and was succeeded by Griffith.

The contest of words in the Dail was, however, but a prelude to another contest of arms. The enemies of the treaty seized prominent buildings in Dublin, like the Easter Week rebels before them, and from June 1922 to March 1923 civil war raged and, in the words of the Roman Catholic bishops, wrecked Ireland from end to end. At last De

[1] The term " Free State " is a literal rendering of the Gaelic word which Sinn Fein had used as the equivalent of Republic.

Valera abandoned open resistance. The rebels against the Free State, unlike the rebels against British rule, had not got public opinion behind them. Griffith died and Collins was killed in the course of this war, but their successor, Mr. Cosgrave, displayed both skill and firmness, particularly the latter. It is notable that, in the course of suppressing the rebellion, he used resources of coercion, in the form of courts-martial and reprisals, surpassing anything ever attempted by a British government.

The Ulster Boundary

When order was restored the centre of interest shifted to the Ulster boundary. The Irish leaders who signed the treaty had by no means reconciled themselves to partition, and the treaty included a clause under which a commission was to be appointed, under a neutral chairman, to revise the frontier " in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, so far as may be compatible with economic and geographical considerations." The Act of 1920 had given Ulster six counties, but two of those counties contain Roman Catholic majorities. The Free State hoped, by means of the Commission, to whittle away so much territory from Ulster that her continued existence as a separate organization would be impossible. Ulster, however, stood firm on the Act of 1920 and refused to recognize any obligation towards a treaty to which she had not been a party. In the end the claim of Ulster was allowed, and the Free State accepted, in exchange for her claim, substantial concessions at the expense of the British taxpayer. The Free State exchequer was relieved of its share of liability for the British National Debt. The concession was a wise one. It is in the British interest that the Free State should prosper, and, even with the benefit of this concession, its financial position has been none too easy.

The Free State

Under the Free State constitution Southern Ireland is governed by a parliament (Oireachtas) consisting of two

houses, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies (Dail Eireann). The Deputies are elected under the system known as proportional representation, a complicated method of voting which is supposed to secure that the strength of parties in the Chamber will correspond, more exactly than under the ordinary system, with the real divisions of opinion in the electorate. The Senators are elected, also under a system of proportional representation, from a panel of candidates selected by the two Houses. The electoral basis of the Senate is too complicated for accurate description here; suffice it to say that its purpose is to secure seats for eminent men representing all parties, particularly groups which are important more by reason of the quality of their members than by reason of their numbers. From this standpoint the constitution of the Senate has been a success. Indeed those who feared that the rulers of the Free State would carry forward into times of peace the partisan passions of the past, have found themselves happily mistaken. For example, by 1925, five out of the nine newly appointed Judges of the High Court were Protestants, and some of these had been strong Unionists; this in spite of the fact that 93 per cent. of the population is Roman Catholic.

Mr. Cosgrave has been President of the Council, which is the equivalent of Prime Minister, ever since the pacification of Ireland. At first De Valera's Republican party, while contesting elections, refused to occupy the seats they had won, treating the Dail as the Sinn Fein members had treated the House of Commons. In 1927 a Bill was carried prescribing an oath of willingness to enter the Dail and of allegiance to the Constitution for every candidate at future elections. This brought the Republican party into the House and there have been times since when the opposition parties looked like compelling Mr. Cosgrave's government to resign; but on each occasion that event has been avoided. There is at present no alternative to Mr. Cosgrave's party, who alone are both able and willing to govern. Mr. de Valera's gifts fit him only for the part of a voice crying in the wilderness.

The wealth of the Free State consists almost entirely of its agricultural produce, and the Government is rightly anxious to foster a greater variety of industries. Some tentative experiments have been made with protective tariffs, but it is difficult to go far in this direction without putting up prices for the cultivators of the soil. An undertaking which may bear fruit in the future is the scheme for drawing electrical power from the waters of the Shannon, which has a greater flow of water than any other river in the British Isles.

So things stand at present. From the days of Grattan's Volunteers down to the days of Michael Collins, Ireland secured for herself a disproportionate amount of the attention of British politicians and the British public. It is impossible to estimate to what extent the social reforms required by the population of the larger island were held up by the insistent claims to attention of " Irish unrest." Perhaps this was not the fault of Ireland ; perhaps she benefited but little by the attention we gave her. That, at any rate, is her view of the matter. In any case it is all to the good that whatever mistakes may henceforth be made in Ireland can only be made by Irishmen. The future of the Free State is in its own hands. It is at the beginning of its history ; and on the whole it has made a good beginning.

Nothing is more likely to unfit a nation for national self-dependence than a prolonged nationalist movement ; and for length and intensity the Irish nationalist movement is unequalled in history. Such a movement teaches its adherents every habit of disloyalty and insubordination towards the alien government. When the movement has succeeded and the alien government gone, the long practised habits of disloyalty and insubordination only too easily survive, as it were, of their own momentum, and are practised at the expense of the national government which the nationalist movement has succeeded in securing. This survival of old habits accounts in a large degree for the continuance of a Republican party under conditions which already secure

all the freedom that a republic could give. Nor need we be surprised at the survival of much anti-British sentiment—a distaste for the sound of the National Anthem, and a disinclination to accept the authority of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as a Court of Appeal. It would be easy to point to more reprehensible failings than these—the murder of Mr. Cosgrave's colleague, Kevin O'Higgins, and the shelter given to his murderers, which made the discovery of their identity impossible. All the greater is the credit due to Mr. Cosgrave and his colleagues who have maintained a policy of loyalty to the Treaty and to the British Empire in face of great difficulties. There is every prospect that Roman Catholic Ireland will find, within the wider framework of the British Empire, a satisfaction that could never be hers so long as she was enclosed within the straiter frontiers of the United Kingdom.

Chapter VIII

THE INDIAN EMPIRE

(i) India and the Indian Peoples under British Rule

THE last five chapters have traced the histories of communities for whose welfare the British government at home is no longer directly responsible. They are now self-governing nations within what is called the British Commonwealth of Nations. Though their areas are large, their populations are still small, perhaps twenty-eight millions in all, including the coloured peoples of South Africa—about two-thirds of the population of England and Wales.

For the welfare of India on the other hand the responsibility of the British government is still direct; and a terrible responsibility it is. Here, in an area about as large as Western Europe (i.e. Europe without Russia), are 320,000,000 people, a fifth of the whole human race. It is no exaggeration to say that about half of them owe their very existence to British rule, for it is the law and order, the science and the enterprise, introduced by the British, that has enabled the Indian peoples to double their population in the last hundred years or so. The mere increase of Indian population during the last fifty years is greater than the total White population of the Empire.[1] The British in India have exercised so profound an influence on the country that it is hard to realise the smallness of their numbers. They are a mere handful, about 150,000, a population such as can live within a single square mile or so of an English industrial town. Of this number 60,000 are in the army and 12,000 are in the employment of the government, including the State railways. The number of grown-up men of European

1 Between 1901 and 1911 the increase was twenty millions, more than the populations of Canada and Australia combined to-day.

race in India, who are not in government employ, is only about 20,000. The Indian Civil Service itself, on which the administration of British India depends, consists of only about fourteen hundred officials. At the beginning of the century these were almost all Europeans, but the service is now being "Indianized," and it is intended that 60 per cent. of this fourtcen hundred shall be Indians. Other government staffs, police, engineering, education, etc., are being similarly Indianized. Canada and Australia are White men's homes; India is anything but a White man's home. It is an alien tropical country to which picked and specialized white men—soldiers, civil servants, merchants, planters, doctors and teachers—have gone to pursue their special callings, returning when their work is done to their homes in England and Scotland.

The Afghan entrance to India

India has been well called a sub-continent, for it is separated from the rest of Asia by the most formidable mountain barrier in the world, the Himalaya mountains. These close the country to the north, and at their eastern and western extremities other mountain ranges, far less lofty but quite formidable, run down from the Himalayas to the sea. The only mountain passes that have played an important part in history are the Afghan passes in the north-western mountains, particularly the Khyber Pass, leading from Peshawar to the valley which comes down from Kabul. Through these passes India has been invaded again and again. By this route, before the dawn of history, the dominant Hindu peoples themselves must have entered India and imposed themselves upon the primitive black aborigines;—for the principal Indian peoples are "Aryans" like ourselves; they belong to the same family of the human race, "Indo-European" as it is sometimes called. Through these passes came the Huns, about seventy years after their power had been broken in Western Europe. Those of them that remained in India were absorbed into Hindu civilization, and are probably the ancestors of some of the Rajput clans,

whose chiefs are famous for their loyalty to the British crown. Through these passes, during the seven hundred and fifty years that lie between the time of Canute and the time of Clive, came a succession of Moslem invasions. They have left their mark on India in the magnificent architecture of their cities in the Ganges valley, and in the 70,000,000 Moslems of modern India. The greatest of the Moslem invaders was Babar, a contemporary of Henry VIII, who founded the dynasty of the Great Moguls, which ruled the greater part of India for nearly two hundred years, and survived another hundred and fifty years, in a line of puppet emperors, until the Indian mutiny. The last invasions through these passes, terribly destructive invasions, were in 1739, when Delhi was sacked by Nadir Shah, and in 1761, when the Afghans defeated the Mahrattas at Panipat outside Delhi four years after the battle of Plassey.

The Defence of the Frontier

Since that time India has not suffered invasion from Asia, for the British Indian army now guards the frontier. That guardianship is no nominal duty. In 1919 King Amanullah of Afghanistan, encouraged by hopes of plunder based on a belief that British rule in India was collapsing before the attacks of the anti-British agitators, launched an attack. The most formidable of all our Indian frontier wars ensued, 340,000 British and Indian troops being engaged in operations which, though ultimately completely successful, were arduous and involved much loss of life. The war was barely noticed in England since, immediately after the end of the Great War, such fighting seemed scarce worthy of attention ; but it was a forcible illustration of what British protection still means for India.

An Indian nationalist writer[1] says :—

The military defence of India is not appreciated adequately by the Indian people. From the Hindu Kush to Makaran

[1] K. T. Paul, *The British Connection with India*—a very instructive book, on account of its curious mixture of admiration for, and dislike of, British rule in India.

is a thousand miles as the crow flies, and the Trans-Indus width of this tract of land is anywhere from forty to four hundred miles. It is physically a very difficult country, and although the Union Jack floats aloft, much of it is really No Man's Land, over which through all the centuries marauding tribes have wandered, owning allegiance to no mortal sovereign. To maintain a foothold in this immense wild area demands a more or less continuous sacrifice of faithful and heroic men. The century of continuous peace which has made possible to India an enormous development in many lines of life, material and cultural, is due primarily to this military undertaking. To this service undertaken by one people for another I do not know of a parallel in the history of the world.

The army, which performs this service, consists of 60,000 British troops, and 150,000 Indian troops with British officers. Indian officers are now introduced in the Indian army, but the process of Indianization of the higher ranks will necessarily be a slow one. The impossibility of placing British troops, or Indian troops, with British officers, under the control of the government of a completely self-governing India is one of the greatest obstacles in the way of India's advance to "Dominion status." Nor is this the only difficulty. India may aspire to be a "nation," but at present she is a collection of sharply contrasted peoples. The contrast between these peoples is nowhere more glaringly illustrated than by this :—that more than half the soldiers of the Indian army come from the warlike races of one province, the Punjab, and none at all from the much more densely populated province of Bengal, so prolific in wordy politicians. Even if the army could be completely Indianized, would a predominantly Punjabi army consent to be the servant of a government dominated by the politicians of Bengal?

Again the army is needed not only for defence of the frontiers but for internal security. Military units have constantly to reinforce the police in the suppression of disorders which, in nine cases out of ten, arise out of religious

THE KHYBER PASS

Showing the Caravan road and the modern motor-road below. On the former is a Camel-caravan

feuds between Hindu and Moslem. For this purpose British troops are far more effective than Indian, not because they are better soldiers but simply because, being neither Hindus nor Moslems, they cannot be suspected of favouring either side.

Geographical features, and Climate

We have spoken of the geographical frontier of India, and that led on to an account of the historical significance of the chief gap in its mountain barrier, and of the army on which the defence of that barrier depends. We pass from the frontier to the internal geography of India, which is, happily, fairly simple. All India between the Himalayas and a line drawn west to east from a little north of Bombay to a little south of Calcutta, is a great plain. The most densely populated part of it is the Ganges valley with the great historic Indian cities of Delhi, Lucknow, Agra, Allahabad, and Benares; and Calcutta, a purely British creation and the biggest city in the Empire after London, on one of the streams of the Ganges delta. To the north-west of the Ganges valley is the Punjab in the valley of the upper Indus and its tributaries. The lower Indus valley had comparatively little fertility until irrigation work had been undertaken in recent times by the British government. Between the lower Indus and the Ganges lie the territories of the Rajput princes. East of Bengal, the province of the lower Ganges, lies Assam, famous for tea plantations. Beyond Assam and beyond the eastern mountain barrier is Burma. Burma is technically a province of the Indian Empire, but its history is so distinct from that of the rest of India that it must be considered as excluded from this chapter.

The southern peninsula of India is a table-land whose northern slopes, the Vindhya mountains, are about as high as the mountains of Scotland. The table-land descends abruptly to the western coast in the Western Ghats mountains; on the eastern, or Madras side, the slope is gentle, and broken by long river valleys. In the far south are the Nilgiri Hills,

rising to 7,000 feet and furnishing welcome holiday resorts to Europeans whose lot is cast in tropical Madras. Ootacamund in the Nilgiris is for Madras what Darjeeling is for Calcutta and Simla for Delhi.

The furthest north of India is in the same latitude as the furthest south of Europe, and the south of India lies within a few degrees of the Equator. Thus, though there are genuinely cold seasons in some parts of India, the country as a whole has a tropical climate. The year falls into two sharply marked divisions, the weather being dry from December to May and wet from June to November. The rains are brought by the south-west monsoon winds, and on the quality of the monsoon Indian agriculture, which means nine-tenths of Indian life, depends. In old days a " bad monsoon " meant a famine, and the starvation of thousands, perhaps millions, of helpless folk. To-day it means that the British organizations of famine relief, always kept in readiness for action like an army in peace time, has to be put into instant operation. In the years 1907 and 1908 the monsoon rains failed throughout the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, which have an area and a population about equal to that of the British Isles ; yet, owing to the efficiency of the relief works only eleven deaths from lack of food took place, less than a quarter of the number reported in London during the same period.

The monsoon rains are by no means equally distributed over India. There are districts in Assam with the fantastic rainfall of 500 inches a year, six or eight times the rainfall of the English Lake District, and other large areas in Bombay province and round the mouth of the Indus, where there is hardly any rainfall at all. Here, as in Australia and in Egypt, irrigation takes the place of rainfall. An eighth part of the crops of India are grown on irrigated land.

The Indian peoples

Physical features are easily described, but to describe the people of India is a task before which the boldest should quail. Many of those who know India best say that the British have

never understood and never can understand the Indian; if that is so, what success is likely to fall to the lot of the writer of a few pages? None the less, the effort must be made.

In the first place, should one say "the people of India" or "the peoples of India"? Certainly there never has been, and perhaps there never will be, an Indian nation in the sense that term bears in Europe. In this respect India is markedly different from the other great Asiatic empire, China. There are said to be 220 languages native to India. Many of these are the tongues of insignificant and backward tribes, and some of the chief languages, notably Hindustani, have a very wide currency. None the less, the only language in which delegates to all-India congresses can make themselves understood by the whole of their audience is English, which is known to only a relatively small aristocracy of educated Indians spread all over the country. Again the Indian peoples are of very different types. There are the fighting and "sporting" peoples whose chiefs have much in common with the best type of English gentleman; there are the astute and ingenious Bengalis of the lower Ganges, who furnish a high proportion of the political and legal classes, highly civilized in their own way, yet a way which is frankly unattractive both to the British and to the fighting peoples of India; there are half a million simple, illiterate village communities scattered all over India; there are Indian peoples, for example the Moplahs of the far south, who are fierce barbarians; and there are scores of obscure and harmless tribes of primitive savages.

Hinduism

Yet in spite of what has been said there is a very real sense in which we can speak of the Indian people. More than two-thirds of the population are Hindus, and Hinduism is a link which binds these all together. Outside Hinduism are the seventy million Moslems, or Mohammedans; but it has often been remarked that many of the Moslem peoples have acquired (or preserved after their conversion from Hinduism) many Hindu characteristics. Other religious bodies are the

Sikhs and the Jains, which are off-shoots from Hinduism. Buddhism, which was founded by an Indian five hundred years before Christ, has long been driven from India, and the eleven million Buddhists which figure among Indian peoples are the Burmese.

What then is Hinduism? We speak of it as a religion, but is has no creed and it does not seek converts. It is an attitude to life in so far as it sets spiritual things above material things, but its "spiritual things" mean for one sort of Hindu a profound idealism and for another sort (far more numerous) the most gross and bestial superstitions. Some Hindus grovel before the Indian equivalents of Baal and Ashtoreth, gods of cruelty and goddesses of lust; others worship God as a spirit. A Hindu recently said: "Christ is the only hope of Hinduism." He had no intention of becoming a Christian, for he was an Indian patriot and therefore a Hindu. He meant that Hinduism must learn, and he claimed that it was learning, to raise its standards and purge itself of its impurities by absorbing the message of Christ.

At present the spirit of Hinduism is not the spirit of Christ, but the spirit of caste. Some years ago an Indian journalist collected answers to the question "What are the essentials to be reckoned a Hindu?"

The net result of it all was that not any creed, any custom, any external mark, any ritual, or anything else usual to other religions was necessary, but that one should belong to a recognized caste. But as one cannot enter a caste by choice, it was agreed that to be a Hindu one should have been born in a Hindu caste and not have renounced it.[1]

The British official definition of a caste is, "an endogamous[2] group bearing a common name and having the same traditional occupation, who are so linked together by these and other ties, such as the tradition of a common origin and the possession of the same protecting deity, and the same social status, ceremonial observances and family priests,

[1] K. T. Paul, *The British Connection with India*, p. 37.

[2] i.e. a group whose members intermarry only with one another. The quotation is from the Census Report, 1911.

that they regard themselves and are regarded by others as forming a single homogeneous community."

There are about two thousand castes, and the apex of the system is the caste of the Brahmans, who are the official custodians and exponents of Hindu religion, though the majority of them are not actually engaged in priestly duties. There are fourteen million Brahmans, and taken collectively they have been for centuries the real masters of India. "Unmoved by the imperial splendour of the Moguls, unshaken by the business grip of John Company and the subsequent triumphs of British engineers over space and drought, the Brahman can afford to watch with quiet indifference political experiments, exotic and of foreign inspiration." So wrote Sir Walter Lawrence, a distinguished Indian administrator of pre-war days; but it is not certain whether the Brahman's position is still so secure.

Few British writers have much that is good to say of caste. A system which fixes at birth the status of the individual irrespective of his personal qualities seems to us the negation of freedom. The minute sub-division of castes, illustrated by the fact that the domestic work of a European household has to be divided among servants of perhaps half a dozen castes, strikes us as absurd. Caste places great difficulties in the way of education since children of different castes cannot eat or wash together. About fifty million Hindus are "outcasts," and their lot is miserable indeed. When Indian patriots complain that Indians in South Africa are not given legal equality with Europeans, it is easy to reply that our treatment of these Indians is generosity itself compared with the treatment Indians themselves mete out to the millions of "untouchables," whose very shadows are held to contaminate their privileged fellow-countrymen. Yet there has always been a very beautiful spirit of self-help within the caste system. Each caste maintains, as a religious duty, its own helpless members, the orphans and the infirm. So long as caste lasts there is no need for an Indian poor-law relief system.

The permanence, through many transformations, of

Hinduism is one of the miracles of history, and it gives to the Indian peoples what unity they possess. From a purely political standpoint Indian history, until a hundred years ago, was a welter of ceaseless warfare, but Hinduism, originating before the dawn of history, survived it all. Twice, before the coming of the British, great imperial dominions were established. The first was that of the Buddhist Asoka in about 250 B.C.; the second that of the Great Moguls in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Both Asoka and the Great Moguls were enemies of the Brahman ascendancy, but they passed away and their works with them; Brahmanism remained. Yet it seems likely that to-day Hinduism is entering upon a state of change which is little short of dissolution. In many directions the caste system is breaking down, before the forces of industrial competition, western democracy and Christian idealism. Gandhi, the most powerful influence in India to-day, is a devout Hindu, but he has denounced caste as an evil excrescence upon Hinduism, and has championed the cause of the outcasts. India is so vast and, in all but superficial politics, so conservative that the change will be slow, but it seems probable that it is coming.

An essential feature of Hinduism is the seclusion of women; nothing makes social intercourse between Indians and Europeans more difficult and artificial than this fact. When Sir Walter Lawrence, the distinguished Indian administrator already quoted, was asked what he regretted most in his Indian career, he answered: "That I never had the pleasure of meeting the women of India, and of understanding their life." Even here, also, the age-long tradition is beginning to break down, and Indian women are coming out into the world. They enjoy, like men, the privilege of voting in the new electorates.

Agriculture

It is no accident that the three largest cities of India—Calcutta, Bombay and Madras—are of British creation. The great bulk of the population lives in the 500,000 villages

Indian State Railways

BENARES

Ceremonial Bathing in the Ganges

and is dependent upon agriculture. Indian agitators often blame British rule for the fact that the Indian villager is still miserably poor and nearly always in debt to the local money-lender. Money-lending is one of the most prosperous industries in India, and until very recently it was said that the profits of the money-lending class exceeded those of all the workers on the land. But the fact is that, while British rule has made possible a great increase of wealth, the increase has been, as it were, converted into increase of population and each individual is nearly as poor as before. Moreover Hindu superstition places formidable obstacles in the way of what would seem the most obvious reforms. The Hindu objects to taking life, and allows his land to be overrun with vermin. He venerates the cow as a sacred animal, with the result that there is an enormous population of entirely useless cows, consuming the agricultural wealth of the country and giving nothing in return. It is estimated that there are fourteen million surplus cows, which consume fodder worth £17,000,000 every year. There is, of course, no scientific breeding; and the average Indian cow yields, per life, 80 gallons of milk whereas the Imperial Agricultural Institute of India has cows yielding 1200 gallons. Against the superstition and ignorance responsible for such things, enterprising government departments can make but slow progress.

Cotton fabrics

In one respect, at least, the British connection inflicted great injury upon India. For centuries before the British came, India had been famed all over the east and as far as the Mediterranean, for her beautiful hand-woven cotton fabrics. The very word " calico " is derived from Calicut, the port of southern India where Vasco da Gama first landed, which, like our own Calcutta, is called after the terrible Hindu goddess Kali. The East India Company did a great trade in carrying Hindu cotton fabrics to Europe. Then came the industrial revolution. Indian export of cotton fabrics fell rapidly after the beginning of the nineteenth

century. Then the British "Manchester goods" invaded the Indian market, and the native crafts were ruined.[1] Not until the last quarter of the century did cotton manufacture under factory conditions begin in India. It is to-day the principle factory industry of India, its chief centre being Bombay where many of the employers are Parsis, a very small but wealthy and enterprising community with a religion of Persian origin.

One of the first manifestations of the modern anti-British nationalist movement was the *swadeshi* movement for the boycotting of British goods, particularly textiles. Twenty years later Gandhi took the spinning wheel as the symbol of Indian self-independence, and urged his followers to learn to spin, and to use none but native hand-made cotton goods. Indians have a real grievance against us for our treatment of their cotton industry. In 1896 it was necessary for Indian revenue purposes to levy a small duty on imported cotton goods, but, in order that Lancashire might not suffer, an excise duty of the same amount was at the same time imposed on the products of Indian cotton mills. In 1917, however, the import duty was raised, while the excise remained the same; since that date the import duty has been still further raised and the excise duty abolished.

The steel industry

Factory industry has recently made striking progress in India, but one must remember that, relative to the agricultural population, its scale is minute. Even though twenty Birminghams and Manchesters sprang up in India, the country would continue to be predominantly agricultural. The most remarkable of India's new industries is the steel industry founded by the Parsi family of Tata in Bihar, the province lying to the west of Bengal. It owes nothing to British governmental encouragement, for the capital was subscribed by Indians, and the works were erected by Americans. It was not founded until 1902, but its steel

[1] English handicraftsmen in spinning and weaving were, of course, ruined at the same time, and for the same reason.

was of immense service in the Great War. " I can hardly imagine," said the Viceroy of that date, " what we should have done if the Tata Company had not been able to give us steel rails which have provided not only for Mesopotamia, but for Egypt, Palestine, and East Africa."

Political divisions of India. The Indian States

British India is divided into fifteen provinces. Nine of these are large provinces, each equal in size and population to the principal countries of Western Europe. Each has its Governor, its own staff of civil servants and, to-day, its own elected parliamentary assembly. Of the remaining provinces two, the North-West Frontier province and Baluchistan, are areas where military defence is the first consideration. The remaining four are small districts created by special circumstances which need not concern us here. But " British India " is not the whole of the Indian Empire. There are also the Indian States which, though they contain less than a quarter of the population, constitute nearly half of the Indian Empire. They are nearly seven hundred in number, ranging from large kingdoms like Kashmir, Hyderabad and Mysore, to petty principalities covering only a few square miles.[1] Rajputana, between the lower Indus and the Ganges, is an immense area consisting almost entirely of Indian States. It would be possible to fly in an aeroplane 2,000 miles from the northern to the southern limits of the Indian Empire without crossing more than a very few hundred miles of " British " territory. The Indian princes are bound by treaties to the British crown, and owe allegiance to the Viceroy as the King's representative in the Indian Empire, but they are careful to assert their independence of the same high functionary in his other capacity of Governor-General of British India. They are outside British India, and they view its modern development with considerable misgiving. They have surrendered to the British crown the

1 Both in their numbers and in their variety the Indian States are comparable with the three hundred States of the Holy Roman Empire in Germany before its dissolution during the Napoleonic Wars.

control of their foreign policy, but they retain the management of their domestic affairs. There is a British Resident at the courts of the greater princes, and the Viceroy has a right to intervene if he is convinced that the State is being grossly misgoverned. The petty States, which are, in numbers, the great majority, are under the supervision of the Governor of the nearest British Province.

The survival of the Indian States is easily explained. Throughout the greater part of its history the British in India have been anything but anxious to extend the sphere of their direct responsibilities. It was the pressure of circumstances and of incorrigibly unquiet neighbours which led the East Indian Company to extend its authority, within less than a hundred years, from Bengal, Bombay, and Madras over the whole sub-continent. Whenever possible it preferred to preserve and control the native dynasty. For a short period before the Mutiny, under Lord Dalhousie, this policy was reversed, but since the annexation of Oudh in 1856 no further annexations have been made within the frontiers of the Empire.[1]

The Indian States present every variety of good and bad government. Some, like Mysore, have long been models of good government, combining order with progress. In others the princes have yielded to the natural temptation to extort money from their subjects and spend it on frivolity. On the whole they represent conservative India, and British administrations of a conservative temperament have often contrasted them very favourably with British India. In *The India we served* Sir Walter Lawrence writes of the Indian States that they are

> the real India, rich in variety. I seemed to pass into a new world when I left the land of regulation for the country of chance, colour, and charm. In British India the machine of law and regulation moves on like a steam roller, and all is well for those who keep clear of the wheels. . . . Wherever he may go, the dweller in British India will find the

[1] The frontiers themselves have been extended on the north-west and by the annexation of Burma.

INDIA

Showing (1) The Indian States (shaded) and (2) the Provinces of British India. Nepal and Bhutan are dotted

same law court, the same school, the same gaol. If he likes monotony, it is there. But the Indian hates monotony. . . . The Raja knows what his people want and, unconsciously perhaps, is more swayed by public opinion than the rulers of British India, who find it very difficult to know what the people really desire. They think they know what the people ought to want in the way of sanitation, education, popular franchise, and swifter progress; but the people are too polite and too fatalist to say that in their hearts they care for none of these things.[1]

British Indian administration

But the Indian States belong in the main to an India which seeems to be gradually passing away, though what their future is to be no one can confidently say. More than three-quarters of the Indian peoples live within "the land of regulation" which has now become also "the land of unrest," the India that has been created by the devoted labours of generations of Civil Servants. "British administration in India," says Sir Walter Lawrence, "is the finest achievement of our race." One could go further and say, without the possibility of contradiction, that it is the finest achievement of its kind to the credit of any race in any period of history. The passage I have already quoted proves that Sir Walter Lawrence is not blind to its defects. A stranger, he says, observing the efficient uniformity of our bureaucracy, might think it had been made in Germany! Moreover its increasing efficiency only added to its shortcomings in the eyes of the Indian who does not care for efficiency even when he accepts its services. Towards the end of the nineteenth century the Civil Servant became more and more "paper-logged"; the burden of office routine kept him more and more from leisurely human intercourse with the simple folk he governed. He had not time to think of the future, and it was not his business to do so. His business was to run an ever more complicated machine ensuring an ever increasing degree of material prosperity.[2]

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 177, 182.
[2] Paraphrased from Lawrence, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

To detail the work of the Indian Civil Service would be an impossible task, and a general appreciation from the pen of the British writer might not carry conviction. I will, instead, quote a paragraph from the book of an enthusiastic Indian Nationalist who, while eager for the coming of Indian self-government, has the honesty (unlike many of his countrymen) to admit all that India has hitherto owed to the alien government we have imposed upon her.

Mr. K. T. Paul writes :—

A criminal law common to all persons without distinction ; a personal and civil law in accordance with every one's particular traditions ; a judicial machinery organised regardless of cost so as to make legal remedy available to practically every person in the land ; relief and amelioration measures on a gigantic scale to grapple with famines to which India is so frequently liable ; curative and preventive medical work to reach the ordinary ills as well as the emergency needs of a population as large as that of Europe (barring Russia) many of whom live in conditions exposing them to many kinds of poison ; an ever increasing supply of schools and teachers to overtake the illiteracy of a people whose net increase is some two millions per annum ; it is no exaggeration to say that each one of these lines of " official service " really imply an expenditure of human worth and personality, the recounting of which would be more fascinating than a romance. These and more represent the quality, the care and the potentialities of the administration.

To the many millions of India the fact of the British connection as much as its character is in this manner brought to the very door of the tiniest village. The Sircar [i.e. the Government] is here, there and everywhere. Its long arm can be touched wherever you are. It is relentlessly watchful of public rights ; but it is also there to protect. And above all its unfailing power, and the marvel of organization which secures that power, are the solid impressions which possess the mind, even as the law which bids the sun rise every morning and set every evening.[1]

[1] *The British Connection with India*, p. 29.

British philanthrophy in India

Equally remarkable and fruitful in its way has been the work of the missionary societies, in education, in social work, and most of all perhaps in medical service. One could maintain that the work of the Civil Service was done for the sake of British authority and commerce as much as for the welfare of the Indian peoples ; but it would be absurd to suggest that the work of the missions had any such ulterior purpose.

There was a time when the East India Company disapproved of missions and described them (in about 1800) as " pernicious, impudent, useless, harmful, dangerous, profitless, fantastic. They strike against all reason of sound policy, and bring the peace and safety of our possessions into peril." Times changed, and seventy years later Lord Lawrence, the only Viceroy who rose to the post through the ranks of the Civil Service, said : " Notwithstanding all that the English people have done for India, the missionaries have done more than all other agencies combined."

The number of native Christians in India is about five million, and they are mostly drawn from the outcasts of southern India. But the securing of converts is the least important part of the work of the missions. They have brought the teaching and the person of Christ to India, and its effect upon Hinduism has already been profound. Gandhi, the revered Mahatma or " prophet " of Hinduism, openly sets before his people the standards and the example of Christ.

(ii) BRITISH INDIAN POLICY TO LORD CURZON'S VICEROYALTY (1905)

Three hundred and thirty years have passed since the East India Company received its charter. We may divide the period into large and simple divisions. For about a hundred and sixty years (1600–1760) the sole interest of the Company was trade. Then came Clive's conquest of

Bengal; a hundred years followed (1760–1860) in which, by wars of conquest and treaties with Indian princes, British authority was extended all over the sub-continent. During the last seventy years (1860–1930) the map of India has remained almost unchanged, except for the annexation of Burma.[1]

But this is rather superficial. We might divide up the modern periods along rather different lines. Until Pitt's India Act in 1784 the East India Company ruled its territorial possessions and, in spite of the wise statesmanship of Hastings and his keen interest in the culture of the native peoples, there was a good deal of pillage by the Company's servants. From 1784 to 1858 the British government controlled the Company and appointed its Governor General. In 1813 the trading monopoly of the Company was abolished; in 1833 it ceased to be a trading concern at all, and became simply the instrument through which British India was governed; thus its abolition in 1858 was not the important event which it might seem to be.

Let me offer one more scheme of dates for the reader's guidance; it is the scheme on which what follows is based. Down to about 1830 the British in India adopted what Sir Walter Lawrence calls the policy of "better not." They refrained as much as possible from interfering with the social and religious customs of the people. How the East India Company in this period regarded the missionaries we have already seen. After 1830 came the Reform Bill in England: it was the age of middle-class Liberalism, the period in which the missionary societies attained their greatest political influence and secured the abolition of slavery; the period when railways began to run to and fro over the face of the earth. The British in India launched forth upon social reform. The Civil Service, hitherto an instrument for maintaining order and collecting money, began to be transformed into the great instrument of social service. How did India respond? Much was accepted with passive thankfulness, and perhaps passive thankfulness has always

[1] Some account of the earlier periods will be found on pp. 40-42 and 54-56.

been the attitude of the majority of simple folk. But passive thankfulness leaves little mark on history. The responses we have to record, and which will serve as chronological landmarks to the story are (i) the Indian Mutiny of 1857; (ii) the establishment of the Indian National Congress in 1885; and (iii) the outbreak of agitation against the Partition of Bengal in 1905 which opens the period of modern unrest.

Viceroyalty of Lord William Bentinck

Four famous achievements are associated with the Viceroyalty of Lord William Bentinck (1828–1835). He abolished Suttee—the burning of Hindu widows—and undertook the suppression of the Thugs, a caste of hereditary murderers who terrorized the roads. His most famous collaborator was Macaulay, the historian, who drew up the Indian Penal Code and induced the government to adopt English, instead of one or more of the native languages, as the medium of instruction in the schools which Bentinck was founding. Much has since been said about the dangers this course involved; it has been said that the system of education established by Bentinck and Macaulay has created a class prone to agitation but unfit for responsibility. But Macaulay and his supporters held that only through English education would it be possible to create a united Indian nation capable of playing an honourable part in the civilized world.

" It may be," wrote Macaulay in his famous " Minute " on Indian Education (1835),

that the public mind of India may expand under our system till it has outgrown our system; that by good government we may educate our subjects into a capacity for better government; that, having become instructed in European knowledge they may, in some future age, demand European institutions. Whether such a day will ever come I know not. But never will I attempt to retard it or avert it. Whenever it comes it will be the proudest day in English history.

It has come; and our " pride " is overlaid with embarrassment and anxiety. Macaulay was a historian, and he

may have thought that the Indian would be Anglicized by education much as, for example, the Roman Britain was Romanized under the Roman Empire.[1] He overlooked much; the way to Indian self-government was strewn with difficulties he could not foresee, but it may be that, fifty years hence, his optimism will appear less inappropriate than it must appear at the present moment.

Macaulay was not alone in his views. Such an idea had already been expressed ten years earlier by Sir Thomas Munro, Governor of Madras, and the British government, when renewing the Charter of the East India Company in 1833, laid down the principle that no Indian native should "by reason only of his religion, place of birth, descent, or colour, be disabled from holding any place, office or employment under the Company."

Viceroyalty of Dalhousie

Under the Government of Lord Dalhousie (1848–1856) British civilization began to penetrate Indian life with unprecedented rapidity. Dalhousie believed that the continued existence of Indian states delayed the progress of the Indian peoples, and he laid down the rule that, if a prince died without natural heirs, his sovereign rights should pass to the British government, in spite of the fact that Hindu, like Roman, law regards an adopted heir as equivalent in all respects to an heir of the blood. Also, in 1856, he annexed the great province of Oudh, on account of the continued misgovernment of its rulers. Oudh was to be the centre of the Mutiny in the following year. By these methods Dalhousie increased British territory by more than one-third. He introduced the railway and the telegraph. He made the largest of Indian canals, and carried the Grand Trunk Road through the Punjab. He established the Indian equivalent of a penny post. He founded the government engineering department. He greatly extended the school system, founding elementary schools teaching by means of the

[1] At almost the same date we find Durham confidently looking forward to the Anglicization of the French Canadian.

various native languages. After eight years of superhuman labour he had completely ruined his health at the age of forty-four, and returned to England to die. His one fault, it has been truly said, was that he lacked imagination to realise that Indians might prefer oppression to order, and misgovernment to change. He was one of the greatest of the Viceroys, but his policy led to the Indian Mutiny, which broke out under his successor, Lord Canning.

The Mutiny

The general causes of the Mutiny were, in fact, the achievements of Lord Dalhousie. Its special cause was the introduction into army use of a new cartridge greased with the fat of cows, which are sacred to Hindus, and of swine, which are an abomination to Mohammedans. The Mutiny was, as its name implies, a revolt of Sepoys, native troops within the British Indian army. None the less the grievances it expressed were religious rather than military. It should be remembered, however, that many Sepoy regiments remained entirely loyal and that the area of the trouble was confined to a single province—what is now called the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh. The disturbances covered a period of eighteen months, but long before the end of that time the back of the rebellion had been broken.

The chief events of the Mutiny centred round Delhi, the old capital of the Moguls; Lucknow, the capital of Oudh; and Cawnpore, a town about fifty miles from Lucknow. The trouble began in May 1857 at Meerut, where the mutineers, after killing their British officers, marched off to Delhi, proclaiming the last of the Moguls as Emperor of India. Troops were despatched from the Punjab by John Lawrence, and Delhi was captured by the heroic energy of John Nicholson in September. At Cawnpore a very small garrison, with about five hundred women and children, was besieged by Nana Sahib, a native who bore a bitter grudge against the British because his claims as an adopted heir to an important Indian state had been ignored by Dalhousie. This miscreant induced the garrison, by an offer of safety, to

place themselves in his hands, and then treacherously murdered both them and the women and children. At Lucknow a British garrison was besieged for many months by the mutineers, but was relieved at last in the spring of 1858, when ample forces for the suppression of the Mutiny had arrived from England.

The fight against the Mutiny produced many military heroes whose names became deservedly popular in England.[1] But no one played a nobler part than the Viceroy, Lord Canning. It was his task not only to supervise the suppression of the Mutiny, but to look to the future. With this end in view he restricted, until the crisis was past, the freedom not only of the seditious native press, but also of the British Indian press, inflamed with hatred, born of panic, against Indians of all classes. He showed his confidence in the loyalty of all but the actual mutineers by refusing to disband his own Sepoy bodyguard. In July 1857, when the Mutiny was at its worst, he issued a proclamation in which he exhorted all concerned to refrain from excessive or superfluous severity in their treatment of the rebel districts. This proclamation won him the contemptuous nickname of " Clemency Canning " ; it was not the first time in history that a nickname given in derision became a title of honour. Like Dalhousie he gave his life to the service of India, and died of overwork immediately after his return. He was succeeded by Lord Elgin, who had already rendered great service in Canada.

At first sight the Mutiny might seem to belong to that rare class of historical incidents, a great event without consequences. Provoked by prejudice against European innovations, it failed, and innovation went forward more rapidly than ever. None the less the Mutiny had consequences, and very unfortunate ones ; it cast a lengthening shadow over the relations of the rulers and the ruled. In the previous thirty years British administrators had believed not only that

[1] Perhaps the most popular was Havelock, whose name still indicates the date of many ugly little streets in English provincial towns. Population was growing fast, and architecture was busy doing its worst.

they were working for the good of India, but that the Indian peoples would enter into their work with ever increasing appreciation, and ultimately, perhaps, take over the charge of it more and more completely into their own hands. After the Mutiny the British government went on with its work as devotedly as before, but it no longer looked for co-operation. The hopeless idea expressed in Kipling's lines—

East is east, and west is west,
And never the twain shall meet,—

came to be accepted as the last word on the relations of British and Indian. Half a century of "efficiency" followed, culminating in Curzon as the first period of reform had culminated in Dalhousie; and after Curzon came something which, if it lacks the tragic horror of certain episodes of the Mutiny, presents the British government with far more difficult problems.

The rise of national self-consciousness

The first twenty years after the Mutiny were a quiet time for the Indian government, but "unrest" was preparing beneath the surface. It was our own work, the fruit of the educational system we had created. The introduction of popular education in England has produced a popular socialist movement; the creation of a western educated class in India has produced Indian nationalism. The movement was, and has remained, bafflingly complicated. One strand of it is purely western; the educated Indian learnt from the books we gave him to admire the theory of liberty and to applaud rebellions undertaken on its behalf, whether by a Hampden or a Garibaldi. Another strand is oriental, yet this, too, owes much to British scholarship. From the time of Warren Hastings onwards British scholars began research among the ancient sacred books of Hinduism. Indian scholars followed in their footsteps, and a new pride began to be felt in the ancient civilization of India. It led some minds to a very wholesome criticism of modern Hinduism, for it was found that much that is least defensible

in the system, the rigidity of caste and the segregation of women, had formed no part of the earliest discoverable Hindu civilization. This side of the movement is now once again bearing fruit, reinforced by the influence of the Christian missions, an influence far wider, as has been said, than the statistics of actual conversion to Christianity would suggest. But for a long time it was swamped by a tendency towards uncritical glorification of all that could be called Hindu. "Back to the Vedas"[1] was the watchword, as unprofitable as "Back to the Koran" or "Back to the Old Testament." Hence the curious phenomenon we see to-day; a body of agitators who denounce western civilization as "satanic" (itself a western term of abuse), and at the same time clamour for parliamentary institutions which are nothing if not western inventions.

During the same period the improvement of transport produced circumstances which tended to widen the gulf between British and Indians. It became commoner for the British to bring their wives with them to India, and this led to their living a more exclusive life, and mixing less in ordinary social intercourse with the menfolk of the peoples they governed. Intercourse between the womenfolk was as a rule impossible. The development of "hill stations," to which the British migrated whenever they could in the hot season, had the same effect. At the same time educated Indians began to visit England in increasing numbers. Here they often found themselves ignored by the better elements in English society, and acquired familiarity with aspects of our civilization which did not increase their respect for us.

There was of course much to be said for the unfavourable view the British generally took of the aspiring educated Indian. His education was generally very superficial, fitting him for little but to wrangle in the law courts and write nonsense in his newspapers. He was the dupe of catch-words and shut his eyes to facts he did not like. He knew far less about the ordinary Indian folk in their 500,000

[1] The Vedas are the earliest Hindu scriptures.

villages than the British Civil Servant. What right had he to claim to be their " representative " ? Also a large part of the difficulties of Indian government arise from religious disputes. The British, being neither Hindus nor Moslem, have the great merit of impartiality as judges of such disputes ; but how could a native view a religious question impartially, when he was inevitably associated with one religion or the other ? On the other side the Indian might fairly reply : " I am the product of your educational system. My defects are your responsibility. And has not all your own history taught you that the only way to fit people for political responsibility is to give it them, and let them learn from their mistakes ? "

The Indian National Congress

In 1880 Gladstone sent out Lord Ripon as Viceroy with express instructions to pursue a liberal policy. A bill was introduced in parliament, known as the Ilbert Bill, to remove certain privileges that Europeans enjoyed over Indians in the law courts. A furious agitation against the bill was raised by the British mercantile community in India, in face of which the bill was dropped. This taught the Indians a lesson which they have been applying ever since. If one side could frighten the government into withdrawing reforms, the other side could frighten it into granting them.

In 1885 an annual gathering called the Indian National Congress was founded. Its founders were men of high character and wide education, fully appreciative of the value of the British connexion, and its programme included not only a demand for some measure of representative government, but also a scheme of social reforms designed to remedy some of the more glaring moral evils of Hinduism. Its first action was to invite the British Governor of Bombay to take the chair at its proceedings, and, though it was thought best to refuse this invitation, Lord Dufferin, the new Viceroy, publicly commended Congress as a useful channel for the expression of Indian public opinion. Its recommendations bore fruit, Dufferin's Act of 1888

creating local Native Councils to co-operate with the district officers of the Civil Service in certain departments of their work, and in the next Viceroy's (Lansdowne's) Act of 1892, creating Advisory Councils with nominated native members, for purposes of consultation with the Viceroy and with the Governors of the various Provinces.

The results of these measures were disappointing. The Civil Servant, admirable as a benevolent despot, had little gift or inclination for co-operating with an inevitably rather foolish Native Council; the Councillors wasted his time, and certainly he had little time to spare. The nominated members of the more exalted Advisory Councils also proved less helpful than the authors of the Act had hoped; either they were docile henchmen of the British system, or else agitators who, having no responsibility for administration, could afford to play to the Nationalist gallery.

For these and other reasons Congress, under the evil influence of a Brahman named Tilak, gradually abandoned the pursuit of those social reforms which alone could provide a healthy foundation for Indian self-government, and adopted a policy of barren agitation against British institutions and senseless glorification of Hindu "culture." They opposed, for example, an Act of 1891, for raising the legal age of marriage from ten to twelve. The fact was, Hindus found it impossible to combine on schemes for reforming their own institutions, and therefore sought out subjects on which they could present a united front.

Curzon's Viceroyalty

The last, and one of the greatest, of the Viceroys who could convince himself that benevolent despotism was the only need of India was Lord Curzon (1898–1905). In his heroic energy and his achievements he rivalled Dalhousie and Warren Hastings. Endowed himself with all the instincts of a *grand seigneur* he took particular interest in the Indian princes, and a great revival of loyalty and efficiency among the rulers of that half of India dates from his day. He was also one of the first Viceroys to show deep

appreciation of the architectural treasures of India. In all respects he was efficiency incarnate; yet in the cause of efficiency he took a step which produced effects he had not in the least foreseen, and ushered in a new period of Indian history.

The Province of Bengal, which at that time included Bihar and Orissa, was too big for administrative convenience. In 1905 Lord Curzon cut it in half. It seemed the sensible thing to do, but the Bengalis had come to cherish towards their province a sentiment of national pride. To them the Partition of Bengal was an insult, nay an iniquity, like the Partition of Poland which was denounced as a crime in all the English history books. They had also a religious grievance, for in the old united Bengal the Hindus enjoyed a majority, whereas in the new Eastern Bengal there would be a Mohammedan majority. Shortly afterwards Lord Curzon resigned, before the end of the second term of office to which he had recently been appointed. His resignation was quite unconnected with Bengal, being due to a quarrel with Kitchener about army organisation; however, the agitators naturally triumphed in his fall. At the end of the same year there was a general election in Great Britain. The Conservatives who had sent out Curzon suffered a shattering defeat, and John Morley, famous as a champion of Irish Home Rule, became Secretary of State for India in the Liberal Government. A new epoch seemed to have begun; and so it had.

(iii) FROM JOHN MORLEY TO JOHN SIMON (1906–1930)

The Morley-Minto Reforms

Indian agitators were quickly disappointed in their hopes of John Morley, the new Liberal Secretary of State. He maintained the Partition of Bengal and took strong measures to suppress disorder. "Reforms" were promised, but three years passed before the scheme was ready for publication. Meanwhile sedition and even assassination were openly advocated in the extremer sections of the press.

Anti-British sentiment expressed itself in the policy of *swadeshi* or boycott of British goods, which had already been tried on a smaller scale under the inspiration of Tilak. Schoolboys were encouraged to gratify both patriotic and possibly other instincts by deserting their schools and making bonfires of their English schoolbooks. Meanwhile Morley and the Viceroy, Lord Minto, who, though appointed by the previous Conservative government, entered heartily into his plans, were slowly incubating their scheme.

The Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909 were the last word in British concession to Indian demands before the Great War. Generally speaking, they introduced the principle of representative institutions on a very limited and artificial scale, but they did not give the representative bodies thus created any control over the British executive. Morley repudiated the suggestion that his scheme " could be said to lead directly or indirectly to the establishment of a parliamentary system in India " ; if such had been its character he would, he said, " have nothing at all to do with it." He believed, in fact, that the Indian demand was for prestige rather than power, and that it would be satisfied by the former without the latter. Up to a point he was justified by the result, for the reforms were accepted with expressions of gratitude such as have greeted none of the far more generous advances towards Indian self-government in more recent times. None the less, the Morley-Minto Reforms neglected the great principle that the only way to train a people in political common sense is to give them some measure, however modest, of political responsibility.

Lansdowne's Act of 1892 had created Advisory Provincial Councils, on which Indian members nominated by the British government had a minority of the seats. Morley's Act enlarged the minority into a majority, and for nomination substituted a system of election by specially constructed constituencies which were unkindly, but not altogether inaccurately, described as rotten boroughs ; but the Councils remained " Advisory " only, that is to say, they could give advice, but the Governor was under no obligation to accept

it. At the same time a few Indians of great distinction and unimpeachable loyalty were nominated as members of the Viceroy's Legislative Council, and of the Secretary of State's Council in London. In fact the political status of Indians was raised, but the power of the British authorities remained intact.

Shortly before the War, Lord Crewe, who succeeded Morley as Secretary of State, appointed a Commission to enquire into the question of the admission of Indians to the higher ranks of the civil service. Among its members were Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and also several Indians, notably Mr. Gokhale,[1] the wise leader of the moderate Indian reform party. The presence of Indians on such a commission marks the advance made since Curzon's day ; in 1900, for example, Lord Curzon had appointed a Committee on Indian education on which not a single Indian had been invited to serve.

The Mohammedans

Indian unrest in the pre-War period was almost entirely limited to Hindus. The Mohammedans, seventy million in number and settled in communities scattered almost all over India, had abstained from taking part in it, partly because their devotion to the Koran kept them for the most part aloof from Western education, and partly because, being a minority, they dreaded a movement which, by weakening British power, might ultimately hand them over to the tender mercies of the Hindu majority. The last few years before the war saw, however, the beginnings of Mohammedan agitation. The repeal of the Partition of Bengal, granted at last to Hindu clamour in 1911, constituted a Mohammedan grievance, just as the original partition had been a Hindu grievance. Events in Europe also wounded Mohammedan pride. It looked as if there was a conspiracy of the Christian nations, and particularly those friendly with Great Britain, to destroy the independence of Mohammedan countries. The French occupied Morocco ; Great Britain and Russia made an agreement which practically amounted

[1] Pronounced " Gōkăly."

to a partition of Persia; lastly came the assault of Italy in 1911 and the allied Balkan states in 1912 upon Turkey itself, whose sultan was recognized by Indian Mohammedans as Caliph or Head of their religious community.

However Indian unrest before the war never assumed the proportions to which it grew immediately after it. The visit of the King and Queen in 1911 was marked by demonstrations of enthusiastic loyalty, very unlike the deplorable reception accorded to the Prince of Wales when he visited India in 1921.

India during the Great War

The coming of the Great War provoked an amazing and almost unanimous outburst of loyalty to the Empire. Not only the princes of the great fighting races, but the western educated classes were caught up on a wave of spontaneous enthusiasm. Even Tilak, just released from a long term of imprisonment, forgot his grievances for the moment. Mr. Gandhi had just returned to India after his long struggle for the rights of Indians in South Africa, a struggle in which he had been effectively supported by Lord Hardinge, who was Viceroy when the war broke out. His war message was: "The gateway to our freedom is on the French soil. . . . The British Empire has certain ideals with which I have fallen in love. . . . My advice to the country would be to fight unconditionally unto death with Britain for victory."[1] The spokesman of Great Britain made a suitable response, Asquith, the Prime Minister, declaring in words to which much weight was attached in India, that in future Indian questions must be approached from "a new angle of vision." Within a few months Indian troops were fighting in France, and they subsequently played a great part in the Mesopotamian, Syrian, and East African campaigns. Indeed, it is probably true to say that without Indian troops none of these campaigns could have been carried to a successful

[1] Quoted from K. T. Paul, *op. cit* 118. It ought to be added that Gandhi wished "agitation, also unto death" to be carried on at the same time!

conclusion. About 2,000,000 Indians saw active service in the war.

But as the war dragged out its slow and terrible length, enthusiasm inevitably ebbed, and voices were heard saying that this " European civil war "—for such it was from an Indian standpoint—proved the hollowness of western civilization. Great Britain felt that the Indian constitutional problem could wait until after the war. It was a very natural assumption, but India was impatient. In 1916 the Indian members of the Viceroy's Legislative Council published a vague and ambitious scheme of Home Rule, or *swaraj*, from which any conceivable British scheme was bound to make considerable subtractions. Later in the same year Congress fell under the spell of Mrs. Besant, a very eloquent and eccentric English lady who in the course of a long life had championed many different causes, and now gave an impetus to an anti-British movement from which, three years later, she shrank with horror. An All-India Moslem League followed the lead given by the Hindu Congress.

The Montagu-Chelmsford Report

At last, on August 20th, 1917, Mr. Montagu, Secretary of State for India in Mr. Lloyd George's government, made a notable statement in the House of Commons. The purpose of British policy, he declared, was not only " the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration, but also the greatest possible development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire." In these words Indians were definitely encouraged to look forward to the ultimate attainment of " Dominion status," the status enjoyed by Canada and Australia. The British government, Mr. Montagu added, " must be judges of the time and the measure of each advance ; they must be guided by the co-operation received from those upon whom the new opportunities of service will thus be conferred. . . . Substantial steps should be

taken as soon as possible." Mr. Montagu then proceeded to India, and in May 1918, in co-operation with the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, issued the " Montagu-Chelmsford Report."

The main conclusions of the Report were : (i) The central government of India must, during the whole of the " transition period," remain responsible to the British government. (ii) Experiments in representative government could at once be made in the various Provinces.

As regards the central government the Report recommended the immediate creation of an All-Indian Legislature, consisting of a Council of State, part elected and part nominated, and a Legislative Assembly based on the widest practicable franchise. The Viceroy was empowered to over-ride the Legislature only if it failed to pass measures or grant supplies which he was prepared to " certify " as vital to the peace, safety, and interests of India. Thus a very real royal veto was retained. In the provinces experiments were to be made on the lines of what was called " dyarchy."[1] The departments of government were to be divided into two classes. One class, including the maintenance of order, were " reserved " in the hands of the British authorities; the other class, including such social services as education, were to be " transferred " to ministers entirely responsible to representative assemblies, elected on the widest practicable franchise.

On the basis of this Report an Act was drafted and carried through parliament by the end of 1919. Meanwhile, however, the Indian situation had not stood still. Terrible events had occurred, and the great experiment, perhaps the greatest experiment in the whole history of political liberty, was to open under most discouraging circumstances.

The Rowlatt Acts

So long as the war lasted the government possessed emergency powers for dealing with sedition, which would expire as soon as the war was over. A committee had been appointed under Mr. Justice Rowlatt, a British judge, to

[1] i.e. dual rule.

enquire into the nature of political crime in India, and to make recommendations as to how the government should deal with it. As a result of the Report the Government enacted, in spite of the unanimous protest of the Indian members of the Viceroy's Council,[1] two Acts, popularly known as the Rowlatt Acts, which gave the government certain powers for dealing with political criminals and those who encouraged and abetted them.

The Rowlatt Acts may well be compared with the famous Stamp Act imposed on the old American colonies. Both measures were, in themselves, moderate and reasonable; both provoked explosions as unexpected as they were disproportionate to the occasion; in both cases the offending Acts were the occasion but hardly the real cause of the explosions. It is easy to defend both Acts, but it would have been better if neither of them had seen the light. The stamp duties were never collected and the powers granted under the Rowlatt Acts were never used; both were repealed, but only after the damage had been done.

Mr. Gandhi, and the tragedy of Amritsar

The Rowlatt Acts seem to have suddenly convinced Mr. Gandhi that the British rule in India was Satanic. He proclaimed a crusade of passive resistance and non-co-operation, and from that day to this (1930) he has been the most powerful enemy of British rule in India. He belongs to a type that we find it hard to understand; if one looked for parallels to him in Europe one would have to seek them in the Middle Ages rather than in modern times. He is a religious rather than a political leader, and his movement is a "crusade." He is undoubtedly a saint; he preaches difficult ideals, and he practises them himself, living a life of strict and continuous self-denial in all that concerns his personal comfort. His voice sways millions of devoted followers, but he wears the dress and eats the food of the humblest peasant. It is apparently impossible to argue

[1] The Rowlatt Acts were, of course, enacted *before* the new Montagu-Chelmsford constitution came into operation.

with him on lines of what we should call common sense, to ask him what he would substitute for British rule, whether he thinks that the Indian peoples, more that 90 per cent. of whom can neither read nor write, peoples now more than ever rent by feuds between Hindus and Moslems, could govern themselves without the protection of the British Indian army, and the guidance of the civil service. He will answer that what he is doing is right, and that he cannot judge the consequences.

However, it seems that Mr. Gandhi's call to "passive resistance" had struck no really deep root in the feeling of the Indian masses until a tragic and sensational event stirred all India as it had never been stirred before, not even at the time of the Mutiny. Serious riots had occurred in Bombay province and the Punjab, and some hideous crimes against white men and women were committed. Troops had to be used to put down the rioters. In Bombay Province the disorder was brought under control without any great loss of life, but General Dyer, who was responsible for the restoration of order in the Punjab, was faced with a more menacing situation. As he said afterwards, he considered it necessary for the safety of the British community in the province, to "strike terror into the whole of the Punjab." A crowd of many thousand seditious Indians had assembled, in defiance of his orders, in a public square of the city of Amritsar. On this crowd he opened fire for ten consecutive minutes. 379 were killed and 1,200 wounded.

British opinion is still divided on General Dyer's action. There is no question, of course, that he did what he believed to be his duty in extremely difficult circumstances; very likely he had in mind the well-grounded opinion that the Indian Mutiny of 1857 would never have spread beyond Meerut if the first mutineers had been immediately and drastically punished. Some hold that Dyer's action "saved India." Others hold that it made the position ten times worse, and also that it was an exhibition of "Prussian" methods unworthy of British traditions. Certain it is that

the "massacre of Amritsar" furnished the anti-British agitators with a more powerful argument than they had ever possessed before. To this day Indians write of it as if it were a slaughter of the innocents: the barbarous murders of British subjects which had preceded it are never mentioned. This is entirely characteristic of the Indian native press which thrives upon the wildest abuse of every action of the Government, regardless of all European standards of truthfulness.

The situation might have been retrieved if the Viceroy had at once disavowed the action of the general who was, indirectly, his agent. But British statesmen are, rightly, extremely reluctant to take a step of that kind. So nothing was done. Six months after the event a committee of six Englishmen and three Indians was appointed to investigate the circumstances of the massacre, and the six Englishmen produced a report defending Dyer, in which the three Indians refused to concur. Meanwhile the British mercantile community had greeted General Dyer as the saviour of India. His action was ultimately condemned by Mr. Montagu, supported by a majority in the House of Commons, but not in the House of Lords.

Meanwhile Gandhi had entered into alliance with a Mohammedan movement, called the *Khilafat* movement; its nominal purpose was to carry out reprisals against the British government in India for the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire after the Great War. Its chief result was the rebellion of the Moplahs, a fierce Mohammedan people in southern India, and the victims of the Moplahs were for the most part the Hindus who dwelt in their neighbourhood. The alliance between Gandhi and the Mohammedans was always artificial; Gandhi's religion dictates *ahimsa* or resistance through self-suffering, whereas Islam has believed in the sword ever since the days of Mahomet. Before long Hindu and Moslem were at one another's throats, as before. Indeed the competition for power in the new representative assemblies had sharpened the rivalry between them.

The new Constitution

In the atmosphere generated by " Amritsar " the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms were launched, and the first elections were held in 1920. The franchise is based on taxation and creates an electorate of over six millions. It is not much more than 2 per cent. of the population, but it should be remembered that it is quite as democratic as the electorate of Great Britain before the Reform Bill of 1832. The constituencies are not all of them of the ordinary geographical type. Some are religious or " communal " constituencies for the representation of Moslems and other religious minorities, and some are reserved for the British communities. These last have led the British mercantile classes in India to take a more sympathetic interest in Indian aspirations.

The non-co-operation parties refused to take part in the first elections, and the result was the election of moderate men. The first sessions were therefore marked by a very friendly spirit, and much good work was done, both by the central and the provincial legislatures. A much needed Factory Act, a Mines Act, and an Act securing compensation for injuries to employed persons were among the work of the first years of the new assemblies. Their success was such that, when the second general election became due in 1924, the extremist parties determined to put forward their candidates and to wreck the assemblies by " obstruction," *i.e.* by opposing every measure necessary to the carrying on of the government. A large number of extremists were elected, but the results have hardly been equal to their hopes. There has been a lot of obstruction at Delhi, and the Viceroy has had to use at times his power of " certifying " a measure in spite of its rejection by the Assembly. In two Provinces the system of dyarchy broke down for a time and had to be temporarily suspended. But the course of events, if it has disappointed the hopes of the optimists, has also fallen short of the fears of the pessimists.

On the whole it is fair to say that a great deal of sensible and successful work has been done by elected Indian



NEW DELHI : THE COUNCIL HOUSE

politicians in both the Central and Provincial Assemblies. There has been real co-operation between Indian parliamentarians and British officials, and each has learnt much from the other. This fact is not easily realized from the newspapers, for the Assemblies only become " news " when friction produces something dramatic ; but it is made very plain by the Report of the Simon Commission of 1930. The popular notion prevalent in England—that the British stand on one side and the Gandhi-ites on the other, and that the great gulf between them is an uninhabited vacuum—is entirely at variance with the facts.

The Simon Commission

A promise had been given that, after ten years, the constitutional experiment should be reviewed with a view to a grant of increased powers and responsibilities to the Indian people, and a Royal Commission was appointed for this purpose in 1927, under the chairmanship of Sir John Simon, a distinguished Liberal lawyer. The Commission was supported by, and contained members of, all the three British political parties. Indian extremists found a grievance in the fact that the Commission contained no Indian members ; they failed to realise that the Commission was simply intended to be a minute replica, as it were, of the British parliament, sent to India to investigate the Indian situation and hear the views of Indian leaders, and to report them to the British government at home, which, in the words of Mr. Montagu's historic statement of August 1917, must be " the judges of the time and the measure of each advance " towards the goal which is now officially defined as " Dominion status," or " complete self-government within the Empire." A vigorous attempt was made to boycott the Commission, but it was largely unsuccessful. Moderate parties were eager to lay their views before it, and the extremists felt they would be unwise to abstain.

In June 1930 the Simon Commission published its Report, in two large volumes which have had a wider sale than any previous government publication. The first volume consists

of an elaborate survey of the existing situation in all its aspects, and the second volume contains the proposed developments which, in the unanimous opinion of the Commissioners, are the conclusions logically deducible from their survey of the facts. The proposals, in brief, are as follows :—

(i) In the Provinces "Dyarchy" should be abolished, and ministers responsible to the elected Provincial Legislatures should be entrusted with the charge of all the departments of government, including that of police. The Commissioners recognize that all the "safety first" arguments are against entrusting the control of the police to a minister who is at the mercy of the vagaries of an Indian elected assembly. Nevertheless they hold that the step must be taken. The fatal drawback of Dyarchy has been that it has "blurred the sense of responsibility" in the minds of Indian politicians, and the exclusion of the police from ministerial control would mean preserving Dyarchy. They reserve, however, to the Governor, under the control of the Governor-General and thus ultimately of the British government, the right of intervention, and of overriding his ministers, in certain extreme emergencies. At the same time they recommend that the electorates should be extended so as to include 10 per cent. of the population, instead of about two-and-a-half per cent. as at present. The system of separate constituencies for Mohammedans and other minorities is to be preserved.

(ii) The ultimate destiny of India is to be a Federation of self-governing provinces, like the United States or Australia. That being so, the present Legislative Assembly of British India should give place to a Federal Assembly, the members of which should be elected by the members of the Provincial Legislatures under a system of proportional representation which will secure fair representation of minorities. The central executive, however, must remain with the Governor-General in Council. In other words, while the Provinces must enjoy the benefits and the risks of a complete parliamentary system, the central government, controlling the

army, must for the present retain full freedom of action, and be capable of giving support to the Provinces in case of need.

(iii) The Indian Federation of the future must include not only British India but also the Indian States. The framework of the Federation must be so devised that the Indian States can enter it as full members if and when they please. In order to prepare the ground for development along these lines, the Commissioners suggest the erection of a Consultative Council of Greater India, consisting of, say, thirty members, of whom ten would be nominated by the rulers of the Indian States.

(iv) The Commissioners observe that the clause of the Montagu-Chelmsford Constitution ordaining a formal investigation of the workings of that constitution at the end of its first ten years, followed by the promulgation of a revised constitution enacted by the British parliament, has had an unsettling effect on Indian politics. This arrangement inevitably gave to the Montagu-Chelmsford constitution a transitory and provisional character; it encouraged Indians to prefer future dreams to present necessities; to demonstrate the need of more "reforms" by rendering unworkable the reforms already granted. Thus the Simon Commission recommend that there shall be no more "Simon Commissions." The constitution now about to be enacted should be a flexible constitution, capable of self-development without further intervention of the British government through the British parliament.

There, for the moment, the matter rests—these words being written a very few days after the publication of the Simon Report. The months immediately preceding the issue of the Report were marked by a renewal of disturbances in many parts of India on a scale more formidable than at any time since 1921. Mr. Gandhi is once again where apparently he wanted to be—in prison. The first response of Indian politicians to the Report has been an outburst of shrill indignation; in this respect both those who claim to have read it and those who boast that they have not done so seem

to speak with one voice. But these facts need not, perhaps, in themselves be taken too tragically. We must await the next stage, when a reprcsentative Conference of British and Indian delegates will assemble to discuss the Report in London. On the results of that Conference the British government will, presumably, present an Indian Government Bill to parliament.

Chapter IX

CEYLON, BURMA, AND THE FAR EAST

THE present chapter will be found to consist of several disconnected items. It is fragmentary and miscellaneous; but so is much of the British Empire. None the less, if the colonies and provinces here described have little or no connection with one another, their history connects itself in every case with the history of the Indian Empire. In different ways and in different degrees they might all be described as outposts of British India.

Ceylon

Ceylon is a mountainous island about the same size as Scotland, and containing about the same population—four millions. It is separated from India by a strait more than fifty miles wide, but this strait is in parts so shallow that, if the sea sank thirty feet, Ceylon would be joined to India by an isthmus ten miles wide. The most famous mountain of Ceylon is Adam's Peak, on the summit of which is a "footprint" supposed by Buddhists to be the footprint of Buddha and by Moslems to be the footprint of Adam; but possibly both are mistaken. The country was colonized from India a little over two thousand years ago at the time when Buddhism was predominant in India, and Buddhism is still the religion of the Sinhalese,[1] as they are called. There is also, however, a large minority of Hindus, and a smaller population of Moslems who, like many of the Moslems of southern India, owe their faith not to the Mohammedan invaders who came through the Afghan passes, but to the Arab traders who sailed all over the Indian Ocean centuries

[1] Or Cingalese.

before the Europeans had rounded the Cape of Good Hope.

Portuguese settled at Colombo, then as now the principal port at Ceylon, in 1517, and were displaced by the Dutch eighty years later. The Dutch colony passed to the British at the same time as Cape Colony, and in the same circumstance. Holland had been conquered by the French Revolutionary armies, and we were at war with the French Revolution. At first the new possession was attached to the Madras governorship of the East India Company, but this plan did not work well, and Ceylon was then entirely separated from India. To this day it is within the department not of the India Office but the Colonial Office.

Until the time of the Great War the Governor of Ceylon was assisted by an advisory Council consisting entirely of nominated members, but for some time past this system had not given satisfaction. The discontent was due not to dislike of British rule in itself, but to rivalries between the different social classes and religious communities in the island. In 1924 a new constitution was introduced which proved a signal failure, for, though it declared the Governor solely responsible for the administration of the country, it left him financially at the mercy of a mainly elected assembly. Another constitution has now been drawn up, which presents many curious and novel features. The closest parallel to it is said to be the constitution of the London County Council !

Up to about 1870 the principal industry and export of Ceylon was coffee, which had been introduced by the Arabs. About that date, however, a mysterious disease attacked the coffee plants. No remedy could be found and great fortunes were lost. Tea planting was then introduced, and has now entirely replaced coffee. Much of the labour in the tea gardens is done by Hindus who come over from India for the purpose.

Burma

Burma is a kind of semi-detached province of the Indian Empire, and if the recommendation of the Simon Commission is accepted, its connection with India will be severed entirely. It was conquered and annexed in three stages, after the Burmese wars of 1823–6, 1852, and 1885. These wars and annexations were undertaken for the commonest of all reasons, namely that the native rulers would not leave the frontier between themselves and us alone. For the third and final war there was another reason, also a very familiar one; the French who had a colony of Indo-China on the other side of Burma were entering into negotiations with King Thibaw, the savage ruler of Upper Burma, and it looked as if Upper Burma would very quickly become a French province if it did not still more quickly become a British one.

Burma is a mountainous country more than twice as large as the British Isles, with a population of 12,000,000. The Burmans are Mongolians, akin by race to the Chinese rather than the Indians. Their language is of the Chinese type, composed by the stringing together of monosyllables, and their religion is Buddhist. They are always described as attractive folk, clean in their habits, honourable and sporting in character, and lazy by temperament. Their women enjoy an amount of freedom quite unusual in non-European races. It seems strange that so agreeable a people should, until the British came, have allowed themselves to be ruled by a line of ferocious tyrants; it is, at any rate, a refutation of the maxim that nations always have the government that they deserve.

Rangoon became British territory in 1852 and has grown to be one of the greatest mercantile cities of the Indian ocean. It is in Burma, but not of it; for the greater part of the population consists of Indian immigrants. The real Burma is up country. Most of it has only been under British rule for forty-five years and there are districts where the white man has as yet scarcely penetrated at all.

Buddhism exercises a profound and beautiful influence over the life of the people. The headman of every village is a yellow-robed monk. Every village has its pagoda, which serves as a silent reminder of Buddha's teaching, and white-washed pagodas crown the tops of innumerable hills.

Burma was excluded from the scope of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms on the ground that there was no demand for anything of the kind among the Burmans. But, a few years ago, Indian methods of agitation spread to Rangoon and some of the more sophisticated parts of the country, and a constitution like that of the other Indian provinces was established in 1923. There is now a Legislative Council, of which three-quarters of the members are elected, and to the control of this Council certain subjects are "transferred," others being "reserved" to the Governor.

The most remarkable industrial enterprise in Burma is the Burmah Oil Company, founded by a Scotsman in 1871; it is the principal petroleum producer in the British Empire.

British Malaya

British Malaya consists of the southern part of the long Malay Peninsula, being separated from Burma by a strip of Siamese territory. It is about 700 miles long, and nearly 200 miles wide at its widest point. It stretches to within a degree of the equator, and the climate, being exceedingly moist, is said to be "like a perpetual Turkish bath." The country has been acquired piecemeal, like so many provinces of the empire.

The East Indian "spice islands," the way to which lies through the Straits of Malacca, between Malaya and Sumatra, were the principal interest of the East India Company at the time of its foundation, and it was only after the Dutch had got the better of us in the East Indies that we began to interest ourselves seriously in the mainland of India. The massacre of British traders at Amboyna in 1623 is always taken as the event which marked the turning of the tide against us in the East Indies, but we retained a "factory" at Bantam in Java till 1682.



EAST INDIES

British Possessions shaded

Modern British interest in Malaya began as soon as the East India Company had secured its position as a great power of the east at the time of Warren Hastings. In 1786 the Company sent an expedition which occupied Penang; Malacca further down the Malayan coast was taken from the Dutch during the Napoleonic wars; and in 1819 Sir Stamford Raffles, who had governed Java for several years during the wars and protested vigorously against its surrender to the Dutch after Waterloo, secured by his own initiative the little island at the tip of the peninsula, which now contains the great seaport of Singapore. These, and two other small stations, form the Federated Straits Settlements.

British intervention in the interior did not begin till after 1870. The Malays are amiable, easy going folk, Mohammedan by religion, and akin by race and character to the peoples of southern India. They are divided into many communities, ruled by "sultans." By 1870 strife had arisen between the Malays and immigrants who came in increasing numbers from China. The Chinese also fought among themselves, and defeated factions were driven into the territories of the Straits Settlements, or took to piracy and preyed upon British commerce. The Governor of the Straits Settlements intervened, and a series of treaties were negotiated with various sultans at various dates in the course of the next twenty years. The sultans accepted the offer of British residents, who in effect govern the country on their behalf. There has really been no conquest, but the country is under British protection, which means that the Malayans are protected from the Chinese.

Nothing that we can do, however, will alter the fact that the Malayans are steadily losing ground and the Chinese steadily gaining—no longer in warfare but in every form of industry. The Malayan does not like work, and the Chinaman seems never to tire of it. The Chinese are now two million and outnumber the Malays. There are also about half a million Indians. The non-European populations of Singapore and the other seaports are almost entirely Chinese and Indian; the Malayan is unfitted for town life. Perhaps

he is doomed; but his doom will come not from us but from his more vigorous oriental rivals. So far as we have affected his fortunes we have improved them.

Industrially British Malaya has made more striking progress in recent years than any other part of the British Empire. The growth of imports and exports alike since the war has been quite astonishing, and the external trade has a greater value per head of population than that of any other country in the world, New Zealand coming second in this respect.[1] The principal sources of wealth are tin and rubber. The tin mines have been worked by the Chinese for a long time, but "the rubber all comes from a hatful of seeds brought from Brazil within the lifetime of the present generation." At present Chinese and British are amicably developing the country side by side, for "the Chinese immigration is no mere stampede of coolies. Both high and low come, cultured, scientific artistic. . . . Their commercial qualities are world famous, and Mr. Tan Kah Kee's factory in Singapore manufactures everything from sweetmeats to motor tyres, with several thousand operatives, and Chinese management from doorkeeper to directorate."

The East Indies: Java, Sarawak, North Borneo

The richest and most densely populated of the East Indian islands, Java, may be called a twice-lost British possession. In the seventeenth century the East India Company competed unsuccessfully with the Dutch for the control of it; at the beginning of the nineteenth century we easily annexed it during the Napoleonic wars, for the Dutch administration had by that time greatly decayed, but after Waterloo we returned it to the Dutch of our own free will. The Napoleonic wars had brought us a great deal in any case, and we wanted no more. Few stories in the history of British tropical administration are more inspiring than the story of the organization of government in Java during the brief years of our occupation by Sir Stamford Raffles. When the

[1] The figures for 1926 were, imports £117,000,000, exports £147,000,000. The figures and the quotations following are from an article by Major Walter Elliot, M.P., in *The Times*, 1929.

Dutch received the island back again they were wise enough to take the work of Raffles as a model for their imitation. In recent times the Dutch have devoted a great deal of skill and energy to the industrial development of Java. To-day it produces forty per cent. of the world's rubber and is second only to Cuba as an exporter of sugar.

The British possessions in the East Indian islands to-day are none of them very important, but one of them has a remarkable history. In 1826 James Brooke, a young officer in the employment of the East India Company, was badly wounded in the Burmese war, and compelled to abandon his military career. Four years later he went for a cruise in the East Indies and conceived a desire to rescue some part of this vast archipelago from barbarism. Landing on the north-west coast of Borneo eight years later he found the sultan of those parts engaged in war with the barbarous Dyaks of Sarawak. He offered his aid to the sultan and, after some successful fighting, was given by him the governorship of the tribes he had conquered. Henceforth he was Rajah Brooke of Sarawak. For many years he was an entirely independent sovereign. His little kingdom had many ups and downs, and at one time his government was made the subject of attack in the British parliament. He retired in 1862 to his home in Devonshire leaving Sarawak to his nephew, who was Rajah until 1917. The country was made a British Protectorate in 1888. To-day the third Rajah Brooke rules in Sarawak, over territories which have grown till they are as large as England and Wales. To the north-east of them lies the more recent British acquisition of North Borneo, which also has an interest of its own, for it is the only region of the Empire that is still governed by a Chartered Company. The rest of the island belongs to the Dutch. The country produces, it seems, excellent sago and pepper, and rubber plantations are being developed.

China : Hong Kong

China, like India, is a vast and densely populated territory ; between them they contain nearly half the population of the

world. But China, unlike India, was, until very recent years, a more or less united empire with a traditional hatred of " foreign devils," and in the early part of the nineteenth century Canton was the only Chinese port open to foreign trade. British trade with Canton was part of the monopoly of the East India Company, and when the Company ceased to be a trading concern, the British government began to interest itself in the trade with China. Grievances on both sides led, in 1840, to war, as a result of which the British annexed the little island of Hong Kong, close to the estuary of the river on which Canton stands, and secured the opening of various ports, including Shanghai, to European trade. Another war, in 1857 and the following years, brought a British force to Peking, and led to the establishment of European trading stations at Hankow, five hundred miles up the Yang-tse river. In 1894–5 China was defeated in a war with Japan, and this event led Russia to occupy Port Arthur, whereupon the Germans took Kiao-Chow and the British Wei-hai-wei.

Shanghai and Hankow, though the former contains, and the latter used to contain until the recent disturbances, large British trading communities, are not within the British Empire. Wei-hai-wei is comparatively unimportant.[1] We obviously cannot enter here upon the vast subject of British relations with China in general. Let us confine ourselves to Hong Kong.

Like Singapore it was, at the time of its occupation by the

[1] The British government have now (1930) agreed to return Wei-hai-wei to China. As a result, the Chinese inhabitants of the 300 villages of the territory have sent an urgent protest to the Colonial Office. They enumerate, says *The Times* correspondent, " the great benefits which Wei-hai-wei has derived from British rule. Peace, prosperity, and justice without parallel elsewhere in North China have, they say, been secured by the British flag, while lawlessness and banditry are prevalent in Shantung. They beseech Great Britain to postpone the return of the territory till better times." Surely this is as significant as it is gratifying. If, to suppose the impossible, we were to announce our complete withdrawal from India, the volume of protest would certainly not fall short of the volume of the present outcry against our continued presence in that country.

HONG KONG HARBOUR

British, an almost uninhabited island. No one had ever heard of it before. "Albert," writes Queen Victoria in April 1841, "is so much amused at my having got the Island of Hong Kong, and we think Victoria [the queen's eldest daughter, then an infant in arms] ought to be called Princess of Hong Kong in addition to Princess Royal." To-day it ranks with London, Liverpool, New York and Hamburg as one of the greatest ports of the world.

There is a striking description of Hong Kong in Albert Demangeon's book on *The British Empire*,[1] which is perhaps the more worth quoting as it is from the pen of a foreigner. He speaks of it as:—

the proudest monument of England's commercial genius. Its task is to collect the produce of the Far East destined for European and other markets, and to distribute the merchandise of European and other markets destined for the far east.[2] Here Great Britain practises on a large scale that transhipping and forwarding trade in which she excels. To the waters of Hong Kong are brought, transhipped, and carried away enormous cargoes of sugar, flour, rice, cotton and cotton goods, silk, hemp, hides, tin, petroleum and other oils, fish, tea, coal, cement, condensed milk, opium, and matches. The greater part of the tea and silk trade of China is in the hands of Hong Kong firms.

Hong Kong offers us an arresting picture, on its meagre site of 400 square miles, of what can be created by mercantile genius[3]: a wonderful position facing a great river and a great city; a rocky islet so small that it has to be artificially enlarged to allow the building of the harbour and the laying out of the town of Victoria: . . . a seat of industry on modern lines, with spinning and weaving mills, sugar refineries, paper mills, rope works, cement works, and shipbuilding yards; a waterside railway station for Chinese

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 129, 130.

[2] Oceanic vessels cannot proceed up to Canton; consequently the whole trade of the chief commercial centre of southern China passes through Hong Kong.

[3] The island on which the city of Victoria stands is only 32 square miles; the rest is territory on the mainland leased from the Chinese Government.

emigrants. . . . Out of the total of steamship tonnage of 8.7 millions entering in 1920 the British flag covered 4.2 millions. In the same year, out of a total importation of 89.2 millions sterling (excluding China) 30.3 millions came from the British Empire, and out of 55.1 millions of exports 14.1 were destined for the Empire. These figures do not indicate any British preponderance, and there is nothing strange in this, since much of the trade of Hong Kong is done with the Far East and the United States. It is an essential fact, however, that this trade is always assisted by British equipment and British business.

Chapter X

EGYPT

EGYPT is not, and strictly speaking it has never been, a province of the British Empire. None the less, for about forty years it was almost as completely under British rule as India, and there is no country that has been more profoundly affected by British administration. Moreover, the history of the British connexion with Egypt illustrates with peculiar clearness some of the most characteristic features of British Imperial policy. We went to Egypt inspired neither by lust for conquest nor by a disinterested desire to promote the welfare of the Egyptians. We went there to protect the financial interests of an influential body of British investors. Having got there, we found that Egypt could not pay the dividends it owed to these investors unless the whole country was reformed. So we undertook the reform of the country, and the Egyptians have certainly benefited enormously by what we did for them. Since we went there they have doubled their population, which is now over 14,000,000, nearly all of it living within the irrigated area of the Nile valley and its delta. If we disregard the rest of the area of the country, which is mostly desert, Egypt is one of the most densely populated countries in the world, surpassing Belgium and Bengal. The great bulk of the population are Moslems, but there are about one million Christians of an eastern sect, called Copts. The European community numbers about 150,000, within which the largest element is the Greeks. There is a small but socially influential Turkish aristocracy, a survival from the long centuries when Egypt was a province of the Turkish Empire.

It need hardly be said that Egypt has a longer history than

any other country in the world. Lord Cromer, the maker of modern Egypt, could count among his predeeessors Saladin the greatest enemy of the Crusaders, the Greek Ptolemies, and presumably the Hebrew Joseph. Even in Joseph's day Egyptian civilization had a longer past than has British history from Julius Caesar to George V. The geographical position of Egypt is hardly less remarkable than its history. In 1672 a German philosopher advised Louis XIV to seize Egypt as it was the key to dominion over the whole of the East; Louis XIV paid no attention to this advice, but Napoleon entirely agreed with the German philosopher, as his Egyptian expedition and his numerous remarks about Egypt show. The ruler of Egypt controls the isthmus that divides Asia from Afriea, the short cut between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.

Mehemet Ali and Ismail

Modern Egyptian history begins with Mehemet Ali, an Albanian adventurer, who made himself master of Egypt, shortly after we had driven out the remnants of Napoleon's expedition, and ruled the country for about forty years. He was a remarkable man, who proved that he could eombine the ruthlessness of a savage with efficiency and enlightenment in the development of his country's industry and trade. He conquered the Sudan and founded Khartum; if the Great Powers had not intervened to prevent him, it seems quite likely that he would have conquered the whole Empire of the Sultan of Turkey, whom he had recognized as his overlord. He died in 1848, and his suceessors had most of his defects and few of his merits.

In the 'seventies of the last century the Khedive of Egypt was Ismail, a man with an immense capacity for wasting money on his own amusement. Prodigal display has, of course, always been a vice of oriental despots. They borrow money from oriental money-lenders and, when the crisis eomes, they treat the money-lenders much as our own King John is said to have treated his Jews. The peculiarity of Ismail was that, living on the confines of modern Europe, he

was able to borrow his money from the speculative investors of England and France. They were deceived, perhaps, by the fact that French enterprise had just built the Suez Canal, and thought the Khedive a good investment. While he lasted he certainly paid a good rate of interest.

The Dual Control and Tel-el-Kebir

The crash began to come when, in 1875, the Khedive sold his shares in the Suez Canal, which were bought, in the nick of time, by Disraeli's government. Soon after this it began to be plain that the British and French investors in the Khedivial loans would lose all their money unless their governments intervened, and in 1879 Great Britain and France established a " Dual Control " over the finances of the Egyptian government. Ismail was deposed and the docile and sensible Tewfik succeeded him.

So far, so good. But the " Dual Control " was one of those half-measures which are inevitably but a prelude to greater things. In 1881 a spirit of mutiny arose in the Egyptian army. Its original cause was the subordination of Egyptian to Turkish officers, but as the movement grew in force it grew in scope, and rapidly joined hands with a nationalist movement—" Egypt for the Egyptians "—aiming at the overthrow of the Dual Control. Gladstone, the least imperialist of statesmen, was now Prime Minister. He was most anxious to avoid saddling Great Britain with further Egyptian responsibilities, but in January 1882 the French and British governments issued a Joint Note, declaring that they were resolved to guard by their united efforts against anything that might menace the existing order in Egypt.

The French had taken the lead in the policy which led to the Joint Note. Immediately afterwards, however, there was a change of government in France, and the new French government would have nothing to do with Egypt. We had to go forward alone. A naval squadron bombarded Alexandria. General Wolseley landed with a British force and scattered the Egyptian forces at Tel-el-Kebir (1882), the last

battle where the British soldiers fought in their old red coats. Arabi Pasha, the leader of the mutiny or rebellion, was deported to Ceylon. We declared at once, and again and again during subsequent years, that our occupation of Egypt was a purely temporary measure, and that we should withdraw as soon as the necessary reforms had been carried out. Not till long afterwards was it openly admitted that the work of reform involved the political education of a whole nation, and could not be completed till a new generation had risen in Egypt. The other European powers, except France, who was very jealous of us, were anything but anxious that we should withdraw. Most of them had interests of one sort or another in the country, and they were very glad that we should act as policemen on their behalf. Thus the way was opened for the remarkable work of Sir Evelyn Baring, afterwards Lord Cromer, who, though nominally only the representative of Great Britain at a foreign court, was actually the ruler of Egypt from 1883 to 1907.

Lord Cromer

When Cromer took charge of Egypt, the normal instrument of government was the *kurbash*, or, in English, the whip ; it was usually applied to the soles of the feet, and was used to extort taxes, and to encourage witnesses to tell the truth in legal proceedings. It was abolished, and with it went the *corvée*, or system of forced labour. The *kurbash* and the *corvée* were, of course, part of the same system. Egypt has practically no rainfall, and it lives on the water of the Nile, distributed over the country by irrigation. The miserably inadequate irrigation canals of the pre-Cromer epoch had to be dredged every year, and the *kurbash* drove the peasantry (*fellaheen*) to the task of dredging. When the *kurbash* was abolished, the *fellah* was disinclined to dredge, and it looked as if he would have to be flogged to save him from starvation. However, funds were set aside to pay for the work. As time passed, British engineers, trained on the great irrigation works of India, notably Sir William

Willcocks, undertook the creation of a scientific system of irrigation, culminating in the completion of the great Assouan dam in 1902. "Water and Justice," it has been said, summarize the chief gifts of Great Britain to Egypt.

Other reforms must be briefly reviewed. Economic progress is proved by the fact that the rates of every tax except the tobacco tax were lowered during Cromer's régime, and yet the revenue was doubled. The slave trade was abolished, and the purchase of slaves made a criminal offence. An Egyptian army with British officers was organized on Indian lines, and proved its excellence in Kitchener's conquest of the Sudan. It is in the sphere of education that the results of British rule have been most criticized. Certainly the great bulk of the population is still illiterate. Two points, however, should be borne in mind when this criticism is advanced. First, our task was from the beginning envisaged on financial lines ; we had temporarily taken over a bankrupt estate, and our primary duty was to make it pay its way by a sound economic policy of material reforms. Secondly, the promotion of education among a Mohammedan people, who exalt the Koran as the sum total of necessary knowledge, is a very slow and difficult matter. Even in India Mohammedan education, such as it is, has been mainly promoted by Mohammedan enterprise, and owes comparatively little to the educational policy of the British Indian government.

The history of Egypt during the seven years between the retirement of Lord Cromer and the Great War is unhappily a record of increasing unrest among the Egyptians and of failing skill on the part of the British. The British official staff, hitherto a small body of extremely high quality, was increased in number but not in efficiency. The motor car and the motor bicycle enabled officials to get through their provincial duties with agreeable rapidity, and thus spend more of their time in the European society of Cairo. The old friendly contact with the natives, fostered by slow journeys in caravan and campings-out in distant quarters, was weakened. The Khedive Abbas, freed from the control of

Cromer's omniscient watchfulness, intrigued with the pro-German group who had made themselves masters of Turkey, and looked forward to the day when he would re-establish the oriental despotism of his grandfather, Ismail. Finally, the old generation that, remembering the horrors of the days before the British came, could appreciate what had been done for their country, was dying out, and a new generation, full of self-sufficiency, was eager to try its hand at governing Egypt, and resented British control.

The Great War

When the Great War came, and Turkey joined the enemy, the Khedive Abbas was at once deposed, and a member of his family who was loyal to the British connexion became "Sultan" of Egypt.[1] At the same time Egypt was proclaimed a British Protectorate. This proclamation was a mistake, for it suggested to Egyptians that we had now thrown off the mask of hypocrisy and proclaimed our intention to stay in their country for ever.

At first the war seemed to make little difference to Egypt. No attempt was made to enlist the enthusiasm of the Egyptians by inviting them to co-operate with us in the prosecution of the war. Instead, we went out of our way to say that Great Britain "takes upon herself the sole burden of the present war without calling upon the Egyptian people for aid therein." Having told the Egyptians that we did not want their aid, however, we soon found ourselves reduced to asking for it, and afterwards to taking it by methods quite as forcible as regular conscription and less fair in their effects. Egyptian "labour corps" not only played an important part in Allenby's Syrian campaign, but were also employed in Mesopotamia and even France. At the same time the stock in trade of the Egyptian *fellah*, his beasts and his cart, were requisitioned for military service. It is true that he was paid for them, but as in most cases the money

[1] The title Khedive was dropped since it means "Viceroy" for the Sultan to Turkey, to whose Empire, right down to 1914, Egypt had been nominally attached.

would not enable him to replace them, the payment was a mockery.

Another cause for discontent was the presence of great numbers of British and Australian troops in Egypt; they showed little respect for, or sympathy with, the inhabitants of the country. In many cases battalions were required to lend one or more of their officers for administrative work, which brought them in close contact with Egyptians. Needless to say, the battalions did not choose to part with their best officers for these purposes; and the results were often very bad. In fact we have nothing to be proud of in our management of Egypt during the war.

The Demand for Independence

Two days after the Armistice, on November 13th, 1918, Zaghlul Pasha, the leader of the extreme nationalist party, presented a demand for complete independence. When it was rejected, he addressed himself to the leading statesmen of the Allies at Versailles. Thereupon the Prime Minister of Egypt, Rushdi Pasha, who had co-operated loyally with the British government throughout the war, asked leave to go to England and to confer with the British government. He was told that they had no time to attend to him, and immediately resigned. Every allowance must of course be made for the immense pressure of work upon the British government at that time. None the less their conduct was a fatal error. Egyptians of all parties felt that their country had been simply insulted.

It had in fact become necessary for the Egyptians to employ the one infallible method of attracting the respectful attention of a European government. Rioting broke out, and spread all over Egypt in March 1919; much property was destroyed, and some British soldiers were brutally murdered in a train. The riots were quickly suppressed, but were followed by strikes of native government employees. The British government now made amends by sending out a Commission under Lord Milner, who had been a leading member of Lloyd George's War Cabinet, to examine and

report upon the situation. The Nationalists, however, having gained much more by violence than they had gained by respectable behaviour, persisted in methods of unreason, and subjected the Milner Commission, in spite of its well-known friendly intentions, to a complete and elaborate boycott, supplemented by such salutations in the streets as, "God crash Milner! Long live Egypt! Long die England!"

Undeterred by this hostile reception, the Milner Commission pursued its labours, and Lord Milner had an interview with Zaghlul Pasha, the "Gandhi of Egypt," the upshot of which was an important "Milner-Zaghlul agreement," afterwards incorporated in the Report of the Commission. The British statesman and the Egyptian nationalist leader agreed in recommending a Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Egypt, in which Great Britain would recognize the independence of Egypt as a constitutional monarchy with representative institutions, and Egypt would confer upon Great Britain the rights necessary to safeguard her special interests, would undertake not to enter into any agreement with any foreign power prejudicial to British interest, and would confer upon Great Britain the right to maintain a military force upon Egyptian soil.

Independence granted

More irritating delays followed, and more riots; and Zaghlul Pasha was deported from Egypt. At last, in 1922, Egypt was formally proclaimed an independent State by the British government, certain questions being reserved for future settlement. Zaghlul Pasha was allowed to return to his country and, supported by the Wafd, or Nationalist organization, he won a sweeping victory in elections for the Egyptian parliament and became Prime Minister.

The subsequent history of Egypt hardly belongs to a book on the British Empire. There was serious trouble at the end of 1924 when the Sirdar, or British Governor of the Sudan, Sir Lee Stack, was shot in the streets of Cairo. The assassination was clearly connected with the policy of anti-

British agitation still being pursued by Zaghlul and his colleagues, and the British government presented a stern ultimatum which the Egyptian government felt compelled to accept.

The reserved questions have not yet been settled, and a fresh offer of terms made by the Labour government of Great Britain, has just encountered (1930) the same fate as the Conservative proposals made three years earlier. The questions at issue are (*a*) the security of the communications of the British Empire (i.e. the Suez Canal); (*b*) the military defence of Egypt; (*c*) the protection of the European communities living in Egypt; (*d*) the claim of Egypt to a share in the control of the Sudan. Egypt's interest in the Sudan is mainly a matter of prestige, but she also professes alarm that our policy of using Nile water for irrigating the Sudan may starve Egypt of her water supplies.

Egyptian "independence" is in fact something short of independence as the term is understood by the rest of the world. Though we are perfectly willing that the Egyptians should rule themselves, there are certain things in Egypt, notably the Suez Canal and the European communities, which we cannot leave to the tender mercies of Egyptian politicians until the time comes, as we hope it may, when Egyptian politicians inspire us with rather more confidence in their wisdom than they have done hitherto.

Chapter XI

TROPICAL AFRICA

(i) THE BEGINNINGS OF A NEW EMPIRE

A MAP of the world made fifty years ago shows the British possessions in America, Asia, and Australasia very much as they are at the present day. In Africa, on the other hand, the area "coloured red" has since that date been multiplied a hundred-fold. In the 1880 map there is of course the considerable strip of territory stretching across the southern extremity of the continent from the Orange river to Natal, but besides that, only three insignificant patches along the coast between Cape Verde and the Gold Coast. To-day, to these three small patches in West Africa has been added the great wedge of Nigeria, while on the eastern side of the continent British territory stretches unbroken from the southern frontier of Egypt to the Cape, through the Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika, Nyasaland and the two Rhodesias—a distance of about 3,500 miles.

This empire in tropical Africa is not only the newest part of the British Empire: it is in some respects, for the British people at home, the most interesting and the most important. The Dominions—Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand—are now the masters of their own destinies. The future of India is unknowable, but it seems likely that our direct control over the destinies of the Indian peoples is entering on its last stage. Apart from India and the Dominions, tropical Africa is incomparably the largest area of the British empire. It is, in fact, half as large again as the Indian Empire, and its population of forty million natives (half of them in Nigeria alone), though small

compared with that of India, is larger than the combined populations of all the Dominions. These countries are newly acquired, undeveloped, rich in possibilities, and their destinies are entirely in our hands.

The western and eastern groups of British African colonies and protectorates[1] are separated, even at their nearest approach to one another, by a wide belt of French territory. Conditions of life in west and east Africa are in many respects different, and the two groups require separate treatment. None the less, it was a single set of causes which led to modern empire-building on both sides of the continent, and these causes must first be considered before we pass to a description of the African colonies in detail.

Revival of Tropical Colonization

The colonies of the world have been classified by French writers in two groups as *colonies d'exploitation* and *colonies de peuplement*, and English writers have taken over these terms, translating them as " colonies of exploitation " and " colonies of settlement." The first of these terms is objectionable in its English form, for the word " exploitation " is generally used in a sinister sense ; we say " A exploits B " meaning " A works B to death for his own profit." There have, unhappily, been occasions in the colonial history of the past when a native population has been exploited in this sense ; but when writers employ the term " colonies of exploitation " they refer only to the exploitation, i.e. development, of the material resources of the country. In a colony of exploitation the primary interest of the colonizing country is in the products of the colony ; its citizens go out to grow crops whieh cannot be grown at home, or to trade with the natives by whom the crops are grown. In a colony of settlement the primary interest of the colonizing country is in the land which will provide

[1] Lord Lugard, the greatest empire-builder in British tropical Africa, has declared that the distinction between the terms " colony " and " protectorate " has lost almost all its significance. That is surely very comforting to those of us who often use one term where we should have used the other.

permanent homes for the overflow of her own population. No doubt the distinction is not absolute. Colonies originally valued mainly for commercial purposes may also provide homes for the colonist in which he and his descendants will take root; colonies originally valued mainly as a field for emigration grow into daughter nations whose trade is a matter of interest and importance to the mother country. The distinction is, in fact, a distinction between motives of colonization as much as between types of colony, and the motives of colonization are often mixed. None the less these terms are useful if they are not pressed too far.

We have seen how, in the days of the old mercantile system, the British-American colonies were thought of primarily (though not wholly) as colonies of exploitation. The trouble which ended in the American War of Independence arose because the New England colonies were not fitted to be colonies of exploitation, being in their physical characteristics much too like the mother country. After the breakdown of this old policy of exploitation in the American mainland, and the adoption of free-trade, colonies of exploitation went out of fashion. British India, it is true, continued to flourish, but the West Indies markedly declined. Interest shifted to the colonies of settlement, especially Canada and Australia. Their development was the great feature of British colonial history in the nineteenth century.

However, towards the end of that century, the colony of exploitation, the tropical colony, began to come into its own again, and Africa, the one great unoccupied continent, became the centre of colonial interest. The reasons for this new development were many; we will state them as they affected Great Britain.

In the first place, manufacturing industry was achieving such unprecedented productivity that it demanded new export markets, the more so as its old markets, in Europe and the United States, were threatened with decline owing to the development of similar manufacturing industries in the countries of our former customers. Great Britain had grown rich as "the workshop of the world." The known

AFRICA

Showing the British Provinces (shaded). Egypt is indicated by dots

world was beginning to set up workshops of its own; what about the unknown world? At the same time industrial plant itself was demanding fresh supplies of tropical products, for example, rubber for belting and oil for lubrication.

It so happened that in the course of the previous half century the interior of Africa, hitherto as unknown to the civilized world as the Antarctic continent, had been opened up from north, south, east and west by a number of great explorers. Some had entered upon exploitation as missionaries, others with a view to commercial interests, others again from a love of the adventure itself; the great majority of them had been English or Scots. Mungo Park (1805) starting from the little British colony of Gambia had made his way to the upper waters of the Niger, which was subsequently traced downwards to its fever-stricken delta. Livingstone (1850–70) explored the Zambesi and the lakes to the north of it, touching the upper waters of the Congo, which he believed might be the Nile. Stanley (1874–8) carried on the work of Livingstone, explored Victoria Nyanza and traced the Congo to the sea, crossing the continent for the first time in history. Some ten years earlier Speke and Baker, one starting from the south and the other from the north, had discovered the source of the Nile, thus solving a problem which had puzzled the inquisitive ever since the days of Herodotus.

Great Britain was not the first, however, to undertake the exploitation of these new countries. Both France and Germany were in the field before her. France, crushingly defeated by Germany in 1870 and robbed of Alsace-Lorraine, sought compensation in the extension of the African empire she had already founded in Algeria.[1] Germany, conscious of her position as the greatest power on the continent, sought African colonies partly to satisfy her sense of prestige and partly to secure markets for her rapidly growing industrial production. The "scramble for Africa" began, and Great

[1] Joffre, commander in chief of the French armies through more than half the Great War, first made his name as commander of an expedition to Timbuktu in 1895.

Britain entered into it, somewhat reluctantly until Joseph Chamberlain went to the Colonial Office in 1895. Everyone connects the name of Joseph Chamberlain with the South African War; but his greatness as an imperial statesman is much more securely established upon his services to British tropical Africa. He was the first statesman at home to realize that money generously spent on the equipment of the administration of these colonies would be abundantly repaid in the results secured.

The Partitioning of Africa

The partitioning of tropical Africa was arranged by certain treaties, of which the chief are the Treaty of Berlin in 1885 and of Brussels in 1892. It is unnecessary to describe the territorial arrangements, as they are to be seen on the pre-war map of Africa. The central part of the Congo was to be a "Free State" under the personal direction of Leopold II, King of the Belgians. Indeed all the new colonies or protectorates were to be "Free States" in the pious intention of the treaty-makers, for all would, it was hoped, adopt the British policy of the "open door," i.e. admission of the traders of other countries on equal terms with their own. It was also agreed that the natives should be protected against such deleterious European imports as spirits and fire-arms. Trade in fire-arms was fairly effectively excluded, for very obvious reasons. The gin trade, however, mainly carried on by the Dutch, who had no protectorates in tropical Africa, was allowed to continue for many years on an increasing scale. As for the "open door," the French refused entirely to adopt any such policy; the Germans adopted a middle policy; and only the British threw open their territories to the traders of all countries on equal terms. On the whole they gained by doing so, since their territories were thus the more rapidly and thoroughly developed.

In general the treatment of native peoples in the first rush of African exploitation left much to be desired. The normal practice was to secure a "sphere of influence," as it was

called, by getting a barbarous chieftain to sign a "treaty" which he could neither read nor understand. The worst oppressions by far were those perpetuated in the Congo Free State, under the system established by King Leopold. But those who make sweeping condemnation of the colonization of tropical Africa, on account of the crimes of some governments and the rather too rough and ready methods of others in early days, are simply shutting their eyes to the facts. For example, there is in Africa to-day only one genuinely independent country—Abyssinia; and it is the one country where the iniquities of the slave trade, once rampant all over Africa, still flourish unabated.

(ii) WEST AFRICA

The Old West African Colonies

Such were the general conditions in which the modern exploitation of tropical Africa began. But there are three small British colonies whose history goes back to Stuart times. Gambia, Sierra Leone, and the Gold Coast all owed their importance in early days to the slave trade. They were bases at which the British slave traders met the African slave hunters, and took over their human merchandise in exchange for such commodities as the slave hunters fancied, cheap jewelry, spirits, and fire-arms. After Great Britain had abolished her own slave trade they were used for sixty years as bases of the naval squadron in its long and harassing efforts to suppress the slave trade still carried on by adventurers of other nations. By 1865, owing to the co-operation of the United States under Lincoln, the trans-Atlantic slave trade was at last extinguished, and there seemed no further purpose in retaining these unhealthy and insignificant stations. In fact a royal commission recommended their abandonment. They have, however, survived, and are now seen as isolated projections into the immense area of French tropical Africa.

Gambia is simply the Gambia river with a strip of territory a few miles wide on either bank. It stretches inland

200 miles from the coast, and has an area rather smaller than Yorkshire. Its population of 200,000 is almost entirely engaged in the production of groundnuts, the seeds of a pea plant, from which is extracted an oil that can be used for a variety of purposes. For example, margarine and much of what is called " olive oil " are made from groundnuts.

Sierra Leone, which takes its name from the early Portuguese settlers, is about as large as Scotland, and has a population of 1,500,000. Its principal export is palm nuts, which are used for making lubricating oil and soap. The most interesting episode in its history belongs to the period of the anti-slave trade movement, for an attempt was made to establish there a colony for liberated and refugee slaves. Zachary Macaulay, friend of Wilberforce and the father of the historian, was for a time governor of this settlement, and the experiment is still commemorated in the name of Freetown, the capital of the colony.[1]

The Gold Coast colony takes its name from the quantities of grains of gold mixed with the sand of the rivers which here flow into the sea. These grains of gold fascinated the early Portuguese mariners sent out by Henry the Navigator, and convinced them that the *El Dorado* they were seeking could not now be far off. Gold was exported in considerable quantities from the latter part of the seventeenth century onwards, and is still exported, but the principal product of the colony now is not gold but cocoa. In area it is slightly larger than England and Wales, and has a population of two million. The old colony was little more than a coastal strip along which still stand some of the old " castles " in which the victims of the slave-hunters were kept until the slave-traders came to carry them overseas to America. Inland dwelt the warlike Ashantis, who gave constant trouble. The last of several Ashanti wars was in 1896, when the Ashantis were conquered and their country annexed to the colony. Prempeh, the last Ashanti king, was deposed

[1] Liberia, the nearest neighbour of Sierra Leone, was the scene of a similar American experiment in repatriating liberated slaves.

and transported to the Seychelles Islands, on the other side of Africa. After a quarter of a century of exile he was allowed to return, and is still living to-day in his own capital, watching with philosophic amusement, it is said, the rapid progress of his country. "Every day there is a change in Kumasi," he says.

One of the most interesting recent undertakings in the Gold Coast is the establishment of the government college of Achimota, to give education to native boys and girls from infant school up to university standards. It is merely a single example of the kind of work that is going on all over the British Empire, but it attracted particular notice, being opened by the Prince of Wales in 1927. The principal is a Scotsman, and the first vice-principal was the late Dr. Aggrey, one of the most remarkable of Africans: he had been educated in America. The task of education in tropical Africa is by no means easy, for the native tribes have many more different languages than the peoples of India, and the British authorities are determined to avoid the mistakes made in early days in India, where education tended to create an English-speaking class which lost touch with native tradition. Education at Achimota is to be through English, but also through the vernaculars. The languages taught are "Twi, Fanti, Ga, Ewe, and English."

Nigeria

Nigeria is three times as large as the British Isles and has a population of about twenty million, about the same as the total White population of all the self-governing Dominions together. As regards population it is, if one excludes India, the greatest of the possessions of the British crown. The town of Lagos was occupied as early as 1851 because it was a notorious centre of the illegal slave trade which the British government and navy were tirelessly occupied in trying to suppress. Apart from Lagos the history of British Nigeria belongs entirely to the history of the modern exploitation of tropical Africa.

British enterprise in Nigeria has passed through three

stages—private venture, chartered company, and colonial administration. The greatest of the early pioneers was Macgregor Laird, a Liverpool merchant, who, between 1830 and 1860, undertook several small trading expeditions up the Niger. In spite of the deadly climate which killed thirty-nine of the forty-eight European members of his first expedition, he persevered and established a valuable trade. In 1886, owing to the enterprise of Sir George Goldie, a Royal Niger Company received a charter, empowering it to administer and protect the territory of the native chiefs within the Niger area. In 1899 the government took over the responsibilities of the Company, and established the Protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria, which were afterwards united. Nigeria was governed for practically the first twenty years of the present century by Sir Frederick (now Lord) Lugard, whose work in Nigeria will rank as equal in importance with that of Lord Cromer in Egypt and the greatest of the early Governors-General, Warren Hastings and Dalhousie, in India.

The peoples of Nigeria are divided into a hundred or more different tribes, each with their own language. They differ much in character. Those of the damp forest-clad areas of the south are mostly pure Negroes and pagans, whereas those of the dry inland country are of mixed race, for all north Africa seems to have been invaded, probably several thousand years ago, by Asiatic peoples called Hamites, akin to the Arabs, whose blood is mingled with that of the native Negro peoples. These tribes were converted to Mohammedanism about five hundred years ago. But all alike have certain characteristics in common. Lord Lugard deseribes the typical African as "a happy, thriftless, excitable person, naturally courageous, naturally courteous and polite, full of personal vanity, with little sense of veracity, and loving weapons as an oriental loves jewelry. His thoughts are concentrated on the events and feelings of the moment, and he suffers little from apprehension of the future or grief for the past." When the British government took over affairs from the Chartered Company in 1899

slave-raiding and cannibalism were still rampant. Order had first to be established, and it was secured by means of the West African Frontier Force, the officers and N.C.O.'s of which were recruited from the British army after the South African War.

West Africa used to be known as the White Man's Grave, and there was a grim joke to the effect that the Government could afford to offer generous pensions to its civil servants in those parts as none ever lived long enough to claim them. But the science of tropical medicine has done wonders in the last thirty years, and those who work in West Africa to-day have every prospect of preserving their health if they take the proper precautions. Still, it will never be a White Man's home, for the climate is certainly less agreeable to our constitutions than that of almost any part of India. We shall always be strangers and sojourners in the land.

The problem of governing such a country was—what should be the relation between the native peoples and the small staff of British administrators. Roughly speaking, Indian experience offered two models for imitation, the system of direct government prevailing in British India, and the system of indirect government prevailing in the Indian States, where native princes rule under British guidance. Lord Lugard decidedly preferred the latter. The tribal system has been carefully fostered and preserved, and Nigeria is to-day the most remarkable example in the world of what can be done by taking over the institutions of primitive peoples and developing them in the direction of civilized life. It is really "an experiment towards a black 'Dominion' translated into the idiom of Africa."[1]

It would, of course, be a great mistake to suppose that, under the system of indirect rule, the British civil servant has merely to stand by and look on. On the contrary it is often more difficult and laborious to guide the administration of a native chief than to rule a native population by direct methods. In every province of our tropical empire,

[1] Major Walter Elliot in *The Times*, 1929.

including India, it is on the District Officers that everything depends. Their work has been so admirable that we come to take it for granted. The quotation that follows is taken from Lord Lugard's book on British tropical Africa. The description is, with a few differences of detail, applicable to the British civil servant in every part of the Empire :—

The District Officer comes of a class which has made and maintained the British Empire. . . . His assets are usually a public school and probably a university eduction, neither of which have hitherto furnished him with an appreciable amount of positive knowledge especially adapted for his work. But they have produced an English gentleman with an almost passionate conception of fair play, of protection of the weak, of " playing the game." They have taught him personal initiative and resource, and how to command and obey. . . .

The duties that a District Officer is called on to perform are very varied. In an isolated station he may have to discharge the functions of all the departments—postal, customs, police, engineering—in addition to his normal work. He is the medium of communication between the military or departmental officer and the native chiefs in matters of labour and supplies, and is specially charged to see that the labourers are fully paid and properly treated. To him alike the missionary, the trader, and the miner look for assistance and advice. The leper and the slave find in him a protector. As in India, he combines judicial with executive powers. . . . He is also charged with the constant supervision of native courts. . . . He enforces the ordinances, issues licences, keeps up the prescribed records, and renders the prescribed reports. . . .

His duties as assessment officer of the direct (income) tax affect much more than the mere collection of revenue. He is brought into close touch with the people and gains an intimate knowledge of them. . . . During his visit to each town he administers justice, enquires into and settles disputes, collects valuable statistics of population, agriculture and industries. He uses every effort to detect oppression and extortion, if it exists, and impresses on the village elders the

allegiance they owe to their chiefs, and through them to the Government, the obligation to cease from lawless acts, and the right of every individual to appeal against injustice.[1]

The export trade of Nigeria is increasing by leaps and bounds as improved transport opens up the interior. Railways extend from two ports on the coast right up into the north-west and north-east of the protectorate, but the motor is going to be an even more important feature than the railway. The exports include the usual oil-producing commodities, and cocoa, cotton, skins and hides. More than half of them go to Great Britain, and from Great Britain come nearly half the imports. These include many obvious necessities, but also such simple luxuries as the natives more and more delight in, bicycles and gramophones for example. It is often said that the only permanent cure for our unemployment is the development of new export trades. In the civilizing of the African lies one of the best securities for our own industrial future.

(iii) EAST AFRICA

The East African territories, from north to south, are the Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika, Nyasaland, and Northern Rhodesia.[2] There is also, separated from these by Abyssinia, the small protectorate of British Somaliland on the southern shore of the Gulf of Aden. The area covered is about five times as great as that of the West African colonies, but it is much more thinly peopled. The map presents it, apart from Somaliland, as a single territory divided by frontiers which are in many cases entirely artificial. Actually this great empire has been built up from widely distant bases. The Sudan was conquered from Egypt, Rhodesia from the Cape; Uganda was reached from the Indian Ocean, and Kenya was the road to

[1] Lugard, *Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, p. 131–133.

[2] Southern Rhodesia is now a self-governing colony, and its links are less with its northern neighbours than with South Africa.

Uganda; Tanganyika was conquered from the Germans in the Great War by an army mainly composed of Indian and South African troops, commanded by General Smuts, who had fought against us in the South African War; Nyasaland owes its origin to the work of Livingstone on the Zambesi.

The Sudan

The name Sudan comes from the Arabic *Bilad-es-Sudan*, meaning the Country of the Blacks, and is applied to the whole of tropical Africa from sea to sea, south of the Sahara and north of the Congo basin and the great lakes. The territory under British rule is the eastern Sudan only. It had been conquered by Mehemet Ali, the warlike Khedive of Egypt, in about 1820, and was abominably misgoverned by him and his successors for sixty years, and continuously over-run by slave-hunters. At the very moment when the British took charge of Egypt, the Sudanese revolted against their masters under a warlike prophet who claimed to be the Mahdi, or Messiah of Islam. What was to be done? Gladstone's government refused to undertake the suppression of the Mahdi, but sent out General Gordon to secure the safe retreat of the Egyptian garrisons in the country. How he lost his life defending Khartum is one of the most famous and tragic stories in modern history. In 1898, thirteen years after the death of Gordon, the Sudan was reconquered by an Anglo-Egyptian army under Kitchener. To this day its political position is involved in the curious fictions which have always enveloped our relations with Egypt. Technically it is not a province of the British Empire. It is "the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan," a *condominium* shared between Britain and Egypt, and the officials who look after its affairs from England are attached not to the Colonial Office, but the Foreign Office. Actually, it is under British rule, and its Governor, entitled the Sirdar, is never likely to be an Egyptian.

It is a vast country, eight times as large as the British Isles, but a good deal of the northern part is Sahara desert.

The official estimates of its population are surprising, and some writers find difficulty, I notice, in believing them. Before the rising of the Mahdi the population was estimated at eight million; sixteen years of uncontrolled savagery is said to have reduced the population to a million and a half; and now it is said to have risen again to six million. The principal export is cotton. The growing prosperity of the country to-day is due in the main to the railway built across the desert to Port Sudan on the Red Sea, and to the Nile irrigation scheme in the Gezira district.

Uganda

Uganda is a British Protectorate on the north and west of Lake Victoria Nyanza, the source of the river Nile. It is about as large as Great Britain, and has a curious history in which Christian missions play a conspicuous part. In fact Uganda to-day is a little island of African Christianity, surrounded by vast areas in which the natives, when not mere pagans, are mostly Moslems.

The chief, though by no means the only, African tribe in the country is the Buganda,[1] a relatively highly civilized people, whose royal dynasty can be traced back to the fifteenth century. In 1875 the explorer Stanley visited King Mutesa, and persuaded him to issue an invitation to Anglican missionaries, which Stanley published in the *Daily Telegraph*. Missionaries arrived in due course, the most famous of them being Mackay, who was an engineer as well as a missionary, and rendered great service to the Buganda in both capacities. Soon afterwards, however, Roman Catholic missions arrived from France and Mohammedan missions from Zanzibar. Mutesa died, and was succeeded by a sanguinary young man who wanted to reverse his father's policy and restore his country to its primitive isolation. There followed a deplorable period in which the

1 The country should really have been called Buganda. "Uganda" is a European mistake; it may be paralleled by some of the strange mispronunciations of "Britain" prevalent in various parts of the Empire.

rival missions and their adherents sought to extirpate one another, and the heathen king sought to extirpate them all.

Relief came (1890) in the person of Captain Lugard, afterwards Governor of Nigeria, with a small force of fifty Sudanese soldiers. He had been sent up from the East Coast by the British East African Company, which was attempting the commercial exploitation of the country between Victoria Nyanza and the Indian Ocean. A British Protectorate was established over Uganda in 1893. A few years later the railway was begun which now connects Uganda with the outside world, running from the shores of Victoria Nyanza to Mombasa on the Indian Ocean.

Kenya Colony

Kenya has been the subject of more controversy in recent years than all the rest of British tropical Africa put together, and the reason for it is easily stated. In addition to its native population of two and a half million there are 30,000 Indians from British India and 12,000 British, most of them colonists from Great Britain or South Africa who have settled with their families, and intend to make homes for themselves and their descendants in the country. In fact, though Kenya lies across the equator and most of it is typically tropical country, it contains a small highland area which is suited to White colonization. Here we have, therefore, reproduced upon a small scale, the same problems as trouble South Africa. In South Africa the responsibility for their solution lies with the European inhabitants of the country; in Kenya it lies with the British government at home.

Before the partitioning of tropical Africa the greater part of the coast from the Portuguese colony in the south to Cape Gardafui was under the rule of the Sultan of Zanzibar. British and German empire builders competed in the eighties for concessions from this potentate, and in 1890 a frontier was drawn between the British and German spheres, which is now the frontier between Kenya and Tanganyika. The part of Rhodes in Rhodesia and of Goldie in Nigeria was played in this part of the continent by Sir William

KENYA MOUNTAIN : NEAR THE SUMMIT

The photograph, reproduced by kind permission of Dr. Arthur, shows a glacier with its morasses and a snowfield on the Equator

Mackinnon who secured a charter for an Imperial British East Africa Company (commonly called I.B.E.A.) in 1888. It did valuable pioneering work, but got into financial difficulties, and its task was taken over by the British government in 1895.

In the same year Joseph Chamberlain became Colonial Secretary and his energetic imperial policy made itself apparent in East Africa as elsewhere. Uganda was isolated and in difficulty, and the British government undertook to build, at the cost of the British taxpayer at home, a Uganda railway from Mombasa, the old Arab and Portuguese port on the coast, to the shores of Victoria Nyanza, 580 miles, or as far as from London to Inverness. 18,000 labourers were brought over from India, and the work progressed steadily to its completion six years later, in spite of diseases which wrought havoc among the workmen and the tsetse fly which killed thousands of the beasts of burden employed on the works.

The railway was built for Uganda, but its course lay through the highlands of what is now called Kenya. The agreeable climate at once attracted attention, and, encouraged by the British government, colonists began to flow in, from the early years of the nineteenth century onward. To-day the European (*i.e.* British and South African settlers) number about two thousand and with them are, of course, their wives and families. They make up the bulk of the White population, the remainder being traders, missionaries and government officials.

The controversies of Kenya concern native labour, the distribution of the land, and the franchise. The White settlers who went to Kenya were led to expect that there would be an abundance of native labour. It proved to be not as abundant as was expected, and the settlers desired the government to take steps which would make it more abundant. Compulsory labour was tried, but this was prohibited in 1920. Another device was to lay a tax upon the natives which they could not pay except by earning wages from the settlers. The government of the colony was distracted

between the interests of the settlers and the interests of the natives. It was anxious to assist the natives to develop their own industries, as had been done with such marked success in Nigeria and elsewhere, but the settlers protested that this would make their supply of native labour smaller still. The settlers' case is a strong one. They point out that, unless labour is somehow available for them, the government will have broken the undertaking which was implied when Kenya was advertised as a White man's land. They also say, very truly, that labour on the estate of a good White employer is an excellent training for the native.

Then there is, as in South Africa, the question of the land. One way of securing labour for the White settlers would obviously be to reduce the area allotted to natives to such small proportions that a sufficient number of them would be compelled to come out and work upon the White men's estates. But this cannot, of course, be contemplated. As the British government officially declared in 1923, " The interests of the African natives must be paramount, and if, and when, those interests and those of the immigrant races (European and Asiatic) should conflict, the former should prevail."

The Indians, as we have seen, were imported to build the railway. Some of these labourers have remained in the country, and others have followed in their wake. Here as in South Africa the Indian competes with the humbler type of European in retail trade and, by reason of his lower standard of living, is generally able to undersell him.

The European settlers naturally want to get control of the government of the country. At present the Governor is assisted by a Council on which are ten members elected by Europeans, five elected by Indians, and one nominated by the Governor to represent the natives; but there is also a body of nominated " official " members sufficiently numerous to outvote all the elected members and to secure that the Governor's policy shall prevail. A Council of this kind has again and again, in the early stages of the history of colonies which have now grown into the White Dominions, been a prelude to the establishment of local self-government.

The settlers desire that Kenya shall develop politically, and as rapidly as possible, along the same lines, and until quite recently British statesmen at home have, perhaps thoughtlessly, encouraged this desire. The problem however has been set out in a very different light by the Commission which was sent out to investigate and report upon East African affairs, under the chairmanship of Sir Hilton Young, in 1927.

The Hilton Young Commission point out that self-government through an elected assembly is a system fraught with danger in a country in which Europeans can never be more than a minute minority. One of two things must happen. If the franchise is permanently restricted to Europeans, then the Europeans are made the sole judges of all conflicts between European and non-European interests, and with the best will in the world no man is a good judge in his own cause. But could it possibly in the long run be so restricted? The Indians outnumber the Europeans, and with representative government making rapid advances in India itself, the Indians of Kenya cannot be indefinitely disfranchised nor, in the long run, would they be satisfied with a representation which left them in a permanent minority. Again, the natives themselves are at present utterly unfit for elective institutions and have no desire for them, but who can foresee their future? In fact, parliamentary self-government would give the Europeans an unfair advantage to begin with, but in the long run would put them at an equally unfair disadvantage.

The control of policy in Kenya, say the Commission, must be permanently entrusted to an impartial authority; but they agree that the Colonial Office in London is unduly remote. Ultimate authority must rest with the British government at home, but they suggest the establishment of a Governor-General of East Africa, exercising a general control over Uganda, Kenya, and Tanganyika, and securing uniformity of policy in the treatment of various problems, including those connected with the treatment of the native races. The British government has now (1930) announced

its acceptance of this proposal; it has at the same time declared that it is unable to grant the request of the White settlers in Kenya for an elected majority on the Legislative Council of Kenya Colony.

The other East African Protectorates

Tanganyika is the large territory, considerably larger than Kenya and containing four million Africans, which was known as German East Africa before the war. At the end of the war all the German colonies, and several provinces of the Turkish Empire were distributed among the victorious allies under "Mandates";[1] that is to say, the country whieh received the mandate is entrusted with the government of the territory for the good of the natives and in the general interest not only of the receiver of the mandate but of the whole world. The mandate system, in fact, really carries out the principles ineffectively set forth in the Treaties of Berlin and Brussels, which partitioned tropical Africa at the end of the nineteenth century. The mandatory power has to send a report every year on the progress of each of its mandated territories, to the Mandates' Commission of the League of Nations, and that Commission has already shown that, when it considers that native peoples in a mandated territory have been ill treated, it can at least give the fact a world publicity which is unpleasant for the mandatory power. The fact of the mandate does not actually affect our methods of government in Tanganyika for, as the Hilton Young Commission said, "The standards of administration so imposed are no higher than His Majesty's Government have imposed on themselves."

Off the coast of Tanganyika are the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. These islands are all that remain of the Sultanate of Zanzibar, which formerly extended all along the coast of East Africa from the Portuguese territory to the Red Sea.

[1] A strip of the German colony of Cameroons is attached as mandated territory to Nigeria, and the Union of South Africa holds the mandate for German S.W. Africa. Australia and New Zealand each hold mandates for ex-German colonies in their neighbourhood. The British mandates for Palestine and Iraq are described in an Appendix.

Since 1890 they have formed a British Protectorate, the Sultan being guided and controlled by a British Resident. The population of the islands is very mixed, with a considerable percentage of Arabs, whose ancestors have done the carrying trade of the East African coast since the dawn of history.

Nyasaland is a small territory, stretching along the shores of Lake Nyasa and the valley of the Shiré river which flows from the lake into the Zambesi. It is a little larger than Scotland, to whose sons it owes its existence. Livingstone's journeys opened up the country and Scottish missionaries and a few other Scottish settlers established themselves in the country round about 1870 and vigorously combated the Arab slave-raiders who were still at work there. It was made a British Protectorate in 1890, just about the time when Rhodes was beginning to open up Rhodesia.

Northern Rhodesia has already been mentioned in an earlier chapter. The most interesting fact about it at the present day is that it contains vast deposits of copper which are now being opened up. Its European population, at present a mere handful, is going to be multiplied tenfold in the near future.

All these East African protectorates and colonies form a continuous territory, but British Somaliland is separated from them. It is a territory about as large as England and Wales, with 350,000 native inhabitants, on the south coast of the Gulf of Aden. It was occupied in 1884–8 in order to protect this coast from the depredations of the Mahdist power in the Sudan. The most notable feature of its history has been the long and harassing struggle with a very warlike and aggressive holy man of the interior, popularly known as the Mad Mullah of Somaliland. He began raiding the territory under British administration in 1899 and was a constant source of trouble for more than twenty years, until in 1920 his forces were destroyed and his spirit broken by the operations of a squadron of aeroplanes. "The Mad Mullah Again" was a headline which mildly amused the English newspaper reader; he had seen it so often before;

but what it signified was anything but amusing to the British forces in Somaliland. On his own small scale the Mullah was one of the most obstinate enemies that the British Empire has ever encountered. It is impossible to refuse the old fellow a certain mead of admiration, but he had to be exterminated. He left us no choice in the matter. Since his day British Somaliland has relapsed into the obscurity that attends uneventful progress.

Chapter XII

THE WEST INDIES

THIS chapter, nearly the last, should perhaps have been the first of the regional chapters of this book, for the British West Indies are among the oldest Colonial possessions of the British crown, and were for a long time reckoned the most important. Politicians after the Seven Years' War seriously considered whether the acquisition of two or three French West Indian Islands would not be better worth having than Canada. In 1780 Thomas Jefferys, geographer to George III, speaks of them as " the centre of the most extensive as well as the most precious trade of America, and which surpasses, at least in riches, that of the East Indies." In fact they sent us sugar, much the most important of our imported foodstuffs in the days before we depended on overseas trade for a large part of our bread and our meat. But in the middle of the nineteenth century two great disasters befel our West Indian colonists : their slaves were emancipated and the tariffs which gave their sugar a monopoly in our markets were abolished. They reeled under these successive blows. The prosperity of the West Indies dwindled while that of the rest of the Empire grew. In 1815 the British West Indies took one-seventh of our exports ; in 1874, one-eightieth. To-day they show some signs of revival, though not as much as could be wished. The Panama Canal has created new trade routes which run through their midst. At present, however, the sugar plantations which still constitute the principal industry of many of the islands, are in great distress owing to the world-excess of sugar produetion, and the planters stand in urgent

need of some measure of protection, to secure the sale of their product in the British market.

The chief island of the British West Indies is, of course, Jamaica, occupied in 1655 by an expedition sent out by Cromwell. To the north, on the other side of Cuba, lie the Bahama Islands. To the west, scattered in a curving line from Puerto Rico to the South American coast are the Leeward Islands, the Windward Islands, Barbados, Tobago, and Trinidad. On the mainland of Central America is the small colony of British Honduras; and in South America the much larger colony of British Guiana.

The smaller Islands

The first of all these islands to be permanently occupied was St. Kitt's in the Leeward Islands, where settlement was made in 1623 by a certain Captain Warner who " thought it would be a very convenient place for the planting of tobaccoes." Many of the others were occupied in the seventeenth century. Those were the great days of the buccaneers, who carried on, from bases in the West Indies, the good work of spoiling the Spaniards, to which Drake had shown the way. The greatest of the buccaneers was the Welshman, Henry Morgan, who captured and burnt Panama in 1671, after which he was first imprisoned and then made lieutenant-governor of Jamaica.

Of these little islands not much need be said. Trinidad is the largest of them. It was captured from Spain in the early wars of the French Revolution when Pitt expended so much energy on the West Indies which would have been better spent on France. It has had a prosperous trade in sugar and cocoa. Its neighbour, Tobago, served Defoe as his model when he described the island of Robinson Crusoe. Barbados, first occupied in 1627, has an excellent harbour and is very densely populated. It is only as large as the Isle of Wight, and has a population of 170,000, the great bulk of whom, as in all these islands, are African negroes, descended from slaves. Cromwell thought highly of the island as a prison for his defeated enemies. The Barbadians export



WEST INDIES

British Possessions shaded

sugar and cotton, but they are also reasonably proud of the sons of Barbados who have migrated to the mother country and achieved eminence there; among these are two bishops, an attorney-general and an editor of *The Times*.

Jamaica

Jamaica is a mountainous island with a pleasant climate, nearly 150 miles long and, at its widest, fifty miles wide. It has a population of just under a million, of whom less than 20,000 are Whites, the remaining 98 per cent. being the descendants of imported African slaves. The Carib aborigenes, in this as in so many other West Indian islands, were extirpated by the incredible cruelty of the Spaniards, long before the British arrived. Sugar was for two centuries the staple output of the country. When free trade came and the British West Indies were exposed to competition with non-British countries, they proved unable to hold their own, and the planters were reduced to a miserable plight. But a new opening was found by Governor Sir J. P. Grant, who, in 1868, secured a state subsidy for the transport of fruit to the United States. That was the beginning of the West Indian fruit trade, and to-day by far the largest export from Jamaica is bananas.

The constitutional history of the island has been anything but a record of simple progress; it proves, if proof were needed, the difficulties of "self-government" in a predominantly Black country. In 1664 the colonists in Jamaica were invited to establish an elective Assembly. It was the normal practice in those days, both in the islands and in the mainland colonies further north. The division of powers between Governor and Assembly was left very vague, as, of course, was the division of powers between King and Parliament at home at that date. In any case, no one would have suggested that "the interests of the natives must be paramount," for they had been imported as slaves.

In the eighteenth century there was a good deal of trouble. The planters in their Assembly had the Governor at their mercy, and mismanaged the affairs of the island to their

hearts' content. The abolition of slavery very naturally infuriated the planters and, since they used their Assembly to render government nearly impossible, Lord John Russell (1839) introduced in the British Parliament a Bill to suspend the Jamaica constitution. It was rejected, and the Whigs resigned, but, as Queen Victoria refused to dismiss her Whig Ladies of the Bedchamber, they resumed office,[1] and Jamaica was left to itself. The final crisis came with the Negro insurrection of 1865. Planter oligarchy could not longer be tolerated, and indeed was thoroughly frightened by the results of its policy. The elective Assembly was abolished after an existence of just over two hundred years. To-day there is in Jamaica, as in Kenya, a Legislative Council on which the majority of members are officials nominated by the Governor.

Another result of the insurrection of 1865 was the recalling of Governor Eyre, on the ground that he had used undue severity in its suppression. The episode excited much interest in England, and leading lights of literature expressed themselves strongly on one side or the other. Carlyle, Ruskin and Tennyson held that Eyre had merely done his duty, and had been hardly used; on the other side the economist Mill and the biologist Huxley held that he deserved to be prosecuted as a criminal. Judicial proceedings were privately undertaken against Eyre, but without success. On a small scale the incident recalls the impeachment of Warren Hastings, and the more recent controversy about General Dyer.

To leave the history of Jamaica at the stage of Governor Eyre would suggest depressing conclusions. The last sixty years make a much brighter picture. Not only has the banana come to the rescue of an economically distressed community; the wounds due to the friction between the two elements in the community, White and Black, have wonderfully healed. Perhaps the most convincing evidence

[1] This "Jamaica question" was exactly contemporary with the "Canada question" on which Durham produced his Report. The contrast between the two situations is well worthy of consideration.

BELIZE, BRITISH HONDURAS

Showing the Belize River and the Timber-sheds

of this may be found in the account of an American professor, who contrasts the position in Jamaica very favourably with that in the Southern States of his own country. He writes[1] :—

Whatever the other problems of Jamaica, our present southern race problem, in the forms which we know best, simply does not exist. There is no public controversy about social race equality or superiority. Neither a white man nor a white woman feels insecure in moving freely about among the black population everywhere on the island. The negroes are genuinely loyal to the government. The best of them are aspiring in their own way, and wholesomely self-conscious. Yet there is no doubt whatever that the English white men are the controllers of the destiny of the country. Few as they are, they control it at present with extraordinarily little friction. The solution was found by the simplest means in the world—the simplest, that is, for Englishmen, viz., by English administration and English reticence.

The American professor goes on to describe the justice and the beneficence of English administration. By " English reticence " he means that the Englishman never asserts his superiority but simply proves it by his conduct.

The picture seems almost too complimentary, but one hopes it may be true. Yet there are obviously other reasons for the success of Jamaica in solving the colour problem as compared with the failure in some of the Southern States, and here perhaps is a lesson which has its application elsewhere, for example in Kenya. Jamaica, unlike the Southern States, does not pretend to be a democracy. Its government is no more controlled by the White population than by the Black, but by a Governor, representing the British crown, in whose impartiality both races can believe.

British Honduras and British Guiana

British Honduras is the outcome of a settlement of buccaneers who had retired from business, and made homes on the coast in 1640. Its population to-day is only 50,000.

[1] Professor J. Royce, quoted, with some condensation, from Egerton's *British Colonial Policy in the Twentieth Century*, p. 241.

The colony is almost all forest, intersected with numerous rivers. There are no roads, and movement is accomplished in motor-boats. It produces a fine assortment of commodities,—mahogany, sponges, canned lobster, tortoise-shell and grape-fruit. As elsewhere in the West Indies, negroes form the bulk of the labouring class. It is nearly twice the size of Jamaica.

British Guiana, formerly called Demerara, is a colony that has come in for a good deal of criticism. It is pointed out that it is rather larger than Great Britain, and that the amount of it under cultivation is a strip along the coast scarcely greater in area than the Isle of Wight. True, it is a land of forests, with a hot steamy climate; but so is Malaya. The rubber seeds that have made fortunes in Malaya came from near the frontier of British Guiana. Yet British Guiana does nothing while Malaya is going ahead by leaps and bounds. Its only cultivated product is sugar, and in present conditions its sugar is almost unmarketable. It has lately, however, been given a new constitution, in place of what must have been the stupidest constitution in the world, taken over intact from the Dutch when we annexed the country during the Napoleonic wars.

Yet even British Guiana has one claim to pre-eminence, for it has produced the most valuable postage stamp in the world. "It is a one-cent stamp, locally printed from printer's stock type to meet a temporary lack of the regular issue in February 1856, of which no other example has ever been brought to light. This, the rarest of all postage stamps, was discovered by a schoolboy among some forgotten correspondence in a garret at Georgetown, Demerara, and because of its unprepossessing appearance was promptly passed on to a fellow-collector for a few shillings. It found its way into the world-famous collection of Baron Renotière von Ferrari, and there it remained for over forty years until, on the dispersal of the Ferrari treasures by order of the French custodian of enemy property in 1922 it was acquired by its present owner for the record sum of £7,500."[1]

[1] *The Times*, 2nd April, 1929.

Is it necessary to add that its present owner is neither British Guiana nor the British Museum, but a citizen of the United States, to wit, Mr. Arthur Hind, of Utica, N.Y. ?

The Bermudas

The Bermudas lie several hundred miles north-east of the West Indies, but they may be included in this chapter. This group of small islands, described in Shakespeare's *Tempest* as the " still vex'd Bermoothes," were granted to the Virginia Company in 1612, for they lie on the direct route from England to the old southern colonies. To-day they contain a British naval station, and are a popular resort of American tourists, especially, it is said, since the introduction of Prohibition in the States.

Chapter XIII

FRAGMENTS THAT REMAIN

SCATTERED all over the world are outposts of the British Empire. Some of them are exceedingly important as links in the world-wide scheme, or defences of our communications in time of war; others are mere oddments and curiosities. To describe them all would be impossible. But by taking, in imagination, a somewhat eccentric voyage round the world we shall be able to make a brief inspection of those that matter most.

Gibraltar

Gibraltar is a rocky promontory two and a half miles long, connected with the mainland of Spain by a flat and narrow isthmus. Its sole purpose is as a fortress and a naval base, and the native population is somewhat rigorously restricted. Every day large numbers of work-people come into Gibraltar from a town on the mainland which British sailors call "the Lines," though Spaniards spell and pronounce it rather differently. The non-British inhabitants of the Rock are for the most part not Spaniards, but Italians and Jews. There is also an historic colony of Barbary apes.

Gibraltar was captured in 1704, the year of Blenheim, in the War of the Spanish Succession, when we were trying (unsuccessfully as it turned out) to seat an Austrian Archduke upon the Spanish throne. A dozen years later we offered to give it back provided the Spaniards would desist from their designs upon territory in Italy, but the negotiations fell through. From 1779 to 1783, under Governor Eliott, it stood and survived one of the greatest sieges in modern history. We were at war with our American colonies, and

the French and Spaniards joined them in order to deprive us of some of the territories we had taken from them in the wars of the previous eighty years. So far as Gibraltar was concerned they failed, but we surrendered Minorca.

Malta

A thousand miles east of Gibraltar we come to Malta, a hundred miles from Sicily and two hundred from Africa. Malta is about half the size of the Isle of Wight, and has a long and interesting history going back to prehistoric man, whose buildings are numerous on the island. In the sixteenth century it was granted to the crusading order of the Knights of St. John, who defended it valiantly against the Turks. It was seized by Napoleon on his way to Egypt in 1798, and, as a natural consequence, Nelson captured it on his way back from the Battle of the Nile. Our refusal to surrender it to the Knights after the Treaty of Amiens was the nominal cause of the renewal of war with Napoleon.

The native inhabitants, more than 200,000 in number, are of very mixed race, and speak Phoenician Maltese, which is a dialect of Arabic. The island has had a complicated constitutional history under British rule, and to-day enjoys a system like that prevailing in the Provinces of India. Certain departments are reserved to the Governor, and others are within the control of an elected Assembly. At the moment of writing Malta is in trouble, and consequently conspicuous in the newspapers, for the Roman Catholic Church, to which the native inhabitants of the island belong, is using all its resources to overthrow the government of the British Prime Minister under the new constitution. In view of this fact the constitution has been suspended, and Crown Colony government temporarily restored.

Malta has been the scene of one of the many triumphs of modern medical research. It used to be afflicted with a disease called Maltese fever; this was traced, early in the present century, to the milk of the Maltese goats, and the extirpation of the infected goats brought the scourge to an end.

Cyprus

Cyprus is about as large as Norfolk and Suffolk combined, and of its 300,000 inhabitants about three-quarters are Greeks and most of the remainder Turkish Moslems. It was acquired by Disraeli from the Turks as the reward of his long diplomatic struggle with Russia in defence of Turkey, culminating in the Congress of Berlin, from which he returned bringing "peace with honour" in 1878. It was supposed that it would be valuable as a coaling station on the way to the Suez Canal, but as we secured control of Egypt itself a few years later, Cyprus lost whatever importance it would have had for us in this connection. Its acquisition was also, no doubt, connected in Disraeli's mind with an ambitious scheme for bringing all Asia Minor under some sort of British control, but this scheme was abandoned by Gladstone two years later—whether wisely or not, is a point on which Disraelians and Gladstonians will no doubt continue to differ.[1] Actually, then, Cyprus is of no great importance to the British Empire, but it is impossible to resist the conclusion that the inhabitants have benefited by the substitution of British for Turkish rule. To-day a vigorous party among the Greeks is clamouring for the union of the island with the kingdom of Greece. If Greece was actively desirous to acquire the island, we should probably let her have it; but the statesmen of Greece seem well content that things should remain as they are.

Aden

Passing through the international waterway of the Suez Canal[2] and down the Red Sea, we come to Aden, which was occupied in 1839. Our foreign policy at that date was in a very vigorous mood under the inspiration of Lord Palmerston. It was the year in which we took the lead in suppressing

[1] The reader may find, if he likes, the two views set side by side in my *Disraeli and Gladstone*, p. 208–210.

[2] Though Great Britain holds nearly half the shares, the majority of the Directors of the Suez Canal Company are French.

MALTA : A STREET IN VALETTA

Mehemet Ali of Egypt, when he was on the point of conquering Turkey; the year of our first and most disastrous invasion of Afghanistan; the year of the Chinese War, which gave us Hong Kong. Aden is not one of the most delightful places in the British Empire, for it has a parchingly hot climate. It was, until recently, under the administration of the Governor of Bombay.

Mauritius

Rounding the corner of Africa and turning south for about 1,500 miles we come to Mauritius, 500 miles east of Madagascar, and on the route from the Cape of Good Hope to the East Indies. It is three or four times as large as the Isle of Wight and, when first discovered by the Portuguese, was entirely uninhabited. The Dutch held it for a time and gave it its name, after their Stadholder Maurice of Nassau. Then it passed to the French, whose influence survives in the fact that French is still more widely known than English on the island. We took it from the French in the Napoleonic Wars, not so much because we wanted it ourselves as because, so long as the French retained it, it served as a base for privateers which rendered our communications with India insecure.

To-day the whole island apart from its mountain area is one great sugar plantation, and sugar makes up nine-tenths of its exports. Its chief claim to historical interest is that it was the first colony to experiment in the importation of indentured coolie labour from India. The example was afterwards followed not only in Natal but as far afield as the West Indies. Indentured labour generally brings free immigration in its wake, and Indian "colonies" are to-day to be found scattered all about the tropical and semi-tropical parts of the Empire. This importation of Indians was the result of the search for a substitute for negro slaves. To-day the population of Mauritius is nearly 400,000, of whom more than two-thirds are Indians.

New Guinea

It is unnecessary to visit either India or Australia on this curious voyage, so we sail several thousand miles eastward, along the route followed by the old East Indiamen, and pass through the East Indies to the very large island of New Guinea. The western half of the island belongs to the Dutch, and before the War the eastern half was divided between Great Britain and Germany. After the war the whole of the eastern half was handed over to Australia under a Mandate from the League of Nations. The Papuans and other peoples of New Guinea are very primitive folk whose customs and beliefs have been made the subject of much study by anthropologists. Passenger transport between Australia and New Guinea is chiefly by aeroplane.

Oceania

Eastwards from New Guinea, over an area of many thousands of miles, are an uncountable number of islands, many of which are British possessions. The most important are the Fiji Islands, 250 in number, of which 80 are inhabited. The largest island, Viti Levu, has about the same area as Jamaica or Cyprus. The natives used to be cannibals, but are now, by all accounts, quite delightful people. The islands were annexed in 1874 after repeated requests from the native rulers who found themselves in trouble with their neighbours, and also with the United States who demanded £9,000 for alleged injuries to one of their consuls. In 1878 Indian coolies were imported to work in the sugar plantations, and their presence is said to have had a depressing effect upon the natives, who resent the slight superiority of the Indian coolie, whereas they do not resent the superiority of the White man, which is too unmistakable to involve invidious comparisons.

Further east than Fiji are the Samoa Islands, divided formerly between the United States and Germany. The German Islands are now administered under a mandate by New Zealand. On one of these islands Robert Louis

Stevenson spent the last years of his life. His South Sea stories and his Vailima Letters have made them familiar to many readers.

Further east again, on the outer edge of Oceania and more than half way from Australia to South America, is Pitcairn Island, two square miles in area and two thousand five hundred feet high. Here live something less than two hundred people, whose origin is strange. In 1789 the crew of the warship *Bounty* mutinied against Captain Bligh, afterwards Governor of the convict station in New South Wales. The captain and some officers and men were turned adrift, and the mutineers, numbering twenty-nine, went to Tahiti (now a French possession), where some of them were captured and punished. Eight, however, sailed off again, taking Tahitian women with them, and for twenty years it was supposed they had all been drowned. They and their offspring were, however, discovered in 1808 by an American whaler in Pitcairn Island, and there they remain. They have, it seems, a " parliament " of seven members, and the British government has presented them with a small ship whereby they carry on their import and export trade.

Islands in the Atlantic

Rounding Cape Horn we come to the Falkland Islands, famous as the scene of Sturdee's victory over the German Pacific squadron in the first winter of the Great War. Both in their general character and in their climate these islands resemble the Scottish Hebrides. Attention was first called to them in England by Admiral Anson after his famous voyage round the world during the " War of Jenkin's Ear." Arguing that all future expeditions to the South Seas with a view to invading the monopoly of trade claimed by the Spaniards would run the risk of being nipped in the bud if the vessels had to call for supplies in South America, he suggested that the islands should be occupied as a place where British vessels could take in supplies of food and water. In 1764 they were occupied by France, and ceded to Spain. In ignorance of this fact, however, an English captain landed

on the opposite side of the island in 1765, and claimed them for Great Britain. Spain abandoned her claim to them in 1771. Previous to the arrival of Europeans they were uninhabited. The population is now about 2,000, mostly Scots, engaged in sheep farming. The islands used to be a centre of whale fishing; but the whales have shifted their ground, and the whalers have followed them to South Georgia, a thousand miles further east. Except for its whaling station South Georgia is uninhabited.

Continuing for another fifteen hundred miles along latitude 45° south we come to Bouvet Island. This was an island of which no ordinary person had ever heard until a year or two ago, when it was leased to a Norwegian whaling company, and a member of parliament, anxious that the British Empire should not be too hastily given away, asked a question about it in the House of Commons. Near Bouvet Island the possessor of a good atlas will discover Thompson Island, which has suffered a worse fate. For the opinion now prevails that Thompson Island does not exist, and that Thompson, who thought he had discovered it about a hundred years ago, had only made a rediscovery of Bouvet Island. Thompson Island is presumably the only British possession that has been lost since the Great War.

Turning back north-west a thousand miles from Bouvet we reach Tristan da Cunha, an island which has become famous for its obscurity. A British garrison was established there at the time of Napoleon's imprisonment at St. Helena, in order to prevent attempts at rescue—which seems strange as these two islands are separated by a thousand miles. When the garrison was withdrawn, one William Glass and his wife and family insisted on staying behind, and other population has since accumulated—castaways and deserters from whalers, coloured women from Cape Colony, and so on. They now number 130, and live for the most part on potatoes, clothing themselves in garments made from their own sheep. They have no laws and no alcohol, and are described as "moral, religious, hospitable, well-mannered, industrious, healthy, and long-lived." They have received several

offers of transportation to some less remote home, in South Africa for example, but they have always refused. In recent times their fortunes have become a matter of widespread interest among charitable persons in England. Ships only visit the island about once a year, but, whenever a voyage to Tristan is projected, it is announced in the English press, and many people send out hampers and parcels.

St. Helena was once important as a halting place on the voyage to the Cape, for it lies about half way from Cape Verde to the Cape of Good Hope. English and Dutch struggled for its possession, and it passed permanently into British hands in 1673, one year before we captured the Dutch colony of New York. Since the making of the Suez Canal its importance has declined, but it would have declined in any case, for the big modern liner has no need of a port of call between England and South Africa. Needless to say, it owes its fame to its use as a prison for Napoleon, but the endless controversy as to whether we treated Napoleon as well as he ought to have been treated is hardly part of the history of the British Empire. Napoleon is not the only political prisoner who has pined on St. Helena. Cronje and several thousands of Boer prisoners were sent there during the South African War; also, somewhat earlier, several Zulu chiefs and an ex-sultan of Zanzibar. Among governors of the island may be mentioned Robert Jenkin, famous as the possessor or loser of "Jenkin's ear."

Sailing homeward from St. Helena we pass, after seven hundred miles, the lonely little island of Ascension. It was uninhabited until we placed a garrison there as part of our widespread precautions against the rescue of Napoleon from St. Helena. Ascension also had its importance as a place of call, when ships could keep at sea much shorter voyages than to-day. Its population is only about 140, and its chief product is the sea turtle. These resort to the island early in the year, and are then captured and kept in ponds. The greater number are sent to England and "the Lords of the Admiralty have a right to a certain proportion of them."

Chapter XIV

THE EMPIRE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

(i) THE WAR AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

IN the first chapter of this book we traced in outline the history of the British Empire, from the standpoint of the mother country, from the days of the Elizabethan sea-dogs down to the end of the reign of Queen Victoria. Now, after a series of chapters in which we have travelled all over the world and surveyed all the greater and most of the lesser provinces of the Empire, it remains to take up again the story of the first chapter and say something of the development of the Empire in general during the last thirty years.

The first question that naturally arises is, what preparation did the Empire make for the Great War, and was that preparation adequate? Great Britain supplied to the Allied cause a navy which proved equal to all that was demanded of it, and her standing army, though exceedingly small, was as large a reinforcement on land as France had reckoned on. What of the Empire as a whole?

Imperial Defence was discussed at the Imperial Conference of Prime Ministers of the self-governing Dominions in 1907, and a system of uniform organisation for the forces of the Dominions and of Great Britain was established. Australia and New Zealand adopted universal military training, and invited Lord Kitchener to visit them, and give them the benefit of his advice. The naval problem was more difficult. The mother country would have liked contributions, in money or ships, to the British navy, but this was repugnant to the national feeling of the larger Dominions. Australia built a navy of her own, on the understanding that it should be at

the disposal of the British Admiralty in time of war, and it was an Australian cruiser which hunted down the German *Emden* in the Indian Ocean during the first winter of the war.

When the war came, not only the self-governing Dominions but every community within the Empire rallied with enthusiasm to the common cause, and set to work to render every service within its power. That great fact has now become a commonplace : we take it for granted. It is hard to realize what a thrill and an inspiration it brought to the mother country in the first months of the war. It falsified one of the most confident predictions of the enemy. German writers had declared again and again that the British Empire was a fiction ; that Canada and Australia were independent nations, as indifferent to Great Britain's welfare as was the United States ; that India was only longing for an opportunity to escape from British rule. Nor should we forget that, at an earlier date, some British politicians themselves had doubted. John Morley, a Liberal statesman, writing in 1883, had declared it inconceivable that the Australians should ever take up arms in a European quarrel, and the example he had chosen was the violation of Belgian neutrality ! In 1914 it was not the Australians, but John Morley himself, who failed to respond to the call of Belgium.[1]

This book is not the place to record the war services and sacrifices of the different parts of the Empire. All parts rendered the utmost service where and when it was asked of them. Gallipoli will always be a sacred memory to Australia and New Zealand. The Canadians served on the Western front and are particularly remembered in connection with the assault upon the Vimy Ridge. In South Africa there was, in the first months, a rebellion of a small section of the Dutch, who had not forgotten or forgiven old feuds, but it was easily suppressed by the Union government in which the leading statesmen, Botha and Smuts, were themselves Dutchmen. South African forces conquered German South-west Africa, and a mainly South African and Indian army,

[1] Lord Morley was one of the two Cabinet Ministers who resigned on the eve of the war.

under General Smuts, conquered the greatest of the German colonies, Tanganyika. The four Dominions produced altogether a million troops, and Australia and Canada each suffered heavier losses than the United States. India produced more troops than all the Dominions together, and her soldiers played conspicuous parts in Mesopotamia, Palestine and East Africa.

After the War

During the thirty years before the war many of those in the mother country who cared most about the Empire had looked forward to the establishment of some kind of federal constitution which would bind together Great Britain and the Dominions more closely than before. When the war came, with its impressive demonstration of the loyalty of the Dominions to the common cause, those who had cherished hopes of imperial federation became more confident that they were about to be realized. The result, however, was in many respects the opposite of their expectations. For the Dominions the war was a sort of " coming of age " ; in the pride of their achievements on the battlefields of Europe, they realised that they were indeed nations, each with a great destiny in the world. It became the fashion to discard the old-fashioned word " Empire," with its suggestion of unified control, and to speak instead of " the British Commonwealth of Nations."

The full-grown nationhood of the Dominions was vividly illustrated at the peace conference of Versailles in 1919. Canada demanded separate representation for herself at the Conference. Great Britain acquiesced, and the other Dominions followed Canada's lead.[1] Thus, when the treaty

1 Clemenceau, the aged Prime Minister of France and the chairman of the conference, delighted in chaffing in a friendly way the spokesmen of these new nations. " Bring your savages with you," he said when inviting Mr. Lloyd George to bring the Colonial Premiers to a meeting of the Big Four (i.e. France, Britain, Italy and America). " Mr. 'Ughes," he said to the Australian Prime Minister, " I am told that in early life you were a cannibal." Mr. Hughes replied that this was an exaggeration.

was made, it was signed, on behalf of King George, not only by the British but also by the Dominion ministers of the Crown, and by them submitted to the Dominion parliaments for ratification.

This new status of the Dominions was recognized in the League of Nations. The British Commonwealth contributed not one but six members to the League—" The British Empire " (represented by the Government of Great Britain), the four Dominions, and India.[1] There was at first some jealousy in foreign countries of this over-representation, as it was called, of the British Empire, but these feelings disappeared when it was found that the representatives of the Dominions acted as the spokesmen of genuinely independent nations, and by no means always supported the policy of Great Britain. The best proof of this change of view was given when, in 1928, the Assembly of all the fifty-six members of the League elected Canada as one of its representatives on the Council, or supreme committee, of the League of Nations, of which " the British Empire " (*i.e.* Great Britain) is, as one of the Great Powers, a permanent member.

Would it, then, be true to say that the British Empire had come to an end, so far as the self-governing Dominions were concerned ? Before the war it was recognized that the Dominions, though self-governing in all other respects, accepted implicitly the lead of Great Britain in foreign policy. Now each Dominion claimed the right to pursue its own foreign policy. Canada and the Irish Free State appointed ambassadors at Washington to transact their own foreign policy with the United States. In 1922 there was a threat of war between Great Britain and Turkey. Happily the danger passed away as suddenly as it had arisen, but not before the Canadian Prime Minister had declared that " under our system of responsible government the Canadian Parliament should determine, except in the case of threatened or actual invasion, whether the country should participate

1 The position of India on the League is unique, since India is not a self-governing nation in any sense of the word. Since 1922 a seventh member has been added, the Irish Free State.

in wars in which other nations or other parts of the British Empire may be involved." Clearly an Empire of which one part could decide to be at peace while the rest was at war, was a political organization unknown to previous history.

These problems were discussed in the Imperial Conference of 1926, and the following conclusions were unanimously adopted :—

Nothing would be gained by attempting to lay down a constitution for the British Empire. Its widely scattered parts have very different characteristics, very different histories, and are at different stages of evolution ; while, considered as a whole, it defies classification and bears no real resemblance to any other political organization which now exists or has ever been tried.

There is, however, one most important element in it which, from a strictly constitutional point of view, has now, as regards all vital matters, reached its full development—we refer to the group of self-governing communities composed of Great Britain and the Dominions. Their position and mutual relation may be readily defined. They are *autonomous Communities within theBritish Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any respect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.* . . .

But no account, however accurate, of the negative relations in which Great Britain and the Dominions stand to each other can do more than express a portion of the truth. The British Empire is not founded upon negations. It depends essentially, if not formally, on positive ideals. Free institutions are its life-blood. Free co-operation is its instrument.

There is, in faet, much truth in the view often expressed by the South African statesman, General Smuts, himself one of the principal authors of the Covenant of the League of Nations, that the British Commonwealth of Nations is itself a League of Nations. In the British Commonwealth we find that a group of once insignificant and subordinate colonies have grown to free and equal partnership with their mother

country. In the League of Nations we find a far larger group of entirely independent states, with long records of rivalry and warfare behind them, seeking a better future by means of a free and equal partnership in the promotion of the welfare of all alike. Starting from opposite ends, the members of the League and the members of the British Commonwealth have worked towards the same result. The two organisations are far from being in rivalry with one another, for the members of the smaller group are also loyal members of the greater group, *i.e.* the League of Nations. Indeed the relations existing between the members of the British Commonwealth offer a kind of model of what we hope the relations between all nations will ultimately be.

(ii) THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EMPIRE

British Imperial policy in the nineteenth century was based, it has been said, on four principles : splendid isolation, naval supremacy, manufacturing supremacy, and benevolent trusteeship for backward peoples. It is rather alarming to reflect that all these principles seem to be more or less out of date.

By " splendid isolation " (the phrase is taken from a Victorian statesman's speech) we meant that we were free from entanglement in the affairs of Europe. We could and would intervene, if it became our duty, but we regarded such occasions of duty as altogether exceptional. The British Empire, like America according to the Monroe Doctrine, was a world to itself. The end of our isolation came when, owing to the menace from Germany, we linked our fortunes with those of France and Russia in the *Entente* Treaties of 1904 and 1907. To-day we are intimately associated with the affairs of Europe, both through the League of Nations, and by the obligations we have assumed in various treaties, such as the Treaty of Locarno guaranteeing the security of the frontier between France and Germany.

Our naval supremacy had been an axiom of British policy since the days of Nelson, and indeed before. At one time

it was expressed by the "two-power standard," *i.e.* the British navy was to be as powerful as the two greatest rival navies added together; at another time by the "16 : 10 standard," *i.e.* our navy was to be more than half as strong again as the greatest rival navy; but the principle itself was unchanged. To-day we accept "parity" with the United States, and, in any case, we are doubtful whether, with the development of aeroplanes and submarines, navies will be able much longer to protect our shores and our trade routes as they protected them in the Great War.

Up to near the end of the nineteenth century Great Britain was "the workshop of the world." We got a long start in the race of modern industry, and for a long time we kept our lead. Other nations were content to buy our manufactures. Now they are one and all developing their own manufacturing resources, and competing with us as suppliers of manufactured goods to the undeveloped countries. The decline of our export trade has been the principal cause of the fact that, year after year, more than a million of our workers have been unemployed.

By "benevolent trusteeship" is meant the theory that it was the special mission of the British to train up backward peoples in the arts of civilisation, with the assumption that our "benevolence" would be appreciated. We have now found, at any rate in India and Egypt, that our very success in educating backward peoples has created new problems, far more difficult to deal with than the "backwardness" of earlier days.

We live in a changed and rapidly changing world. It is not within the compass of this book to peer into the future. It only remains to mention one or two lines along which modern statesmen and administrators are working to fit the Empire for that future as it unrolls itself before us.

The most formidable trouble of Great Britain is unemployment. It is improbable that we shall ever recover the lost foreign markets of our exports. Can compensation be found in the development of markets within the Empire?

From the middle of the nineteenth century onwards our

policy of imperial commerce was free trade and "the open door." Both the goods and the shipping of foreign nations were admitted to Great Britain and its colonies[1] on the same terms as goods and shipping from any part of the empire. We adopted this policy partly (beyond a doubt) because we thought it was morally right and partly because we considered that it would pay us to do so; for the Englishman often manages to worship God and Mammon at the same time, in spite of the contemptuous incredulity of foreigners. There is no doubt that this policy of ours was very convenient for foreign traders, particularly the Germans; there is also little doubt that we gained by it at the same time, for our colonies were thereby developed more rapidly than we could have developed them ourselves. We hoped, however, that foreign nations would follow our example and return the compliment by opening the doors of their own colonies in the same way. They did not do so, and they show no signs of doing so, though the League of Nations insists on the policy of the "open door" in all mandated territories. Can we afford, in the changed conditions of the modern world, to offer these facilities to our rivals? Must we not adopt some policy of Imperial Preference?

The beginnings of Imperial Preference were made not by ourselves, but by the Dominions. They had established protection of their own industries against all outsiders, British or foreign. In 1897 Laurier, the Prime Minister of Canada, introduced a system of preferential rates for British imports, under which the duties levied on British goods were to be less by a certain percentage than those levied on foreign goods, and this policy has been steadily extended and adopted by the other Dominions.[2] There is no doubt that, combined with other causes, this policy has contributed to the remarkably large volume of trade between Great Britain and the Dominions as compared with the trade both of Great Britain

[1] Not, of course, the self-governing colonies (Dominions) which after 1859 controlled their own tariffs.

[2] The Canadian Budget of 1930 marks a further considerable increase in the preferential terms of admission allowed to British goods.

and of the Dominions with foreign countries. A third of our exports go to the Empire. Canada does two-fifths of her foreign trade with Great Britain, Australia one half, New Zealand two-thirds and South Africa four-fifths.

It was obviously more difficult for a free trade country like Great Britain to adopt Imperial Preference, for preferences can only be granted where there is a tariff on which to grant them. If foreign goods are admitted free, no advantage can be given to imperial goods over foreign goods. Before the war the British electorate would allow no tampering with its free trade system. The exports of the Dominions were almost entirely foodstuffs and raw materials, and a duty on the importation of foreign foodstuffs and raw materials would tend to increase prices, which was a cost we were not prepared to pay. Since the war, however, a beginning has been made in a policy of Imperial Preference. In part it has consisted in granting preference to Empire produce on commodities not produced at home which were already taxed for purposes of revenue (as distinct from protection of home industries); such commodities are tea, wine, and tobacco. In part it has consisted in granting imperial preferences in connection with the new duties levied since the war for safeguarding British industries. Preferential tariffs have also been introduced in the West Indies, and some of the other small Crown colonies. To this extent the colonial policy of the open door has been abandoned.

Unfortunately, the policy of imperial preference as pursued by the mother country is inevitably entangled in the controversy as to the respective merits of Protection and Free Trade. So long as the British political parties which alternately control the government continue to disagree on this subject, little can be done from this end to stimulate imperial trade by means of tariffs.

Much, however, can be done to encourage a preference of customers for imperial goods apart from preferential tariffs. Business men know that the success of their enterprises depends on thorough and skilful advertisement, and states-

men have come to realize that the methods which promote the success of a private business can also promote the prosperity of the industry of a whole community. Advertisements exhorting the public to "Buy British," have become familiar, together with the systems of marking goods which enable the patriotic purchaser to distinguish British and Imperial from foreign products. In 1926 the British government established an Empire Marketing Board to promote imperial trade both by advertisement and by scientific research. The Annual Report of the Empire Marketing Board for 1930 shows that the previous year established records for the sales of many Empire products in British markets—fruit from all parts of the empire, dairy produce from New Zealand, eggs from many colonies, sugar and wine.

Science and the Empire

There are many who disapprove of Imperial Preference by means of tariffs, and profess to think that Imperial advertisement is at once inefficient and undignified. But no one can fail to approve of scientific research. It accomplishes fresh wonders every day, and its benefits accrue to all the world. The subject of Science and the Empire demands a book to itself, written not by a historian but by a biologist. Here it is only possible to mention very briefly a few out of many scores of examples.

On an earlier page we noticed that the band of wheat cultivation stretching east to west across the Canadian prairies had been rapidly broadening, *i.e.* spreading northwards towards the Arctic in lands once deemed valueless. Indeed these lands were valueless in the nineteenth century, but what has happened? Science has invented new types of wheat, which will ripen more quickly than the old.

Every day taken off the average time needed for wheat to ripen means so many more miles advance for the wheat belt northwards. In the early years of the present century the three Saunders, father and two sons, bred a new wheat

called Marquis. It ripened a week to ten days earlier than Red Fife, which had been for years the staple Canadian strain. Between 1911 and 1916 Marquis superseded Red Fife, and the limit of wheat farming was pushed fifty miles to the northwards. Since then other wheats have been invented which live at an even quicker rate, and wheat has been brought another forty miles nearer to the north pole. There must be a limit to the process; but it has not yet been reached.[1]

If science can promote the desirable crop it can also check the undesirable. Many years ago the formidable cactus called the prickly pear was introduced into Australia as a parkland ornament. It spread like the rabbit, and threatened to become as great a pest, turning every year a thousand square miles of good pastoral land into a wilderness of prickly pear.

It was suggested that the spines should be burnt off and the plants used for feeding cattle; but it was pointed out that the annual increase of prickly pear was considerably greater than the eating capacity of all the stock in Australia! It was eventually decided that the only hope lay in biological control [*i.e.* the introduction of a "natural enemy" of this vegetable]. A well-financed scheme was brought into being in 1920. Entomologists scoured the United States, South America, and the West Indies for enemies of the prickly pear and related kinds of cactus. For these a breeding station belonging to the Australian Commonwealth was set up in Texas, and special methods of transport were devised. Among the dozens of insects tried out, four main kinds have been liberated on a large scale—caterpillars of the moth *cactoblastis* that tunnel through the plant; plant bugs and cochineal insects which suck its juices; and the "red spider" (really a mite) that nibble its surface. These are all confined to prickly pear and actually starve to death on any other plant, so narrowly specialized are their feeding habits. With the aid of these arthropods the progress of this unpleasant vegetable has been checked.[2]

[1] *The Science of Life*, by H. G. Wells, Julian Huxley, and G. P. Wells, page 686.

[2] *Op. cit.* p. 682.

Ultimately, no doubt, the prickly pear will be thus exterminated off the face of Australia.

When the pest is an insect preying on a valuable crop exactly the same methods of biological control can be, and have been, employed. The coconut plantations of Fiji were recently devastated by the caterpillars of a little purple moth, which some ill chance had brought to these islands. Wanted; a parasite which would prey upon the purple moth. It was found in Malaya and brought to Fiji, and the coconut plantations were saved.

The Empire Marketing Board has established an "Insect Zoo" at Farnham Royal, where beneficial parasites are trained to attack noxious insects in every quarter of the world. "In the past year upwards of 100,000 of these useful insects have been bred. The locust of the Syrian desert is no longer safe from the E.M.B., and the tsetse fly in Tanganyika territory must guard itself as best it can against the day of doom that is being prepared for it at home." (Quoted from *The Times* summary of the E.M.B. Report for 1930.)

But the most famous examples of the service of science to the development of the tropics are to be found in the elimination of human diseases such as malaria.

Malaria is said to have been the most destructive of all the diseases of humanity. Many regard it as the principal cause of the decline of Greek and Roman civilization. Under the homely name of ague it was well known in England until the drainage of the marsh lands of the fen-country. The disease was, in fact, supposed to be caused by the vapours or "bad air" (*mala aria*) of the marshes. Actually it was due to a microbe which is injected in the human blood by the bite of a certain kind of mosquito. Eliminate the mosquito and you have eliminated malaria.

A similar story can be told of one of the principal scourges of tropical Africa, sleeping sickness, which is caused by a microbe carried by the pestilent tsetse fly. The task, then, of the colonial biologist is to eliminate the conditions which

make life possible for the tsetse fly, and this task is being actively undertaken in tropical Africa to-day. It need hardly be said that these achievements of tropical medicine, if they benefit the colonizing European, confer even greater benefits on the native populations. The European can choose for himself whether he will go to the tropics ; if he goes, he goes with his eyes open, and can take precautions which in many cases protect him even in fever-stricken areas. The native has hitherto had no choice in the matter ; to him European medical science offers life instead of death.

Another disease now brought under control is West Indian yellow fever, which at one time killed nearly twenty per cent. of the British garrison in Jamaica every year. When Pitt wasted British energies in occupying French West Indian islands in the first years of the war against the French Revolution, the loss of life from yellow fever was greater than that of all the casualties of the Peninsular War. American research has discovered the mosquito which carries the microbe of yellow fever, and the disease is practically extinct except in the wilder parts of Central and South America.

The greatest names in the history of British tropical medicine are perhaps those of Sir Patrick Manson and Sir Ronald Ross, but science is an international not an imperial undertaking. Yet these things should have their place in any history of the Empire. The future of the Empire depends quite as much on the work of the scientist as on the work of the administrator, the trader, or the settler. Governments cannot make scientific discoveries, but they can do much to assist those who make them. Why is the Dutch sugar industry in Java so much more flourishing than our own sugar industry in the West Indies ? There may be more than one reason, but the Dutch government has certainly spent much more money than the British government on research into improved methods of sugar-cane growing.

No doubt the British government is now giving more attention to these matters. A Colonial Agricultural Council

was established in 1927 and a Colonial Medical Research Council in 1928 ; also what is sometimes called the " Colonial Conference proper," to distinguish it from the Imperial Conference of Prime Ministers of the self-governing Dominions, will henceforth meet at regular intervals, its members being the Governors of the various tropical colonies. Through this Conference the home government should be brought into closer contact with the needs of the tropical colonies.

(iii) CONCLUSION

People sometimes ask, what is the good of the Empire? or, what is not at all the same thing, what good is the Empire to the Mother Country? Let us take the second question first. We may put it crudely and say, what does the Empire cost the British tax-payer, and what does he get in return? It is a fair question,though a complete answer would certainly be a very long one.

In direct taxation I suppose the Empire costs us almost nothing at all. We pay the salaries of the officials who work in the Colonial Office at home, but the cost of administration in the territories of the Empire is borne by the native peoples themselves. In India, for example, the great bulk of the revenue of our Indian government is raised by a tax on the land of the country. Each colony has its own system. The self-governing Dominions, it need hardly be said, raise their own revenue.

Then there is the cost of the army and navy, very large items. It is impossible to say how much of these forces we raise to defend ourselves, and how much to defend the Empire. It is obvious, however, that even if we had not an Empire, we should, owing to the industrial revolution, be dependent on overseas trade for our food supplies, and presumably we should need the navy to defend our commerce even though not a single spot on the map outside the British Isles was painted red. As for the army, those parts of it which serve overseas are normally paid for by the country in

which they are stationed, and the British army in India as well as the Indian army, is paid for by India.

Then there are all the wars of the last three hundred years. Who can say, for example, to what extent our participation in the Napoleonic War or the Great War was due to the existence of the Empire? What one can say for certain is that the wars of Empire were held, by those who undertook them, to be worth the cost, not in "glory" but in material rewards. When the English and Dutch went to war for "the fairest of all mistresses, trade," they held that the dowry of the mistress would pay the cost of the courtship.

But those, it will be said, were the days of the mercantile system, when each country excluded others from the trade of its colonies. True, and some countries, such as France, do much the same to-day, and we may be driven to retrace our steps and follow their example. But even without the application of restrictive tariffs, Empire trade is a factor of steadily growing importance. Australia, though situated on the opposite side of the world, and much nearer to the United States than to us, does more trade with us than with any other country. Nigeria, again, does more than half her trade with us. Are these things accidents, entirely unconnected with "the flag"? Of course they are not.

Empire trade is, indeed, a rapidly growing factor, and, with the steady decline of our European markets, has saved us in the last few years from an industrial depression and unemployment far worse than we have actually suffered. In 1870 less than 30 per cent. of our trade was with the Empire; in 1910 less than 40 per cent.; to-day nearly 50 per cent. Moreover it is the trade that suits us best; for the Empire takes our manufactured articles, and sends us raw materials and foodstuffs in return.

These are all material considerations; but the Empire sends us, at need, something else besides goods. As soon as war was declared in 1914 all the self-governing Dominions threw themselves into the struggle as readily as the people at home. The United States is, like Canada, a country of predominantly British race; yet it took the people of the

United States two and a half years to discover that they had a part to play in the Great War. If the United States had done in 1914 what they did in 1917, and what Canada did in 1914, how very different the world would be to-day! How many millions would be alive, who are now dead! And what was the only significant difference between Canada and the United States? Canada was within the Empire, and the United States had broken away from it in anger a hundred and forty years before.

There are many other lines along which answers could be found to the question, what good is the Empire to us? For example, it has given openings for fine careers to thousands of young Englishmen, as in the Indian Civil Service, and the newer Colonial Civil Services in Africa and elsewhere, as well as in commercial life.

The Empire and the World

When we pass back to the other question, " what is the use of the British Empire, not to ourselves but to the world? " we are surely on still firmer ground.

Until a few hundred years ago, a period very recent in terms of history, the human race lived in a number of groups, which had very little communication with one another. There may in some cases have been a little trade, but there was no real human contact of race with race. Europeans in Europe, Indians in India, Chinese in China, Bantus in Africa, Aztecs and Incas in America, all went their own ways unaffected by one another.

Then came the opening of the seas, and, as a consequence, the clash of civilizations. The first contacts were catastrophic; the kingdoms of the Aztecs and the Incas were blotted out in oceans of blood by the conquering Spaniard. Worse perhaps was the first effects of the contact of Europe and Africa—three hundred years, and more, of slave trading. In more modern times, the story of the relations between the British colonists of the United States and the American Indians does not make pleasant reading. It is an expurgated page in most American histories.

Meanwhile the British Empire had begun to exist. It was perhaps very fortunate that it did not assume large dimensions until its policy had come to be powerfully controlled by the great humanitarian movement of the latter end of the eighteenth century, which sent out the missionaries and abolished the slave trade. For the last hundred years the British Empire has, in spite of many mistakes and backslidings, been occupied not in destroying, but in preserving and educating, the non-European peoples.

The world to-day is all one. Its various peoples have got to learn to get on with one another, and, since all are of the same species, the only tolerable relationship in the long run is one of equality. It does nothing but harm to pretend that to-day an equality exists where in fact there is nothing of the kind. That equality is the goal of the future, and in this process of levelling-up the civilizations of the many branches of the human family, the British Empire is playing a greater part than any other institution in the world.

APPENDIX

THE MANDATES OF IRAQ AND PALESTINE

WHEN the Great War ended, the question arose what was to be done with the German colonies, and the provinces of the Turkish Empire in which the Turk had ruled as an alien conqueror. Mere annexation of the spoils of victory by the victorious powers was rightly thought an unworthy sequel to a war which, it was hoped, would " end war " for ever. On the other hand, none of these territories was in a position to stand alone in entire independence ; in fact the conquering armies of the Allies had inevitably brought with them, to all these territories, a provisional system of government. It remained to regularize these provisional governments, and to subject them to some form of international control by the League of Nations. Hence the system of Mandates, of which something has already been said (p. 296).

The mandated territories were not, however, all of the same kind. The German colonies were inhabited by primitive peoples which would require European assistance and control for an indefinite period. These territories (grouped as Class B and Class C mandates) have become, to all intents and purposes, parts of the empires of the European powers to which they have been mandated.[1] The Turkish provinces (Class A mandates), with their more advanced Arab populations, were territories whose independence " can be provisionally recognised, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance until they are able to stand alone." Under these terms Syria was entrusted to France, and Iraq and Palestine to Great Britain.

[1] Class B mandates cover territories mandated to Great Britain and France ; Class C mandates cover territories mandated under slightly different conditions to the Dominions of South Africa, Australia and New Zealand.

Iraq

Iraq, the ancient Mesopotamia, has an area slightly larger than the British Isles, and a population of close on three millions. The great bulk of the population are Moslem Arabs, apportioned almost equally between the two rival sects, Sunni and Shiah, which have divided the Moslem world for more than a thousand years. The country consists of the three vilayets, or provinces, of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul. Basra (the Biblical Bosrah) is the seaport of the country, fifty miles up the river which combines the streams of Tigris and Euphrates ; Baghdad, once the capital of the Caliph of the Arabian Nights, is the successor of Babylon in the lower Mesopotamian plain ; Mosul is the successor of Nineveh. The vilayet of Mosul was only secured as part of Iraq after prolonged and obstinate negotiations with Turkey.

The Turkish government of Iraq had long been inefficient and unpopular. The last remnants of it were swept away by the advancing British armies, and before the war was over Sir Percy Cox, the British Civil Commissioner, had already established order and tranquillity such as the land had not known for centuries. As soon as the mandate was granted it became necessary to convert an emergency British government into a native government with British " advice and assistance." In 1920 the Emir Feisal was elected king by a vote of the people. He is a lineal descendent of Mahomet, and had won renown as the chieftain and colleague of Colonel Lawrence in the famous " revolt in the desert " of 1918. He is assisted by a popularly elected Iraqi parliament. A treaty was negotiated between Iraq and Great Britain under which the mandatory system is to continue for twenty-five years, or until Iraq is admitted as a member of the League of Nations. It seems likely that the latter event will occur long before the twenty-five years period is concluded. In that event the mandate will terminate, and any further " advice and assistance " rendered by Great Britain will be, presumably, of an unofficial character.

" In broad outline the existing organisation of the administration is as follows :—With the exception of purely technical officers charged by the Iraq government with

executive functions, there is no British official who issues an executive order. The King and his Council are responsible for the government of the country, and their decisions are carried out by native officials. A British adviser, with one or more assistants, is attached to each ministry, while in the provinces British inspectors maintain a close touch with local affairs, on which they report to the Adviser and the Minister of the Interior. The High Commissioner is in receipt of their periodical reports to the Ministry, as well as of the decisions of the Council, on which he offers his comments or advice, or, if necessary, in matters which touch British or other foreign interests, his objections. He is also charged with the duty of conducting foreign relations." [1]

The same writer adds :—" An advisory position is no easy task. It calls for a constant exercise of tact, forbearance and self-denial, to say nothing of a capacity for realizing that infant states will insist on running before they can walk and that, every adage to the contrary notwithstanding, they must within the limits of safety be allowed to do so. The eager advance may entail many a tumble and many an unostentatious resetting of tottering feet, such assistance to be rendered in a manner which will enable the stumbler to regain poise without a diminution of self-respect." Still, the experiment has so far been strikingly and increasingly successful. The Iraqi Arabs are attractive folk, and Iraq has been fortunate in securing the services of many admirable Englishmen who came to their work well trained by experience in Indian or African administration. Order is well maintained, and economic progress, such as the improvement of the port of Basra by dredging operations, is in full swing.

The limiting factor which may delay the full independence of the country is the necessity of defence, from Turkey on the north and the wild tribesmen of the Hejaz on the south. At present the native forces would be quite insufficient for this purpose, and the country is defended by a small British garrison of which the principal element is the air force. The British air force is exceedingly popular ; for a long time it provided a fortnightly mail service to Egypt and Europe, and, like the air services of Australia, has often saved the

[1] Quoted from an article in the *Round Table*, Dec. 1923.

lives of members of remote communities by rendering prompt medical aid.

If present arrangements hold good, the Iraq mandate will terminate in 1932, and Iraq will then be admitted as a member of the League of Nations. Terms have already been agreed of the treaty which will, after those events, regulate the relations between Iraq and Great Britain.

Palestine

The problem of the Palestine mandate is much more difficult; pessimists say it is insoluble. In that small country, not much larger than Wales, we have undertaken not only to render " advice and assistance " to a native population of 600,000 Arabs, but to secure that the country shall be a " national home " for the Jews. It is not surprising that the Arabs regard the Jewish immigrants with dislike and ourselves, as their protectors, with deep suspicion.

The Zionist movement, as it is called, has a very long history behind it. It finds its first expression in the cry of the psalmist :—" By the waters of Babylon we sat down and wept, when we remembered thee, O Zion," and the same longing for " home " recurs again and again in the writings of the persecuted Jews of the middle ages. In its modern form Zionism dates from the publication of a book called *The Jewish State*, by Theodor Herzl, in 1896. At that time there was a great deal of anti-Jewish activity in several European countries ; in France, for example, the notorious Dreyfus case, in which a Jewish officer was convicted of treasonable offences after a most inadequate trial, had aroused the attention of a very wide public. Herzl advocated the founding of a Jewish state in Palestine under the control of the Sultan of Turkey, and various prominent Jewish families, such as the Rothschilds, interested themselves in the scheme. Jewish emigration to Palestine had been in progress for many years, and now secured increased financial support. Joseph Chamberlain interested himself in the Zionist movement, and offered the Jews the then uninhabited highlands of Kenya, which had just been opened up by the Uganda railway ! But Jewish sentiment was set not on Nairobi but Jerusalem.

The war, and the prospective conquest of Palestine by the British and Indian forces under Allenby, altered the whole

situation. The Zionists approached the British government and in November 1917 Mr. Balfour, then Foreign Secretary, announced that "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine." On these terms a mandate for Palestine was granted to Great Britain after the conclusion of the war. The first British High Commissioner was Sir Herbert Samuel, himself a Jew, and formerly a member of Mr. Asquith's cabinet. His successor was Lord Plumer, one of the most distinguished of the British commanders in the war.

The Jewish community in Palestine numbered nearly 100,000 in 1914; it now numbers over 150,000. About 100,000 have emigrated to Palestine since the war, but many of the emigrants returned, being dissatisfied with the conditions. It looks as if the Jews will continue to constitute less than a quarter of the population, but their industry and enterprise, and the financial support behind them, has secured for them a virtual monopoly of the many industrial enterprises that have been set on foot in the country since the war. By these enterprises the Arabs cannot fail to profit. Good roads, motor transport, and electric light are boons to all alike. There is, if human beings were merely rational, no reason why Jew and Arab should not live happily side by side. But human beings are not merely rational, especially when religious factors come into play. Jerusalem is a holy place in the eyes of Moslems as well as in the eyes of Jews, and terrible riots have arisen out of such matters as the rival claims of Jews and Arabs to the "Wailing Wall."

According to the theoretical definition of an "A" Mandate the duty of the Mandatory Power is "to render administrative advice and assistance" to the native "Administration." In Iraq this theory works well enough for it squares with the facts; but nothing could be more remote from the facts of the situation in Palestine. Here are two communities, Arabs and Jews, which refuse to co-operate with one another; the Arab majority are not parties to the Balfour Declaration and are as far as possible from regarding their country as a "National Home" for the Jews.

There is no "native administration" for us to advise. In fact we are administering the country ourselves. How the Zionist experiment will ultimately work out, no one can say; the latest news (1930) is that further Jewish labour immigration is for the present forbidden. This at least is plain; that in accepting the Palestine mandate we have undertaken a task as difficult and delicate as has ever fallen to the lot of our much-adventuring nation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[This does not claim to be a list of all the best books, but simply a list of some of the good books in which the reader could pursue the study of the principal subjects briefly surveyed in my own volume.]

GENERAL

BERTRAM, SIR A. *The Colonial Service.* (Cambridge, 1930, 7/6.)
Conditions of administration in the tropical colonies and protectorates.

CURTIS, LIONEL. *The Commonwealth of Nations.* (Macmillan, 1915, 12/6.)
British Colonial Policy down to 1783, with excellent studies of the Scottish and Irish problems.

DEMANGEON, A. *The British Empire.* (Harrap, 1925, 7/6.)
A descriptive and critical survey by a Frenchman.

EGERTON, H. E. *Short History of British Colonial Policy.* (Methuen, 7th edition, 10/6.)
The standard book on the subject.

HALL, H. D. *The British Commonwealth of Nations: a Study of Past and Future Development.* (Methuen, 1921, 10/6.)
By an Australian; a study of the relations of Mother Country and Dominions.

KNOWLES, L. C. A. *The Economic Development of the British Overseas Empire* 1763–1914. (Routledge, 1924, 10/6.)
The best book on the economic side; deals with the "dependent" provinces only.

LUCAS, SIR C. P. *The British Empire.* (Macmillan, 1917, *3/6.*)
Six lectures delivered at the Working Men's College.

MUIR, RAMSAY. *A Short History of the British Commonwealth.* 2 vols. (Philip, 1922, 30/–.)
A general history both of Great Britain and of the British Empire.

POLLARD, A. F. (Editor). *The British Empire* (published by the League of Empire, 1909).

Chapters by various authors on the various provinces; useful for those provinces for which no convenient special history is available.

WILLIAMSON, J. A. *A Short History of British Expansion.* (Macmillan, 1922, 25/–.)
A good book, treating the subject as a whole.

ZIMMERN, A. *The Third British Empire.* (Oxford, 1927, 6/–.)
Four Lectures on the post-war situation.

CANADA

BORDEN, SIR R. *Canada in the Commonwealth.* (Oxford, 1929, 10/–.)

BRADLEY, A. G. *Canada.* (Home Univ. Lib., 1912, 2/6.)

COUPLAND, R. *The Quebec Act.* (Oxford, 1925, 10/6.)

MORISON, J. L. *The Eighth Earl of Elgin.* (Hodder & Stoughton, 1929, 15/–.)

NEWBIGIN, M. I. *Canada: The Great River, the Lands and the Men.* (Christophers, 1926, 12/6.)

WRONG, E. M. *Charles Buller and Responsible Government.* (Oxford, 1926, 15/–.)

AUSTRALIA

BROWNE, G. S. *Australia.* (Nelson, 1929, 5/–.)

JOSE, A. W. *History of Australasia from the Earliest Times to the Present Day.* (Angus & Robertson (Sydney), 1927, *4/6.*)

WILKINSON, H. L. *The World's Population Problems and a White Australia.* (King, 1930, 18/–.)

NEW ZEALAND

BUICK, T. L. *The Treaty of Waitangi.* (Whitcombe & Tombs, 17/6.)

REEVES, W. P. *The Long White Cloud.* (Allen & Unwin, 1924, 16/–.)

SOUTH AFRICA

BRYCE, SIR J. *Impressions of South Africa.* (Macmillan, 1897, 12/6.)

MACMILLAN, W. M. *The Cape Colour Question.* (Faber, 1927, 21/–.)

—— *Complex South Africa.* (Faber, 12/6.)

WALKER, E. A. *A History of South Africa.* (Longmans, 1928, 12/6.)
WILLIAMS, B. *Cecil Rhodes.* (Constable, 1921, 15/–.)

INDIA

The Report of the Simon Commission, Vol. I. (H.M. Stationery Office, 1930, 3/–.)
CHIROL, SIR V. *India Old and New.* (Macmillan, 1921, 10/6.)
LAWRENCE, SIR W. *The India we served.* (Cassell, 1928, 25/–.)
LYALL, SIR A. *The Rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in India.* (Murray, 1910, 10/6.)
PAUL, K. T. *The British Connexion with India.* (S.C.M., 1927, 5/–.)
WOOLACOTT, J. E. *India on Trial.* (Macmillan, 1929, 12/6.)

EGYPT

CHIROL, SIR V. *The Egyptian Problem.* (Macmillan, 1920, 7/6.)
CROMER, EARL OF. *Modern Egypt.* 2 vols. (Macmillan, 1911, 24/–.)

THE FAR EAST

COUPLAND, R. *Raffles* 1781–1826. (Oxford, 1926, 6/–.)
LUCAS, SIR C. P. *Historical Geography of the British Colonies, Vol. I. The Mediterranean and Eastern Colonies,* revised by R. E. Stubbs. (Oxford, 1906, 6/6.)
[N.B.—This excellent collection of volumes by various writers, under Sir Charles Lucas's direction, covers the whole Empire.]
SWETTENHAM, SIR F. *British Malaya.* (Lane, 1906, 12/6, reissued with supplementary chapter, 1928.)

TROPICAL AFRICA

JOHNSTON, SIR H. H. *The Opening up of Africa.* (Home Univ. Lib., 1911, 2/6.)
LUCAS, SIR C. P. *The Partition and Colonisation of Africa.* (Oxford, 1922, 12/6.)

LUGARD, SIR F. D. *The Dual Mandate in British Africa.* (Blackwood, 1923, 42/–; a new and cheaper edition is promised.)
Report of the Hilton Young Commission: summarized under the title of "East Africa in Transition" (S.C.M., 1929, 1/–.)

THE WEST INDIES

ASPINALL, A. E. *The British West Indies.* (Pitman, 8/6.)
GARDNER, W. J. *History of Jamaica.* (Fisher Unwin, 1909.)

¶ Except where printed in italics, the above prices are net.

INDEX

Abbas, Khedive, 273
Abyssinia, 283
Acadia, 84, 85
Achimota (Gold Coast), 285
Adams, W. (Japan), 25
Aden, 308
Afghanistan, 220–222, 309
Africa (Royal) Co., 35, 57
Africa, Tropical, 63, 70, 79, 278–298
Africa, *see* East, West, South Africa
Agricultural Organisation Society (Ireland), 211
Agriculture (Indian), 229
Albert, Prince Consort, 147, 267
Albuquerque, 21
American War of Independence, 48–51, 280
Amritsar, 252
Anglo-American War (1812), 95–97
Anson, Adm., 311
Arabi Pasha, 272
Aristotle, 162
Ascension Is., 313
Ashanti, 284
Asquith, H. H. (Lord Oxford) on India, 248
Assouan dam, 273
Australia, 52, 59, 68, 113-141, 314, 342

Balboa, 21
Balfour Declaration (Zionism), 335
Ballarat, 132
Baltimore, 28, 110
Banks, Sir J., 124
Banta peoples, 158–163, 187–193, 196, 280–288
Barbados, 300
Bass (explorer), 131
Basutoland, 161
Bechuanaland, 177
Bedchamber question, 302
Bengal, Partition of, 245
Bentham, J., 64
Bentinck, Lord W., 237
Berlin, Treaty of (1585), 282
Bermudas, 305
Besant, Mrs., 249, 261, 262
Bismarck, 69
Blackfellows (Australia), 118
Borden, S. R., 108
Botany Bay, 124
Botha, Gen., 183, 184
Bounty, Mutiny of the, 311
Bouvet Is., 312
Brahmanism, 227
Brand, Sir J., 172
British Columbia, 89, 90
Brooke, Rajah, 265
Brougham, Lord, 64
Buenos Aires, 165
Buller, C., 97
Burke, 51, 55, 73
Burma, 223, 226
Bushmen (African), 158

Cabot, J., 22
Canada, 45–47, 48, 52, 66, 67, 82–109, 315, 317, 321, 323
Canadian Pacific Railway, 105, 106
Canterbury Lamb, 142
Canton, 266
Cape boys, 158
Cape Colony, 52, 59, 172 (*see* also South Africa)
Cape Dutch, 164 *et seq.*
Cape Town, 21, 40
Carleton, Sir G., 93, 94, 95
Cartier, J., 45
Casement, Sir R., 211
Caste, 226
Castlereagh's American treaty, 97
Cetewayo, 70, 160, 173
Ceylon, 259

Chamberlain, J., 70, 179, 282, 293, 334
Champlain, 45, 84
Charles I, 29, 34, 85
Charles II, 29, 35, 36, 38, 41, 57
Chartered Companies, 30–32, 198, 265, 286, 292
Child, Sir J., 42
China, 20, 266
Chinese in Malaya, 263
Clemenceau, 316
Clive, 53, 54
Cobden, 65
Colbert, 36
Colonial Committee of Privy Council, 36, 49, 57
Colonial Reformers, 65, 66
Colonisation, motives in seventeenth century, 28, 33
Columbus, 21
Congo, 21
Congo Free State, 282
Cook, Captain, 90, 123, 144
Cosgrave, President, 215, 216
Cotton (Indian), 229, 230
Cox, Sir P., 332
Cromer, Lord, 270–273
Cromwell, 33, 35, 300
Curzon, Lord, 244, 245
Cyprus, 308

Dalhousie, Lord, 232, 238
Dampier, 123
Darien fiasco, 43
Darwin, C., 68
Defoe, 300
Democracy, 61, 70, 134, 196
De Valera, 214, 216
De Wet, 183
Diaz, B., 21
Disraeli, 63, 271, 308
District Officers (colonial service), 288
Dominion status, definition of (1926), 318
Drake, Sir F., 20, 24, 25
Dufferin, Lord, 243
D'Urban, Sir B., 168
Durham Report, 66, 97, 99, 238
Dutch wars, 29, 41
Dyarchy, 250, 256, 307
Dyer, Gen., 252

East Africa, 289–298
East India Company, 24, 29, 30, 40–42, 53, 164
East India Company (Dutch), 32, 40, 41, 56
East India Company (French), 32, 41, 42, 53
East Indies, 22, 56, 264, 265
Easter Week rebellion, 212
Egypt, 79, 269–277
El Dorado, 20, 22, 284
Elgin, Lord, 67, 101, 240
Elizabeth and colonisation, 26
Emigration, 34, 60, 97, 108, 128, 129, 135, 141, 166
Empire, classification of provinces, 77–80
" Empire Free Trade," 71, 72, 321, 322, 328
Empire Marketing Board, 323, 325
" Enumerated articles," 37
Exploitation, of Colonies, 279
Eyre, Governor, 131, 302

Falkland Is., 311
Federation, American, 51
,, Australian, 136, 138
,, Canadian, 103, 104
,, Imperial, 50, 71, 316
,, Indian, 256
,, South African, 185
Feisal, King, 332
Fiji Is., 311, 325
Francis, P., 55
Franklin, B., 51
Free Trade, 52, 64, 102
French Canadians, 87, 92, 93, 98
Frere, Sir B., 173
Frobisher, 25

Gama, Vasco da, 21, 163
Gambia, 59, 283, 284
Gandhi, 195, 248, 251–257
George III, 50, 125
Gibraltar, 306
Gilbert, Sir H., 26
Gladstone, W. E., 174, 199, 209, 271, 290
Gold Coast, 20, 23, 57, 59, 284, 285
Gold-mining, 91, 121, 131, 132, 150, 174, 284
Grant, Sir J. P., 301
Grattan, H., 208

Great War, The, 108, 140, 181, 248, 274, 311, 314–316, 332
Grenfell, Sir W., 112
Grenville, G., 49
Grenville, Sir R., 26
Grey, Lord (Col. Sec.), 66, 99, 129, 130, 136, 146, 170
Grey, Sir G., 145, 146, 149, 170
Griffith, A., 211, 214
Guiana, British, 304

Hakluyt, 34
Hastings, W., 54, 55, 236, 241
Hawkins, J., 23, 25
Henry II, 203
Henry V, 19, 20
Henry VIII and the Navy, 23
Henry the Navigator, 19, 20
Hertzog, Gen., 187
Herzl, J., 334
Hicks-Beach, Sir M. (Lord St. Aldwyn), 134
Hilton Young Commission, 295, 296
Hinduism, 225
Home Rule Bills (Ireland), 209
Honduras, British, 303
Hong Kong, 267, 268
Hottentots, 158
Hudson Bay Company, 25, 106

Ilbert Bill, The, 243
Imperial Conferences, 72, 196, 202, 318
Imperialism, Modern, 63, 68, 69
India, 24, 29, 30, 40–42, 53–56, 78, 81, 219–258, 317
Indian Army, 222, 328
Indian Civil Service, 233, 234
Indian Mutiny, 237, 239, 240
Indian National Congress, 237, 243, 249
Indian States, 231, 232, 257
Indians in Africa, 188, 193, 194, 293
Indians, American, 96
Industrial Revolution, 60, 61
Iraq, 331–334
Ireland, 202–218
Irish Free State, 214–218, 317
Islam, 19, 21 (*see* also Mohammedans)

Jamaica, 33, 81, 301–303, 326
James I, 85
James II, 38, 42, 57, 206
Jameson, Dr., 177, 185
Jameson Raid, The, 177, 178
Japan, 25, 137
Java, 56, 262, 264, 326
Jenkin, R., 313
Jenkinson (Muscovy Company), 24

Kaffirs, 158–163, 187–193, 196
Kaffir Wars, 168
Kenya, 157, 292–296, 303, 334
Khama, 160
Khartum, 270
Khilafat movement, 253
Khyber Pass, 220
Kimberley, 172, 199
Kitchener, Lord, 182, 198, 290, 314
Klondyke, 91
Kruger, 175, 176, 194

Labour parties in Australia, 136, 138, 139
Labrador, 22, 25, 111
Ladysmith, 182
Lagos, 285
Lancaster, Sir J., 24
La Salle, 45
Laurier, Sir W., 108, 321
League of Nations, 317, 318, 319
Livingstone, D., 68, 281, 297
Lo Bengula, 177, 199
Lok, J., 23
Louis XIV, 42, 270
Louisburg, 46, 85
Lowe, R., 134
Lugard, Lord, 278, 286, 288, 292

Macaulay, Lord, 49, 237
Macdonald, Sir J., 104, 107
MacDonald, J. R., 247
Macquarie, Gov., 125,
Magellan, 22
Mahdi, The, 290
Mahrattas, The, 56, 221
Majuba, 174
Malacca, 263
Malaria, 325
Malaya, 262–264
Malta, 307
Mandates, 296, 330
Maoris, The, 143–145, 148, 190
Maryland, 28, 38
Matabili, 160, 177, 199
Mauritius, 193, 309
Mehemet Ali, 270, 290, 309
Melbourne, Lord, 66
Mercantile system, The, 28, 36–39, 48, 203

Merchant Adventurers, The, 23, 24
Milner, Lord, 179, 185, 275
Milner-Zaghlul Agreement, The, 276
Milton, J., 41, 175
Missionary policy, 58, 61, 63, 64, 68, 144, 166, 235, 291
Mogul dynasty, The, 221
Mohammedans in India, 221, 247, 253
Monsoon (Indian), 224
Montagu-Chelmsford Report, 248, 254
Montreal, 83, 86
Moplah rebellion, The, 253
Morgan, H., 300
Morley, J., 245, 315
Morley-Minto Reforms, 246
Morocco, 69, 247
Moshesh, 161
Mullah, The Mad, 297
Muscovy Company, The, 24

Natal, 169, 193
Naval supremacy, 20, 23, 53, 319, 320
Navigation, Modern, 19
Navigation Acts, 36, 64, 102
New Brunswick, 86
New England, 28, 38, 39
Newfoundland, 22, 105, 109–112
New Guinea, 137, 310
New South Wales, 124–130
New York, 30
New Zealand, 62, 64, 123, 142–151, 264, 314
Nigeria, 81, 278, 285–289
Nile irrigation, 273, 291
North's Regulating Act, 54
North Borneo, 265
North-east passage, 24
North-west frontier (India), 220–222
North-west passage, 25
Nova Scotia, 84–86, 105
Nyasaland, 297

O'Connell, D., 209
Oil products, 61, 63, 281, 284, 289
Ontario, 87, 94
Open door, Policy of, 282, 321
Orange Free State, 170, 172, 173, 185
Otago, 148
Ox-waggon, S. African, 155

Palestine, 334–336
Papineau, 98
Paraguay, 144
Parkes, Sir H., 138
Parnell, C. S., 209
Peace River, 89
Penn, W., 35
Pennsylvania, 35, 36
Philosophic Radicals, 64, 65
Pilgrim Fathers, 28
Pitcairn Is., 311
Pitt, W. (elder), 47, 93, 110
Pitt, W. (younger), 34, 52, 56, 90, 95, 326
Polo Marco, 20, 24
Population, Growth of, 59, 60
Population of the Empire, 76
Port Elizabeth, 166
Portuguese Empire, The, 19–21, 40, 153, 260
Poyning's Act, 205, 208
Prairie provinces (Canada), 88, 105, 106
Prickly pear (Australia), 324
Prince Edward Is., 86

Quebec, 45, 47, 83, 86
Quebec Act., The, 93
Queensland, 120, 131, 132, 137

Rabbits (Australia), 119
Raffles, Sir S., 56, 57, 263, 264
Raleigh, Sir W., 26, 33, 34
Rand, The, 175, 176, 192
Reciprocity (Canada), 103, 108
Redmond, J., 210–212
Reeves, Sir W. P., 151
Referendum (Australia), 140
Religious refugees, 28, 35, 46
Reserved Questions (Egypt), 277
Rhodes, C., 46, 176–178, 198, 199
Rhodesia, N., 201, 297
Rhodesia, S., 198–201
Riels rebellions, 106
Roberts, Lord, 182
Roe, Sir T., 40
Rowlatt Acts, 250
Russell, Lord J., 66, 302

St. Helena, 313
St. Kitts, 300
St. Lawrence River, 83, 86, 92, 123
Sand River Convention, 170

Sarawak, 265
Science in empire development, 287, 307, 323–327
Scotland, Act of Union, 43
Scots in the Empire, 43, 98, 105, 107, 148, 262, 285, 297, 312
Seddon, Sir R., 151
Selborne, Lord, 185
Self-government within the Empire, 62, 66, 67, 74, 80, 93, 100, 127, 130, 148, 172, 294, 301, 307
Seven Years War, 47, 53, 299
Shakespeare, 20, 305
Shanghai, 266
Shannon Scheme, 217
Sheep-farming in Australia, 120, 124, 125
Sierra Leone, 284
Simon Commission, The, 255, 256
Singapore, 57, 263
Sinn Fein, 211–218
Slavery, Abolition of, 64, 167, 299
Slave-Trade, The, 23–25, 35, 57, 58, 273, 284
Sleeping sickness, 325
Smith, Adam, 52
Smith, J., 33
Smuts, Gen., 183, 184, 187, 196, 316, 318
Soap, 61
Somaliland, 297, 298
South Africa, 46, 62, 85, 152–201, 315
South African War, 73, 180–184
South Australia, 133, 146
" Splendid isolation," 319
Stack, Sir Lee, 276
Stamp Act, The, 49, 251
Stanley, Sir H. M., 281, 291
Stephen, Sir J., 64, 167
Straits Settlements, The, 263
Strongbow, Earl of Leinster, 203
Sturt, Australian explorer, 131
Sudan, The, 290, 291
Suez Canal, The, 270, 308
Sugar, 60, 64, 120, 154, 193, 300, 309, 326

Tanganyika, 296
Tasman, 334
Tasmania, 123, 127, 133
Tata Company, 231
Thompson Is., 312
Tilak, 244
Tobacco, 34, 154
Tobago, 300
Toronto (ill.), 46
Transportation, 35, 52, 67, 68, 124, 129
Trek, The Great, 168
Trinidad, 300
Tristan da Cunha, 312
Tsetse fly, The, 325, 326

Uganda, 291, 292
Ulster, 206, 213, 215
United Empire Loyalists, 52, 85, 94, 124
United States, 58, 108, 109, 157, 283, 305
Utrecht, Treaty of, 27, 57, 85, 110

Vancouver, 90, 91
Vergennes, 48
Victoria, Queen, 63, 70
Victoria (Australia), 130, 132, 134, 136

Wafd, The (Egypt), 276, 277
Waitangi, Treaty of, 145
Wakefield, E. G., 66, 99, 128, 129, 144
Washington, G., 51
Wei-hai-wei, 266
Wellesley, Lord, 56
Wentworth, W. C., 127
Wesley, J., 47, 58
West Africa, 20, 28, 57, 283–289
West Indies, 33, 39, 62, 298–305, 326
Western Australia, 128, 129, 132
Wheat (Canadian), 88, 91, 323
White Australia policy, 137, 138, 141
Wilberforce, W., 57, 284
William III, 41, 43
Winnipeg, 88
Wolfe, Gen., 47, 64
Wolseley, Lord, 106, 271
Wyndham, T., 23

Zaghlul Pasha, 275, 276
Zanzibar, 291, 292, 296
Zionism, 334
Zulus, 159, 160, 172

DATE DUE
DATE DE RETOUR

DEC 1 2 2002
DEC 0 3 2003
DEC 0 2 2003

CARR McLEAN
38-296



DA 16 .S6
Somervell, David Churchil
The British empire.
010101 000
0 1163 0218511 5
TRENT UNIVERSITY

DA16 .S6
Somervell, David Churchill.
The British empire.
DATE
ISSUED TO
006598

HE B